BRAHMAN

THE SUPREME BEING IN BRAHMASŪTRAS

Dr. Raghavendra Katti

Sri Vyasamadhva Samshodhana Pratishtana

Brahman, The Supreme Being, in Brahmasūtras

by:

Dr. Raghavendra Katti

Śrī Vyāsa Madhva Saṃśodhana Pratiṣṭhāna
'Pājaka', 89/24, 3rd Cross, Mount Joy Extension,
Hanumanthanagar, Bangalore - 560019.

Brahman, The Supreme Being, in Brahmasūtras - by Dr. Raghavendra Krishnacharya Katti, B.Sc., Grad. I.E.T.E., M.M.S., M.A. (Sanskrit), Ph.D., Divisional Engineer Telephones (Retd.), Dept. of Telecommunications, Govt. of India. Published by Shri Vyasamadhwa Samshodhana Pratishthana, 89/24, III Cross, Mount Joy Extension, Hanumanthanagar, Bangalore - 560 019 ; Pp.: 608 (xxiv + 576)

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ISBN NO. 978-93-81826-12-6

First Edition : 2013

Price : Rs.600/-
$ 50/- (Overseas)

Layout by : Navin Printers, Near Ruparel College, Matunga Road West, Mumbai - 400 016.
Tel. : 022-2430 8316

Printed at : Vagartha, N.R. Colony, Bangalore
Tel. 080-22427677

॥ श्रीदिग्विजयरामो विजयते ॥

जगद्गुरुश्रीमन्मध्वाचार्यमूलमहासंस्थानम्

श्री उत्तरादिमठः

श्री श्री सत्यात्मतीर्थानां अनुग्रहसन्देशः

विप्र-स्थितनां वि-प्रस्थितानां सर्ववाचां विनिर्णयाय कवीनां विप्रतमेन भगवता व्यासेन विरचितानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि । तेषां भावः भगवद्व्याससम्मतः, नाना श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यविरचितभाष्यं दुरधिगमः ।

महदिदं भाग्यं माध्वानाम् यत् तादृशं भाष्यम् अध्ययनाय उपलब्धमिति । श्रीमज्जयतीर्थविरचितया तत्त्वप्रकाशिकया तथाऽनैकैः पूजनीयचरणैः विरचिताभिः टिप्पणीभिः सममेव गुरुमुखेनैव अध्वयेतव्यमिति शास्त्रनिरूढपन्थाः ।

तथापि विहितगुरुमुखश्रवणानां जिज्ञासूनां पुनरनुसन्धानसौकर्याय श्रीमद्भिः राघवेन्द्र कट्टि इत्यैतैः श्रीमद्भाष्यस्य आंग्लभाषानुवादकरणप्रयत्नः व्यधायि, इति महदिदं प्रमोदस्थानं श्लाघनभाजनं च । ग्रन्थस्यास्य प्रकाशनं पण्डितैः डा.प्रभंजनाचार्यैः आत्मीयया प्रकटितचरबहुमाध्वग्रन्थया श्रीव्यासमध्व-संशोधनसंसदा वितन्यते इति महदिदमपरं संतोषास्पदं प्रशंसापात्रं च । उभावपि एतौ लेखकप्रकाशकौ ज्ञानभक्तिवैराग्यादिदानेन ईदृश-सत्कार्यकरणाशक्तिविश्राणनेन च समनुगृह्णन्तु इति अस्मदुपास्यान् श्रीमूलसीतासमेत-श्रीमन्मूलरामदिग्विजयरामवेदव्यासान् प्रार्थयामहे ॥

श्री सत्यात्मतीर्थश्रीपादाः

Most Respectfully Dedicated

To

(Late) Mm. **Dr. B.N.K. Sharma,**

an embodiment of Dvaita Vedanta, whose encouragement and whose writings are a source of inspiration for me.

FOREWORD

I have great pleasure in welcoming the publication of Ph.D. thesis of Dr. R.K. Katti, under the heading 'BRAHMAN, THE SUPREME BEING, IN BRAHMASUTRAS'. The author says that it is an objective study of Brahmasutras or Vedantasutras and the word Vedanta means the essence of all scriptures like Mantras, Brahmanas, Aranyakas and Upanishads - of course Upanishads form the final portions of Veda - and hence Vedanta should not be confined to mere Upanishads as advocated by traditional scholars like Shankaracharya and modern scholars like Prof. S. Radhakrishnan and others. He has presented an objective study of these Sutras referring to the three great Acharyas' commentaries and subcommentaries of their great desciples like Jayatirtha, Vyasatirtha and Raghavendratirtha. But his main thrust is to find out the real import of the Sutras in the light of syntax, grammar and semantics of the very wording of the Sutras and their context, citing the quotations from Panini wherever necessary and following the Mimansa method of interpretation in case of some Sutras. Without any preconceived notion, and any bias, he has tried to judge interpretation of each commentator on the basis of certain unacceptable liberties taken by the latter, not warranted by the context of syntax and semantics of the wording of the Sutrakara himself. He cites the examples of liberties such as,

(i) commentator's disagreement with the Sutra itself,

(ii) arbitrary treatment of some Sutras as Purvapaksha Sutras without any indicatory words therein,

(iii) repeatedly coming to the same conclusion thereby rendering some Sutras redundant,

(iv) adoption of secondary meaning (lakshana) of a word even when the primary meaning has not failed to give a coherent meaning, and

(v) ignoring the defect of 'split sentence' (vakyabhedadosha).

In support of his view, he has quoted extensively the statements of modern scholars like S. Radhakrishnan, S.N. Dasgupta, and V.S. Ghate and others, and also from various other commentaries. On the basis of this, he has concluded that the Madhvacharya's interpretation of the

Sutras are more convincing and are in keeping with the import of the Sutras. One may or may not agree with all his conclusions, but one cannot deny him the credit for his critical acumen and insightful and independent judgement which are the hallmarks of real unbiassed research study. He has reviewed and criticized whenever necessary the statements of not only traditional scholars like Shankaracharya but also the extremist views and comments of modern eminent scholars like Mm. Dr. B.N.K. Sharma, V.S. Ghate and others. The author has presented a crystal clear analysis of almost every Sutra in the first two Adhyayas in the present book and made a comparative study of the commentaries of the three Acharyas, citing his own view with reasons. He has based them mainly on the commentaries viz. Raghavendratirtha's 'Tantradipika' and Vyasatirtha's 'Tatparyachandrika', which are the commentaries on Brahmasutras following Madhvacharya's interpretation.

Such research studies, based on this neglected dimension of philosophical thought as embedded in the entire Vedic literature, Itihasa and Puranas and Agamas, not confining only to the Upanishads, are to be welcomed as rightly pointed out by Prof. S.N. Dasgupta. They add to the contents of realistic philosophy in the Indian philosophical literature in contrast to the dominating view of entire universe as a mere phenomenal show or world of shadows as advocated in abstract monism as per S. Radhakrishnan's observations quoted by the author on page 566.

The present book is thus an important addition to the vast philosophical literature in India. It is a very useful study particularly for research students and all others who are interested in the subject and I hope that it will be welcomed by all.

I congratulate Dr. R.K. Katti for his contribution in this regard and look forward to many more works from his facile pen.

R. N. Aralikatti
(Vidyavaridhi, Darshanakalanidhi, Mahamahopadhyaya, Retd. Prof. Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, Recepient of Award from the President of India, Govt. of Maharashtra and Govt. of Karnataka.)

301, Mantri Smrithi,
Chittaranjan Road,
Vile Parle (East).
Mumbai - 400 057

THE AUTHOR NARRATES

While in service, though I was interested in the study of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy, I was driven by circumstances to pursue a career in 'Engineering and Management'. Nevertheless I used to attend regularly the evening classes conducted by Swamy Satswarupanand Saraswati, an ascetic belonging to the Advaita School, who taught us scriptures like Bhagavadgita, the Upanishads and the Brahmasutras. I also used to go to Prof. P.N. Virkar twice a week and he taught me Sanskrit and gave the first lessons in Brahmasutras. When I was free from my family obligations, I decided to retire from business and to utilize my available time for the study of Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy. So I joined the University of Pune in 1996, at the age of 62, as a regular student in M.A. (Sanskrit) class along with boys and girls in the age-group of 20-22. My special subject chosen was grammar. I passed the M.A. (Sanskrit) Examination in First Class, in 1998. However, it took me two years to decide on the topic of study for the Ph.D. degree, and I registered as a candidate for the Ph.D. degree of the University of Pune, in the year 2000.

The topic studied and presented by me in the dissertation for the Ph.D. degree is 'The Concept of Brahman, The Supreme Being, in Brahmasutras'. It is well-known that in India, religion and culture are greatly influenced by the world's oldest literature called Vedas, which came down orally through many generations. The Vedic thoughts have survived the ideological and political onslaughts for over three millennia. However at a stage in the history of Indian culture, the Vedic thoughts and their ancillary didactic material grew to an unwieldy volume and generated conflicts of views among the learned. The common people were confused. It was necessary to review that mass of compositions and to systematize the teachings of scriptures. This task was undertaken by Badarayana Vyasa. Not only did he collect, collate and arrange the Vedas and the Puranas in the present form, but also pronounced his conclusions on what exactly is the essential teaching of the Vedas, in the form of aphorisms (Sutras) in his masterpiece known variously as Brahmasutra, Vedantasutra, Brahmamimamsa and Uttaramimamsa.

This work is universally recognised as the manual of Vedanta. However, even these Sutras have been interpreted differently by different commentators and divergent doctrines are advocated. It is reported that there are twentynine such commentaries, though only eleven are available, and

each one of the commentators claims that the Brahmasutras advocate his own doctrine. A Sutra is said to be a concise, unambiguous and meaningful statement and Brahmasutras are specially composed to set aside conflicts and to reconcile the purport of Vedic thoughts. So the problem before me was how these Sutras could yield views consistent with divergent and mutually conflicting doctrines as claimed by various commentators.

In order to have a cross-sectional view of this panorama, I chose to study the commentaries of Shankaracharya, Ramanujacharya and Madhvacharya, who represent the three principal traditions in vogue. Considering these three divergent commentaries, my endeavour was to make an objective study of these Sutras depending on the syantax, semantics and grammar of the words used therein and following the customary practice of deciphering the Sutras. The attempt was to know what the Sutrakara intended to tell through these Sutras. Since the first two Adhyayas of Brahmasutras covered the topic chosen for study, those two Adhyayas only were looked into in this dissertation.

With this plan of study, I started reading the commentaries of the three Acharyas, the sub-commentaries and glosses on them, their translations etc., in Sanskrit, English, Marathi and Kannada. The task was frightening. I felt as though I was trying to lift an elephant or was trying to bite far more than I could chew. At one stage, I even thought of abandoning the study. But, it is human nature that when a person feels cornered and helpless, he desperately seeks some divine help, howsoever rational he may be. I was no exception. So I went on a pilgrimage to Badrinath. About three kilometres from Badrinath, on the north-west, there is a village called Mana, on the bank of river Saraswati. It is the last Indian village on that segment of Indo-Tibetan border. On the hill behind that village, there is a cave, and tradition believes that Badarayana Vyasa composed his works here. So having a darshana of Lord Narayana, in Badrinath, I walked up to this cave and literally prostrated before the lifesize idol of Badarayana Vyasa in that cave. I prayed for his blessings so that I could understand the import of his Sutras. However even after a random reading for three years, I could not put down a single word on paper. But one day while going through some book, by chance I saw some extracts quoted from Tantradipika, a rare marvellous commentary on Brahmasutras by Raghavendratirtha. I saw a ray of hope

in them and felt that I could succeed in my endeavour with the help of this work. Tradition believes that Raghavendratirtha's soul still dwells in his Vrindavana and he fulfills the mundane desires of his devotees. That is why people belonging to different caste, creed and status throng his Vrindavana at Mantralayam round the year. I used to offer him my reverence and obeisance as the common people of my community did. But I did not even think of praying him for help in this matter. I had never tried to read any of his books. Surprisingly enough, he came to my help without asking. Once I got his book, I started writing my thesis.

When I completed my analysis of Sutras in the first chapter (Pada) of the first Adhyaya in 2004, I was not yet sure as to whether I was on the right track. So I went to Mumbai and met Mm. Dr. B.N.K. Sharma, a renowned scholar in the subject of my study. Even at the age of 95, he went through each word of that portion. He spontaneously shook my hands, patted me on the back and candidly expressed his happiness about my objective approach to the subject. That raised my spirits and I felt confident of completing the thesis. He was active till I analysed the first two Padas and he read and approved the second Pada also. When I took the third Pada to show him in 2005, he was in the hospital. When I went to see him in the I.C.U. of the hospital, even in that condition he enquired about the progress of my work, and heartily blessed me to succeed. I can not forget his encouragement in the early stage of this study.

I could not complete my thesis within six years, normally allowed, and I got it extended by two years because more than the degree a proper study and presentation was important for me. With this long struggle, when I submitted my thesis to the University in 2008, I was overjoyed and I exclaimed to myself - 'Yes, I have done it!' This dissertation was accepted and the Ph.D. degree was awarded to me by the University of Pune in 2009.

This objective work is the result of a conscious and focussed effort, meant for the modern intelligentsia who consider themselves as rationals and not blind believers in any doctrine. I feel that this work on which I have striven for more than eight years, should reach the interested readers in India and abroad. An abridged version of this thesis was published in Mm. Dr. B.N.K. Sharma's Birth Centenary Commemo-

ration Volume in 2009. It has been received well and many letters of appreciation have been received.

I fall short of words to express my sense of gratitude to Late Mm. Dr. B.N.K. Sharma, whose appreciation, encouragement and writings were a source of inspiration for me in completing this work. I am thankful to Dr. Saroja Bhate, former Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit, University of Pune, who guided me through this arduous journey. I am extremely grateful to Swamy Satswarupanand Saraswati, Pune for initiating me into the study of Bhagavadgita, the Upanishads and the Brahmasutras. I am also thankful to Late Prof. P.N. Virkar for teaching the first lessons in Sanskrit language and in Brahmasutras. I am indebted to Shri. D. Prahladacharya, former Vice Chancellor of Rashtriya Sanskrit University at Tirupati, who went through the entire thesis and appreciated. I express my gratefulness to Dr. K.B. Archak, Head of P.G. Dept. of Sanskrit, Karnatak University, Dharwad, and to some traditional scholars in this subject, namely Dr. Devadatta Patil of Pune, Pt. Krishnacharya Pacchapur of Satyadhyana Vidyapeetha at Mulund, Mumbai and Pt. Ramacharya Avadhani of Gulbarga, who spared their time to go through my analysis of Sutras and to discuss some topics. I thank the University of Pune for permitting me to publish this dissertation.

It is my pleasant duty to express my grateful thanks to Shri Satyatma Tirtha Swamiji, head of Shri Uttaradi Matha, for his blessings to this publication. I am much obliged to Mm. Dr. R.N. Aralikatti for his considered foreword and to Prof. K. T. Pandurangi for his opinion about this book.

I am highly indebted to Dr. Vyasanakere Prabhanjanacharya for undertaking to publish this work. I thank Shri Kiran Shetty of Navin Printers Mumbai for the neat layout of the book. I also thank M/s.Vagartha, for printing the book in a short time.

Some of my friends in Pune enthusiastically contributed towards the cost of this publication, and preferred not to be mentioned here by name. Their voluntary participation in my endeavour is a huge encouragement for me. I express my most hearty thanks to all of them for their support.

A4/1, Aayakar Society, **Dr. Raghavendra Katti**
Paud Road, Pune - 411 038.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We have great pleasure in publishing this book, 'Bramhan, the Supreme Being, in Bramhasūtras'. This is an innovative work by the learned professor, establishing the real purport of the Bramhasūtras, with the help of Pāṇini sūtras and Jaimini pūrvamīmāmsa maxims. He has concluded that the Śrī Madhvācārya's interpretation of the Bramhasūtras are more convincing.

Śrī Madhvācārya ([1]1200-1280 A.D.) is the most erudite philosopher the world has ever seen. He commanded complete knowledge of all the śāstras, languages, sciences and the arts. Apart from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, he was well versed with the quintessence of epics like the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata and Śrīmad-Bhāgavata and also the other Indian scriptures in accordance with the original texts. That is why he is aptly referred to as Pūrṇaprajña, the allknower. He has written 37 books which have distilled knowledge of the absolute truth for the benefit of mankind. These works are collectively known as 'Sarvamūla Granthas', which can be referred to in English as 'Comprehensive Text of Fundamental Maxims'. Another distinguishing aspect of Śrī Madhvācārya is that he was endowed with all the essential thirty two physical characteristics of excellence defined in the śāstras that would entitle him to be revered as 'Jagadguru' or 'Viśvaguru' (Universal Teacher). He was the master of all branches of knowledge, in the truest sense.

Śrī Madhvācārya's life is a fascinating picture of a perdurable philosophical peer that would appeal to all - young and old alike. He possessed excellent knowledge of music and also other forms of art.

His philosophical and literary works are sharp, short, succinct, sweet and precise to the point, with profound import and impact. He has not wasted words. Their meaning and implications are erudite, educative and enthralling. Many commentaries, criticism, explanations and queries on the Sarvamūla Granthas keep on appearing from time to time even as eight centuries have elapsed after they were written, which vouch for the versa-

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1. Our publication, 'Life and works of Śrī Madhvācārya' by Dr. Vyasanakere Prabhanjanacharya, M.A. P.hd., D.Lit.(pub.2011,2nd edn.2012) gives a detailed biographical account of Śrī Madhvācārya.

tility of Śrī Madhvācārya's doctrines. His works encompass many facets of life that are yet to be properly explored, evaluated and explained. Śrī Madhvācārya's life story reads like a series of marvelous events. In physical terms, he was perhaps the strongest person who ever lived in Kali age. He was the embodiment of everything that is good, great, grand and graceful. The mankind is fortunate to have had him as a beacon to look forward to for leading a virtuous and blissful life. He was like a 'Chintāmani', a crystal that grants anything one would wish for.

Śrī Madhvācārya's legacy has enriched the culture, social mosaic, literature and philosophy of life in the context of the modern day lifestyle. In particular, Haridāsa literature - thousands of hymns that have been composed by several saintly disciples of Śrī Madhvācārya - has been influenced to a great extent by his teachings and made enormous contribution to the overall betterment of society. What is of great significance is that during the last eight centuries, Śrī Madhvācārya's contribution for the upliftment of society has been primordial. This great son of Karnataka has bequeathed enduring philosophical doctrines in his monumental works. It is unfortunate that this has not received proper recognition in the present literary circles. Vaiṣṇava philosophy or Dvaita philosophy propounded by Śrī Madhvācārya is the most authoritative doctrine that assures complete upliftment of man. It is the 'kalpavṛkṣa' (a holy tree that grants one's wish) or a 'kāmadhenu' (the divine cow that also grants one's wish). There is no doubt that understanding and following his teachings would ensure one's success in life. After Vedavyāsa, Śrī Madhvācārya's personality comes closest to an outstanding and perfect preacher. That is why he is aptly referred to as '**Abhinava Vedavyāsa**' (protégé of Vedavyāsa).

Sumadhvavijaya of Śrī Nārāyaṇapaṇḍitācārya, Sampradāyapaddhati of Śrī Hṛṣīkeśatīrtha and other such works give fairly exhaustive information regarding life, works, disciples and teachings of Ācārya Madhva.

Śrī Padmanābhatīrtha, one of his direct disciples, was one of the outstanding scholars of his time. Śrī Naraharitīrtha, another direct disciple, even as an ascetic ruled the kingdom of Orissa for over 12 years[1]. Jayasimha, the king of Kāsaragoḍ, was one of his staunch followers.

1. Vide Śrī Kūrmaṁ Inscription-Epigraphica Indica Vol. VI No. 25

Śrī Jayatīrtha (1365-1388), the celebrated Ṭīkākāra of his works, Śrī Vyāsatīrtha of the Vyāsatraya-fame, Śrī Vādirājatīrtha(Yuktimallikā), Śrī Rāghavendratīrtha(Parimaḷa) are some of the prominent exponents of his philosophy.

Śrī Madhva's works include commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras, Bhagavadgītā, Upaniṣads, Ṛgveda and Bhāgavatamahāpurāṇa. His Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya, having 5108 verses, is an unparalleled work in the history of the post puraṇic literature. Tantrasāra-saṅgraha, Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇava, Sadācārasmṛti, Yatipraṇavakalpa are some of his other works dealing with spiritual conduct and rituals. Dvādaśastotra and Nakhastuti (as also Kandukastuti) are the stotras composed by him.

As evident from his works, the biographies and other sources of information available on him, Śrī Madhva was a multi-faceted, unique personality. He was a scholar, a philosopher, a poet, a vedic seer, a teacher, a preacher, an orator, a prolific writer, a researcher, a debator, a mystic, a saint, a linguist, an ascetic, a muscian, an archealogist, a logician, a geologist all rolled in one. He excelled in each of these fields. He was also an able administrator, super organiser and social reformer of the highest order. He was the perfect example of an all-rounder in the truest sense of the term. His physique was so perfect that experts in Sāmudrikaśāstra could notice all the thirty two characteristics of an ideal personality in it. A huge rock weighing over 50 tonnes lifted by him and placed across the river Bhadrā stands as an evidence of his unparalleled physical [1]might. The honourific 'AbhinavaVedavyāsa' describes him most appropriately.

His works are marked by the simplicity of style, precision of thought, brevity of expression, unambiguity of presentation and clarity in narration. Profuse quotations from the ancient works is another salient feature of his works.

Works of Śrī Madhvācārya

1. Brahmasūtrabhāṣyaṁ
2. Aṇubhāṣyaṁ
3. Anuvyākhyānaṁ
4. Nyāyavivaraṇaṁ

1. Vide the Epigraphica Karnatica. Vol. VI. P. 27, Chickmagalur Ins. No.81.

5. Gītābhāṣyaṁ
6. Gītātātparyanirṇayaḥ
7. Ṛgbhāṣyaṁ
8. Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇayaḥ
9. Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇayaḥ
10. Īśāvāsyopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
11. Talavakāropaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
12. Kāṭhakopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
13. Ṣaṭpraśnopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
14. Ātharvaṇopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
15. Māṇḍūkopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
16. Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
17. Mahaitareyopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
18. Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ,
19. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyaṁ
20. Tattvasaṅkhyānaṁ,
21. Tattvavivekaḥ,
22. Tattvodyotaḥ,
23. Viṣṇutattvavinirṇayaḥ
24. Pramāṇalakṣaṇaṁ,
25. Kathālakṣaṇaṁ,
26. Upādhikhaṇḍanaṁ,
27. Māyāvādakhaṇḍanaṁ,
28. Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanaṁ,
29. Karmanirṇayaḥ
30. Yamakabhārataṁ
31. Tantrasārasaṅgrahaḥ
32. Dvādaśastotraṁ
33. Nakhastutiḥ
34. Sadācārasmṛtiḥ
35. Jayantīnirṇayaḥ
36. Kṛṣṇāmṛtamahārṇavaḥ
37. Yatipraṇavakalpaḥ
38. Śrī Kṛṣṇapadyaṁ

[1]Supremecy of Lord Sri Hari, is the most important doctrine of philosophy of Śrī Madhva. Reality of Universe, absolute five-fold difference, gradation among souls, mukti as the total experience of inherent bliss of individual souls, Bhakti as the prime means of attaining mukti are some of his other doctrines. Perception, inference and testimony are the three means of knowledge. All scriptures, without any exception, in primary sense, proclaim the glory of Lord Śrī Hari, is another important doctrine taught by Śrī Madhva.

The Brahmasūtras, also known as Brahmamīmāmsaśastram, along with the Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgīta, constitute the Prasthānatraya of the Vedānta School of Indian Philosophy. Brahmamīmāmsa is considered as the Supreme testimony(Sarvottamaśāstra).

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1. श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरः सत्यं जगत् तत्त्वतो भिन्ना जीवगणा हरेरनुचरा नीचोच्चभावङ्गताः ।
मुक्तिर्नैजसुखानुभूतिरमला भक्तिश्च तत्साधनं ह्यक्षादित्रितयं प्रमाणमखिलाम्नायैकवेद्यो हरिः ॥
- श्रीव्यासतीर्थकृत प्रमेयनवरत्नमालिका

Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvaṇaveda, Mahābhārata, Mūlarāmāyaṇa and Pañcarātra are the seven sacred testaments (Sadāgamās); of these, the first four are the Vedas (Apauruṣeya) and the last three are Itihāsas. The other scriptures like Purāṇas, Smṛtis that are in conformity with the above seven are also called Sadāgamās, of these, the Mahābhārata enjoys the highest place. It is regarded as the fifth Veda **(Bhārataṁ Pañcamo Vedaḥ)** and **Kārṣṇaveda** (Veda composed by Vāsiṣṭhakṛṣṇa Śrī Vedavyāsa).

Of the three Itihāsas, Mūlarāmāyaṇa of 100 Crores of Ślokas is the work of Lord Hayagrīva; Pañcarātra, which is also a work of 100 crores of ślokas is that of Lord Nārāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, a work of one lakh of ślokas is also the work of Lord Vedavyāsa; all the three authors are the direct incarnations of Lord Mahāviṣṇu.

Śāstra is divided into two groups viz., Nirṇeya (Nirṇetavya) and Nirṇāyaka (Nirṇīta). All the works mentioned above come under the Nirṇeya group; **Nirṇāyakaśāstra** also known as Mīmāmsā is threefold[1] viz., Brahmamīmāmsa, Daivīmīmāmsa and Karmamīmāmsa. The Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa constitute the Brahmamīmāmsa. Daivīmīmāmsa is the work of Paila and Śeṣa (excepting the first and last aphorisms composed by Bādarāyaṇa himself); Dharmasūtras of sage Jaimini constitute the Karmamīmāmsa.

The word 'Brahman' means the Vedas and the Parabrahman. Hence the term Brahmasūtra in a sense means the work which interpreting the sacred literature in general and Vedic literature in particular, so as to bring out the exact nature of the Brahman, the Supreme reality. It is also called as [2]**Vedāntasūtra, Śārīrakasūtra, Yuktisūtra, Vyāsasūtra and**

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1. मीमांसा त्रिविधा प्रोक्ता ब्राह्मी दैवी च कार्मिकी ॥ - नारदपुराणवचनम् (गीतातात्पर्य २-३९)
2. ब्रह्मसूत्राणि शारीरकम् । -गीताभाष्ये (१-३५)
   वेदनिर्णयात्मिका मीमांसा वेदान्तः -गीताभाष्ये (१५-१५)
   युक्तिसूत्रकृत । -गीताभाष्ये (१५-१५)
   ब्रह्मणः सूचकानि वाक्यानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि । -गीताभाष्यटीका (प्रमेयदीपिका)
   ब्रह्म वेदः तदर्थः परब्रह्म वा तस्य सूत्राणि, ब्रह्मसूत्राणि । सकलवेदार्थभूतस्य परब्रह्मणो विष्णोः स्वरूपनिर्णयार्थानि सूत्राणीति यावत् । अतः शरीरः परमात्मैव । शारीरौ तावुभौ ज्ञेयौ जीवश्चेश्वरसंज्ञितः। तस्य सकलगुणपूर्णत्वादि-विषयत्वेन शारीरकमीमांसा । -न्यायसुधा (१/१/१)

Satya[1]. It is popularly referred to as **Uttaramīmāmsā** in the history of Indian Philosophy.

As shown by Śrī Madhvācārya, the word Brahman primarily refers to Lord Viṣṇu. Hence the Brahmasūtra be called as Viṣṇusūtras also. The words Brahman, Parabrahman, Paramabrahman and Paramamahadbrahman mean all souls in general, the liberated souls, Goddess Mahālakṣmi and Lord Mahāviṣṇu, respectively[2] Hence, in the light of this interpretation, Brahmasūtras can also be understood as Brahmasūtras (as they deal with the nature of souls in sūtra like **'Kartā Śāstrārthavatvāt'** etc.) Parabrahmasūtras (as they deal with the process of liberation and the nature of liberated souls in the fourth chapter). Paramabrahmasūtras (as they establish the Akṣarapuruṣatva, Nityamuktatva, Samānatva of Goddess Mahālakṣmī; Paramamahadbrahma-sūtras as they propound essentially the supremacy of Lord Mahāviṣṇu throughout.

Śrī Madhva, unlike the other commentators has furnished all the important details regarding the sūtras, in the introductory portion of his Bhaṣya, Anuvyākhyāna and also in the 10th chapter of the Mahābhāratatatparyanirṇaya.

The Brahmasūtras were composed at the fag end of the Dwāpara-age, when the correct knowledge was totally clouded by the wrong knowledge for various reasons; Lord Mahāviṣṇu himself manifested as [3]Vedavyāsa. He composed the Brahmasūtras, Mahābhārata and the eighteen Mahāpurāṇas. He is also referred to as Dvaipāyana, Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, Vāsiṣṭha Kṛṣṇa, Bādarāyana, Pārāśarya and Vāsavīsūnu or Sātyavateya .

The Brahmasūtras are considered as the supreme text of the entire sacred literature; It is Paravidya, the scripture par excellance. Its Nirṇāyakatva, Anugrāhakatva, Upakaraṇatva* and Bahvarthagarbhitatva have contributed to its supremacy[4].

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1. निर्णीयते यतः सम्यगिदं सत्यमिति स्फुटम् । श्रुतिस्मृत्युदितं सर्वं व्यक्तं मीमांसयैतया ॥
   सत्यमित्युच्यते तस्मान्मीमांसा ब्रह्मनिश्चयः ॥ -शब्दनिर्णयः (तलवकारभाष्ये)
2. ब्रह्माणि जीवाः सर्वेऽपि परब्रह्माणि मुक्तिगाः ।
   प्रकृतिः परमं ब्रह्म परमं महदच्युतः ॥ -इति तत्त्वनिर्णयोदाहृता परमश्रुतिः
३. कृष्णद्वैपायनं व्यासं विद्धि नारायणं प्रभुम् ।
   को ह्यन्यः पुण्डरीकाक्षान्महाभारतकृद्भवेत् ॥ -इति महाभारते वायुप्रोक्ते च (म.भा.ता.नि. २-५५)
४. न च सूत्रेषु निश्चितार्थस्य औपचारिकत्वं वक्तुं युज्यते । निर्णयात्मकत्वात्तेषाम् । -ऐतरेयभाष्ये

It is superior to the Karmamīmāmsa of Jaimini,[1] as it enjoys all the three important factors viz., Vaktrānukūlya, Śrotrānukūlya and Prasangānukūlya, necessary for trustworthiness(validity) to the fullest extent[2]. Hence, It is the sūtra in the truest sense.

The fact that no thinker without a Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras to his credit would be recognised as a founder of the Vedānta system, firmly establishes the absolute primacy of the Brahmasūtras. Though Śankara and Rāmānuja have no Bhāṣyas to their credit on the Vedas, they are recognised as the founders of new schools of vedānta since they have written

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बलवांश्च सविचारो निर्णयो वाक्यमात्रात् । -गीताभाष्ये (२-५०)

''ऋचः सामानि'' इत्यादिकं वचनमात्रम् । 'अत एव च नित्यत्वम्' इति शारीरकोक्तं वाक्यं निर्णयात्मकम् ।। वचनं च वृत्त्यन्तरेणापि सम्भवति । न तूपचरितो वाक्यार्थावधारणात्मकोऽपि निर्णयः। अतस्तस्मादिदं बलवदित्यर्थः । -गीताभाष्यप्रमेयदीपिका

ब्रह्मसूत्रानुसारेण वेदाद्यं सर्वमेव च । योज्यं न ब्रह्मसूत्राणि दृश्यमानार्थतोऽन्यथा ।। -छान्दोग्यभाष्यम्

परमात्मनोऽत्यन्तभिन्नस्य स्वतश्चिदानन्दात्मकस्यापि जीवस्य अनाद्यविद्याकामकर्मादिनिमित्तोऽयं परमार्थ एवान्यथाकारो दुःखाद्यनर्थो न परमेश्वरप्रसादादृते अपगच्छति । न चासाक्षात्कृतोऽसौ प्रसीदति । न च अविदितस्वरूपः शक्यते साक्षात्कर्तुं इति सकलगुणाकरतया निःशेषदोषगन्धविधुरतया च तं प्रतिपादयितुमशेषा-म्नायाः प्रवर्तन्ते, तदुप- करणभूता च ब्रह्ममीमांसेति परमार्थः ।

-श्रीटीकाकृत्पादाः (उपाधिखण्डनटीका)

इह हि विविधसांसारिकदुःखदर्शनेन विरक्तस्य शमदमादिमतो मुमुक्षोरधिकारिणस्तन्निवृत्त्यै परमानन्दावाप्त्यै च सकलजीवजडात्मकात् प्रपञ्चात् परमार्थत एव अत्यन्तभिन्नं निखिलगुणोदारं निरस्तसमस्तदोषं परब्रह्म प्रतिपादयितुं सकलश्रुतिस्मृतीनां तदुपकरणभूतब्रह्ममीमांसायाश्च प्रवृत्तिरिति तत्त्वम् ।। -श्रीटीकाकृत्पादाः(मायावादखण्डनटीका)

ननु भारतं सर्वशास्त्रेषूत्तममुच्यते, सत्यम् । विचार्येषु तदित्यविरोधः । -न्यायसुधा (१/१/१)

अतो ब्रह्मसूत्रसमं न प्रमाणतममस्ति । -श्रीपद्मनाभतीर्थाः

'एतेन उपनिषदः परविद्या' इति व्याख्यानमपि परास्तं । ऋगादिग्रहणेन तासामपि गृहीतत्वात् । ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजकन्यायश्च अगतिकागतिः । तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं परविद्येत्यपि न युक्तं अधिगतिकरणत्वानुपपत्तेः अनेकार्थताकल्पनापत्तेश्च । अतोऽनया परविद्याख्यया अस्य शास्त्रस्य सर्वोत्तमत्वप्रामाण्यसाधनमुप-पन्नमिति ।। -न्यायसुधायाम् (१-१-१)

१. ननु कर्मनिर्णयो जैमिनिना पूर्वमीमांसायामेव कृतः । तत्किमनेन । सत्यम् । कर्मस्वरूपमात्रं जैमिनिना निर्णीतम् । न तु तदङ्गभूतानां मन्त्राणां भगवत्परत्वम् । नाप्यन्तःकरणशुद्धिद्वारकमीश्वरसाक्षात्काररूपं मुख्यं फलम् । -श्रीटीकाकृत्पादाः (कर्मनिर्णयटीका)

२. आप्तवाक्यतया तेन श्रुतिमूलतया तथा । युक्तिमूलतया चैव प्रामाण्यं त्रिविधं महत् ।
दृश्यते ब्रह्मसूत्राणामेकधाऽन्यत्र सर्वाः । अतो नैतादृशं किञ्चित्प्रमाणतममिष्यते ।।

-अनुव्याख्याने (१/५-७)

Bhāṣyas for Brahmasūtras; it is very interesting to note that Rāmānuja has not left even a single commentary on any Upaniṣad; Śrī Madhva is the only spiritual teacher of the philosophical screen who has written commentaries on the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Bhagavadgīta, Brahmasūtras, Mahābhārata and Bhāgavata, Hence he is aptly called Pūrṇaprajna.

Śrī Madhva has given the essence of the Brahmasūtras in a very compact manner in his Mahabharatatatparyanirnaya, as follows:

सर्वदोषैर्विहीनत्वं गुणैः सर्वैरुदीर्णता ।
अभेदः सर्वरूपेषु जीवभेदः सदैव हि॥
विष्णोरुक्तानि सूत्रेषु सर्ववेदेड्यता तथा ।
तारतम्यं च मुक्तानां विमुक्तिर्विद्यया तथा ॥

-म.भा.ता.नि. (१-४४, ४५)

There were as many as twenty one Bhāśyas on Brahmasūtras, before Śrī Madhva. Śrīkanṭha (Śrīkanṭhabhāṣya), Śrīpati (Śrīkarabhāṣya), Nimbārka, Vallabha (Aṇubhāṣya) and Baladeva (Govindabhāṣya) are the post-Madhva commentaries on Brahmasūtras.

Śrī Madhva is the only commentator[1] who has written as many as four works on the Brahmasūtras. They are Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, a sūtra-wise commentary (2000 granthas), Anuvyākhyāna, a supplementary commentary to his Bhāśya in more than 2000 verses, Sannyāyavivṛti or Nyāyavivaraṇa, a commentary on the Nyāyamāla portion of his anuvyākhyāna (420) and Aṇubhāṣya, a metrical epitome of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, in 32 anuṣtup verses. Of these, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya is a sūtrawise commentary. Anuvyākhyāna is a metricial substantiation of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Nyāyavivaraṇa is a summary of the major arguments of Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta under each adhikaraṇa and Aṇubhāṣya is a metrical epitome of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya in 32 anuṣṭubh verses.

His Anuvyākhyāna is the only metrical commentary written directly on the Brahmasūtras; In fact, no other Sūtra enjoys such a metrical commentary.

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1. Saṇkaracārya has written only Bhāśya on the sūtras ; Rāmānujācārya has written two works viz. Śrībhāśya and Vedāntadīpa.

Most of the modern scholars, while reviewing the Śrī Madhva's view on the sūtras have taken into account only his Bhāśya, thereby missing lot of his reflections appearing in his other works.

To understand Sri Madhva's view on the Bramhasutras, Nyayasudha of Sri Jayatirtha and Tatparyacandrika of Sri Vyasatirtha are indespensible. Tantradipika and Nyayamuktavali of Sri Raghavendratirtha are compendiums on Bramhasutras, according to Dwaita interpretation. Yuktimallika of Sri Vadirajatirtha is another fantastic work in 5320 verses elaborating the Madhva dialectics on Brahmasutras.

As rightly observed by Prof. S.N. Dasgupta[1] and others, most of the mod-

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1. The present volume deals with the philosophy of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa, the philosophy of Śrī Madhva and his followers.... But so far nothing has appeared about the philosophy of the great teachers of the Madhva school such as Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha. Very little is known about the great controversy between the eminent followers of the Madhva school of thought and of the followers of the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta. In my opinion Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian thought. There is a general belief amongst many that monism of Śaṅkara presents the final phase of Indian thought. The realistic and dualistic thought of the Sāṅkhya and the yoga had undergone a compromise with monism both in the purāṇas and in the hands of the later writers. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jayatīrtha and particularly of Vyāsatīrtha will realise the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian thought. Much more could have been written on the system of Madhva logic as explained in the Tarkatāṇdava of Vyāsatīrtha. In this great work of Vyāsatīrtha has challenged almost every logical definition that appears in the Tattva-Cintāmani of Gaṅgeśa, which forms the bed-rock of the new school of Nyāya logic. But this could have been properly done only in a separate work on the Madhva logic. Of the controversy between the monists of Śaṅkara school and the dualists of the Madhva school, most people are ignorant of

ern scholars, both east and west are highly ignorant of the strength of Dwaita

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the Madhva side of the case, though there are many who may be familiar with the monistic point of view. It is hoped that the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers undertaken in the present volume will give new light to students of Indian thought and covered in Indian or European thought. - **S.N. Dasgupta** (History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 4., Preface, P. vii and viii)

Dr. V.S. Sukthankar, a renowned modern Sanskrit scholar, who was the chief editor of the critical edition of Mahābhārata brought out by the Bhanḍārkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, has this to say on Śrī Madhvācārya's contribution towards the interpretation of Mahābhārata :

.... I will only mention that this is no new discovery of mine, but that such psychological and metaphysical explanations of the characters and the plot of the Mahābhārata are scattered in the ancient Indian commentaries of the epic, the best known among them being the Mahābhāratatātparya-nirṇaya of Ānandatīrtha, the great Madhvācārya, who has clearly stated in that work that the story of the Great Epic has been related in such a way as to convey also an allegorical meaning :

evam adhyātmaniṣṭhaṁ hi Bhārataṁ sarvamucyate /
durvijñeyam ataḥ sarvair Bhāratam tu surairapi //

Ānandatīrtha explains the symbolism by giving the psychological concepts corresponding to many of the important characters, differing partly from those given by me. ....

- On the Meaning of the Mahābhārata; Pub : Asiatic Society of Bombay, Town hall, Bombay, 1957.

"Again, the tradition that the Vedic hymns are supremely spiritual in their import was recovered by Ānandatīrtha, the Dvaita teacher known as Madhvācārya. This shows clearly that there was, even before Sāyaṇa, a school of Vedic interpreters holding that though ritual worship was part of the Vedic religion and as such, the Mantras present an aspect favorable to it, yet, the inner meaning of the Mantras was spiritual and the highest

view of the Brahmasūtras.

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aim and use of Veda was God knowledge and attainment of supreme end of life possible for man. Madhvā-cārya's work is comparatively small in volume, the language simple, but its influence among scholars modern or ancient is not commensurate with its importance, as can be judged from the fact that most modern scholars and Paṇḍits as a class with the possible exception of some among his followers are unaware of the very existence of such a work.

-Śrī Kapāli Śāstry of Aurobindo Āśram, Light on Vedas

Following whole-hearted appreciation of Ṛgbhāṣya of Śrī Madhva by Maharṣi Dyvarāta is note worthy :

वेदो विश्वविभूत्यर्थं विश्वविद्योदयास्पदम् । विश्वकल्याणसिद्ध्यर्थं वेदो विजयतेतराम् ॥
ऋग्भष्यं वै विजयते मध्वाचार्यमुखोदितम् । अनुष्टुप्छन्दसा बद्धं सार्थत्रयसमर्थितम् ॥
अग्न्यादिदेवताद्यर्थमध्यात्मं चान्तरार्थकम् । तदन्तर्यामिविष्ण्वर्थं तत्सङ्केताद्विदुः समम् ॥
एकोननवत्यधिकं चतुःशतमृचां मतम् । चत्वारिंशत्सूक्तक्लृप्तं सङ्क्षेपात् तत्र वाङ्मयम् ॥
अल्पग्रन्थसमूहाप्तं गम्भीरं गर्भितार्थकम् । वेदार्थानां प्रकाशार्थं विदुषां मार्गदर्शकम् ॥
अतिप्राचीनमपि तद्गुप्तमद्यापि गोपितम् । साम्प्रतं तत्प्रकाशेन भूयाज्ज्ञानाभिवृद्धये ॥
देवतोपासनाद्यर्थं यज्ञकर्मादिसिद्धये । ईशासन्तप्रसादार्थं ऋग्भाष्यमुपकारकम् ॥
तत्त्वज्ञानोदयद्वारा जनतासुखशान्तये । ऋग्भाष्यस्य प्रकाशेन प्रीयतां भगवानिति ॥
'दैवरातस्य' विज्ञप्तिः समृद्ध्यै वेदसंविदाम् । जनताजगदीशाप्त्यै भूयात् सन्तुष्टये सताम् ॥

- महर्षिदैवरातः

The following observation Śrī Kapāli Śāstri stand as an another evidence to the uniqueness of Ṛgbhāṣya of Śrī Madhva :

''एवमपि न कोऽप्यासीद्वेदानामध्यात्मपरत्वपक्षस्योज्जीवनाय प्रवृत्तः इति न शक्यं वदितुं अचार्यमध्वग्रन्थेषु जाग्रत्सु । यत् सायणात् किञ्चित्पूर्वं आनन्दतीर्थः आचार्यः ऋङ्मन्त्रतात्पर्यपरिग्रहस्य प्रकारोपप्रदर्शनाय ऋक्संहिताया प्रथममण्डलीयानि चत्वा-रिंशत्सूक्तानि व्याचख्यौ । वैदिकधर्माचरणे कर्मानुष्ठानस्यावश्यकतया कर्मपरव्याख्यानं मन्त्राणां सध्विति कर्मकरणमेव मुख्यं तात्पर्यमितिमतसाध्विति च मध्व अचार्यो मन्यते । मन्त्राणामध्यात्मपरोऽर्थो मुख्यः सर्वेषां वेदानां विष्णुपदप्राप्तिरूपपरमपुरुषार्थे तात्पर्यमिति च प्रतिपादयति आचार्यः । लघु-विस्तरं माध्वमृग्भाष्यम् । विरलान् माध्वसम्प्रदायपण्डितानन्तरा प्रायशो वेदविचारिणामविदितमेव तादृशमसमग्रमपि अस्त्येव वेदभाष्यमिति । तदनुसारिणा महानुभावेन श्रीराघवेन्द्रस्वामिना योगीन्द्रेण आचार्यस्य भाष्यमनुसृत्याशयान् विशदुन्ती मन्त्रार्थमञ्जरी नाम व्याख्या निबद्धा । अग्न्यादि देवतापरतया तदन्तर्गतपरदेवताभूतविष्णुपरतया आध्यात्मपरतया च ऋचो व्याख्येयाः किल । यद्यपि तदुक्तत्रिविधार्थप्रकार-परीक्षायै न वयं

The contents and interpretation of these Bhāṣyakāras widely vary and reflect various schools of philosophy that they belong to. From the pure monism (Adwaita) of Saṇkara, to full-fledged dualism (Dwaita) of Madhva is a wide spectrum of metaphysical thought. The ingenuity and resource-

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प्रवृत्ताः स्मः तथापि कथमर्थत्रयं ऋचां सिद्ध्यति अस्मिन्नर्थाविष्कारनय इति समासतो ब्रूमः । आवश्यकस्थलेषु मन्त्रार्थमञ्जरी वाक्यान्येव उद्धृत्योदाहरिष्यामः ॥
- कपालिशास्त्रिणः ऋग्वेदभाष्यभूमिकासम्पादने

Roy Abraham Varghese in his book, The Wonder of the world (A Journey from Modern Science to the Mind of God) - Pub. Tyr Publishing, Fountain Hills, Arizona, 2004, considers Śrī Madhvācārya as one of the wonders of the world. Some of his statements are as follows :

> The three seminal Hindu thinkers were Sankaracharya, Ramanuja and Madhvacharya. Admittedly, Sankaracharya has had the greatest influence in terms of establishing monism as a dominant view. But I consider Madhvacharya to be the greatest thinker in his tradition because of (a) his definitive and comprehensive refutation of Sankaracharva's arguments and (b) his establishment of a school of thought that produced, among others, the two leading Hindu logicians.
>
> In terms of personal charisma, intellectual rigor and scholarly breadth and depth, Madhvacharya (c.1238-1317) was the most fascinating of the Hindu sage-philosophers and one of the greatest theistic thinkers of all time. More to the point, he was an intellectual juggernaut who single-handedly reversed the slide toward monism and re-established theism as a dominant force. He was also an accomplished wrestler, mountaineer and singer !
>
> Rejecting Advaita on rational and religious grounds, he systematically laid out the case for theism, eventually convincing even his guru. He visited the major intellectual centers of the day, debating monists and drawing attention to the theism of the Hindu scriptures..... His defense of theism and his critique of monism were continued by numerous subsequent thinkers, most notably Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, the two greatest logic and in the history of Indian thought.
>
> Madhvacharya and his successors have created a formidable arsenal of arguments against monism that have yet to be answered.

fulness of each Bhāśyakāra lies in his genius of expounding his point of view and claiming that his view point faithfully reflects the view of the writer of Brahmasūtras, i.e., Bādarāyaṇa. Notwithstanding the disparity and the differences inherent in this wide spectrum of view points, there is a rich contribution from all the Bhāśyakāras to the art and science of Epistemology and Germeneutics and metaphysical interpretation.

Even amongst the limited number of publications on this subject, most have dealt with Saṇkara's commentary to the virtual exclusion of other major Bhāśyas and in particular of Rāmānuja and Madhva. So much so, that for a casual reader of modern publications, Vedānta is synonymous with Saṇkara's monism(Advaita).

It is in this context we are happy that Dr.Katti has contributed to an objective research study of the Bramhasūtras and has succeeded in his critical review to bring about not only the doctrinal differences amongst the major Bhāśyakāras but also in underlining the profound importance of other Bhāśyakāras such as Madhva. In doing so he has also referred to and brought to the attention of the readers important works of other scholars like Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha and Rāghavendratīrtha as well as modern scholars like V.S.Ghate, S.Radhakrishnan and B.N.K. Sharma.

What is worth appreciating in this work is that the author has approached the subject as a student and tried to see in which of three traditional commentaries is the strength of dialectical logic and analytical appeal. We think that this publication is a valuable addition to the literature on this important subject.

19.02.2013 **Vyasanakere Prabhanjanacharya**
Sri Madhvanavami **Founder - Director,**
Sri Vyasamadhva Samshodhana Pratishtana

Publisher's Note

The readers are requested to note that the comments, remarks and opinions expressed by the author in this book, are according to his perspective and understanding of the subject. Concurrence of the Publishers on all the details, such as omissions and commissions, in the book may not be taken for granted. Some accomplished readers have felt that certain additions and alterations are necessary in the book. Their suggestions will be taken note of while publishing the next edition of this book.

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CONTENTS

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Key to Diacritical Marks

ā	-	आ
ī	-	ई
ū	-	ऊ
ṛ / Ṛ	-	ऋ
ḷ	-	ऌ
ṅ	-	ङ्
c	-	च
ch	-	छ
ñ	-	ञ्
ṭ	-	ट्
ṭh	-	ठ्
ḍ	-	ड्
ḍh	-	ढ्
ṇ	-	ण्
ś / Ś	-	श्
ṣ / Ṣ	-	ष्
jña	-	ज्ञ
ḥ	-	विसर्ग
ṁ	-	अनुस्वार

*****

ABBREVIATIONS

A. Ā.	Aitareya Āraṇyaka.
A. B.	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.
ADP.	Studies in the Epics and Purāṇas by A.D. Pusalkar.
Ait. Up.	Aitareya Upaniṣad.
AV.	Anuvyākhyāna. A supplementary commentary by Madhvācārya on his own Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.
BG.	Bhagavadgītā.
BGB.	Bhagavdgītā and its classical commentaries by S. K. Bhavani
BG.-SC.	Bhagavadgītā tr. by Swami Chinmayananda.
BG. AGK.	Śrīmadbhagavadgītā tr. by A. G. Krishna Warrier.
Bhāg.	Bhāgavata.
BNK.	The Brahmasūtras and their Principal commen taries by B. N. K. Sharma.
Bṛha. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
BS.	Brahmasūtra.
BSB.	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.
BVB.	Bhāvabodha. A gloss by Raghūttamatīrtha on Jayatīrtha's Tattvaprakāśikā.
BVD.	Bhāvadīpa. A sub-commentary on Jayatīrtha's Tattvaprakāśika by Rāghavendratīrtha.
Chānd.Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
GDK.	Gurvarthadīpikā. A gloss by Vādirājatīrtha on Jayatīrtha's Tattvaprakāśikā.
GVN.	Sumadhwavijaya of Narayan Panditacharya rendered into English by G. V. Nadgouda.
HDSV.	History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its literature, by BNK Sharma.
HIP.	A History of Indian Philosophy by Surendranath Dasgupta.
IPR.	Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan.

Kaṭha.Up.	Kaṭhopaniṣad.
Kaṭha.Up. - SG.	Kaṭhopaniṣad. English translation by Swami Gambhirānanda.
Kena. Up.	Kenopaniṣad.
Kaus. Up.	Kauśītaki Upaniṣad.
KKD.	Kaṭhopaniṣad Khaṇḍārtha by Rāghavendratīrtha.
Māṇḍ.Up.	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
M. BSB.	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya by Madhvācārya.
M. BSB. - AHB.	M.BSB with Kannada Translation by A. Haridas Bhat.
M. BSB. - SSR.	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Madhvācārya, translated in English by S. Subba Rau.
Mbh.	Mahābhārata.
Muṇḍ.Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
Muṇḍ.Up.- MB.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad with a commentary by Madhvācārya.
NS.	Nyāya Sudhā. A commentary by Jayatīrtha on Anuvyākhyāna.
OIP.	Outlines of Indian Philosophy by Prof. M. Hiriyanna.
Pāṇini.	Pāṇinīya Vyākaraṇasūtra (Aṣṭādhyāyī).
PCK.	Prācīna Caritra Kośa by Siddhesvarshastri Chitrav.
PHM.	Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya by B. N. K. Sharma.
PMS.	Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Sūtra.
Praśna.Up. - SG.	Praśna Upaniṣad. English Translation by Swāmī Gambhirānanda
RV.	Ṛgveda.
S. BSB.	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya by Śaṅkarācārya.
S. BSB. - VA.	Śāṅkarabhāṣya. Marathi translation by Vāsudevaśāstri Abhyankar.
S. BSB. - SD.	Śāṅkarabhāṣya. Marathi translation by S.D. Deshmukh.
S. B.	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa

SDS.	Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha of Mādhavācārya rendered into Marathi by R. P. Kangale.
SED.	Sanskrit-English Dictionary by V. S. Apte.
Śrībhāṣya.	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya by Rāmānujācārya.
Śribhāṣya	Śrībhāṣya- English translation by - SV. Swami Vīreśvarānanda.
RDK.	Śrībhāṣya - Edited by R. D. Karmarkar.
SRK.	The Brahmasūtra by S. Radhakrishnan.
STK.	Sattarkadīpāvali. A commentary on M. BSB., by Padmanābhatīrtha.
Śveta. Up.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
T. Ā.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.
Tait. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
Tarka.	Tarkasaṅgraha by Annaṁbhaṭṭa.
Tarka-YVA.	Tarkasaṅgraha- Yashwant Vasudev Athalye.
Tarka-MRB.	Tarkasaṅgraha- Mahadev Rajaram Bodas.
TC.	Tātparya Candrikā, by Vyāsatīrtha
TCP.	Tātparyacandrikāprakāśa by Rāghavendratīrtha.
TDK.	Tantradīpikā. Independent and concise commentary on Brahmasūtras, by Rāghavendratīrtha.
TOI.	Times of India.
TP.	Tattvaprakāśikā. A commentary by Jayatīrtha on Madhvācārya's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.
TP-RR.	Tattvaprakāśikā. Marathi translation by Raṅgācārya Raddi.
TPD.	Tāttvapradīpikā. A commentary on Madhvācārya's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya by his direct disciple Trivikrama Pandita.
VGR.	The seers of the Ṛgveda by V, G. Rahurkar.
VKM.	Vākyārthamañjarī. A sub-commentary on Jayatīrtha's Tattvaprakāśikā by Śarkarā Śrīnivāsa.

VSG.	The Vedānta. A study of the Brahmasūtras with the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva and Vallabh, by V. S. Ghate
VST.	Vedāntasūtra by George Thibaut.
VVM.	Vākyārthavivaraṇam. A sub-commentary on Jayatīrtha's Tattvaprakāśikā by Śrīnivāsatīrtha.
VML.	Vākyārthamuktāvalī. A sub-commentary on Jayatīrtha's Tattvaprakāśikā by Tāmraparṇī Śrīnivāsa.
(2-3-8)	(Adhyāya no. 2- Pāda no. 3- Sūtra no. 8)

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॥ ॐ नमो नारायणाय ॥

INVOCATION

॥ मङ्गलाचरणम् ॥

नारायणं विजिज्ञास्यं जगज्जन्मादिकारणम् ।
शास्त्रसमन्वयादेव गम्यं नत्वा परायणम् ॥ १॥
वेदव्यासगुरून् नत्वा सूत्रभाष्यकृतस्तथा ।
टीकाटिप्पणिकर्तॄंश्च नत्वा सूत्रार्थ ईक्ष्यते ॥ २ ॥

Having made obeisance to Lord Nārāyaṇa, the final resort, Who is worth inquiring into, Who is the cause of creation etc. of the world, Who is comprehensible only through a proper critical interpretation of the entire range of scriptures, having saluted the great preceptor Vedavyāsa who composed these Vedānta-sūtras, the ācāryas who commented on these sūtras and those who wrote glosses and comments (on these commentaries), the import of the sūtras would be looked into.

Chapter I
General Introduction

Culture in India

It is rather surprising that in various international surveys of human happiness index Indians rank high on 'happiness barometer' inspite of economic backwardness, inadequate education, inefficient governance, rampant corruption, uncontrolled terrorism and so on, in the country. This is attributed to their religion, culture and attitude towards life. It is not that there is no religion or philosophy in other countries. But in India philosophy is not for mere intellectual satisfaction. It stands interwoven with religion and culture. There is a maxim in Jainism, which says, " Do not live to know, but know to live"[1]. There are many religions and sects in India. They have grown over a period of thousands of years and do not depend on some sermons given by any single divine saint. Almost all the religions and sects in India except one or two, depend on the basic concept of a superhuman, omnipotent and omniscient power called by various names like *Īśvara, Paramātman* and *Brahman*, behind the existence and sustenance of this world. Those religions which ignored such a Supreme Being, did not survive in India for long. Hence, this development of a culture around a central concept of a Supreme Being, is worth looking into.

Development of Indian Culture

It is well known that in India religion and culture are greatly influenced by the world's oldest literature called the Vedas. They started with simple devotional hymns addressed to the forces of nature conceived as deities. These hymns called '*mantras*' also contain some seeds of philosophy. For example, some hymns conceive a Supreme Being Who transcends the world and is

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1 OIP. p. 20.

immanent in it. These hymns have been handed down to us orally from unknown antiquity. Some western scholars guess that these could have come from a date 1200 to 2400 B.C. Bal Gangadhar Tilak holds that these came from a date 4000 B.C.[1]. This simple devotion then changed into a tradition of elaborate, complicated and costly sacrifices. The procedures of these sacrifices were compiled in a class of works called '*Brāhmaṇas*'. In course of time people got fed up of these sacrifices, and the public aversion gave birth to symbolic sacrifices, meditations and philosophic discussions in secluded forests as described in the works called '*Āraṇyakas*'and '*Upaniṣads*'. This vast literature consisting of the *mantras*, the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads* is collectively known as Vedas, developed over a period of 5000 years. The orthodox believers hold that the Vedas are superhuman (*apauruṣeya*) and that they have been directly revealed by the Supreme Being, and heard by the sages. Hence, the Vedas are also known as '*Śruti*' i.e. 'what is heard'. Then, there developed another class of scriptural texts composed by historically known sages. These works are called '*Smṛtis*'. Under this category, there are some expatiatary works which try to propogate the Vedic truths and values to the masses. They are the *Purāṇas*, the *Pañcatantras* and the two epics *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* which also go by the name *Itihāsa*. By the time of about 600 B.C., the Vedic and other ancillary literature had grown to an unwieldy volume. There were mutual conflicts of views among the learned. S. Radhakrishnan describes- "It was an age of speculative chaos, full of inconsistent theologies and vague wranglings"[2]. Thus, for a common man, the condition was quite confusing. The atmosphere was conducive to the advent of heterodox doctrines. That was the time when materialism (*Cārvāka-darśana*), Jainism and Buddhism arose and caught the imagination of some people. This stimulated activity in the orhodox camp as well. The need of the hour was

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1 HIP. I. p. 10.

2 IPR. I. p. 353.

to provide the people with a comprehensive system based on the Vedic literature. As a result a number of systems emerged viz. Kapila's *Sāṅkhya*, Patañjali's *Yoga*, Gautama's *Nyāya*, Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika* and Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. These orthodox and unorthodox schools of philosophic opinion are known as *darśanas*.

The *Brahmasūtras*

In the case of the first four orthodox doctrines mentioned above, even though their authors accepted the suzerainty of Vedas, what they gave in their doctrines, were their own intuitive theories. All these theories were dry arm-chair discussions and they had nothing in them to touch the heart of a common man struggling to make both the ends meet. The fifth one broached the out-dated sacrificialism. Each one of these authors promised that those who studied and followed his doctrine would get release from the worldly suffering and get final beatitude (*apavarga, niḥśreyas*). Though all these doctrines were evolved with an aim of removing the confusion in the minds of the followers of Vedas, and providing them with a comprehensive system for their spiritual progress, they only added to their confusion. What was required was a stock-taking, a review. It was necessary to pronounce an authoritative judgement on WHAT EXACTLY IS THE ESSENCE OF VEDAS, i.e. VEDĀNTA among the apparent conflicting thoughts and opinions. It was also necessary to show the flaws in other competing doctrines, both orthodox and heretical, and to give a road map for spiritual development and achieving final deliverance (*mokṣa*). This task was undertaken by Bādarāyaṇavyāsa, also known as Vedavyāsa. He gave his decisions on these points, in about five hundred and odd *sūtras*, which came to be known as *Brahmasūtras* or*Vedāntasūtras*. This treatise is called as *Brahmasūtra* or *Vedāntasūtra*. *Vedāntasūtra* is universally recognized as the manual of *Vedānta*. It is the sixth orthodox *darśana*, called *Vedāntadarśana* or *Uttaramīmāṁsā* or *Brahmamīmāṃsā*.

Date of *Brahmasūtras*

Regarding the date of *Brahmasūtras*, "Indian scholars are of the opinion that the *sūtra* was composed in the period from 500 to 200 B.C. Frazer assigns it to 400 B.C."[1]. Pāṇini does not mention Vedavyāsa anywhere, but Patañjali does refer to him. Moreover, Patañjali is shown as the ninth descendant in Jaimini's lineage[2]. The dates of Pāṇini and Patañjali are fairly agreed to as 500 B.C.[3] and 150 B.C.[4] Therefore, Vedavyāsa's period could be between 500 to 400 B.C.

The structure of *Brahmasūtras*

There are 564 *sūtras* in all. The figure varies from one commentator to another, because one may combine two *sūtras* into one and another may split one *sūtra* into two. Occasionally one may read an additional *sūtra*. But such variations are rare. It will be mentioned, wherever variation occurs. The *sūtras* are grouped into four divisions called *adhyāyas*. Each *adhyāya* has four chapters called *pādas*. Each *pāda* is subdivided into topics known as *adhikaraṇas*. An *adhikarṇa* may consist of one or more *sūtras*. The first *adhyāya* is known as *samanvayādhyāya*. It reconciles the different scriptural texts and demonstrates how they all convey the nature and attributes of the Supreme Being, *Brahman*, the source of the universe, which is the central point in all-philosophical enquiry. The second *adhyāya* is called as *avirodhādhyāya*. It confirms the conclusion of the first *adhyāya* by showing that it is not open to any contradiction or objection, either by the other established doctrines or by the apparent inconsistencies within the scriptural texts themselves. In the third *adhyāya*, the *sūtrakāra* discusses the ways and means, the *modus*

1 IPR. II. p. 433.
2 PCK. p. 921.
3 PCK. p. 405.
4 PCK. p. 383.

operandi, of realizing the Supreme Being, as prescribed in the scriptures. Hence it is known as *sādhanādhyāya*. The fourth *adhyāya*, known as *phalādhyāya*, deals with the path of spiritual progress of an individual who has realized the Supreme Being and describes how he attains the status of a released soul and obtains unadulterated eternal bliss.

The style of *Brahmasūtras*

As the name suggests *Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa* has rendered this work in the form of *sūtras*, in keeping with the fashion in those times. A *sūtra* by definition comprises few words. So the *Brahmasūtras* are necessarily cryptic. Some of the modern scholars feel that the *sūtras* are too laconic to be doubt free. Some remarks are as follows. "In the anxiety for economy of words which is carried to an excess the *sūtras* are not intelligible without a commentary"[1]. "In fact, they (the *sūtras*) are more cryptic than the *Upaniṣads*, and it is consequently much more difficult to get at their meaning than at that of those old treatises. The result is that even as regards the most essential points there is ambiguity"[2]. Possibly the *sūtras* are in the nature of the modern news-paper headlines. For example, look at these headlines: "Green card blues"[3], "Government prepares for life after left"[4], "yellow fever, blues"[5]. Unless one knows the topics they refer to, it is difficult to get at the meaning behind these headlines. Similarly, the key-words in the *sūtras* are topic-specific. The topics referred to by the *sūtras* could be the popular ones debated in different scriptures in those days. So unless one is able to locate the topic, the *sūtra* cannot be intelligible. The difficulty would aggravate if we start with a preconceived notion that "the *Brahmasūtra* is

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1 SRK. p. 23.
2 OIP. p 337.
3 TOI. 22-7-07.
4 TOI. 21-8-07.
5 TOI. 14-10-07.

the exposition of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* "[1] and "all schools of Vedānta claim to be based upon the *Upaniṣads*"[2]. If we look at the *Brahmasūtras* from a narrow window of a few *Upaniṣads* which Śaṅkarācārya has made us familiar with, then the *sūtras* would certainly look enigmatic. The *sūtras* appear to have much wider sweep. The *Sūtrakāra* avers *śāstrayonitvāt* (BS. 1-1-3) that the *Brahman* can be known through *śāstra* (scriptures) only. He does not say *Upaniṣadyonitvāt. Śāstra* for Śaṅkarācārya includes the four Vedas, the epics, the *purāṇas* and other branches of learning, *vidyāsthāna*[3]. That is why we need a commentary in order to understand the *sūtras*, because the commentator would be conversant with all the branches of learning.

Commentaries on *Brahmasūtras*

The *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtras* are known as *prasthānatraya*, the triple foundation of the *Vedānta*. Therefore, there are a large number of commentaries on these, particularly on *Bhagavdgītā* and *Brahmasūtra*. In *Madhvavijaya*, a biography of Madhvācārya, its author Nārāyaṇapaṇḍitācārya refers to the existence of twenty-one commentaries on *Brahmasūtra* earlier to that of Madhvācārya. The names of these twenty-one commentators are given by the same author in his own gloss *Bhāvaprakāśika* on *Madhvavijaya*. They are 1. Bhāratīvijaya, 2. Saṁvidānanda, 3. Brahmaghoṣa, 4. Śatānanda, 5. Udvarta, 6. Vijaya, 7. Rudrabhaṭṭa, 8. Vāmana, 9. Yādavaprakāśa, 10. Rāmānuja, 11. Bhartṛprāpañca, 12. Dramiḍa, 13. Brahmadatta, 14. Bhāskara, 15. Piśāca, 16. Vṛttikāra, 17. Vijayabhaṭṭa, 18. Viṣṇukrānta, 19. Vādīndra, 20. Mādhavadāsa and 21. Śaṅkara. These names are not in chronological order. Of these twenty-one commentaries, only three are available, namely those of Śaṅkarācārya, Bhāskarabhaṭṭa and Rāmānujācārya. After

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1 SRK. p. 21.

2 OIP. p. 336.

3 SRK. p. 242.

Madhvācārya also, there are a number of commentators on Brahmasūtras. They are 1. Nimbārka, 2. Śrīkaṇṭha, 3. Śrīpati, 4. Vallabha, 5. Śuka, 6. Vijñāna-bhikṣu, and 7. Baladeva. It means that these twenty-nine Vedāntins interpret the *sūtras* differently and they have different doctrines to teach, which are all derived from these *Brahmasūtras* only, according to them.

The area of difference

A doctrine or philosophy in general, broadly includes two things, 1. Ontology i.e. the metaphysics concerning the emergence and sustenance of the world etc. and 2. Epistemology i.e. the science of understanding things. The world comprising sentient and insentient things, is perceptible and there is no difficulty in understanding it. The only hypothesis to be comprehended is the existence of a super-sensuous entity *Brahman*, the Supreme Being. The means of understanding, agreed to by all the Vedāntins, are 1. perception, 2. inference, and 3. verbal testimony. All these commentators have no quarrel on certain points. They all agree that *Brahman* is the cause of the universe; that *Brahman* is all-pervading; and that in understanding super-sensuous matter like *Brahman* the final authority is the revealed truth (*śruti*) declared in scriptures; and reasoning is acceptable as long as it does not contradict the revelation. They also agree that the goal of all spiritual endeavour is to get deliverance from the transmigratory suffering in the world. Then where is the difference? In order to explain the hypothesis of a super-sensuous Supreme Being, any doctrine in *Vedānta* has to present Him with reference to the known sentient and insentient entities in the world. In other words, the doctrine has to establish a relation between individual soul (*Jīva*), the inanimate matter (*Jagat*) and the Supreme Lord (*Īśvara*). It is here that the commentators differ, and differ widely.

The three Principal Traditions

In this panoramic spectrum of various views, at one extreme end is Śaṅkarācārya's *advaita* or *kevalādvaita*. Śaṅkarācārya holds

absolute identity between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. At the other extreme end is Madhvācārya's *dvaita*. Madhvācārya holds absolute distinction (*bheda*, *dvaita*) between *Jīva*, *Jagat* and *Brahman* and within *Jīvas* and within the *Jagat*. All others try to strike a golden mean by reconciling identity and duality i.e. by accepting identity in some matters, and difference in others. S. Radhakrishnan lists the doctrines of all these commentators chronologically, which are self-indicative. They are Śaṅkara's *nirviśeṣādvaita*, Bhāskara's and Yādavaprakāśa's *bhedābheda*, Rāmānuja's *viśiṣṭādvaita*, Madhva's *dvaita*, Nimbārka's *dvaitādvaita*, Śrīkaṇṭha's *śaiva-viśiṣṭādvaita*, Śripati's *bhedābhedātmaka-viśiṣṭādvaita*, Vallabha's '*śuddhādvaita*', Śuka's '*bheda-vāda*', Vijñāna-bhikṣu's *ātmabrahmaikya-bhedavāda* and Baladeva's *acintya-bhedābheda*[1]. Three of these are important. They are the doctrines advocated by Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya who have large followings and are widely respected. These three views of *Vedānta* are traditionally considered as the cornerstones of *Vedānta*. Vidyāraṇya mentions these three traditional views of *Vedānta* only, in his well-known *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*. B. N. K. Sharma remarks : "Without a complete study of these three principal traditions of interpretation of the *sūtras*, in their relation to one another, it would be difficult to have a clear and firm background of ideas and sufficient data for entering upon a valid discussion of the problem of where the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa are intended to lead us".[2]

The *Kevalādvaita* of Śaṅkarācārya (788-820 A. D.)

Śaṅkarācārya is so popular, especially with the learned class, that many in India and abroad take *Vedānta* as synonymous with his *advaita* philosophy. His doctrine of absolute monism (*Kevalādvaita*) can be summarized in half of a verse[3]. The ultimate

1 SRK. p. 27.

2 BNK. I. p. xix.

3 ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ॥ (*Vedāntadindima*. p. 19).

truth in the world is *Brahman*. The world of plurality is unreal and illusory. The individual soul is nothing else but *Brahman*. *Brahman* is all-pervading and is pure consciousness, devoid of all qualities, devoid of all forms. *Brahman* is the cause of origination, subsistence and dissolution of the world. Apart from *Brahman* or consciousness, the world of objects does not exist itself. It is only an appearance superimposed on *Brahman* due to ignorance (*avidyā*) just as a snake is seen in place of a rope or silver seen in place of a shell. With reference to the world, *Brahman* associated with the principle of *māyā* or creative (i.e. projective) power, is *Īśvara*, who creates and maintains the world. The individual soul (*Jīva*) is a phenomenon while the truth is *Brahman*. *Jīva* has ignorance (*avidyā*) about his status as *Brahman* and he believes in his own finiteness and identifies himself with the body, the sense organs etc. *Jīva* can get deliverance only when he realizes his identity with *Brahman*. Actions can only purify the mind and make it fit to acquire the knowledge of this identity of *Brahman* and *Jīva*. But finally it is knowledge alone, which can give him the release.

The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of Rāmānujācārya (1017-1137 A.D.)

Rāmānujācārya advocates a different line of epistemology. According to him, knowledge implies both subject and object. Mind can apprehend only a differentiated object. What is known is necessarily known as characterized in some way[1]. All knowledge including that of ultimate reality, is necessarily of an object as complex (*saguṇa*). If the *Upaniṣads* described *Brahman* as without qualities, it only means that some qualities are denied while there are still others characterizing it. All know that there are two types of things, *cetana* (sentient) and *jaḍa* (insentient). Rāmānujācārya adds another, which is neither. *Jñāna* (knowledge) is of this intermediate type[2]. *Jñāna* is known only along with some object

1 OIP. p. 386.

2 OIP. p. 387.

or not at all[1]. What exists (*sat*) is alone cognized and that knowledge in the absence of a real object corresponding to its content (*yathārtha*) is inconceivable. This is known as *sat-khyāti*. Knowledge extends from that (*prakārin* or object) to the what (*prakāra* i.e. mode, kind, property or quality) of the object presented[2]. Knowledge no doubt, is always of the given and nothing but the given; but it need not be of the whole of what is given[3]. The mode, property or attribute of an object is called *viśeṣaṇa* and the object itself is known as *viśeṣya*. The *viśeṣaṇa* cannot exist by itself, separately. Thus, there is unity or inseparability (*apṛthak-siddhi*) between a substance and its attribute but no identity. For example, in a 'blue-lotus' the blueness is quite distinct from the lotus, for a quality cannot be the same as a substance. But, at the same time the blueness as a quality (*viśeṣaṇa*) depends for its very being upon the lotus, the substance (*viśeṣya*) and cannot therefore be regarded as external to it. The complex whole (*viśiṣṭa*) of the flower in question, in which the *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are necessarily included, is spoken of as a unity. Hence, the name '*Viśiṣṭādvaita*'[4]. Rāmānujācārya extends the principle to two or more substances where one controls the others, and holds that such a *Viśiṣṭādvaita* relation may be found between one substance and another. For example, in any organism there are two separate entities, the body and the soul. The soul controls, supports and utilizes the body for its own ends. Therefore, the soul is the important part, the substance, and the body which is subordinate to the soul, is treated as the attribute of the soul. Here too there is inseparable unity between the soul (*viśeṣya*) and its body (*viśeṣaṇa*).

Rāmānujācārya makes use of these principles while establishing his concept of ontology. He holds that the world

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1 OIP. p. 388.

2 OIP. p. 390.

3 OIP. p. 394.

4 OIP. p. 399.

consists of three factors (*tattva-traya*) namely the inanimate matter (*acit*), the sentient individual souls (*cit*) and *Brahman* or Viṣṇu. *Brahman* controls and supports the *cit* and *acit*, and therefore, the *cit* and *acit* are considered as the body or the attribute of *Brahman*. Rāmānujācārya holds that there exists unity or inseparability (*apṛthak-siddhi*) between *Brahman* and His attributes the *cit* and *acit*. With this hypothesis, he reconciles the various statements in the *Upaniṣads*, referring to unity and plurality. According to this doctrine, *Brahman* possesses all the auspicious qualities and is free from all impurities. *Brahman* is all-knowing, all-pervading, all-powerful, all-merciful, all-blissful and free from all-limitations of time, space and causality. He is the cause of the universe, both sentient and insentient. The individual soul (*Jīva*) is not mere consciousness but the knower, the subject (*kartṛ*) of knowledge. Knowledge is intuitive by nature and does not necessarily depend upon the senses[1]. *Jīva* has the power to act and in its pristine purity, possesses the auspicious qualities resembling those of *Brahman*, but to a limited extent. This is the reason why the *Jīva* is often described as being identical with *Brahman*.[2] *Jīva* has no power whatsoever on the movements of the world, and it is atomic in size[3]. *Jīvas* are infinite in number. *Jīva* suffers on account of ignorance of *Brahman*. Right knowledge of *Brahman* results in devotion (*bhakti*) towards *Brahman*. *Jīva* can get salvation only through *bhakti*. Even in liberation, *Jīva* does not lose its individuality. Rāmānujācārya[4] accepts the *Pariṇāmavāda* or the *satkāryavāda* which maintains that the effect is nothing but a modification of the form of the cause, in which it is already present.

The *Dvaita* of Madhvācārya (1200-1280 A.D.)

This doctrine is simple and easy to understand. Madhvācārya accepts some of the tenets advocated by Rāmānujācārya. But,

1 VSG. p. 25.
2 VSG. p. 25.
3 VSG. p. 25.
4 VSG. p. 26.

unlike Rāmānujācārya, Madhvācārya does not feel compelled to establish some kind of unity between *Brahman* and the world of sentient and insentient entities, by some device like conceiving the sentient and insentient things as forming the body of *Brahman*, simply because there are some Upaniṣadic statements which apparently declare unity among them. Perhaps he feels that there is no difficulty in holding duality (*dvaita*) in the world since there are many Upaniṣadic statements in support of it and the other texts which seemingly assert unity (*advaita*) can be explained away as figurative statements, as done by others. S. Radhakrishnan opines that "different commentators starting with particular beliefs force their views into the *Upaniṣads* and strain their language so as to make it consistent with their own special doctrines"[1]. Hence, Madhvācārya boldly accepts that the world is real with fivefold difference, viz. that between the *Jīva* and *Brahman*, between the inanimate (world) *Jagat* and *Brahman*, between the *Jīva* and the inanimate *Jagat*, between the *Jīvas* themselves and between matter and matter in the inanimate *Jagat*.

Madhvācārya holds *Brahman* as a personality called Viṣṇu, having innumerable auspicious qualities and free from all impurities. He is all-knowing, all-pervading, all-powerful, all-merciful, all-blissful, and free from all limitations of time, space and causality. He is *saguṇa*. When he is said to be *nirguṇa*, it only means that He is not associated with the attributes of *Prakṛti*, i.e. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Madhvācārya does not agree with the view that 'words cannot describe *Brahman*, but they may only suggest or indicate Him'. Madhvācārya argues that in that case i.e. if *Brahman* is *avācya*, He cannot be the subject-matter of scriptures. Whenever scriptures say that *Brahman* is indescribable, it only means that words fail to describe His limitless qualities fully. *Brahman* is considered as the efficient cause of creation. Madhvācārya

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1 IPR. I. p. 140.

attributes an eight-fold[1] function to *Brahman* with respect to creation. The functions are creation (*utpatti*), subsistence (*sthiti*), destruction (*saṁhāra*), control (*niyamana*), enlightenment (*jñāna*), obstruction (*ajñāna*), bondage (*bandha*), and release (*mokṣa*). *Brahman*, *Prakṛti*, *Jīvas* and (the inanimate matter) *Jaḍa* are all real and the latter three exist as subservient to *Brahman*. Individual souls are atomic in size and innumerable in number. *Jīvas* have some auspicious attributes like knowledge, bliss etc. resembling those of *Brahman*, to a limited extent; but *Jīvas* suffer in the world, because their pristine intelligence and bliss are veiled by ignorance (*avidyā*). Knowledge of *Brahman* obtained by *Jīva* through study and rituals results in devotion (*bhakti*) towards the Lord. *Jīva* can get salvation only through *bhakti*. Even in the state of release, *Jīva* retains its individual identity and it can never become identical with *Brahman*.

The Problem

All these theologians claim that their doctrines are consistent with the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahmasūtra*. With all due respects to these great teachers, for a student without any prior belief in any particular doctrine, the problem is how the same *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa, can advocate such divergent and mutually conflicting doctrines, as claimed by the respective protagonists of these views. It is true that the *Brahmasūtras* are extremely laconic. So some may argue that because of their cryptic nature, the *Brahmasūtras* permit varying interpretations. Swami Shivanand, the founder of The Divine Life Society at Rishikesh, observes in the introduction to his commentary on *Brahamsūtras* as follows. "Sanskrit is very elastic. It is like *Kāmadhenu* or *Kalpataru*. You can milk out of it various kinds of *Rasas* according to your intellectual calibre and spiritual experiences. Therefore different Ācāryas have built different systems of thoughts or cults

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1 उत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारा नियतिर्ज्ञानमावृतिः। बन्धमोक्षौ च पुरुषात् यस्मात् स हरिरेकराट्॥ (स्कन्दपुराण) (M. BSB. 1-1-2).

by interpreting the *sūtras* in their own ways and became founders of sects''. The argument is not convincing. Such a contingency is possible in interpreting revealed texts (*Śruti*), which are intuitive expressions of sages. It is also possible in amorous or entertaining Sanskrit literature like dramas, poems, novels etc. where a sentence may carry different meanings like *vācyārtha* (primary meaning), *lakṣyārtha* (secondary or indicated meaning) and *vyaṅgyārtha* (insinuation). But, that is not expected in *Brahmasūtras*, which are specially composed to set aside conflicts and reconcile the purport of *Śrutis* and to pronounce authoritative judgements (*nirṇāyakagranthas*) on what exactly is the essence of Vedas and that too in the language of *sūtras*. In Sanskrit literature, there are so many compositions in the form of *sūtras* in different subjects, but there are no such reports of conflicting interpretations except that in the case of *Brahmasūtras*. In fact, ''the wise ones call it a *sūtra*, which comprises few words, is free from doubt, is meaningful and suggestive of wide meaning and which avoids unnecessary details and is free from flaws''[1]. There is a customary method and practice of exposing a *sūtra* into a full sentence, using the agreed techniques (*tantra*) like continuing a word or two from a previous *sūtra* (*anuvṛtti*), repeating a word from the *sūtra* under consideration itself (*āvṛtti*), drawing a word from a next *sūtra* (*apakarṣa*), taking a word from the previous governing *sūtra* (*adhikāra*), supplying an ellipsis (*śeṣapūraṇa*, *adhyāhāra*) and adding a word or two compatible with the context (*yogyatā*). With these techniques it should be possible to amplify each *sūtra* into a full sentence and to decipher it. **The aim should be to understand what the *Sūtrakāra* has to convey through each *sūtra*.** It is not necessary to prove with the help of other testimonies like the *Upaniṣads*, the validity of what the *sūtra* declares. As already said, *Brahmasūtra* is one of the three pillars (*prasthāna-traya*) on which the edifice of *Vedāntadarśana* stands. So it is on par with the other two pillars, namely the *Upaniṣads* and

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1 अल्पाक्षरमसंदिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम्। अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः॥
(M. BSB. 1-1-1).

Bhagavadgītā. Therefore, *Brahmasūtra* itself is a self valid testimony (*svataḥsiddha*) as a statement pronounced by a credible person[1]. We cannot get a more knowledgeable and trustworthy person than Vedavyāsa, who is believed to have compiled and edited all the four Vedas, eighteen *Purāṇas* and composed *'Jaya'*, the great epic *Mahābhārata*.

Some comparative studies on the subject

On such an important work like *Brahmasūtra*, when there are so many divergent commentaries, there have to be some comparative studies of varying commentaries. Perhaps, the earliest such work could be that by Vyāsatīrtha. (1460- 1539 A.D.) In his *Tātparyacandrikā*, he comments on these doctrines viz. *kevalādvaita*, *viśiṣṭādvaita* and *dvaita*. Some of his observations and arguments will be made use of in this work. S. N. Dasgupta remarks: "The logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole of Indian thought"[2]. During the modern times, there are at least three works in English, which present a comparative study of various commentaries on *Brahmasūtra*. The first one is '*The Vedānta*' by V. S. Ghate (1918), the second is '*The Brahma Sutra*, The Philosophy of Spiritual Life' by S. Radhakrishnan (1959) and the third is '*The Brahmasūtras* and Their Principal Commentaries' by B. N. K. Sharma (1971). However, all these highly learned and illustrious professors appear rather biassed one way or the other.

A Study by V. S. Ghate

The study by V. S. Ghate covers the commentaries of as many as five commentators, namely, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka (latter half of 13th century A. D.) and Vallabha

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1 लौकिकं तु आप्तोक्तं प्रमाणम्। आप्तः यथार्थवक्ता। (Tarka).

2 HIP. IV. p. vii.

(16th century A. D.). So, the picture is on a wider canvas. Yet, his analysis of various *Adhikaraṇas* is very brief. In the first *Adhyāya*, he analyses each *Pāda* in about 3-4 pages and in the second *Adhyāya* in about 8-9 pages. Against each *Adhikaraṇa* he mentions what that *Adhikaraṇa* intends to establish. He normally does not go to the details of the *sūtras* and he rarely quotes a *sūtra*. Wherever divergent views are there among the commentators he mentions the view of each one in one or two sentences; he accepts one and criticizes the others. In one *Adhikaraṇa* he may accept one commentator's view, but in the next *Adhikaraṇa* he may criticize the same commentator's view. He has tried to remain objective and unbiassed. In his preface to the work, the author remarks: "If this venture of mine succeeds in arousing some interest in Sanskrit Philosophy, and more particularly in removing the idea, which is now current in Europe that the sum of the *Vedānta* is to be found in the system of Śaṅkara, I shall consider that my labour will not have been in vain"[1]. But in spite of all this attempt to remain unbiassed, certain bias is discernible. S. Radhakrishnan observes: "Like Madhva and Jīva Gosvāmin, Vallabha holds the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* in high esteem. --- He (Vallabha) himself was a follower of Viṣṇu-svāmin (fourteenth century)---- He (Viṣṇu-Svāmin) follows Madhva's views except that he advocates the worship of *Rādhā* along with that of *Kṛṣṇa*"[2]. So the views of Vallabhācārya are not expected to be drastically different from those of Madhvācārya. But even when Madhvācārya and Vallabhācārya hold the same view on a *sūtra* (BS. 2-3-29), V. S. Ghate remarks: "I am inclined to believe that, on the whole, the interpretations as proposed by Nimbārka and Vallabha (16th century) are most satisfactory and least far-fetched"[3]. But in the case of Madhvācārya (13th century), the author grudgingly remarks:

1 VSG. p. viii.
2 SRK. p. 88,89.
3 VSG. p. 89.

"Madhva's interpretation also of this particular *sūtra* is quite good; but his splitting up of what forms a single *Adhikaraṇa* according to others into so many different *Adhikaraṇas* is anything but satisfactory"[1]. The author observes: "Madhva also follows Nimbārka"[2]. According to S. Radhakrishnan, Nimbārka was born about half-a-century later than Madhva[3]. Then who can follow whom? At the introductory stage itself the author opines that "the very fantastic and forced manner in which he (Madhvācārya) interprets many of the *sūtras* leaves no doubt about the fact that he would have even set aside the *sūtras* altogether, but that their uncontested authoritativeness prevented him from doing so"[4]. The author's concluding remarks start with Madhvācārya: "To begin with, the commentary of Madhva is evidently inferior in character and is a performance of little or no merit. His interpretations differ from those of the rest very widely and in a very large number of cases; but the reader has seen that in a majority of instances, his explanations are far-fetched, fantastic and too sectarian in character; the scriptural passages he refers to for discussion more often belong to the *Saṁhitās* than to the *Upaniṣads*, a procedure, which can be easily explained by the fact that it is very difficult for him to find in the *Upaniṣads* a support for his own doctrine"[5]. What is wrong in differing from others? In fact he is possibly the first commentator to come out completely from the then prevailing belief that 'the sum of the *Vedānta* is to be found in the system of Śaṅkara', as desired by the author. Further, is it a defect to quote *saṁhitās*? In order to get to the depth of the topic in a *sūtra*, Madhvācārya quotes not only *Saṁhitās* but also *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, *āgamas*,

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1 VSG. p. 90.
2 VSG. p. 80.
3 SRK. p. 27.
4 VSG. p. 30.
5 VSG. p. 156.

Mahābhārata, *Purāṇas*, and many *Upaniṣads* beyond the groove of the 4-5 popular *Upaniṣads*. He is fully aware of the *Sūtrakāra*'s teaching that *Brahman* can be known only through the *Śāstra* (*Śāstrayonitvāt* BS. 1-1-3) and *Śāstra* includes all these and not merely a few popular *Upaniṣads*. In fact he deserves loud applause for his ability to refer to such a wide range of scriptures. V. S. Ghate finally rejects the doctrines of all these five commentators. Whether the author accepts one doctrine or another or none, is a subjective matter. He may not be biassed towards anyone of these commentators. But the author's unsavoury remarks against one commentator, are indicative of an inherent whimsical bias against that commentator and the consequent perfunctory reading of his commentary.

A study by S. Radhakrishnan

S. Radhakrishnan covers a still wider range of commentaries. He takes into consideration twelve commentators namely Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Yādava Prakāśa, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha, Śrīpati, Vallabha, Śuka, Vijñāna-bhikṣu and Baladeva. In the preface to his book '*Brahmasūtra*', he says : "In this book I have followed principally Śaṅkara's commentary---"[1]. In his analysis of *Brahmasūtras*, the author considers each *sūtra* separately. He first translates the *sūtra* as it stands, supplying the ellipses if necessary. He gives the meaning of each word in the *sūtra*. Then he gives a gist of Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on that *sūtra*, fairly in detail. Wherever doctrinal differences are found among the commentators he simply expresses the views of the other commentators briefly in one or two sentences. However, he does not justify why he accepts Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation or why he does not accept the other interpretations. The author refers to Madhvācārya's views in the first four *sūtras*, but one does not find the name of Madhvācārya under any

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1 SRK. p. 11.

subsequent *sūtra*. It does not mean that the author has not taken into account Madhvācārya's views. He does mention Madhvācārya's views at some places but under the name of 18th century commentator Baladeva from Bengal. Kṛṣṇadāsa in his Hindi translation of *Shribrahmasūtra- govindabhāṣyam* of Baladeva, addresses Baladeva as *Śrīmādhvagauḍīyavīthīpathika* [1]. Baladeva includes in his list of teachers[2], the names of Madhvācārya, Padmanābhatīrtha, Nṛharitīrtha, Mādhavatīrtha, Akṣobhyatīrtha, Jayatīrtha, Rājendratīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha. All these are the well-known pontiffs of Mādhva tradition. Thus Baladeva is a follower of Mādhva tradition in which devotion to the Supreme Being alone leads one to salvation. Opinions are normally attributed to the pioneer. S. Radhakrishnan himself says: "Bengal *Vaiṣṇavism* developed by Caitanya (A.D. 1485-1533) is greatly influenced by the teachings of Madhva. --- Baladeva is said to have lived about the beginning of the eighteenth century--- His views are based on the doctrine of Madhva and the teachings of Caitanya"[3]. The attempt seems to be to banish an unlikeable name by ignoring to mention it. This is not expected of an illustrious philosopher teacher. This shows on the part of the author, an overt bias towards Śaṅkarācārya and a covert bias against Madhvācārya.

A Study by B. N. K. Sharma

B. N. K. Sharma makes a study of only the three principal commentaries viz. those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. This work appears to have been carried out with an express intention of countering the injustice caused to Madhva's commentary at the hands of many modern scholars like those shown above. In his preface to the book *'The Brahmasūtras and their Principal*

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1 अथ वैष्णवाग्रगण्य दार्शनिकधुरन्धर पण्डितप्रवर श्रीमाध्वगौडीयवीथीपथिक श्रीकृष्णचैतन्य-महाप्रभुचरणानुग महानुभाव श्रीबलदेवविद्याभूषणजी ।

2 HIP. IV. p. 448.

3 SRK. p. 97.

Commentaries', the author says: "By way of gently but firmly disengaging the study of the *sūtras* from the excessive hold of the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, I have taken the lead in commencing this study of the *sūtras* with Madhva's interpretation. This may help the reader to adapt himself to looking at the *sūtras* in fresh light regardless of what he has been conditioned to expect to find in them. In most of the known works in English, written specially on the *Brahmasūtras*, Madhva's interpretations have generally been ignored or have been only perfunctorily 'noticed'; or else dismissed in a few words as 'a performance of little or no merit'. This injustice to one of our principal commentators on the *sūtras* has to be remedied by the new generation of scholars"[1]. Thus, the author takes up the position at the other extreme end. Each chapter of this work, is an essay on an *Adhikaraṇa*. In that the author first establishes the purport of that *Adhikaraṇa* according to Madhvācārya, supported by a number of quotations from the scriptures, Madhvācārya's *bhāṣya* and other further commentaries and glosses like *Tattvaprakāśikā*, *Tātparyacandrikā* and others. Then he gives in a nutshell the interpretations of Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, quoting along with them extracts from the commentaries on them like *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru*. Further, under the heading 'criticism' the author brings forth the flaws and inconsistencies in these interpretations mostly with the help of *Tātparyacandrikā*. Thus, in this study, naturally the author is avowedly biased towards Madhvācārya.

The Concept of the Supreme Being

It is said earlier that a number of philosophical systems and theories arose in India, all aiming to remove the confusion in the minds of people caused by the multiplicity of deities and duties, and all promising to bring salvation. *Brahmasūtras* were necessitated when the other systems, both orthodox and heretical,

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1 BNK. I. p. xix.

failed to kindle enthusiasm among people. The five orthodox systems failed to impress the people and became part of history because they were dry theories where there was no primacy for the Supreme Being. It is seen that out of the three factors of the world, *Jīva*, *Jagat* and *Īśvara*, the first two are discernible, one being self-evident and the other being perceptible. The problem is about comprehending the *Īśvara*, the Supreme Being, and His relation with the first two, which can be known only through scriptures. The heretical systems like Jainism and Buddhism which tried to explain the world ignoring the Supreme Being, and concentrated on personal discipline to get out of suffering, did not survive the test of time. Jainism exists today in some small pockets of India. Buddhism, however logical, psychological, ethical and practical it may be, soon met its 'waterloo' in India for want of the concept of God in it. S. Radhakrishnan describes the fall of Buddhism in India as follows. "The old Buddhism, which denied the very being of God, offered no hope of human

immortality and looked upon life as misery, love of life as the greatest evil, and the end of man is the extinction of all desire, lost its power. --- Even Buddhism could thrive only by accepting Brāhmanical gods. Early Buddhism included Indra, Brahmā and other divinities. The new converts carried into it much of their reverence for the old gods. The Hīnayāna accepted Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Nārāyaṇa in their own names. The Mahāyāna, we have seen, never seriously opposed itself to the Hindu doctrines and practices. It elaborated the mythology and spoke of a hierarchy of divine grades and capacities, at the head of which was Ādi Buddha. While Brahmins looked upon Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, the Buddhists returned the compliment by identifying Viṣṇu, with Bodhisattva Padmapāṇi, called Avalokiteśvara. ---- When Brāhmanical faith inculcated universal love and devotion to God and proclaimed Buddha to be an avatār of Viṣṇu, the death knell

of Buddhism in India was sounded. --- Buddhism died a natural death''[1]. One can see in Bangkok, that even now the king of Thailand who is a Buddhist by religion, has maintained on his pay-roll some Brahmin priests, called '*Brām*', and invites them on some special occasions to his palace for invoking the Vedic gods and seeking their blessings for the Royal family. The present king himself is known as the ninth Rāma. In the capital city Bangkok, in every huge commercial building housing Govt. offices and public sector corporations etc., at the main gate one can find a cabin-like temple with an idol of the deity, four-faced *Brahmā*. Thus, the concept of a superhuman power, the Supreme Being behind the world, and reverence towards that power is an inevitable part of human culture and psyche, particularly in India, howsoever one may deny it. It cannot be simply brushed aside as a figment of superstition. Therefore, 'The Concept of Brahman, the Supreme Being, in *Brahmasūtras*' is worth studying since the *sūtras* are recognized as forming the 'manual of *Vedānta*', which tells the essence of Vedas.

The scope of this study

This topic mentioned above is covered in the first two *Adhyāyas* of *Brahmasūtras* and hence those two *Adhyāyas* only will be looked into in this work. What one should do after knowing the Supreme Being or what are the means available to a *Jīva* for achieving deliverance from the transmigratory bondage, or what will a *Jīva* get after release etc. are the topics of later concern. They are the topics considered in the third and fourth *Adhyāyas*, which will be dealt with in another work.

As mentioned earlier, there are twenty-nine *Vedāntins* who have given different interpretations of *Brahmasūtras*. Each *Vedāntin* has his own doctrine to teach and he claims to have

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1 IPR. I. P. 605, 606, 607.

derived his doctrine from these *sūtras* only. Going through all these commentaries becomes too unwieldy. In order to have a cross-sectional view of this panorama, one may study the commentaries of Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya only. The divergent doctrines of these three *Ācāryas* are seen earlier in a nutshell. Comparative studies of the varying commentaries by three modern scholars have been reviewed and it has been observed that each one of them has his own axe to grind.

Ignoring these doctrinal differences and attempts to read one's own doctrine in the *Brahmasūtras*, one should try to know what the *Sūtrakāra* intends to tell us through these *sūtras*, depending on the syntax and semantics of the words used in the *sūtras*. The endeavour should be to expand each *sūtra* into a full sentence (*vṛtti*), using the customary techniques like *anuvṛtti*, *āvṛtti* etc. and then to arrive at the meaning depending on the available common knowledge of grammar, lexicon, logic etc., irrespective of whether it agrees or disagrees with some Upaniṣadic statements. It is really a daunting task.

Selection of a reference text

The *sūtras* are in the nature of decisions on the doubtful topics in *Vedānta*. The keywords in the *sūtras* are topic-specific in order to help locating the topics, and the *sūtras* appear enigmatic till the topics are located. Therefore one needs a classical commentary for reference since the commentator would be conversant with all the branches of learning and the ambiguous subjects therein.

The commentaries of Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya are in the style of traditional lengthy disputation or debate. The reader gets confused as to whether the *sūtra* intends to tell all this. On the other hand, Madhvācārya's comments in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* are too brief. He just throws some hints for understanding the *sūtras*. At some places he simply quotes a statement from *Veda* or *Upaniṣad* or a verse from a *Purāṇa*, from

which the student is expected to guess what the *sūtra* has to tell. So a direct reading will not suffice. To understand Madhvācārya's comments one needs another commentary on it like that of Jayatīrtha. Possibly Madhvācārya assumes that the student of *Brahmasūtra* is wellversed in *Śāstra* and not a novice. Perhaps that is why some scholars either dismiss his commentary as a performance of little or no merit, or ignore it. Jayatīrtha's *Tattvaprakāśikā* and Vyāsatīrtha's *Tātparyacandrikā*, though brilliant works, are also in the style of lengthy dialectics like that of Śaṅkarācārya. V. S. Ghate, in his work, just makes some remarks on a few traditional commentaries and does not go into the details of the *sūtra*. S. Radhakrishnan refers to each *sūtra*, gives the meaning of words in the *sūtra*, supplies the necessary additional words and makes a full sentence. Then he gives a gist of Śaṅkarācārya's comments and some remarks of other commentators. But he does not use the established techniques like *anuvṛtti* etc. while supplying the additional words. So the meaning of the *sūtra* appears unconvincing. BNK Sharma has written an essay on each *Adhikaraṇa*. He has written extensively quoting extracts from a large number of works. The language is lucid. But his style is the same traditional one of disputation and he has used the customary techniques of deciphering a *sūtra* occasionally. However, there is a rare work on *Brahmasūtras* by Rāghavendratīrtha (1595-1671 A.D.). In this, for each *sūtra* he first states which additional words are to be brought in as per the techniques viz. *anuvṛtti*, *āvṛtti*, *adhyāhāra* etc., then gives the full exposition of the *sūtra* and then interprets each word depending on the context. The techniques of interpreting a *sūtra*, like *anuvṛtti* etc. are known as *'tantra'*. So the work has been aptly named as *'Tantradīpikā'*, the one that throws light on the techniques used in interpreting the *sūtra*. Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar[1] considers this work as an independent commentary on *Brahmasūtra*. BNK

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1 S-BSB-VA. I. p.10.

Sharma exclaims- "It is a marvel of brevity, clarity and adequacy of explanation"[1]. This work is of immense help in understanding the import of the *sūtras.* It is true that Rāghavendratīrtha was a pontiff in Madhvācārya's tradition. So his interpretation can not be at variance with the doctrine of Madhvācārya. But a student of philosophy need not worry on this point. His approach is expected to be open minded. The aim in going through the writings of so many theologians and teachers is to understand the import of the *sūtras* from the words therein and the internal dynamics of the *sūtras.* It is not aimed at rejecting all the existing doctrines. In the endeavour if one finds a convincing interpretation of *sūtras* and it agrees with the doctrine of a well-known teacher, it is an occasion to rejoice. Hence, the *'Tantradīpikā'* of Rāghavendratīrtha has been selected for reference.

The Methodology followed

In order to arrive at a clear concept of *Brahman,* The Supreme Being, the *sūtras* in *Adhyāya* I and II would be analysed in the following pages. For each *sūtra,* in addition to the words therein, a minimum number of words necessary for composing an exposition of the *sūtra* would be selected in keeping with the established techniques of *anuvṛtti* etc. The *sūtra* would be blown into a full sentence in the form of *Naiyāyika's* syllogism, "the mountain has fire because it has smoke"[2]. It would have a clear proposition (*pratijñā*) and a reason or probans (*hetu*). The exposition (*vṛtti*) would show the import of the *sūtra.* The additional words supplied on account of *anuvṛtti* etc. would be normally on the authority of *Tantradīpikā.* **Therefore, no specific reference to *Tantradīpikā* would be shown in the footnote for each *sūtra.*** Occasionally a word or phrase or the format would be taken from other works if it is found simpler and more expressive. At such

1 BNK. I. p. xxx.

2 पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात्।

places, reference to the concerned text would be specifically shown in the footnotes. Naturally the import of a *sūtra* thus obtained would be the view of Madhvācārya only, but arrived at on the basis of syntax and semantics of the wording in the *sūtra*, which is not always explicitly expressed by him in his *Brahamsūtrabhāṣya*. Then a comparative study would be made of the purports arrived at by the three commentators namely Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya. They might agree on the purport of some *sūtras* and differ on others. Wherever they differ, the three interpretations would be discussed with due respect, and they would be looked into to see which one would be the most convincing to a person without prior affiliation to any particular doctrine, and which interpretation would not, and why. Extracts from various texts referred to in the discussion would be given in the footnotes. The whole exercise would be in twelve chapters. These introductory paragraphs form chapter I. The analysis of *sūtras* in the first and second *Adhyāyas* of the *Brahmasūtra* would be presented in chapters II to XI. Chapter XII would include conclusions, findings and a pen-picture of *Brahman*, the Supreme Being, as conceived in *Brahmasūtras*.

Chapter II
Introduction to *Adhyāya* I

The first *Adhyāya* is called *Samanvayādhyāya*. In this the *Sutrakāra* is achieving *śāstrasamanvaya* in *Brahman*, i.e. he shows how all the names, comprising a word or a phrase, in Vedas go to describe *Brahman* the Supreme Being, which is the quest of all philosophy and which is the topic chosen for study in this work. The names in the Vedas can be broadly divided into four groups. (i) There are some words like Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu etc., which are popularly understood to be signifying the Supreme Being and therefore there is no need to show that they denote the Supreme Being. They are termed as *Tatra- prasiddhaśabdas* (ii) There are some other words and phrases like *Ākāśa*, *Jyotis* etc., which are popularly understood to be denoting some entity other than the Supreme Being. They are known as *Anyatraprasiddhaśabdas*. (iii) Some words and phrases are capable of denoting both *Brahman* and things other than *Brahman*, e.g. *Akṣara*. They are called *Ubhayatraprasiddhaśabdas*. (iv) There are some words and phrases like *Duhkhin*, *Tuccha* etc., which are used solely to denote entities other than *Brahman*, whose usage therein is supported by scriptural statements and which nobody would like to use with reference to *Brahman*. These are known as *Anyatraivaprasiddhaśabdas*.

Each of these classes of words and phrases can be further subdivided into two divisions, one of proper names (*nāmātmakaśabdas* or *dharmibodhakaśabdas*) like *kamala* denoting lotus and *vṛkṣa* denoting a tree, and another division of significant terms (*liṅgātmakaśabdas* or *dharmabodhakaśabdas*) like *paṅkaja* (lotus) meaning that which takes birth in mud and *pādapa* (tree) meaning that which drinks from the roots.

This *Adhyāya* has four chapters called *Pādas*. The first *Pāda* deals with *Anyatraprasiddha-nāmātmakaśabdas*. The second *Pāda* considers *Anyatraprasiddha-liṅgātmakaśabdas*. Both the

nāmātmaka and *liṅgātmaka* terms falling in the category of *Ubhayatraprasiddhaśabdas* are dealt with in *Pāda 3*. *Pāda* 4 takes up both the *nāmātmaka* and *liṅgātmaka* terms among the *Anyatraivaprasiddhaśabdas*. It appears that the *samanvaya* of those terms, which are easier to comprehend are taken first and those, which are comparatively difficult to understand are deferred to later chapters. This is just a broad arrangement of work and the chapters are not water-tight divisions. There could be some exceptions here and there.

Śaṅkarācārya holds as follows. The first *Pāda* discusses the texts which contain clear indications of *Brahman* as their subject matter (*Spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgavākyāni*) and the second and the third *Pādas* deal with texts which contain uncertain marks of Brahman (*Aspaṣṭabrahmaliṅgavākyāni*)[1]. The fourth *Pāda* establishes that the *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna* is no-where recognized in the *Vedānta* (i.e. the *Upaniṣads*), as the cause of the world. With this classification there would be many overlappings of the bases of classification and many exceptions. Moreover, if the fourth *Pāda* is meant to criticize the *Sāṅkhya-Pradhāna*, it deserves to be included in the second *Adhyāya* (*Avirodhādhyāya*) and it goes against the plan of the *Sūtrakāra* to include it in this *Samanvayādhyāya*. Hence this classification does not appear to be satisfactory.

According to Rāmānujācārya the first *Pāda* defines *Brahman* as the cause of the world and "rules out the improbability (*asambhava*) of the definition by showing in the rest of the *Adhikaraṇas* of the first *Pāda* that *Brahman* is invariably the cause of all. The other three *Pādas* refute the objection of *ativyāpti* or over-pervasion of the definition by excluding the causality of others (*anyayogavyavaccheda*). Of these, *Pāda* 2 discusses,

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1 प्रथमे पादे ---- कानिचिद्वाक्यानि स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानि सन्दिह्यमानानि ब्रह्मपरतया निर्णीतानि। पुनरपि अन्यानि वाक्यानि अस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानि संदिह्यन्ते। तन्निर्णयाय द्वितीयतृतीयौ पादौ आरभ्येते। (S. BSB. 1-2-1).

'*Aspaṣṭaliṅgas*' i.e. uncertain marks relating to *Jīvas*, *Prāṇa*, *Buddhi* etc.; *Pāda* 3 discusses '*Spaṣṭaliṅgas*' i.e. clear indications of the same entities and *Pāda* 4 texts which contain very clearly expressed grounds in favour of the *Pūrvapakṣas* in support of *Prakṛti, Jīvas* etc.''[1]. This classification also would not be very satisfactory because Rāmānujācārya removes the possibility of *ativyāpti* of the definition in *Pradhāna* in the fifth *Adhikaraṇa* of *Pāda* 1, and that in *Jīva* in BS. I-1-18, and it renders the remaining three *Pādas* superfluous.

1 तत्र लक्षणे असंभवरूपायोगव्यवच्छेदः प्रथमपादे अतिव्याप्तिरूपान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदस्त्रिपाद्यां तत्रापि अस्पष्टजीवादिलिङ्गकानि वाक्यानि द्वितीये स्पष्टजीवादिलिङ्गकानि तृतीये तत्तत्प्रतिपादनच्छायानुसारिणी चतुर्थे विचार्यन्त इत्याहुः। (TC. I. p. 88) (BNK. I. p. 27).

Chapter III
Adhyāya I, *Pāda* 1
(प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।)

1 जिज्ञासाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ ॥ (1-1-1)

अथ अध्ययनशमदमादिरूपाधिकारसम्पत्त्यनन्तरम् अतः ज्ञानोत्थप्रसादजमोक्षाख्यफलसत्त्वात् ब्रह्मणः सर्ववेदविषयकश्रवणमननरूपा जिज्ञासा 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व' इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्ता कर्तव्या । कर्तव्या इति शेषः ।

Then, after studying the scriptures and cultivating self-control, one should enquire into the nature of *Brahman*, as told in the *Śruti* "enquire into That" (Tait. Up. 3-1), by listening to the various teachings of Veda and reflecting on them, because that knowledge and the resulting composure would lead to liberation. The word *'kartavyā'* (ought to be done) is supplied to complete the construction.

"Athāto Brahmajijñāsā", the very first aphorism (*sūtra*) in *Brahmasūtras*, is like an author's foreword to his work in which the author specifies the four parameters (*Anubandhacatuṣṭaya*) of the work. They are: (1) *Adhikārin* i.e. one who can study the book or for whom the book is written; (2) *Viṣaya* i.e. the subject discussed in the book; (3) *Phala* i.e. fruit for which one should study the book or that which one would get after studying the book and (4) *Sambandha* i.e. the correlation between the above three.

The word '*Om*' is used at the beginning because it is considered as auspicious. Tradition prescribes that while reciting the *Brahmasūtras*, the word '*Om*' should be used at the beginning and at the end of each *sūtra*. In addition to auspiciousness, the purpose could be to avoid the possible mixup of the *sūtras* during the oral transfer from one generation to another. The term *'atha'* (then) is also believed to be auspicious. In addition, it expresses

the sense of immediate sequence (*ānantarya*). It means immediately after the student becomes eligible (*Adhikārin*) to study *Brahmasūtras*, having studied first the requisite scriptural texts like *Saṁhitā*, *Āraṇyaka*, *Upaniṣad* etc. Otherwise the student will not understand the topics being discussed, arguments being made and the conclusions being arrived at. The term '*ataḥ*' (therefore) indicates the purpose of this enquiry into *Brahman*, which leads to the liberation from worldly sufferings and accomplishment of eternal bliss. The term *jijñāsā* means the desire to know i.e. enquiry. The compound *Brahmajijñāsā* is to be resolved as *Brahmaṇaḥ jijñāsā*. The word *brahmaṇaḥ* is in genitive case and the *Brahman* is the object of enquiry (*karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī*)[1].

According to Śaṅkarācārya[2] the word '*atha*' (then) means after acquiring the four requisites namely (i) discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal things, (ii) aversion to the enjoyment of fruits of actions here and in the next world, (iii) possession of equanimity and (iv) the desire for release. The word '*ataḥ*' (therefore) means, for the reason that the knowledge of *Brahman* alone can lead to eternal bliss.

Rāmānujācārya takes the word '*atha*' as indicative of immediate succession. The word '*ataḥ*' suggests the cause of something that has happened. Thus the first *sūtra*, according to Rāmānujācārya, means: "After an enquiry into the ritualistic portion of the Vedas one comes to know that results acquired by mere sacrifices etc. are ephemeral; on the contrary the result of the knowledge of *Brahman* is eternal. As such an enquiry into *Brahman* should be taken up"[3]. Under this *sūtra* there is a lengthy discussion in which Rāmānujācārya severely criticizes the *Māyāvāda* or *Kevalādvaita* doctrine advocated by Śaṅkarācārya.

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1 ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा इति कर्मणि षष्ठ्या समासः । (TDK. 1-1-1).

2 SRK. p. 227.

3 Śrībhāṣya- SV. p. 81.

Thus, the *Sūtrakāra* initiates an enquiry into *Brahman*, in this first *sūtra*. But, who or what is this *Brahman*? In the next *sūtra*, Bādarāyaṇavyāsa defines the *Brahman*, that we are asked to enquire into.

2 जन्माद्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॐ ॥ **(1-1-2)**

यत इत्युक्तेः तदिति लभ्यते । अस्य प्रमितस्य चिदचिदात्मकस्य विश्वस्य जन्मादि सृष्टिस्थितिलयनियमनज्ञानाज्ञानबन्धमोक्षजातं यतः भवति तद् ब्रह्म ।

On account of the term *'yataḥ'* in the *sūtra*, the word *'tat'* is obtained. ***Brahman* is that from which proceed origin, etc. i.e. origin, subsistence, destruction, control, enlightenment, nescience, bondage and liberation of this known animate and inanimate world.**

This *sūtra* gives the characteristic marks (lakṣaṇa) of *Brahman*. Based on a passage from *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* [1], Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have taken the term *'janmādi'* to include only creation, subsistence and destruction. Following a verse[2] from *Skanda Purāṇa*, Madhvācārya has taken the term *'janmādi'* to include creation, subsistence, destruction, control (*Niyamana*), enlightenment (*jñāna*), nescience (*ajñāna*), bondage (*bandha*) and release (*mokṣa*). Thus, this *sūtra* defines *Brahman*, the Supreme Being as the source of this eight-fold dispensation of the Universe. V. S. Ghate opines[3] that "this definition of *Brahman* is very important, because, at the very threshold of the work, it gives a

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1 यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत्प्रयन्ति अभिसंविशन्ति। तद् विजिज्ञासस्व। तद् ब्रह्म इति। (Tait. Up. 3-1).

2 उत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारा नियतिर्ज्ञानमावृतिः।
बन्धमोक्षौ च पुरुषात् यस्मात् स हरिरेकराट्॥ (स्कन्दपुराण M. BSB. 1-1-2).

3 VSG. p. 53.

knock to the doctrine of *Śaṅkara*, according to whom *Brahman* proper is merely existence, intelligence and bliss (*sat, cit, ānanda*); while it is lower *Brahman* which, associated with *Māyā*, produces, sustains and destroys the world, which has nothing but a phenomenal existence."

S. Radhakrishnan writes[1] : "...the world is like a dream or an illusory cognition. It exists as it is perceived. It has no other independent existence except the fact of its perception. It has *Brahman* for its basis. The concrete appearances are impositions on this unchanging reality. They are not the effects of *Brahman*, for *Brahman* is not *upādāna* or the material cause of the world of objects". But these concepts of *Vivartavāda* [2] (i.e. the doctrine that the world is a phenomenal appearance of *Brahman*) are not visible in this *sūtra*.

The next *sūtra* specifies the means of knowing the *Brahman*, defined here above.

3 शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-3)**

तस्य जन्मादिकारणस्य इति वर्तते। तस्य जगज्जन्मादिकारणस्य शास्त्रयोनित्वात् शास्त्रं वेदः तदनुसारिपौरुषेयग्रन्थश्च योनिः ज्ञप्तिकारणं प्रमाणं यस्य तत् शास्त्रयोनि तस्य भावः शास्त्रयोनित्वं तस्मात् अन्यप्रमाणैः अज्ञेयत्वम्।

The words *'tasya janmādikāraṇasya'* are obtained from the previous *sūtra*. **The means of knowing that *Brahman*, the cause of origin etc. of the world, is through scriptures (*śāstra*) comprising Vedas and other texts faithful to them and attributed to human authors, and therefore *Brahman* is not knowable by any other means.**

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1 SRK. p. 34.
2 OIP p. 339.

The means of knowledge are, broadly speaking, taken as three: (i) direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) (ii) inference (*anumāna*) and (iii) authoritative word (*śabda*). These are known as *Pramāṇas*. This *sūtra* tells that, that *Brahman* who has been defined as the cause of creation etc. of this world can be known only through Scriptures. Scriptures (*śāstra*) are the only authoritative literature for knowing *Brahman*.

Śaṅkarācārya has given two interpretations of this *sūtra*. In the first, the word *śāstrayoniḥ* is treated as a *Tatpuruṣa* compound, which gives a meaning *śāstrasya yoniḥ* i.e. (*Brahman* is) the originator of Scriptures. In the second one, the word is treated as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound, which gives a meaning *śāstram yoniḥ* (*pramāṇam*) *yasya* i.e. one who can be known through Scriptures, as already stated above. The first interpretation is not accepted by other commentators, though Indian tradition believes that Vedic Scriptures originated from *Brahman*. For, it does not fit in the sequence of ideas between *sūtras* 1, 2, and 3, whereas the second one does. Moreover, when the creation of the whole world is attributed to *Brahman* in the previous *sūtra*, the origination of Scriptures is included in that. *Śāstra* for Śaṅkarācārya includes the four *Vedas*, the epics, the *purāṇas* and other branches of learning *Vidyāsthāna*[1]. However, in his commentary he mostly refers to *Upaniṣads* only. Madhvācārya gives a similar liberal explanation of the term *śāstra*. It includes *Vedas*, Epics, *Purāṇas*, *Pañcarātras* and whatever else is in conformity with their teachings [2]. The Scriptures[3] are not only the only means of knowing *Brahman* but they are also meant only to expound and establish *Brahman*.

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1 SRK. p. 242.

2 ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वश्च भारतं पञ्चरात्रकम्। मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥ यच्चानुकूलमेतस्य तच्च शास्त्रं प्रकीर्तितम्। अतोऽन्यो ग्रन्थविस्तारो नैव शास्त्रं कुवर्त्म तत्॥ (M. BSB. 1-1-3).

3 वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः। (BG. 15-15).

4 समन्वयाधिकरणम्।

Having told that the *Brahman* can be known only through Scriptures, the author prescribes here the *modus operandi* of interpreting the Scriptures in order to understand *Brahman.*

॥ ॐ तत्तु समन्वयात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-4)**

According to Śaṅkarācārya this *sūtra* states as follows[1]. That *Brahman* who is said to be the cause of creation, sustenance and destruction of the world, is understood from scriptures only. Whence? For, the purports of statements in all scriptural texts consistently and harmoniously arrive at this meaning.

Rāmānujācārya understands the *sūtra* differently as shown below. "The word *'tu'* is for the purpose of removing the doubt put forward- *'tat'* - having the Śāstra alone as the authority in the case of *Brahman*- is certainly possible. Whence? On account of the *Samanvaya* (co-relation). *'Samanvaya'* means relation with the nature of human purpose in life, on account of the relation with reference to *Brahman*, the highest human purpose in life, as the object fit to be denoted"[2]. This interpretation appears clumsy and not convincing.

Madhvācārya understands the *sūtra* in the same way as Śaṅkarācārya has, but he throws more light on the prefix *saṁ* in the *sūtra*. The exposition of the *sūtra* is:

शास्त्रयोनि शास्त्रगम्यं तत्तु जगज्जन्मादिकर्तृ ब्रह्म एव। कुतः। समन्वयात् सम्यग् अन्वयात् सकलशास्त्रमुख्यतात्पर्यात्।

The One to be comprehended from scriptures, is that *Brahman* the author of creation etc. of the world, only; whence? For, the main purport of all the scriptural texts arrived at after their exegetical interpretation, is to that effect.

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1 तद् ब्रह्म जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रादेव अवगम्यते। कथम्। समन्वयात्। सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येण एतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि। (S. BSB. 1-1-4).

2 Śrībhāṣya - RDK. 1-1-4.

The term *Śāstrayoni* is continued here from the previous *sūtra*. *Tu* is in the sense of 'only'. The prefix *saṁ* applies to both the terms *anvaya* and *śāstra* and therefore signifies two things. When applied to *śāstra*, *saṁ* refers to the main harmonious purport of the entire range of scriptures[1]. Secondly, *Samanvaya* means proper exegetical interpretation i.e. a critical explanation normally adopted in philosophy. Madhvācārya refers to the practice in vogue in Indian philosophy[2]. The evidences (*pramāṇa*) on which the purport is to be determined (*tātparyaliṅgas*) are (i) *Upakrama* (commencement of the text), (ii) *Upasaṁhāra* (conclusion), (iii) *Abhyāsa* (repetition), (iv) *Apūrvata* (novelty), (v) *Phalaṁ* (fruitfulness), (vi) *Arthavāda* (eulogistic or deprecatory references) and (vii) *Upapatti* (logical justification). These have an ascending order of strength, i.e. each one is stronger than the earlier one[3]. In fact all these are logical justifications only, but some are particularized, in order to indicate their mutual strengths. Along with these, another set of logical justifications is to be accepted. They are *Śruti*, *Liṅga*, *Vākya*, *Prakaraṇa*, *Sthāna*, and *Samākhyā*. These are the six modes of evidence accepted by *Pūrvamīmāṁsakas* for interpreting the Vedic injunctions and these have a descending order of strength[4].

Jayatīrtha explains these terms *Śruti* etc. in his own way, and tells why they differ in their strengths[5]. *Śruti* is the declaration of an import by a word according to convention (*rūḍhārthanirdeśa*). A word or a phrase which tells an uncommon or special characteristic of a thing is called as *Liṅga*. A group of words

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1 शास्त्रयोनीति वर्तते। तुरेव। समित्येतत् शास्त्रपदेनापि अन्वेति। तस्य कात्स्न्र्यं मुख्यत्वं चार्थः। (TDK. 1-1-4).

2 उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वताफलम्। अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥ (M. BSB. 1-1-4).

3 उपक्रमादिलिङ्गानां बलीयो ह्युत्तरोत्तरम्। (AV. 1-1-4) BNK I. p. 85.

4 श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यम् अर्थविप्रकर्षात्। (PMS. 3-3-14).

5 नाममात्रेण निर्देशः श्रुतिः। असाधारणधर्मो लिङ्गम्। निराकाङ्क्षपदानि वाक्यम्। एकप्रमेयप्रतिपादकानेकवाक्यानि प्रकरणम्। अनेकप्रमेयप्रतिपादकमेकार्थे तात्पर्ययुक्तं स्थानम्। समानोक्तिः समाख्या। (TP. 1-3-24).

which have fulfilled their mutual expectations for rendering a complete sense or thought, is known as a *Vākya*. A number of sentences which establish a thing to be proved form a *Prakaraṇa*. *Sthāna* is a group of *Prakaraṇas* which establish a number of things but their purport is one. A parallel or synonymous statement of a topic established elsewhere is known as *Samākhyā*. Among these, *Śruti* is the strongest since it directly conveys the meaning[1]. Since *Liṅga* conveys the meaning by inference, it conveys later than *Śruti*. Therefore it is considered as weaker than *Śruti*. *Vākya* is weaker than the *Liṅga* because it infers the meaning after considering the meanings of many words therein. An import is inferred from a *Prakaraṇa* after considering the meaning of a number of sentences and therefore a *Prakaraṇa* is weaker than a *Vākya*. *Sthāna* conveys an implied sense inferred from the imports of a number of *Prakaraṇas* and therefore it is taken as weaker than *Prakaraṇa*. *Samākhyā* conveys a meaning inferred from its resemblance to an import established elsewhere in a *Sthāna*, and hence it is considered as weaker than the *Sthāna*. While considering the mutual strengths of these evidences including the earlier *Upakarma* etc., one should note that if an evidence, though naturally weak, has no scope for alternate interpretation, it overrides another evidence which is naturally stronger but has scope for another meaning[2].

Madhvācārya holds that when there are conflicting statements in scriptural texts, the purports of the texts are to be determined with due regard to these *tātparyaliṅgas* and their relative strengths[3].

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1. तत्र श्रुतेः साक्षादर्थधीजनकत्वात् सर्वतः प्रावल्यम्। लिङ्गस्य अनुमापकतया अर्थबोधकत्वात् तदानन्तर्यम्। वाक्यस्य अनेकार्थकथनद्वारा अर्थानुमापकत्वात् ततोऽपि दौर्बल्यम्। प्रकरणस्य बह्वर्थपरत्वेन अर्थानुमितिहेतुत्वात् तदवमता। स्थानस्य अतिबह्वर्थकथनेन अभिप्रायतो अर्थानुमितिजनकस्य ततोऽपि दौर्बल्यम्। समाख्यायाः स्थानान्तरगतायाः सादृश्यमात्रेण अर्थानुमापकत्वात् ततोऽपि दुर्बलत्वम्। (TP. 1-3-24).
2. निरवकाशात् स्वभावदुर्बलादपि स्वभावप्रवलसावकाशस्य दौर्बल्यमित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम्। (TP. 1-3-24).
3. उपक्रमादितात्पर्यलिङ्गैः सम्यङ् निरूप्यमाणे तदेव शास्त्रगम्यम्। (M. BSB. 1-1-4).

Vyāsatīrtha drives home the necessity of such a rigorous analysis of scriptural statements in his own poetic style. He says[1]: "The taste of sugarcane-juice certainly cannot be felt just by licking the sugarcane and not certainly without squeezing it". Thus the term *Samanvaya* in the *sūtra* implies (i) a purport arrived at after subjecting the scriptural texts to such a proper rigorous exegetical interpretation and (ii) a comprehensive harmonious principal purport of scriptures.

In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* just indicates the method he is going to adopt in the following *sūtras* to arrive at the purport of *śāstras* and to resolve the apparent conflicts in them. He is yet to unravel his concepts of *Brahman* and the world. But Śaṅkarācārya introduces a lengthy discussion here and establishes the important tenets of *Vivartavāda*. These concepts of *Brahman* and the world established here are the commentator's views based on the *Upaniṣads*. But this study aims at knowing the *Sūtrakāra*'s concepts expressed in the following *sūtras*.

5 ईक्षत्यधिकरणम्।

Before starting the actual analysis of Scriptural passages, the author removes here a possible doubt in the minds of unwary students that, when some Scriptural statements clearly declare that *Brahman* cannot be expressed in words, that *Brahman* is absolutely beyond the reach of word and thought, how are we going to understand *Brahman* through Scriptural words only. Hence he declares:

॥ ॐ ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-5)**

तदिति वर्तते। न विद्यते शब्दः वाचकः यस्य तद् अशब्दम् अवाच्यम्। ईक्षतेः इति धातुनिर्देशेन[2] तदर्थः ईक्षणं लक्ष्यते। तद् (ब्रह्म) न अशब्दम् अवाच्यम् ईक्षतेः ईक्षणीयत्वात् ज्ञेयत्वात्।

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1 न हीक्षुलेहनेनैव ज्ञात इक्षुरसो भवेत्। न चेक्षुदण्डं निष्पीड्य लब्धो नेक्षुरसो भवेत्॥ (TC. I. p. 60).

2 इक्श्तिपौ धातुनिर्देशे। (Pāṇini 3-3-108 वार्तिक) इक् तथा श्तिप् इति प्रत्ययौ धातुनिर्देशे योजितौ। श्तिप् इत्युक्तौ शप् तथा तिप् इति प्रत्ययौ। यथा छिदिः भिदिः पचतिः पठतिः यजतिः ।

The term *'tat'* is continued from the preceding *sūtra*. That for which there is no word to express, is known as *'aśabda'* i.e. inexpressible in words. From the term *'īkṣateḥ'* (in the *sūtra*), which points out the use of the root *īkṣ* (to see), the sense of 'seeing' or 'knowing' is understood by secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*).

The Brahman is not inexpressible in words because the verb *īkṣ* (to know) is used.

Since *Brahman* cannot be seen through the physical eyes, the verbs *īkṣ*, *dṛś* used with reference to *Brahman*, have to be understood in the sense of knowing. The *Śruti* statements *''puruṣaṁ īkṣate''* [1] *''Ātmānaṁ paśyet''* [2] etc. inform us that *Brahman* can be known. Since two negatives are used in the phrase 'not inexpressible in words', it emphasizes a sense of strong positive i.e. 'certainly and undoubtedly expressible in words'[3]. If *Brahman* is not knowable i.e. beyond human understanding, then all the efforts put in studying *Vedas* and these *Brahmasūtras* etc. are futile. If He is knowable, (since, whatever is knowable is namable)[4] He can be expressed in words. But some *Śruti* statements like *'yato vāco nivartante'*[5], *'Aśabdamasparśamarūpamavyayaṁ'*[6], apparently tell that *Brahman* is beyond words i.e. *Brahman* is inexpressible in words. How are we going to understand such statements? The literal meaning of such statements is that *Brahman* cannot be expressed in words. But in exegetic parlance, the literal meaning must not be considered if it is opposed to the purport arrived at by analyzing the various factors such as *upakrama* etc. Madhvācārya is the first commentator to interpret this *sūtra* in a straightforward manner that *Brahman* is not

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1 स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषम् ईक्षते । (Praśna. Up. 5-5).
2 आत्मन्येव आत्मानं पश्येत् । (Bṛha. Up. 6-4-23).
3 द्वौ नञौ प्रकृतार्थं सातिशयं गमयतः । (BVB 1-1-5).
4 घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् पटवत् । (Tarka. 48).
5 यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह । (Tait. Up. 2-4-22).
6 अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् । (Katha. Up. 1-3-15).

inexpressible in words. According to him, the *Śruti* statements like *'yato vāco nivartante'* do not totally deny the fact that *Brahman* is expressible in words, but they only indicate that *Brahman* is not fully and completely describable as the characteristics of *Brahman* are infinite. He quotes a beautiful example from *Garudapurāṇa,* to drive home this point. "The wise ones though perceiving the expanse of the Meru mountain, (still) perceive it not, in its entirety as this much."[1]

Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra* is entirely on a different track. According to him this *Adhikaraṇa* refutes the *Sāṅkhya* view that the unintelligent *Pradhāna* is the cause of the world.

न साङ्ख्यपरिकल्पितम् अचेतनम् प्रधानं जगतः कारणं शक्यं वेदान्तेषु आश्रयितुम्। अशब्दं हि तत्। कथम् अशब्दत्वम्। ईक्षतेः। ईक्षितृत्वश्रवणात् कारणस्य ।[2]

Because of seeing (*īkṣateḥ*), the unintelligent *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna,* not founded on Scripture, is not the cause of the world.

This interpretation looks far-fetched. In essence it says :[3]

(i) (प्रधानं) न (जगत्कारणं) अशब्दम् (अशब्दत्वात्) ।

(ii) (कारणस्य) ईक्षतेः (= ईक्षितृत्वश्रवणात्)

This interpretation is not consistent with the sequence of ideas in the first four introductory *sūtras*. Having started to show by proper interpretation (*samanvaya*), how various words and phrases in *Śāstra* (Scriptures) convey *Brahman*, in this *Samanvayādhyāya*, the author is not expected to go off track to criticize the *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna*. No doubt, the *Sūtrakāra* has refuted the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, but he has done so, along with

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1 न तदीदृगिति ज्ञेयं न वाच्यं न च तर्क्यते। पश्यन्तोऽपि न पश्यन्ति मेरो रूपं विपश्चितः॥ इतिवत् (M. BSB. 1-1-5).

2 S. BSB. 1-1-5.

3 BNK. I. p. 90.

refutation of other views, in the second *Adhyāya* (*Avirodhādhyāya*), which is meant for refutation of doctrines and dogmas of other established schools of philosophy. In the second chapter (*pāda*) of second *Adhyāya*, the author has mentioned ten *sūtras* to refute the *Sāṅkhya* views. Therefore, the same is not expected here again. While interpreting *sūtra* 1-1-18, Śaṅkarācārya again brings in *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna*. V. S. Ghate remarks, "Śaṅkara's interpretation unnecessarily brings in the *Pradhāna*"[1].

Secondly, in general each *Brahmasūtra* is a proposition in which there is an assertion (*pratijñā*) and a reason or probans (*hetu*) for that. Probans is normally in ablative. For example, the mountain has fire (*parvato vahnimān*) because of smoke (*dhūmāt*). In this sūtra 1-1-5, there are three words *īkṣateḥ*, na and *aśabdaṁ*. *Īkṣateḥ* in the ablative is certainly the word for reason. Śaṅkarācārya has treated '*aśabdaṁ*' also as a reason. Then the only word left for assertion is '*na*'. The assertion (*pratijñā*), '(*Pradhānaṁ*) na (*jagatkāraṇaṁ*)' is formulated by importing words for which there is no justification like continuity (*anuvṛtti*) or repetition (*āvṛtti*) from previous *sūtras*. The assertion appears more as commentator's imagination. Moreover, Śaṅkarācārya presents a complicated interpretation involving two distinct propositions. It involves a defect, which is known in technical parlance as *vākyabhedadoṣa*.

Further, the word '*aśabdaṁ*' has been interpreted as 'not founded on Scripture'. Thus, *śabda* is taken as Scripture. But, the primary meaning of *śabda* is a sound or word. Scripture is the secondary meaning of *śabda*. The secondary meaning is taken to save the coherence of the sentence, only when the primary meaning does not give a coherent sense. Here, there is no such failure of the primary sense of the word '*śabdaḥ*' and yet its secondary meaning Scripture has been adopted. The proverb '*guṇe tvanyāyakalpanā*' allows the concession to forgo a child if it saves the mother but not if it harms her. Thus, for the reasons stated above Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation is not convincing.

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1 VSG, p. 55.

The commentators who came after Śaṅkarācārya, upto Madhvācārya, have somehow accepted Śaṅkarācārya's view of this *sūtra* with some changes. Rāmānujācārya has taken *'aśabdaṁ'* not as a probans but as signifying *Pradhāna* itself. But it goes against his doctrine since *Prakṛti* (*acit*) is one of the three factors *cit, acit* and *Brahman* which make up the world according to him. Madhvācārya gave his fresh, straightforward and convincing interpretation as stated at the beginning of this *Adhikaraṇa.* Commentators like Vallabha and Baladeva who came after Madhvācārya have followed Madhvācārya's view.[1]

When a case comes up for hearing and judgement before a court, the point which comes up for decision first is whether the court itself has legal jurisdiction over that case or not. The *Sūtrakāra* initiates a similar discussion in this *Adhikaraṇa.* The subject matter in the coming *sūtras*, is the enquiry into the nature and characteristics of *Brahman* which can be known only through scriptures (*śāstra*) and these texts can be in the form of words and words only. But, if that *Brahman* is inexpressible in words and beyond the reach of word and thought, as some scriptural statements declare so, then the whole exercise of these *sūtras*, which are also nothing but words, would be futile. Therefore this *Adhikaraṇa* avers that the *Brahman* is not inexpressible in words. The *Śruti* statements, which declare that *Brahman* is beyond words, only indicate that the Supreme Being is not fully and completely describable in words, since His characteristics are infinite.

The remaining *sūtras* of this *Adhikaraṇa* are in support of the purport of the above one and to ward off certain possible objections against that.

॥ ॐ गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॐ ॥ (1-1-6)

ईक्षणीयः गौणः त्रिगुणबद्धो जीवः इति चेत् न ईक्षणीये आत्मपदश्रवणात्।

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1 BNK I . p. 90.

If it be said that what is to be known is the individual soul having three *guṇas* (attributes) *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, it is not so on account of the word *Ātman* used with reference to the object of knowing.

In the previous *sūtra* it has been argued that *Brahman* is expressible in words because *Brahman* is the object of knowing, based on *Śruti* statements *'puruṣaṁ īkṣate'*, *''Ātmānaṁ paśyet''* etc. If there is a contention that the object to be comprehended in the above *Śruti* statements is the individual soul having three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and not *Brahman* then this *sūtra* declares that it is not so because of the use of the word *Ātman*. *'Ātman'* primarily means *Brahman*.

The word *puruṣa* also means *Brahman*. In the previous *sūtra* the word *'aśabdaṁ'* is in neuter gender conforming with the word *tat'* continued from earlier *sūtra*. Here the word *gauṇa* is in masculine gender in order to be in conformity with the word *Ātman*.

Even though the word *'Ātman'* is used with reference to the object of knowing, why cannot the object of knowing be individual soul? To answer this objection, the next *sūtra* says :

|| ॐ तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ॐ || (1-1-7)

तन्निष्ठस्य आत्मनिष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् आत्मशब्देन न गौणः उक्तः ।

The word *Ātman* does not refer to *Gauṇa Jīvātman* because it is told (in *Śruti*) that one who is devoted to *Ātman* attains liberation.

The doubt mentioned above, arises because the word *'Ātman'* is used as a synonym of individual soul *'jīvātman'* in many places. Therefore, the *sūtra* clarifies that according to *Śruti,* one who is devoted to *'Ātman'* will attain liberation[1] (*mokṣa*), but devotion to *Gauṇa jīvātman* does not lead to liberation and therefore the

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1 यस्यानुवित्तः प्रतिबुद्ध आत्मा अस्मिन्सन्दोहे गहने प्रविष्टः। स विश्वकृत् स हि सर्वस्य कर्ता तस्य लोकः स उ लोक एव। (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-13).

word *Ātman* does not refer to *Gauṇa Jīvātman*. To clarify this doubt, Madhvācārya quotes some verses[1] from *Pādma Purāṇa*. Sentient beings are of two types, the individual souls (*jīvas*) and the Supreme Being (*Ātman*). All living beings from Brahmāji (the son of Viṣṇu and progenitor of all the world) onwards are *jīvas* and *Janārdana* (*Viṣṇu*) alone is *Ātman*. The use of the word *Ātman* in others is in a secondary sense. Liberation is accomplished only from the knowledge of that *Ātman* who is devoid of *guṇas* -*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Others are bound by these *guṇas*, and their knowledge does not lead to the liberation. Viṣṇu is the Supreme Being and, therefore, liberation comes from Him only.

The next *sūtra* provides another reason why the *Gauṇa Jīvātman* is not the object of knowing.

॥ ॐ हेयत्वावचनाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-1-8)**

(आत्मशब्दार्थस्य) हेयत्वावचनात् प्रत्युताहेयत्ववचनात् अन्यस्य हेयत्ववचनाच्च आत्मशब्देन न गौणः उक्तः।

Since the *Śruti*[2], ("you know *Ātman* only and reject others"), does not tell to reject, on the contrary it asks not to give up the Supreme Being designated by the word *Ātman* and to abandon all others, the (*Gauṇaḥ Jīvaḥ*) individual soul is not denoted by the word *Ātman*.

The next *sūtra* gives another reason to hold the Supreme *Brahman*, devoid of three *guṇas* as expressible in words.

॥ ॐ स्वाप्ययात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-9)**

स्व इति तन्त्रम् (आवृत्तिः)। स्वस्य स्वस्मिन् अप्ययवचनात् 'आत्मनि एव आत्मानं विलापयति' इति श्रुतिवचनात् निर्गुणं त्रिगुणरहितं ब्रह्म न अशब्दम्।

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1 चेतनस्तु द्विधा प्रोक्तो जीव आत्मेति च प्रभो। जीवा ब्रह्मादयः प्रोक्ता आत्मैकस्तु जनार्दनः ॥१॥ इतरेष्वात्मशब्दस्तु सोपचारः प्रयुज्यते। तस्यात्मनो निर्गुणस्य ज्ञानान्मोक्ष उदाहृतः ॥२॥ सगुणास्त्वपरे प्रोक्तास्तज्ज्ञानान्नैव मुच्यते। परो हि पुरुषो विष्णुस्तस्मान्मोक्षस्ततः स्मृतः ॥३॥ इति पाद्मे. (M. BSB. 1-1-7)\

2 तमेव एकं जानथ आत्मानम् अन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ अमृतस्य एष सेतुः। (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-2-5).

The word '*sva*' is to be repeated. **On account of One's merger in Oneself expressed in *Śruti*, *Brahman* devoid of three *guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas)*, is not inexpressible in words.**

Here in this *sūtra* there is only one word in ablative and it is a probans (*hetu*). But the assertion (*pratijñā*) is missing. It has to be repeated (*anuvṛtti*) from some earlier *sūtra*. The first claim is of that in the immediately preceding *sūtra*. That assertion is "*Ātmaśabdena na gauṇaḥ uktaḥ*". Then the interpretation would be that "the individual soul (*Jīva*) is not told by the word *Ātman*, because *Ātman* is said to merge in itself"[1] and that is not expected of an individual soul. But Madhvācārya has not accepted this line. According to him, if this *sūtra* is another probans for the preceding assertion, then the *sūtra* would have been "*svāpyayācca*". Therefore, he has connected this probans with the assertion in the first (main) *sūtra* of this *adhikaraṇa*, "*tad (Brahma) na aśabdaṁ*". Thus, Madhvācārya interprets, "Since *Śruti* tells (in so many words) that *Brahman* (*Ātman*) (emerges from and) merges in itself, it cannot be inexpressible in words". This interpretation is quite convincing.

If one doubts that in some other branches of Vedas, someone else might have been told as the cause of creation etc., the next *sūtra* clears the doubt.

॥ ॐ गतिसामान्यात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-10)**

तत्तु शास्त्रयोनीति वर्तते । गतेः सर्वशाखोत्पाद्यज्ञानस्य सामान्यात् समानत्वात् एकरूपत्वश्रवणात् शास्त्रयोनि तत्तु ।

The words '*tattu*' and '*śāstrayoni*' are continued. **On account of the uniformity of knowledge (obtainable from all branches of *Śāstra*) all the Scriptures expound and establish that *Brahman* only, (who is the cause of creation etc.).**

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1. ॥ आत्मन आत्मानम् उद्धृत्य आत्मनि एव विलापयति अथ आत्मैव भवति । (M. BSB. 1-1-9).

Madhvācārya quotes a statement from *Paiṅgiśruti* which exactly corroborates the purport of this *sūtra* -"All Vedas and reasoning based on evidence convey the same knowledge about *Brahman*. There is no mutual controversy anywhere in Vedas and also traditional epics (like *Mahābhārata*)"[1].

The next *sūtra* provides another reason why *Brahman* is considered as expressible.

॥ ॐ श्रुतत्वाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-1-11)**

तत् न अशब्दम् इति वर्तते । तद् (ब्रह्म) न अशब्दं श्रुतत्वात् च ।

The words *'tat na aśabdaṁ'* are continued. **That *Brahman* is not inexpressible in words because He is heard (from *Śruti*).**

This *sūtra* directly proves that *Brahman* is not inexpressible in words. It says, Madhvācārya remarks, "That which is inexpressible in words is not verily heard."[2]

Some have put forth a two-tier system of *Brahman*, one without any attributes (*nirguṇa*) and the other with attributes (*saguṇa*). They argue that only *saguṇa Brahman* can be expressed with the primary sense (*abhidhāvṛtti*) and *nirguṇa Brahman* can only be indicated with the secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*) of words. Madhvācārya quotes a verse[3] from *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* to show that *Śruti* sings in so many words about *nirguṇa Brahman* only. He further says that if anything is incapable of being expressed by any word whatsoever in language, then it cannot be indicated by the secondary signification power of words[4].

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1 सर्वे वेदा युक्तयः सुप्रमाणा ब्राह्मं ज्ञानं परमं त्वेकमेव । प्रकाशयन्ते न विरोधः कुतश्चित् वेदेषु सर्वेषु तथेतिहासे ॥ (M. BSB. 1-1-10).

2 न हि अशब्दः श्रूयते । (M. BSB. 1-1-11)

3 एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा । कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥ (Śvetā. Up. 6-11).

4 सर्वशब्दावाच्यस्य लक्षणायुक्तेः । (M. BSB. 1-1-11).

6 आनन्दमयाधिकरणम्।

Having cleared the first hurdle that *Brahman* is not expressible in words, the author now proceeds to show by proper exegetical interpretation (*samanvaya*) how certain words and passages in Scriptures convey *Brahman*. He has selected the words in such a way that when one word is shown to convey *Brahman*, the same argument can be extended to a number of similar words by implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*). Thus by discussing some representative words, in the remaining portion of this *Adhyāya* (*samanvayādhyāya*), the author has covered large number of words. From these words conveying *Brahman*, we will come to know a large number of attributes (*guṇa*) and characteristic marks (*lakṣaṇa*) of *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-12)**

तत्तु इति अनुवर्तते। आनन्दमय इत्युपलक्षणम्। तैत्तिरीये श्रुता आनन्दमयादयः पञ्च तत्तु तदेव ब्रह्म। कुतः अभ्यासात् ब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यासात्।

The words *'tat tu'* are continued. The term *'ānandamaya'* here implies other similar terms also. **All the five terms *ānandamaya* etc. heard in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* convey that *Brahman* only because of the repetition of the term *Brahman* (with reference to them).**

Taittirīya Upaniṣad expounds *Brahman* in its five forms or characteristics namely, *annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya* and *ānandamaya*. In common Vedic parlance, these terms *annamaya* etc. are used to denote the five sheaths, which successively make the body, enshrining the individual soul (*jīva*). The *Upaniṣad* shows how, at the macrocosmic level, these terms connote the forms of *Brahman*. *Sūtrakāra* has chosen these words for his first exercise in showing how the words, which normally denote something else (*anyatraprasiddhāḥ śabdāḥ*), convey *Brahman* in Scriptural texts. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* treats this topic in two separate chapters, *Brahmavallī* and *Bhṛguvallī*, in two different styles and arrives at exactly the same conclusion. The

style of *Brahmavallī* is rather mystic, but that of *Bhṛguvallī* is lucid. *Brahmavallī* declares at the outset that the knower of *Brahman* attains it[1]. Then it defines *Brahman* and describes the evolution of the five elements, food and man from *Brahman*. Having created the universe, *Brahman* is said to have entered it[2]. Since the individual souls are said to have been covered by the five sheaths, called *annamaya* etc., the *Brahman* presents itself in the souls and in their sheaths. The outer sheath is called *annamayakośa* because it is born from food. The *Upaniṣad* declares *annaṁ* is *Brahman* only. It defines *annaṁ* as *adyate atti ca bhūtāni tasmād annaṁ tad ucyate iti,* i.e. *Brahman* is the source of sustenance (food) for all living beings and in the end *Brahman* devours (eats) everyone. Similarly, for the *prāṇamayakośa* which represents the physical functions of the body, the source of energy is *Brahman*. *Bhagavadgītā* clearly tells that *Brahman* only manifests itself as the digestive power in every living organism[3]. Thus, for each of the five sheaths (*kośa*) of the embodied self, there is a corresponding form of *Brahman* at the cosmic level, in a purely spiritual sense and not in a material sense. In keeping with the opening remark (*upakrama*) that the knower of *Brahman* attains it, the *Upaniṣad* concludes (*upasaṁhāra*) that one who understands *Brahman* in these forms, reaches those forms after leaving this world[4], i.e. he attains liberation (*mukti*).

Each one of these five forms, *annamaya*, etc, is designated by the significant word *Ātman*, a synonym of *Brahman*. Therefore *Sūtrakāra* says :"*Ānandamayaḥ (tattu) abhyāsāt*", i.e. *Ānandamayaḥ* conveys that *Brahman* only (and not *Jīva*). V. S. Ghate says[5], "this seems to be a natural and straightforward interpretation and all except Śaṅkara follow it". He also remarks[6],

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1 ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्। (Tait. Up. 2-1).

2 तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्। (Tait. Up. 2-6).

3 अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा प्राणिनां देहमाश्रितः। प्राणापानसमायुक्तः पचाम्यन्नं चतुर्विधम्॥ (BG. 15-14).

4 स य एवंवित्। अस्माल्लोकात् प्रेत्य। एतमन्नमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति। एतं प्राणमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति। एतं विज्ञानमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति। एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति। (Tait. Up. 2-8).

5 VSG. p. 55.

6 VSG. p. 54.

"here again Śaṅkara makes the introductory remarks to the effect that the question now before us is whether the higher or lower *Brahman* is referred to in certain passages of the *Upaniṣads*. But this seems to be without justification because in the remaining part of the *Adhyāya*, we are concerned with the choice between *Jīva* and *Brahman* and even Śaṅkara's own commentary accords with the same. Thus this is only another instance of the commentator showing the influence of his preconceived prejudices".

In keeping with *vṛttis* then available to Śaṅkarācārya[1], he has initially interpreted that *Ānandamaya* conveyed *Brahman* only but the other four are considered as sheaths (*kośa*) and hence *anātma*. Later at the end of the *Adhikaraṇa* he goes back on his earlier interpretation and rejects it completely. Śaṅkarācārya's objection against this *sūtra* will be discussed at the end of this *Adhikaraṇa*. Rāmānujācārya interprets[2] that *Ānandamaya* conveys *Brahman*, but *Vijñānamaya* conveys *Jīvātman* and the earlier three are only sheaths (*kośa*). In keeping with the intentions of the *Sūtrakāra*, Madhvācārya interprets that *Ānandamaya* conveys *Brahman* only and by the implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*), *Annamaya*, *Prāṇamaya*, *Manomaya* and *Vijñānamaya* also convey *Brahman* only[3].

A likely objection to the above conclusion is answered in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-13)**

विकारार्थकमयट्शब्दादन्नमयादिर्न ब्रह्मेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् मयट्शब्दजातस्य प्राचुर्यार्थत्वात्।

If it is said that *annamaya* etc. do not connote *Brahman* since the suffix *mayaṭ* denoting modification is used, it is not so, because the group of words represented by *mayaṭ* also denotes abundance.

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1 S. BSB-VA 1-1-12.

2 अतो विज्ञानमयाज्जीवादन्य एव परमात्मा। (SRK. p. 257).

3 उपलक्षणत्वं शब्दानामानन्दमयपूर्विणाम्। (AV. 1-1 Adhi. 6), (BNK. I. p. 101).

If the *suffix mayaṭ*, is taken in the sense 'made of', 'a modification of' or a 'product of', then the words *annamaya* etc. cannot be taken to convey *Brahman*, since Brahman is not a product or a modification. To obviate such a possible objection, *Sūtrakāra* replies that the suffix *mayaṭ* need not always indicate a modification, and it can also mean abundance (*prācurya*)[1].

The next *sūtra* provides a further evidence to show that *Ānandamaya* is *Brahman* and the suffix *mayaṭ* does imply abundance.

॥ ॐ तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-1-14)**

आनन्दमयः तत्तु इति वर्तते । मयट् प्राचुर्यार्थः इति च । आनन्दमयः तत्तु मयट् प्राचुर्यार्थः लोकचेष्टायां तद्धेतुव्यपदेशात् च ।

The words '*ānandamayaḥ*', '*tat tu*' are continued from previous *sūtras*. The words '*mayaṭ prācuryārthaḥ*' are also supplied (*adhyāhāra*). ***Ānandamaya* is that *Brahman* only and the suffix *mayaṭ* implies superabundance (of bliss) because it has been mentioned as the cause (*hetu*) for the creation of this world.**

Using the conjunctive particle *ca*, the *Sūtrakāra* enumerates here another reason, adduced by *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* itself, in support of his statement that *Brahman* abounds with bliss. The reason offered in the previous *sūtra* that the suffix *mayaṭ* conveyed superabundance was based on psychological and practical grounds. Even after accepting the scriptural statement that *Brahman* is the creator of this world, we are sometimes faced with the ontological question as why at all *Brahman* created this world. The *Upaniṣad* attempts to answer this question. We know that normally no one proceeds to do anything without a purpose (*prayojana*).[2] But

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1 तत्प्रकृतवचने मयट् । (Pāṇini 5-4-21) तदिति प्रथमा समर्थविभक्तिः प्राचुर्येण प्रस्तुतं प्रकृतम् । प्रथमासमर्थात् प्रकृतोपाधिकेर्थे वर्तमानात्स्वार्थे मयट् प्रत्ययो भवति । (*Kāśikā*) The affix *mayaṭ* may be employed after a word denoting some substance, when we require expression for it as abundant.

2 प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते । (*Subhāṣita*).

occasionally when one is overjoyed, he laughs, he sings to himself without any purpose. *Brahman* has nothing to get from this world. Therefore the *Upaniṣad* asks that in case this *Brahman* is not full of bliss who verily would have created us and impelled us to work.[1] Thus, as per this *sūtra*, the very fact that *Brahman* has created this world from which It / He needs nothing, is an evidence to support the fact that *Ānandamaya* is *Brahman* only.

The next *sūtra* adduces another reason to show that all the five terms *Ānandamaya* etc. convey *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ मान्त्रवर्णिकमेव च गीयते ॐ ॥ **(1-1-15)**

आनन्दमयादिः ब्रह्म इति वर्तते। चो यतः इत्यर्थे। "सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तम्" इति मन्त्रवर्णेन उक्तं परं ब्रह्म एव अन्नमयादिशब्दपञ्चकेन गीयते। यतः अतः च आनन्दमयादि पञ्च अपि ब्रह्म एव ।

The words *'Ānandamayādiḥ Brahma'* are continued. The term *'ca'* is used in the sense of *'yataḥ'* (because). ***Ānandamaya*** **etc. are *Brahman* only because the *Brahman* who is defined by the *mantra "satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ"*, only is (further) sung by the five terms *annamaya* etc.**

Why should we not take the mythological deity four-faced Brahmā born from the naval of Viṣṇu, as the one conveyed by these terms *Ānandamaya* etc.? The next *sūtra* answers:

॥ ॐ नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ॐ ॥ **(1-1-16)**

आनन्दमयादिः इति वर्तते। इतरः ब्रह्मेतराः चतुर्मुखादयः न आनन्दमयादयः। कुतः "ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्" इत्युक्तमुक्तिहेतुज्ञानविषयत्वस्य तेषाम् अनुपपत्तेः। तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः एव अन्नमयादित्वेन उक्तत्वात् इत्यर्थः।

The word *'Ānandamayādiḥ'* is continued. **Others, those other than *Brahman* i.e. *Caturmukha* etc. are not referred to by *Ānandamaya* etc., because the (*Śruti*) statement**

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1 को ह्येवान्यात् कः प्राण्याद् यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात्। (Tait. Up. 2-7) आसमन्तात् काशते तद् आकाशः ब्रह्म इत्यर्थः।

***'Brahmavidāpnoti paraṁ'* tells that the knowledge of *Brahman* leads to liberation and it is inappropriate to attribute that (*Brahman's*) characteristic to others, i.e. because *Ānandamaya* etc refer to *Brahman* only.**

The next *sūtra* gives another reason why the four-faced Brahmā etc. are not meant by the terms *Ānandamaya* etc.

॥ ॐ भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-1-17)**

आनन्दमयो नेतर इति वर्तते। आनन्दमयाद् भेदव्यपदेशात् च आनन्दमयः न इतरः इत्यर्थः।

The words *'Ānandamayaḥ na itaraḥ'* are continued. **On account of the declaration of difference between *Ānandamaya Brahman* and others (in the amount of happiness enjoyed) *Ānandamaya* does not convey others.**

Taittirīya Upaniṣad has tried to quantify the happiness possible for men, Gandharvas and various deities like Indra, Bṛhaspati, and Prajāpati, in an ascending gradation. Their happiness is shown as limited, however abundant it may be. But the happiness of *Brahman* is described as unlimited, infinite, which words fail to describe and mind fails to imagine[1]. On account of the declaration of this difference between the happiness of *Brahman* and that of others, the term *Ānandamaya*, which denotes superabundance of happiness, does not convey others.

Ānandamaya etc. may convey the Supreme *Brahman*. But if we accept the logic of identity (*advaita*) between *Brahman* and the other individual souls like four-faced Brahmā, then there is no basic difference between the two. The next *sūtra* refutes such a contention.

॥ ॐ कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा ॐ ॥ **(1-1-18)**

चोऽवधारणे । अदृष्टेऽर्थे अनुमानापेक्षा न कार्या। कामात् च। यथाकामं हि अनुमातुं शक्यत्वात् च।

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1 यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह। (Tait. Up. 2-4).

The word *ca* is used for emphasis.

In case of unseen matter, inference is not dependable, because it is indeed possible to infer at will.

In the previous *sūtra*, *Brahman* is expressed as different from other individual souls like Prajāpati, Indra, Bṛhaspati, Gandharvas, Human beings etc., however exalted they may be. But some may infer logically and some do infer that there is no difference between *Brahman* and others. The *Sūtrakāra* categorically refutes such inference about *Brahman*, in this *sūtra*. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* expresses the same sentiment when it says, 'this knowledge (about *Brahman*) cannot be gained by logical inference'[1]. While commenting on this *sūtra*, Śaṅkarācārya again brings in his favourite theory that 'the unintelligent (*Sāṅkhya*) *Pradhāna* is not the cause of this world', and V. S. Ghate finds it "unnecessary"[2].

If one insists that in fact the difference between *Brahman* and individual souls is apparent but not real, and there is no harm in accepting the non-difference between the two, the next *sūtra* refutes such an argument.

॥ ॐ अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति ॐ ॥ (1-1-19)

चशब्दो युक्तिसमुच्चये । श्रुतिर्मुक्तावपीति शेषः । अस्मिन् प्रकरणे अस्य इतरजीवस्य तद्योगम् आनन्दमयादिरूपेण ब्रह्मणा सह योगं संबन्धं मुक्तावपि श्रुतिः शास्ति यतः अतः ऐक्यायोगात् आनन्दमयादिः न इतरः ।

'*Ca*' indicates that this is another reasoning in support of the conclusion reached in the earlier *sūtras*. The words '*śrutiḥ muktau api*' are to be supplied to complete the construction.

In this chapter (of the *Upaniṣad*), since *Śruti* tells a relation between *Brahman* in the form of *Ānandamaya* etc. and the individual soul even after its liberation, in the absence of

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1 नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया । (Kaṭha. Up. 1-2-9).

2 VSG, p. 55

identity between the two, *Ānandamaya* etc. connote not the individual soul but *Brahman* only.

Taittirīya Upaniṣad [1] declares that one who knows *Brahman* as described here, goes near *Ānandamayabrahman* after leaving this world. Thus, even after achieving liberation, the individual soul is said to have a relation with *Brahman* but not oneness or identity.

V. S. Ghate opines that 'in this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *sūtras* 16,17,19 deserve notice, because they all rest on the conception of a difference of individuality between *Brahman* and *Jīva*; and Śaṅkara, at the end of *sūtra* 17, comes forth with his usual explanation that such *sūtras* as these only refer to difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva*, which is due to *māyā*, whereas, really speaking, there exists no such difference'[2].

As already mentioned earlier, Śaṅkarācārya has initially accepted that *Ānandamaya* conveyed *Brahman*, and later has gone back on it and rejected the *sūtra*. He has upheld the same contention, which he earlier treated as *Pūrvapakṣa* and rejected. The objections raised by Śaṅkarācārya against the *sūtra* *Ānandamayobhyāsāt* are as follows.

The *Upaniṣad* states that *Brahman* is the tail / support of *Ānandamaya*.[3] Therefore, it would be inconsistent if the same *Brahman* is both the whole (*avayavī*) and the part (*avayava*) of *Ānandamaya*.[4] This argument of Śaṅkarācārya is not sustainable because the axiom that a part is different from the whole or a part is smaller than the whole is applicable to only finite things. For example, 4 is smaller than 8 since it is half of 8, and 16 is bigger than 8 since it is double of 8. This syllogism is true as long as

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1 य एवंवित्। अस्माल्लोकात्प्रेत्य। एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति। (Tait. Up. 2-8).

2 VSG. P. 55-56.

3 आनन्द आत्मा। ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा। (Tait. Up. 2-5).

4 तदेव ब्रह्म आनन्दमय आत्मा अवयवी तदेव च ब्रह्म पुच्छम् इति असामंजस्यं स्यात्। (Ś. BSB. 1-1-19).

8 is finite. If we consider infinity in place of 8 the same axiom fails, because half of infinity is also infinity. Infinity plus infinity is infinity and infinity minus infinity is also infinity[1] and not zero. So in case of *Brahman* the part and the whole are the same. Madhvācārya quotes some verses from *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* in support of this contention. 'The head is Nārāyaṇa, the right wing is Pradyumna, the left wing is Aniruddha, and the assemblage is Vāsudeva; or Nārāyaṇa is the assemblage and Vāsudeva is the head and the tail is said to be Saṅkarṣaṇa; thus, one only is told in five parts or ways'[2].

Another objection is that even after accepting that the suffix *mayaṭ* signifies abundance, the term *Ānandamaya* still implies the existence of some amount of the contrary element (*pratiyogī*), sadness along with happiness.[3] Since *Brahman* cannot be expected to have sorrow, one cannot signify *Brahman* by the term *Ānandamaya*. B. N. K. Sharma argues[4] that though abundance of a particular property in a given thing is generally conceived in relation to a modicum of its opposite existing elsewhere, it is not always true that such a rival element must also be conceived to be present in the same locus[5]. Madhvācārya offers a simple example to clear this doubt. According to him since happiness is a characteristic mark of *Brahman*, he can be described as *Ānandamaya* just as the sun can be described as *pracuraprakāśaḥ* [6]. The statement that the Sun has abundant luminosity should not imply that the Sun has some darkness also[7]. The contrary element (*pratiyogī*) i.e. darkness or dimness could exist elsewhere.

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1 पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते , (Bṛha. Up. 5-1-1) .

2 शिरो नारायणः पक्षो दक्षिणः सव्य एव च। प्रद्युम्नश्चानिरुद्धश्च सन्दोहो वासुदेवकः॥ नारायणोऽथ सन्दोहो वासुदेवः शिरोऽपि वा। पुच्छं सङ्कर्षणः प्रोक्त एक एव तु पञ्चधा॥ (M. BSB 1- 1-15).

3 अपि च आनन्दप्रचुर इत्युक्ते दुःखास्तित्वमपि गम्यते प्राचुर्यस्य लोके प्रतियोग्यल्पत्वापेक्षत्वात्। (Ś. BSB. 1-1-19).

4 BNK. I. p. 108.

5 प्राचुर्यस्य प्रतियोग्यल्पत्वापेक्षत्वेऽपि न प्रतियोगिनः सामानाधिकरण्यनियमः।(TC).

6 स्वरूपे च युज्यते प्रचुरप्रकाशो रविरितिवत्। (M. BSB. 1-1-13).

7 प्रचुरप्रकाशः सविता इत्युक्तेऽपि तस्मिन्नन्धकारलेशाप्रतीतेः। (TC).

Śaṅkarācārya raises another objection that when the suffix *'mayaṭ'* is used in the sense of modification (*vikārārtha*) in the first four instances of *Annamaya, Prāṇamaya* etc, then how in the same chain all of a sudden *'mayaṭ'* signifies abundance in the term *Ānandamaya* only, in the same way as saying that half of the lady is old and the other half is young.[1] This objection is relevant for those who have treated only *Ānandamaya* as connoting Brahman and the other four namely *Annamaya* etc. as sheaths (*kośa*) and hence *anātma*. The spirit of the *sūtra 'Ānandamayobhyāsāt'* is such that by the implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*) all the five terms in the chain *Annamaya* etc. convey *Brahman* and the suffix *'mayaṭ'* signifies abundance in all the five terms. When *Annamaya* etc. are all *Brahman*, the fear that "if *Ānandamaya* is treated as *Brahman* then *Annamaya* etc. may also become *Brahman*"[2] has no room and it becomes unfounded. When Bādarāyaṇavyāsa. has just started his *śāstrasamanvaya* and has proceeded to show how various expressions in Scriptures convey *Brahman*, it is unfortunate that the very first *sūtra* should have been faulted by Śaṅkarācārya. Vācaspati Miśra, Śaṅkarācārya's disciple, has defended Śaṅkarācārya by saying that "the *sūtras* have to be overruled and otherwise interpreted if they conflict with the *Śrutis*"[3]. It amounts to saying that the *sūtras* are not in keeping with the spirit of *Śrutis*. The aim of this study is to find the concept of *Brahman* in *Brahmasūtras* as they are. Therefore, the question whether the *sūtras* are in keeping with Vedas or not, is beyond the scope of this study. Even S. Radhakrishnan, an ardent follower of Śaṅkarācārya, does not agree with Śaṅkarācārya's explanation. He says: "The *Sūtrakāra* evidently means that *Brahman* is full of bliss. Since this interpretation goes against the unqualified character of *Brahman*, Śaṅkarācārya offers a strained explanation that *ānandamaya* is a vesture of *Brahman*"[4].

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1 विकारार्थे मयट् प्रवाहे सति आनन्दमय एव अकस्मात् अर्धजरतीन्यायेन कथमिव मयटः प्राचुर्यार्थत्वम्। (Ś. BSB. 1-1-19).

2 अन्नमयादीनामपि तर्हि ब्रह्मत्वप्रसङ्गः। (Ś. BSB. 1-1-19).

3 वेदसूत्रयोर्विरोधे 'गुणेत्वन्यायकल्पना' इति सूत्राणि अन्यथा नेतव्यानि। (*Bhāmatī*) (BNK. I. p. 98).

4 SRK. p. 261.

"Deussen (a foreign disciple of Śaṅkarācārya,) sought to hide his discomfiture by making a desperate suggestion that *Pucchabrahmavāda* in Śaṅkarācārya's *bhāṣya* was probably an interpolation by some later writer"[1].

7 अन्तःस्थत्वाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-20)**

तत्तु इति वर्तते[2] **(1-1-4),** श्रुतमिति शेषः । इन्द्राद्यधिदेवेषु अन्तः श्रुतं तत्तु (ब्रह्मैव) तद्धर्मोपदेशात् तस्य ब्रह्मणः व्यावर्तकधर्माणाम् उपदेशात् ।

'Tattu' is to be repeated (from *sūtra* 1-1-4). *'Śrutaṁ'* is to be supplied to complete the construction. **The Being heard within the presiding deities like Indra is that *Brahman* only as *Brahman*'s exclusive attributes are mentioned.** In the Scriptures there are discussions in different texts about the existence of some Being in the heart of various presiding deities (*Adhidevas*) like Indra, Sūrya, Varuṇa and so on. This *sūtra* states that the Being so mentioned is the Supreme Being *Brahman* only because the various characteristics of that inner Being, described in the texts are the attributes of *Brahman* only. In this manner Bādarāyaṇavyāsa shows that all the names like Indra, Sūrya, Varuṇa and so on, though normally denote the respective presiding deities, they connote in the highest sense (*paramamukhyavṛtti*), the Supreme Being.

This can also mislead the reader to understand that the Supreme Being, *Brahman* and the presiding deities like Indra, Sūrya etc. are all one and the same. To avoid this possible mis-conception, the author immediately adds another *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॐ ॥ **(1-1-21)**

चः समुच्चये । तदिति वर्तते । इन्द्रादिभ्य इति योग्यतया लभ्यते । तद् ब्रह्म स आत्मा "इन्द्रस्य आत्मा" इत्यादौ इन्द्रादिभ्यो अन्यः तेभ्यः इन्द्राद्यन्तर्यामित्वाद्युक्त्या भेदव्यपदेशात् ।

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1 BNK. I. p. 99.

2 वर्तते is in the sense of अनुवर्तते

'ca' is a conjunctive. *'Tad'* is to be continued (from *sūtra* 1-1-4). *'Indrādibhyaḥ'* is obtained on account of compatibility of sense.

In statements like *'Indrasya Ātmā'* etc. that *Brahman* is different from Indra etc. on account of the declaration of the difference from them with expressions like 'the inner controller of Indra', and so on.

All the commentators agree on the purport of both the above mentioned *sūtras*, though they refer to different texts for the topic of discussion (*viṣayavākya*). V. S. Ghate opines that, "*sūtra 21 "Bhedavyapadeśāccānyaḥ"* deserves notice, as it refers to the distinction between *Brahman* and *Jīva* (individual soul) ".

The neuter *'tad'* continued from an earlier *sūtra*, changes its gender in order to conform to the predicate *'anyaḥ'* which is in agreement with the word *'ātman'* in the *Śruti* [1]. This feature is known as *'Liṅgavipariṇāma'*.

8 आकाशाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात् ॐ ॥ (1-1-22)

तत्तु इति वर्तते । आकाशः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव तल्लिङ्गात् ब्रह्माव्यभिचारिलिङ्गस्य आकाशे श्रवणात् ।

'Tat' is continued. ***Ākāśa* is that (*Brahman*) only, since the exclusive characteristic marks (of *Brahman*) are understood with respect to *Ākāśa*.**

The topic discussed here is a passage[2] from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad:* What is the origin or source of this world? *'Ākāśa'* it was said. All these beings arise from *Ākāśa* only and at the end dissolve into *Ākāśa:* Indeed *Ākāśa* alone is greater than all these and *Ākāśa* is the final resort.

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1 तदित्यनुवृत्तेरन्यदिति वाच्ये पुंनिर्देशः श्रौतात्मपदानुसारात् । (TDK. 1-1-21).

2 अस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाश इति होवाच सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्त आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यन्त्याकाशो ह्येवैभ्यो ज्यायानाकाशः परायणम् । (Chānd. Up. 1-9-1).

Here, a doubt may arise that the word *Ākāśa* may refer to the elemental space (*Bhūtākāśa*), because the word is normally understood in that sense. The above *sūtra* avers that since the characteristics of *Brahman* are mentioned in regard to *Ākāśa*, the word *Ākāśa* here refers to *Brahman* only. All commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*.

Though the name *Ākāśa* only is mentioned here, it can be understood by implication (*upalakṣaṇa*) that the names of all the five *Adhibhūta*-entities like *Ākāśa*, *Tejas*, *Vāyu* etc. connote *Brahman* in their highest sense (*paramamukhyavṛtti*).

In the previous *Adhikaraṇa* it was shown that the names of presiding deities (*Adhidevas*) like Indra, connoted *Brahman* since they derived their powers from *Brahman*. Here, the names of inanimate and insentient (*Adhibhūta*) entities like *Ākāśa*, are shown to convey *Brahman*, since they too owe their properties to the same *Brahman*.

9) प्राणाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अत एव प्राणः ॐ ॥ **(1-1-23)**

अत एव पूर्वसूत्रोक्तहेत्वतिदेशात् तल्लिङ्गात् ब्रह्माव्यभिचारिलिङ्गस्य प्राणे श्रवणात् प्राणः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव ।

For the same reason as argued in the previous *sūtra* i.e., since the exclusive characteristics of *Brahman* are understood in regard to *Prāṇa*, *Prāṇa* is that *Brahman* only.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. However, they refer to topics in different scriptural texts. Though only *Prāṇa* is mentioned in the *sūtra*, the purport of the *sūtra* can be extended to the other bodily principles, by implication (*upalakṣaṇa*). "*Adhyātma* means body since it is an abode of enjoyment. *Adhyātma* also refers to (the acts like) breathing, living, movement etc."[1].

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1 आत्मानमधिकृत्य तस्य भोगायतनत्वेन वर्तत इत्यध्यात्मं शरीरम्। तस्मिन् प्राणनं जीवनं चेष्टादिकं च। (NS. P. 149). (BNK. I. p. 119).

In other words, just as it was concluded in the earlier *sūtras* that the various presiding deities owed their powers to *Brahman* (*sūtra* 20) and the insentient (*Adhibhūta*) entities like *Ākāśa* owed their properties to *Brahman* (*sūtra* 22), here too the physiological functions of all the living beings owe their capabilities to *Brahman*.

10 ज्योतिरधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-24)**

ज्योतिः तत्तु चरणाभिधानात्।

The term *Jyotiḥ* (Light) conveys that (*Brahman*) only on account of the mention of the word *caraṇa*. *Caraṇa* means either roaming or a quarter i.e. the fourth part.

Here, the author asserts that the word *jyotiḥ*, which is popularly understood to denote luminous objects like Sun, Moon, Stars, Lightening, Fire and so on, in fact connotes *Brahman*.

All the commentators agree on the assertion (*pratijñā*) viz., *Jyotiḥ tu tat Brahma*, but they differ on the interpretation of the reason (*hetu*) *caraṇābhidhānāt*. It all depends on the guesswork as to what topic in the Scriptures could be in the mind of Bādarāyaṇavyāsa while composing this *sūtra* and which passage (*viṣayavākya*) could have raised the doubt whether *Jyotiḥ* implied *Brahman* or something else.

Śaṅkarācārya takes *caraṇa* to mean a quarter (a fourth part). He quotes a passage from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [1]; "Above the heaven, above the world, above everything, in a world better than which there is no other world, there shines The *Jyotiḥ* and that *Jyotiḥ* is in the heart of every person". This word *Jyotiḥ* indicates *Brahman*, because in a previous sentence, *Brahman* is said to be of four parts, *pādas*, and all that exists in this world is equivalent to one-fourth and that immortal portion in heaven represents His three-fourth part[2]. The same immortal *Brahman* is referred to here

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1 अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते विश्वतः पृष्ठेषु सर्वतः पृष्ठेषु अनुत्तमेषूत्तमेषु लोकेष्विदं वाव तद्यदिदमस्मिन्नन्तः पुरुषे ज्योतिः। (Chānd. Up. 3-13-7).

2 पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि। (Chānd. Up. 3-12-6).

as *Jyotiḥ* in the heaven. No other luminous body is anywhere described as having four parts, *pādas*. Following Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and others except Madhvācārya have interpreted the *sūtra* on similar lines.

Madhvācārya, however, takes another view. He interprets the word *caraṇam* as meaning moving or roaming, from the root *car* to move. He quotes a *mantra* from *Agnisūkta* in *Ṛgveda* [1].

"My ears turn away; so too my eyes from the Light (*Jyotiḥ*) that is placed in the heart. The mind too strays far away. What can I say or think of that Light". The idea is that our sense-organs cannot comprehend the Light, that is the Supreme Self within us, since they are all focused outside. Hence, even-though this *mantra* is from *Agnisūkta*, the word *Jyotiḥ* implies *Brahman* and not fire, since the words (*vi*)*caraṇam* i.e. moving away or roaming away have been used.

Thus, the exposition (*vṛtti*) of this *sūtra*, according to Madhvācārya is:

'ज्योतिर्हृदय आहितम्'इति अग्निसूक्तोक्तं ज्योतिः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव न तु अग्निः 'वि मे मनश्चरति दूर' इति सर्वेन्द्रियाणां तज्ज्योतिषः विचरणाभिधानात् सर्वेन्द्रियविदूरत्वलिङ्गात्।

The term *Jyotiḥ* (light), uttered in the *Śruti* "*Jyotirhṛdaya āhitaṁ*" while reciting *Agnisūkta*, implies *Brahman* only but not fire, because in the immediate next statement "*vi me manaścarati dūra*" it is said that all the sense organs wander away from that Light i.e. the attribute of being far off from all the sense organs has been told for that Light.

In that case, the reason (*hetu*) in the *sūtra* should have been *vicaraṇābhidhānāt*. But it is simply *caraṇābhidhānāt* either because the prefixes are only explanatory and not significatory,

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1 वि मे कर्णा पतयतो वि चक्षुर्वीश्दं ज्योतिर्हृदय आहितं यत् । वि मे मनश्चरति दूर आधीः किं स्विद् वक्ष्यामि किमु नू मनिष्ये ॥ (RV. 6-9-6).

or in order to maintain conformity with the wording of the *Śruti* statement *vi* me *manaścarati*[1].

The topical text from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (3-13-7) referred to by the other commentators certainly appears befitting. Still Madhvācārya has preferred another text possibly to avoid the repeated reference to the *Chāngogya* text and the characteristic of *Brahman* having Its fourth part equivalent to the whole world etc., in the next two *sūtras*.

11 गायत्र्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ छन्दोऽभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथा चेतोर्पणनिगदात्तथा हि दर्शनम् ॐ ॥ (1-1-25)

गायत्रीपदेन छन्दसः अभिधानात् ब्रह्म न वाच्यम् इति चेत् न गायत्री तत्तु ब्रह्मैव तथा हि दर्शनम् श्रुतिः तथा तद्गानत्राणकर्तृत्वादि गुणविशिष्टतया चेतसि अर्पणाय उपासनाय निगदात् कथनात्।

If it is doubted that the word *Gāyatrī* cannot convey *Brahman*, since *Gāyatrī* is popularly understood to denote a metre, (the reply is) it is not so; *Gāyatrī* connotes *Brahman* only, because *Śruti* says so. *Śruti* says '*Gāyati trāyati* ca'[2]. These attributes of (original) singing (of *Vedas*) and protecting belong to *Brahman* only, and it is told so to enable one to meditate on *Brahman* having these attributes.

One may wonder how this word *Gāyatrī* crops up suddenly. In the previous *sūtra* the word *Jyotiḥ*, i.e. light is declared to convey *Brahman*. That *Jyotiḥ* is described in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (3-13-7) also as "that which shines above the heaven, above the world, etc." i.e. *Brahman*. The same *Jyotiḥ* is found to be referred to earlier as *Gāyatrī*, in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* in the statement "*Gāyatrī* indeed is all this[3]". Now if *Gāyatrī* is understood as

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1 विचरणेति वाच्ये चरणेत्युक्तिरुपसर्गस्य द्योतकत्वमात्राद्वा वि मे मनश्चरतीति श्रुत्यनुगमार्थो वा । (TDK. 1-1-24).

2 गायति त्रायति च। (Chānd. Up. 3-12-1).

3 गायत्री वा इदं सर्वम्। (Chānd. Up. 3-12-1).

a metre only, then *Jyotiḥ* will also convey a metre and it cannot be said to signify *Brahman*. Hence the urgency of declaring *Gāyatrī* as connoting *Brahman* in the immediately following *sūtra*.

If it be questioned why *Brahman* is to be addressed by such uncommon words like *Gāyatrī*, the reply is *tathā cetasi arpanāya nigadāt* i.e. it is so said in order to enable one to meditate upon those attributes of *Brahman*, indicated by such words. This applies to other *sūtras* also, where uncommon words are declared to connote *Brahman*.

In the next *sūtra* Bādarāyaṇavyāsa adduces another reason for saying that *Gāyatrī* conveys *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ॐ ॥ (1-1-26)

गायत्र्याः ब्रह्मणः च भूतामृतरूपपादचतुष्टयवत्वव्यपदेशस्य "पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि" इत्येवं व्यपदेशस्य उपपत्तेः च एवं गायत्री ब्रह्म [illegible] ।

Gāyatrī and Brahman are both stated to be consisting of four quarters, one quarter or part of them being equivalent to the entire existing world and the remaining immortal part of three quarters being in the heaven; and on account of this reason also *Gāyatrī* conveys *Brahman* only.

Gāyatrī is described in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (3-12-5) as four-footed and six-fold[1]. It is further said to be expressed in the following *mantra* [2] which is quoted from the famous *puruṣasūkta* and which describes *Brahman*. It says: "Such is the greatness of this (world); even greater than that is this Supreme Being (called Gāyatrī). All this world is a quarter of Him; the other three quarters of Him constitute the immortal portion in heaven". Thus also it is concluded that *Gāyatrī* conveys *Brahman*.

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1 सैषा चतुष्पदा षड्विधा गायत्री तदेतदृचाभ्यनूक्तम्। (Chānd. Up. 3-12-5).

2 तावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायाँश्च पूरुषः। पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि। (Chānd. Up. 3-12-6).

Another possible objection is answered in the following *sūtra.*

॥ ॐ उपदेशभेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् ॐ ॥ (1-1-27)

गायत्रीज्योतिषोः द्युस्थत्वदिवःपरत्वरूपोपदेशभेदात् तद्द्वयं ब्रह्माख्यम् एकं वस्तु इत्युक्तं न युक्तम् इति चेत् न। उभयस्मिन् अपि उपदेशे अविरोधात्।

In *Chāṇdogya Upaniṣad*, in one place it is said that the three quarters of *Gāyatrī* are in *Dyuloka*[1], in another place it is mentioned that *Jyotiḥ* is above *Dyuloka*[2]. If it be doubted that because of this difference in description it is not proper to say that both convey one reality called *Brahman*, it is not so; there is no contradiction between the two statements. One statement is from the point of view of three worlds- *Bhūḥ*, *Bhuvaḥ*, *Svaḥ*, and the other statement is from the point of view of the seven worlds- *Bhuḥ*, *Bhuvaḥ*, *Svaḥ*, *Mahaḥ*, *Janaḥ*, *Tapaḥ*, *Satyaṁ*. There are two methods of dividing the worlds. Śaṅkarācārya gives an example; ''Just as in ordinary language, a falcon at the top of a tree is said to be on the tree as well as above the tree, a man sitting on a verandah can be described as available in the house as well as outside the house, likewise, *Brahman* can be described as being in the heaven as well as above the heaven''.

All the commentators agree on the purport of these three *sūtras* no. 25, 26 and 27. In *sūtra* no. 25, instead of *nigadāt* (on account of being declared), Rāmānujācārya reads *nigamāt* (on account of a Vedic sentence).

12 पादान्त्यप्राणाधिकरणम् ।

In *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* already seen, it was decided that the word *Ānandamaya* conveyed *Brahman*. Then by the implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*) it was seen that *Annamaya*, *Prāṇamaya* etc. also conveyed *Brahman*. Thus *Prāṇa* connotes *Brahman*. Then in *Prāṇādhikaraṇa* it was specifically told that

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1 पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि। (Chānd. Up. 3-12-6).

2 यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिः। (Chānd. Up. 3-13-7).

the word *Prāṇa* referred to *Brahman* only since the characteristic marks of *Brahman* were mentioned in regard to *Prāṇa*. Again some objections might have been raised that some characteristic marks, which could not be of *Brahman* were mentioned in regard to *Prāṇa* in some other contexts and hence *Prāṇa* in those contexts might not convey *Brahman*. To remove this doubt the *Sutrakāra* again affirms in this *Adhikaraṇa* that *Prāṇa* in such places also conveys *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ प्राणस्तथानुगमात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-28)**

यथा 'अत एव प्राणः' इति अतीतसूत्रे प्राणः ब्रह्मैव तथा अयं च ऐतरेये 'ता वा एता' इत्यारभ्य वहुषु स्थलेषु श्रुतः प्राणः ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्मशब्दस्य तथा ब्रह्माव्यभिचारिलिङ्गानाम् अनुगमात् अनुवृत्तेः अभ्यासात्।

As in the foregoing *sūtra 'ata eva Prāṇaḥ'* (BS. 1-1-23) *Prāṇa* conveys *Brahman* only, similarly this term *Prāṇa* heard at many places in *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*[1] after the commencement as *'tā vā etāḥ'*, also signifies *Brahman* only, because the word *Brahman* as well as the exclusive characteristic marks of *Brahman* are repeatedly told.

In keeping with the interpretation of Madhvācārya, Rāghavendratīrtha has taken the word *Anugama* to mean *Anuvṛtti* i.e. repetition. But Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted the word *Anugama* as *tātparya* i.e. purport. So, according to Śaṅkarācārya, the *sūtra* says, प्राणः तत्तु तथानुगमात्। *Prāṇa* connotes that *Brahman* only, because the purport (of the *Śruti* sentences[2]) is in that manner.

There is no controversy among the commentators regarding the conclusion reached in this *sūtra*, that *Prāṇa* connotes *Brahman*. The *Sūtrakāra* further argues in support of this conclusion, in the next *sutra*, which also indicates what topic

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1 This refers to a passage (*Viṣayavākya*) from *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* taken by Madhvācārya, in which *Prāṇa* is placed in the company of a group of sense organs, which breeds the doubt, which will be discussed later.

2 Śaṅkarācārya refers to a passage from *Kauśītakī Upaniṣad* which will be discussed in the next sūtra.

under discussion could be in the mind of Bādarāyaṇavyāsa, while composing the above *sūtra*.

॥ॐ न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् ॐ॥
(1-1-29)

वक्तुः आत्मोपदेशात् न (प्राणो ब्रह्म) इति चेत् (न)[1]। हि अस्मिन् (प्रकरणे) अध्यात्मसम्बन्ध भूमा।

If it be said that on account of the speaker's reference to himself (as *Prāṇa*), *Prāṇa* does not denote *Brahman*, it is not so because in this chapter there are numerous references to *Ātman*.

Possibly based on the words *'Vaktuḥ Ātmopadeśāt'* meaning "because of the speaker's reference to himself", Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and some other commentators have assumed that the topic under discussion in this *Adhikaraṇa* is a conversation between Indra and Pratardana mentioned in *Kauśītakī Upaniṣad.* A certain valiant king called Pratardana fought his way through and reached Indra. Pleased with Pratardana's valour, Indra offered him a boon. Pratardana asked for that which would be most beneficial to mankind. To that Indra said, "know me only. I am *Prāṇa,* the intelligent self"[2]. Since Indra calls himself as *Prāṇa,* this may create a doubt that *Prāṇa* may connote Indra and not *Brahman.* According to Śaṅkarācārya, this *sūtra* decides that, since Indra has given this advice as the most beneficial for mankind and a man can attain the most desired liberation only from the knowledge of *Brahman*, the purport is that *Prāṇa* connotes *Brahman* only. Eventhough, in this section there are characteristic marks of a presiding deity, vital breath and individual soul mentioned in regard to *Prāṇa*, the purport of the entire section from the beginning (*upakrama*) to the conclusion (*upasaṁhāra*) shows that *Prāṇa* conveys *Brahman.*

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1 न इति शेषः। TDK. 1-1-29.

2 मामेव विजानीहि। प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा। (Ś. BSB. 1-1-29).

Here, in the phrase *vaktuḥ ātmopadeśāt* i.e. speaker's reference to himself, the speaker is already implied in the word *ātmopadeśāt*. Other than the speaker, who else can talk about himself? Therefore the word *vaktuḥ* in the *sūtra* appears superfluous. A *sūtra* is said to be laconic (*alpākṣaraṁ*) and hence the *Sūtrakāra* is not expected to use such redundant words. He is likely to be indicating something more by using the word *vaktuḥ*. *Vaktuḥ* is in genitive case. In Sanskrit, the genetive case can be used for the subject (*kartā*) as well as the object (*karma*)[1], when the verb is in a substantive form. Thus, *vaktuḥ* can refer to the speaker Indra in a conversation, or to the listener. The listener could be a *vaktā*, the speaker or reciter of something other than this conversation. Possibly on this clue, Madhvācārya takes a similar conversation between the god Indra and the sage Viśvāmitra mentioned in *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, as the topic of discussion (*viṣayavākya*) for this *adhikaraṇa*.

Viśvāmitra recited *Brahtīsahasra* (a *sūkta* containing 1000 *ṛcas*) three times. God Indra, pleased with the recitation offers a boon to Viśvāmitra. Viśvāmitra says to Indra: "Sir, I want to know you well". Thereupon Indra declares to him- "O sage, I am *Prāṇa*. You are *Prāṇa*. All these creatures are *Prāṇa*. Verily *Prāṇa* is He who scorches (the worlds) and pervades the quarters with that form" and so on[2]. This raises a doubt as to whether *Prāṇa* conveyed Indra or an individual soul like Viśvāmitra or the chief breath in all the creatures. *Sūtrakāra* decides that *Prāṇa* connotes *Brahman* only and he gives a reason for this conclusion in the second half of the sūtra (29) as '*Adhyātmasambandhabhūmā hyasmin*.' Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted this phrase as follows: "on account of the numerous references (*Sambandhabhūma*) to the inner self (*adhyātma i.e. pratyagātmā*), in this chapter (*asmin*)"[3]. This reasoning does not appear to bring out any

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1 कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति । (Pāṇini 2-3-65). The sixth case affix is employed after a word, in denoting the agent and the object, when used along with a *kṛt* affix (3.1.93) (S. C. Vasu Vol. I. p. 302).

2 BNK. I. p. 127.

3 अध्यात्मसंबन्धः प्रत्यगात्मसंबन्धः तस्य भूमा बाहुल्यम् अस्मिन् अध्याये उपलभ्यते । (S. BSB. 1-1-29).

substantial new point other than what is said by the word '*anugamāt*' in the previous *sūtra*. *Sūtrakāra* normally takes up an objection raised by a *Pūrvapakṣin*, in the first half of the *sūtra* and then gives a convincing refutation in the second half. The *Siddhānta* view that *Prāṇa* connotes *Brahman* since there are numerous references to that effect or the purport of many sentences therein is to that effect, is already known in the previous *sūtra* no. 28, *Prāṇastathānugamāt*. Here in *sūtra* 29, a specific objection is raised that when someone (like Indra) says "I am *Prāṇa*", how this claim of identity with *Prāṇa* can be reconciled with the *Siddhānta* view that *Prāṇa* conveys *Brahman*. This reconciliation does not appear to have been convincingly accomplished by saying that there are numerous references to *Brahman* in this chapter.

Rāmānujācārya also has given an interpretation similar to that of Śaṅkarācārya. He says that, since a multitude of characteristics which exclusively pertain to *Brahman* has been mentioned in this chapter, *Prāṇa* connotes *Brahman*[1]. This also does not convincingly reconcile Indra's claim of identity with *Prāṇa*, and the view that *Prāṇa* conveys *Brahman*.

The reconciliation is contained in the phrase '*Adhyātma-sambandhabhūmā hyasmin.*' i.e. "by virtue of there being a profusion of the contact with the Supreme Self in him (Indra) at the time."[2] In other words, the *Sūtrakāra* avers that when Indra says, "I am *Prāṇa*" he does not claim identity with *Brahman* but only exclaims his extreme awareness of the fact that all his (Indra's) powers flow from *Prāṇa* i.e. *Brahman*. It becomes clearer in the reference to the conversation between Indra and Viśvāmitra where Indra says "O Sage, I am verily *Prāṇa*, You are *Prāṇa*, all these beings are *Prāṇa*"[3].

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1 परमात्मासाधारणधर्मसंवन्धो ह्यध्यात्मसंवन्धः तस्य भूमा वाहुल्यम् अस्मिन् प्रकरणे विद्यते। (Śrībhāṣya 1.1.30).

2 BNK. I. p. 127.

3 प्राणो वा अहमस्म्यृषे। प्राणस्त्वम्। प्राणः सर्वाणि भूतानि। (A.Ā. 2.2.3).

Thus, according to Madhvācārya, the exposition (*vṛtti*) of this sūtra is:

[illegible]ः वृहतीसहस्रं पठितुः विश्वामित्रस्य तमुद्दिश्य इन्द्रेण 'प्राणो वा अहमस्मि ऋषे' इति आत्मनः एव प्राणतया उपदेशात् न प्राणो ब्रह्म इति चेत् न हि यस्मात् अस्मिन् इन्द्रे अध्यात्मनः परमात्मनः सम्बन्धभूमा आवेशबाहुल्यं तदपेक्षया 'प्राणो वा अहम्' इत्युक्तिः।

Since Indra addressing Viśvāmitra who recited *Bṛhatīsahasra*, says "O sage, I am *Prāṇa*", if it be said that *Prāṇa* does not denote *Brahman*, it is not so, because such utterance of Indra as "I am *Prāṇa*" is by virtue of profuse influence of the Supreme Being in Indra at that time.

Viśvāmitra knew Indra's bravery and his fights with enemies, his jealousy, his attachment to his position, his weakness for women and so on. But, on recital of *Bṛhatīsahasra* by Viśvāmitra, Indra appeared before Viśvāmitra in all his effulgence and offering a boon. On seeing Indra in that luminous form, possibly Viśvāmitra sensed that some greater power could be speaking to him through Indra. Therefore, when Viśvāmitra says to Indra: "Sir, I want to know you well", perhaps he wanted to know from Indra (i) the identity of that power and (ii) its attributes. Otherwise he would not have desired to know Indra whom he knew earlier[1]. To the first part of the question Indra says, "O Sage, I am *Prāṇa*", and to the second, "you are *Prāṇa*, all these beings are *Prāṇa*; *Prāṇa* is that which scorches (the worlds) and pervades the quarters with that form"[2]. This is the mystic way of expressing the fact that the indwelling (*Antaryāmin*) source of power in everyone and everything is that *Brahman*. Such utterances emerge from the mystic when he stands flooded by the Divine Power as his own *Antaryāmin* as well as that of every one and every thing[3]. This is the purport of the phrase 'Adhyātmasambandhabhūmā'.

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1 अन्यथा त्वामेव जानीयामिति ज्ञातपूर्वेन्द्रस्य मुनेः प्रश्नस्यैव असम्भवात्। (TP. 1-1-29)

2 BNK. I. p. 133.

3 BNK. I. p. 133.

In order to show that the usage of such a language is quite common in mystic tradition, Sūtrakāra gives an illustration in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-30)**

शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तु उपदेशः वामदेवोपदेशवत्।

The declaration is from the standpoint of śāstra only, like the declaration of Vāmadeva.

Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted this *sūtra* thus: Indra a deity, had the *Ṛṣi*-like insight that "I am *Brahman*", which is vouched for by the Scriptures. Therefore he instructed (Pratardana) as "you know me only", just as *Ṛṣi* Vāmadeva having obtained this insight, understood as "I became Manu, I became Sūrya" etc.

This is not convincing. As per *Ṛgveda* (4-27-1,2), Vāmadeva, while he was still in his mother's womb, was believed to be aware of his former lives that he was once Manu, once Sūrya and once Ṛṣi Kakṣīvān the Brāhmin. How can one get Scriptural insight while in Mother's womb? Secondly, when a person attains true Monistic insight, he is expected to say, "I am *Brahman*, I am everything", and not "I became *Brahman*, I became everything". *Advaita* exhorts understanding what already exists and there is no question of anyone becoming anything. The root *'bhū'* in Sanskrit has both the meanings, 'to be' and 'to become'. Therefore, the expressions of Vāmadeva, quoted above, can be as "I was Manu, I was Sūrya" and not as "I became Manu, I became Sūrya" etc.

Ṛṣi Vāmadeva is considered as a staunch devotee of Indra and is credited to be the seer of the majority of hymns in the fourth *Maṇḍala* of *Ṛgveda*. The hymns of this *Maṇḍala* are mostly in praise of Indra. These hymns are full of riddles and the language there in is mystic. The exclamations that "I became Manu, I became Sūrya" etc., assumed to have been uttered by Ṛṣi Vāmadeva, are from the hymn IV-26 of *Ṛgveda*. From the excerpts

quoted below from the book "The seers of the *Ṛgveda*" written by V. G. Rahurkar, one can see that there is no unanimity amongst the scholars, on the conjecture that Vāmadeva uttered these words.

[We may begin with stanzas IV-26.1-3[1], --- The translation of the stanzas as given by Griffith[2] is as follows: (1) I was aforetime Manu, I was Sūrya: I am the sage Kakṣīvān, holy singer, Kutsa, the son of Arjunī. I am the sapient Uśanā: behold me. (2) I have bestowed the earth upon the Arya and rain upon the man who brings oblation. I guided forth the loud roaring waters and the gods moved according to my pleasures. (3) In the wild joy of *soma* I demolished ninety-nine forts of Śambara and also the hundredth habitation when helping Divodas Atithigva.

Sāyaṇa, while commenting on these stanzas does not seem to be quite sure as to who the speaker of these stanzas is.

Griffith[3] is of the opinion that Indra is the speaker of the first three stanzas.

Pischel[4] says that, IV-26 is an Indra-sūkta and that the first three stanzas are spoken by Indra.

Sieg[5] is of the opinion that in the first three stanzas Indra praises himself.

The stanzas in question can, however, be perhaps best interpreted if Indra is taken to be its speaker. Presumably Indra

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1 अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चाहं कक्षीवाँ ऋषिरस्मि विप्रः। अहं कुत्समार्जुनेयं न्यृञ्जेऽहं कविरुशना पश्यता मा ॥१॥ (RV. 4-26-1).
अहं भूमिमददामार्यायाहं वृष्टिं दाशुषे मर्त्याय। अहमपो अनयं वावशाना मम देवासो अनुकेतमायन् ॥२॥ (RV. 4-26-2).
अहं पुरो मन्दसानो व्यैरं नव साकं नवतीः शम्बरस्य। शततमं वेश्मं सर्वताता दिवोदासमतिथिग्वं यदावम् ॥३॥ (RV. 4-26-3).

2 Hymns of Ṛgveda, I. p. 428 (VGR. p. 51).

3 Hymns of Ṛgveda, I. p. 428 (VGR. p. 52 fn).

4 Ved. Stud. Vol. I p. 206 (VGR. p. 52 fn).

5 *Sagenstoffe der Ṛgveda* (VGR. p. 52 fn).

is glorifying his magical miraculous power by means of which he was able to assume any form he liked[1]][2].

Thus there is a possibility that the words "I was Manu, I was Sūrya" etc. could have been attributed by Vāmadev to Indra in his *Indrasūkta*. In that case, these Indra's words only cannot be considered as an independent evidence in support of an interpretation of Indra's utterance 'I am *Prāṇa*' as indicative of his realization of oneness of all souls. Indra is known to have eulogized himself many times. It is difficult to surmise that this self-praise is a result of his knowledge of oneness of souls.

The attempt of *Sūtrakāra* in this *sūtra* and the previous one is to reconcile the *Siddhānta* view that "*Prāṇa connotes Brahman*" with Indra's claim that "I am *Prāṇa*". If the Monistic view of Scriptures were to be accepted, the reconciliation would have been much simpler. *Sūtrakāra* could have simply said '*Jīvabrahmaṇorabhedāt*' instead of the complicated expression '*adhyātmasambandhabhūmā hyasmin*'. This illustration of Vāmadeva or anyone would not have been necessary at all. Further, if we accept Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation that Indra had the insight that "I am *Brahman*", which is vouched for by the Scriptures, then it amounts to that the *Brahmasūtras* are mutually inconsistent. For, the author has earlier categorically declared in *sūtra*[3] 21, that *Brahman* is different from Indra etc.

To tide over these difficulties, Madhvācārya has given an entirely different interpretation. '*Tu*' is taken as a particle for emphasis, in the sense of 'only'. The word '*Śāstra*'[4] has been interpreted as the indwelling ruler, *antaryāmin*. Madhvācārya quotes an authority for this interpretation from *Bhāgavata*[5].

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1 इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते। (RV. 6-47-18) (VGR. p. 52 fn).

2 VGR. p. 52.

3 ॥ ॐ भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॐ ॥

4 तुरेव। शास्तीति शास्त्रम् अन्तर्यामी। संविच्छास्त्रं परं पदम् इत्यादेः। TDK. 1-1-36.

5 स्वप्नो मायाग्रहः शय्या जाग्रदाभास आत्मनः।
नामरूपक्रियावृत्तिः संविच्छास्त्रं परं पदम्॥ (Bhāg. 1-6-17).
The (संवित्) all knowing (inner) (शास्त्रम्) controller, who causes the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, is the highest goal (to be reached).

The term *śāstra* formed according to *Uṇādisūtra* '*sarvadhātubhyaṣṭran*'[1], can stand for both the 'ruler; and the 'rule'.The term *śāstra* or *śāsana* usually means an order, a command or a rule. A rule is the prescribed action when many options are available. The propensity to act in a particular way could be according to the dictates of a state-authority, religious-authority, subject-authority or, more often than not, the inner conscience of the actor. And this intangible power called conscience is nothing but the indwelling ruler *antaryāmin*. In practice, just as the word Government is used to designate both the Governor and the governance, the term *śāstra* and *śāsana* can be used for both the rule and the ruler. Therefore, it is perfectly logical to take the word *śāstra* in the sense of the indwelling ruler antaryāmin.

The exposition of this *sūtra* according to Madhvācārya is :

शास्त्रदृष्ट्या अन्तर्यामिदृष्ट्या तु "प्राणो वा अहम्" इति उपदेशः वामदेववत् वामदेवोपदेशवत् यथा वामदेवः अन्तर्यामिदृष्ट्या 'अहं मनुरभवम्' इत्याद्याह [illegible]त्।

The utterance (of Indra) as "I am *Prāṇa*" is from the standpoint of the Inner Ruler of all only, just as Vāmadeva said from the standpoint of his individual self that "I was Manu" etc.

Thus, *'Śāstradṛṣṭi'* directly means *'Antaryāmidṛṣṭi'*, and *'Śāstradṛṣṭyā'* means from the standpoint of the Inner Ruler of all'. As mentioned in the previous *sūtra* when Viśvāmitra saw Indra in all his effulgence, he desired to know from Indra the identity of that effulgence and its attributes. Instead of giving a simple reply as "That is *Prāṇa*, *Prāṇa* is in me, *Prāṇa* is in you, *Prāṇa* is in all beings", Indra talks from the standpoint of the effulgent Ruler in him, i.e. Indra replies in a mystic and poetic

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1 शास्त्रम् - शिष्यते अनेन। शास् +"सर्वधातुभ्यष्ट्रन्" उणा. ४-१५८ इति ष्ट्रन्। (शब्दकल्पद्रुमः प्रथमः काण्डः। p. 68.)

2 BNK I. p. 134

fashion as though his inner Ruler is speaking, and says "O Sage, In am *Prāṇa*, you are *Prāṇa*, all these beings are *Prāṇa*". To make the matter clear the author quotes in this *sūtra* the example of Vāmadeva, who was aware of his former lives while he was still in his mother's womb, and how he expressed from the standpoint of his soul that "I was Manu and Sūrya, I was *Ṛṣi* Kakṣīvān the Brahmin"[1]. The comparison is only for the awareness. I do not think that the author has considered this as the monistic realization of oneness of all.

॥ ॐ जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगात् ॐ ॥ **(1-1-31)**

प्राणो ब्रह्मेति वर्तते। नेत्यनन्तरं शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेश इति च। ऐतरेयोक्तशतायुष्ट्वादिजीवलिङ्गात् तथा प्राणस्य इन्द्रियैः सह संवादादिमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गात् च न प्राणो ब्रह्म इति चेत् न। प्राणो ब्रह्मैव यस्मात् जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गोपदेशः अन्तर्याम्यपेक्षया एव युक्तः। तथोक्तिः अन्तर्बहिस्सर्वगतत्वेन ब्रह्मोपासात्रैविध्यादिह एतत्प्रकरणे आश्रितत्वात् उक्तत्वात्। तस्य उपासात्रैविध्यस्य अधिकारिभेदेन योगात् युक्तत्वात्।

The words *'Prāṇo Brahma'* are continued. The terms *'śāstradṛṣṭyā tu upadeśaḥ'* are also continued and placed after *'na'* which refutes the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

If it be said that since in *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* the characteristic marks of *Jīva* like a hundred year life span etc. and those of *Mukhyaprāṇa* like his conversation with other sense organs etc. are mentioned with respect to *Prāṇa*, *Prāṇa* does not convey *Brahman*, then it is not so. *Prāṇa* is *Brahman* only, because the mention of the characteristic marks of *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa* is from the standpoint of *Prāṇa* as their indwelling ruler only. The purpose of describing *Brahman* in this way as the indwelling ruler is to be in conformity

1 BNK. I. p. 128.

with the three types of meditation told in this chapter viz. (i) *Brahman* as the indwelling ruler, (ii) *Brahman* as present outside and (iii) *Brahman* as omnipresent. In this section of A.Ā. the topic of these three kinds of meditation is resorted to. It is quite proper to have three types of meditation to suit the devotees of different capabilities.

The knowledgeable ones can meditate on the all-pervasive *Brahman*, the *yogis* can meditate on *Brahman* in their own heart and the ordinary people can meditate on *Brahman* in idols outside.

This is a rather complex *sūtra*. The initial portion '*Jīvamukhyaprāṇaliṅgāt na iti cet na*' clearly states the *Pūrvapakṣa* and its negation. The *Siddhānta* '*Prāṇo Brahma eva, śāstradṛṣṭyā tu upadeśaḥ*' is continued from the preceding *sūtras*. Then there are three probanses (*hetus*), each one answering a corollary question, progressively. The *Siddhānta* is that though the characteristics of *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa* are mentioned for *Prāṇa*, Prāṇa is *Brahman* only because the mention of the characteristics of *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa* is from the standpoint of *Prāṇa* as their indwelling ruler only. The corollary question[1] is what for is this indwelling ruler mentioned here. The first probans '*upāsātraividhyāt*' reminds that there are three kinds of meditation on the indwelling ruler, (i) within one's self, (ii) out of self and (iii) in everything. The second corollary is why are these methods of meditation referred to here. The second probans '*āśritatvāt iha*' answers that in this section (of A. Ā.) the topic of three kinds of meditation is resorted to[2]. The next question is that when one type of meditation is enough, why three kinds of meditation are told. The third probans '*tadyogāt*' answers: It is quite proper to have

1 किमर्थमन्तर्याम्युक्तिरित्यत उक्तम् उपासेति। अन्तर्बहिस्सर्वगतत्वेनोपासात्रैविध्यात्। (VML.1-1-31).

2 इह प्रकरणे त्रैविध्यस्य आश्रितत्वात्। (VML. 1-1-31).

three types of meditation to suit the devotees of different capabilities[1].

V. S. Ghate observes that Śaṅkarācārya has given two different interpretations of this *sūtra*[2]:

(1) "If it be said that *Brahman* is not meant on account of the characteristic marks of individual soul and the chief vital air being mentioned, we reply, no; for your interpretation would lead to or would necessitate three-foldness of devout meditation, which it is inappropriate to assume".

(2) "Even the characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as the chief vital air are not out of place in a chapter whose topic is *Brahman*, on account of the three-foldness of devout meditation; i.e. the chapter actually aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation according as *Brahman* is viewed under the aspect of *Prāṇa*, under the aspect of *Prajñā* or in its own nature".

He further opines : "Rāmānujācārya, Nimbārka and Madhva follow the second way of explaining the ablative; while Vallabha follows the first way; and no doubt, the second way is more natural".

1 एकयैवोपासयाऽलं किं त्रैविध्येनेत्यत उक्तम् - तद्योगात्। तस्य उपासात्रैविध्यस्य अधिकारिभेदेन योगात् युक्तत्वात्। (TDK. 1-1-31).

2 VSG. p.56.

Chapter IV

Adhyāya I, *Pāda* 2

(प्रथमाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः।)

1 सर्वगतत्वाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ॐ ॥ **(1-2-1)**

तत्तु इति वर्तते। उच्यमानम् इति शेषः। सर्वत्र पृथिव्यादिषु सर्वभूतगतत्वेन उच्यमानं तत्तु ब्रह्मैव श्रुतौ परमात्मनि एव प्रसिद्धस्य ब्रह्मशब्दस्य तस्मिन् सर्वभूतगते 'एतमेव ब्रह्म इत्याचक्षते' इति उपदेशात्।

Tattu is to be continued from *sūtra* 1.1.4. *Ucyamānaṁ* is to be supplied for compatibility. **What is being told as present in all the things everywhere on the Earth etc. is that Supreme Being only, because in scriptures that has been described by the word *Brahman* as 'this only is spoken of as *Brahman*', which word is popularly known to denote the Supreme Being only.**

Madhvācārya explains this *sūtra* with reference to a passage (*viṣayavākya*) from Aitareya *Āraṇyaka* viz[1]: "This Sun is the essence of that (*Brahman*) who is being described. It should be understood that He who is without a body, is intelligent and that He and that who is in this Sun are one and the same. Therefore, the Sun is in the company of everyone. All this description is from (*Ṛgveda*) *mantra*. 'He who is the essence / soul of all moveable and immoveable things in this universe, who is attainable by the learned, pervades in and through this Earth, Heaven and the intermediate space between the two. This *mantra* becomes fruitful

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1 तस्यैतस्यासावादित्यो रसः। स यश्चायमशरीरः प्रज्ञात्मा यश्चासावादित्य एकं तदिति विद्यात्। तस्मात्पुरुषं पुरुषं प्रत्यादित्यो भवति। तदप्येतदृषिणोक्तं 'चित्रं देवानामुदगादनीकं चक्षुर्मित्रस्य वरुणस्याग्नेः। आ प्रा द्यावापृथिवी अन्तरिक्षं सूर्य आत्मा जगतस्तस्थुषश्च'। इत्येतामनुविधं संहितां संधीयमानां मन्ये इति ह स्माह बाध्वः। एतं ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते एतमग्नावध्वर्यवः एतं महाव्रते छन्दोगा एतमस्यामेतं दिवि एतं वायौ एतमाकाशे एतमप्सु एतमोषधीषु एतं वनस्पतिषु एतं चन्द्रमसि एतं नक्षत्रेषु एतं सर्वेषु भूतेषु एतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते इति। (A.Ā. 3.2.3).

to the one who properly inquires into it', thus said Ṛṣi Bādhva[1]. Him the Bahvṛcas (*Ṛgvedī Brāhmaṇas*) laud in the great *Uktha (Brahatīsahasra)*, the *Adhvaryus* (*Yajurvedī Brāhmaṇas*) in *Agni*, the *Chandogas* (*Sāmavedī Brāhmaṇas*) in *Mahāvrata stotra*. The wise ones proclaim Him to be present in this Earth, in Heaven, in the Wind, in the Sky, in the Waters, in herbs, in trees, in the Moon and in the stars. In all these beings, they declare Him to be existing as *Brahman*''[2]. In the previous passage of *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (3-2-2), there are also indications of the description of the *Jīvātman* in *Cakṣurmayaḥ Śrotramayaḥ Chandomayaḥ* etc.

Even though the passages start (*Upakrama*) with the names like Sun, *Jīva* etc. the concluding (*Upasaṁhāra*) sentence categorically states that this all-pervasive entity is called *Brahman*. Therefore, the *sūtra* declares that, "the use of the term *Brahman*, which by its established usage refers to the highest *Brahman*, is sufficient to disprove the claims of *Āditya, Jīva* and others"[3]. The purport of this *sūtra* is that *Brahman* has the characteristic mark of pervading in and through everything in the universe, sentient and insentient.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* thus: ''(That which is to be meditated upon as consisting of mind etc. is *Brahman*) because of the teaching of what is well known everywhere''[4]. Normally a probans (*hetu*) in a *sūtra* establishes some predicate/ assertion (*pratijñā*) in the same *sūtra* or in a previous *sūtra* of the same *Adhikaraṇa*. The above mentioned one is the first *sūtra* of this *Adhikaraṇa* and also of the *Pāda*. Śaṅkarācārya has treated the whole of the *sūtra* as a probans (*hetu*). That leaves the predicate wide open to the imagination of the commentators and renders the purport of the *sūtra* doubtful. Earlier in *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa*,

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1 TP- RR. 1-2-1.

2 BNK I p. 141.

3 BNK I p. 141.

4 परमेव ब्रह्मेह मनोमयत्वादिभिर्धर्मैरुपास्यम्। कुतः? सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्। (S. BSB. 1-2-1).

Śaṅkarācārya has argued that since '*mayaṭ*' conveyed modification and *manomaya* conveyed a sheath (*kośa*), *manomayatva* could not be given the status of being the mark of *Brahman*. It has been treated as a characteristic of *anātman*. The same *manomayatva* is being raised here to the status of a characteristic mark of *Brahman*. Such inconsistent interpretations do not convince anyone.

Following Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya also takes the same passage from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* as reference (*Viṣayavākya*) viz. "Verily all this universe is *Brahman*. From Him do all things originate, into Him do they dissolve and by Him are they sustained"[1]. Rāmānujācārya interprets this *sūtra* as follows: "Everywhere (i.e. in this world referred to by the word *sarvaṁ* in '*sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ brahma*') the being which has been denoted by the term *Brahman* and placed in apposition with the world and spoken of as partaking of the nature of all, is indeed the Supreme Being. The particle '*iti*' placed after '*tajjalān*' sums up the reason (*hetu*) why *Brahman* is said to be all this"[2]. Rāmānujācārya treated the word *sarvatra* in the sūtra and *sarvaṁ* in the *viṣayavākya* as synonyms. *Sarvatra* is an indeclinable and *sarvaṁ* is a pronoun in the nominative case. It appears that Rāmānujācārya's selection of *viṣayavākya* is not befitting.

V. S. Ghate says: "this *Adhikaraṇa* shows, according to all except Madhvācārya, that the being which consists of mind (*manomayaḥ*), whose body is breath (*prāṇaśarīraḥ*) etc. enjoined to be meditated upon in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III-14-1 and 2, is not the individual soul but Brahman"[3]. But, on account of the reasons shown above, it is doubtful whether this topic was in the mind of the *Sūtrakāra*, while composing the *sūtras* of this *Adhikaraṇa*.

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1 सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत। (Chānd.Up. 3.14.1).

2 तज्जलानिति हेतुतः सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति प्रसिद्धवदुपदेशात् ब्रह्मणो जातत्वात् ब्रह्मणि लीनत्वात् ब्रह्माधीनत्वाच्च हेतोः ब्रह्मात्मकं सर्वं खल्विदं जगत्। (Śrībhāṣya 1-2-1) (BNK 1 p. 147).

3 VSG. p. 57.

The *Sūtrakāra* adduces another reason in the next *sūtra* in support of the assertion made here.

॥ ॐ विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ **(1-2-2)**

सर्वत्र पृथिव्यादिषु सर्वभूतगतत्वेन उच्यमानं तत्तु ब्रह्मैव विवक्षितानां वक्तुं योग्यानां वक्ष्यमाणानाम् उपसंहारे श्रूयमाणानां गुणानाम् अस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि एव उपपत्तेः च ।

And because the qualities that are going to be expressed in the concluding passage (*Upasaṁhāra*) of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (3-2-4), are appropriate in *Brahman*, the Being told as present everywhere (in the Earth etc.) is that *Brahman* only.

The characteristic of all-pervasiveness cannot, therefore, be applied to the Sun or any other being. The conclusion (*Upasaṁhāra*) is stronger than the beginning (*Upakrama*). The conclusion[1] speaks of that Being as the all-pervasive one who cannot be heard, comprehended or thought of in all His fullness, who submits to none, who cannot be seen directly or known indirectly in all His fullness, who cannot be ordered, who listens to all, thinks of all, sees all but reports to none, who knows all and who is the conscious inner Person in all. These characteristics cannot be expected in any one except *Brahman*.

Since the name of the Sun (*āditya*) and the characteristics of an individual soul (*Jīva*) like the possession of eyes, ears etc. (*cakṣurmayaḥ, śrotramayaḥ*), are heard in the same chapter of *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, under discussion, if one doubts why the Sun or *Jīva* should not be taken as the all-pervasive entity, then the next *sūtra* answers the question.

॥ ॐ अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः ॐ ॥ **(1-2-3)**

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1 स योऽतोऽश्रुतोऽगतोऽमतोऽनतोऽदृष्टोऽविज्ञातोऽनादिष्टः श्रोता मन्ता द्रष्टाघोष्टा विज्ञाता प्रज्ञाता सर्वेषां भूतानामन्तरपुरुषः । (A.Ā. 2-3-4).

सर्वत्र उच्यमानमिति वर्तते। तुरेव। सर्वत्र सर्वगतत्वेन उच्यमानं न शारीरः आदित्यो जीवो वा शारीरस्य सर्वगतत्वानुपपत्तेरेव।

'*Sarvatra ucyamānaṁ*' is to be continued. *Tu* is for emphasis. **The all-pervasive entity is not the embodied individual soul, Sun or *Jīva*, because all pervasiveness is certainly inapplicable to individual souls.**

Individual soul being atomic in size, cannot be all-pervasive. In the passage (*Viṣayavākya*) referred to under *sūtra* 1-2-1 the Being described as *Aśarīraḥ, prajñātmā* cannot be equated with *śārīraḥ*, the embodied individual soul. According to Śaṅkarācārya this *sūtra* tells that "it is true that God resides in the body but He is outside as well and is all-pervading. The individual soul resides in the body alone---"[1].

The next *sūtra* offers another reason to confirm the conclusion reached here that the individual soul cannot be the all-pervasive entity and that it is different from *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-2-4)**

सर्वत्र उच्यमानस्य इति शारीरस्य इति च विपरिणम्यानुवर्तते। सर्वत्र सर्वगतत्वेन उच्यमानस्य कर्मत्वेन शारीरस्य कर्तृत्वेन व्यपदेशात् च न शारीरः जीवः सर्वगतत्वेन उच्यमानं ब्रह्म।

The words '*sarvatra ucyamānasya*' and '*śārīrasya*' are to be continued with the changed case-endings. **Since the all-pervasive entity is mentioned as an object (*karma*) and the embodied Individual soul as subject (*kartā*), the individual soul is not the all-pervasive entity *Brahman*.**

The axiom used here is that in any action, normally one and the same thing cannot be both subject and object.

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1 SRK. p. 271.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*, but they continue to refer to the passages, as done in the previous sūtra. Śaṅkarācārya refers to a passage from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (3-14-4)[1]. "Into him, I shall enter, on departing hence". Here the object of meditation is declared to be different from the meditator who is the individual soul. Rāmānujācārya says[2], "The soul which obtains is the person meditating and the Highest *Brahman* that is to be obtained is the object of meditation. *Brahman*, therefore, is something different from the attaining soul". Madhvācārya refers to a sentence from *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (3-2-3). "*Ātmānaṁ parasmai śaṁsati*". Here *Brahman* is the topic of discourse i.e. *Karma* and the *Jīva* is the exponent i.e. *kartā*. Hence the two are different.

If one insists that the term *Brahman* used in the passage under discussion should be taken as referring to *Jīva* on account of the strong evidence of peculiar attributes of *Jīva* like having eyes etc. mentioned therein, the next *sūtra* refutes the same.

॥ ॐ शब्दविशेषात् ॐ ॥ **(1-2-5)**

ब्रह्मशब्दस्य सावधारणत्वरूपविशेषाद् ब्रह्मशब्दो न शारीरपरः ।

Since the word *Brahman* is used with an emphasis (*eva*) it cannot be taken to denote a *Jīva*.

In the passage (AĀ 3-2-3) referred to earlier while explaining the *sūtra* 1-2-1, in the concluding sentence "*Etameva Brahma ityācakṣate*", the emphatic way in which the term *Brahman* is used along with '*Eva*' to denote the all-pervasive entity shows that the word does not convey an embodied individual soul. This *sūtra* repudiates a possible argument that since the word *Brahman* is used to denote a *Jīva* in a secondary sense and since the terms like *cakṣurmayaḥ*, which are indicative of *Jīva* are used in the

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1 SRK. p. 271.

2 SRK. p. 271

Āraṇyaka, *Brahman* may connote *Jīva* also. One can say *Jīva* is also called *Brahman* but not *Jīva* alone is *Brahman*. Thus, the all -pervasive *Brahman* is different from individual soul. On this *sūtra Śaṅkarācārya* also concludes that "the two (i.e. *Brahman* and *Jīva*) are different as they are denoted by different words"[1].

The next *sūtra* adduces another evidence for holding *Brahman* only as the all-pervasive entity.

॥ ॐ स्मृतेश्च ॐ ॥ **(1-2-6)**

अहमात्मा गुडाकेश सर्वभूताशयस्थितः इति स्मृतेश्च सर्वत्र सर्वगतं ब्रह्म एव ।

The statement in *Smṛti* (*BG.* 10-20) like, "O Arjuna, I am the Self seated in the hearts of all beings" also confirms the view that the all-pervasive entity is *Brahman* only (and not *Jīva*).

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* as telling that "the *Smṛti* also demonstrates the difference between *Jīva* and *Paramātman*"[2].

The previous four consecutive *sūtras* are interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya as establishing the difference between *Paramātman* and *Jīvātman*. The *sūtras* are composed by Vedavyāsa and interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya. And Śaṅkarācārya remarks here that[3] "The *Paramātman* only, when He is limited by the adjuncts body, senses, mind and intellect, is treated as *Jīvātman* by the simpletons(!)".

V. S. Ghate opines : "This *Adhikaraṇa* is very important for our purpose, in that it contains many *sūtras* speaking of the difference of nature between *Brahman* and *Jīva*, e.g. *sūtras* 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, and Śaṅkara has to add his usual explanation after *sūtra* 6 that all this difference is to be understood as unreal and only

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1 तस्मात्तयोर्भेदोऽधिगम्यते । (S. BSB. 1-2-5).

2 स्मृतिश्च शारीरपरमात्मनोर्भेदं दर्शयति । (S. BSB. 1-2-6).

3 पर एवात्मा देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्ध्युपाधिभिः परिच्छिद्यमानो बालैः शारीर इत्युपचर्यते । (S.BSB. 1-2-6).

due to the false limiting adjuncts of the Highest Self; whereas other commentators do not feel the necessity of any such explanation''[1].

The next *sūtra* refutes another objection against holding *Brahman* as the all-pervasive entity.

॥ॐ अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च ॐ॥ **(1-2-7)**

सर्वत्र तत्तु इति वर्तते। व्यपदेशात् इत्यस्य आवृत्तिः। ब्रह्मणः 'सर्वेषु भूतेषु' इति अर्भकौकस्त्वव्यपदेशात्[2] सर्वप्राणिहृदयगुहाख्याल्पस्था-नस्थत्वव्यपदेशात् तद्व्यपदेशात् तस्य शारीरस्य चक्षुर्मयत्वादिना व्यपदेशात् च न सर्वगतं ब्रह्म इति चेत् न अपरिच्छिन्नस्य अर्भकौकस्त्वेन चक्षुर्मयत्वादिना निचाय्यत्वात्[3] उपास्यत्वात् एवं व्योमवत् च यथा व्याप्तस्यापि व्योम्न एकैकदेशे अवस्थितिः तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि भूताशयादौ स्थितिः।

The words '*sarvatra*' and '*tat tu*' are continued. The term '*vyapadeśāt*' is repeated. **Since *Brahman* is said to be present in all the beings i.e. *Brahman* has the characteristic of being in the tiny heart cavities of all the beings, and (in the same *Śruti*) the characteristics of *Jīva* such as having eyes etc. are told, if it be said that the all-pervasive entity is not *Brahman*, it is not so. For, that unlimited *Brahman*'s characteristics of remaining in tiny abodes and *cakṣurmayatva* i.e. being the controller of the sense-organs[4], are told for the purpose of meditation. Just as the sky, though unlimited, can remain in different places (like pots), *Brahman* can be present in the hearts of beings.**

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1 VSG p-57.

2 '*Arbhaka*' means small and '*okaḥ*' means a house. Therefore, '*arbhakaukastva*' signifies the attribute of being in a minute abode.

3 The root '*cāyṛ*' means both to see and to worship. Therefore, the verb *nicāyati* /*nicāyate* indicates an act of continuous mental worship i.e. meditation.

4 'सर्वेन्द्रियमयः' इति स्मृत्या सर्वप्राणिगतेन्द्रियस्वामित्वेन चक्षुर्मयत्वादेरुक्तत्वादित्याशयेनाऽऽह। (TP. 1-2-7).

This is a complicated *sūtra*. There are three probanses. The first two are parts of *Pūrvapakṣa* and the third indicates the *Siddhānta*. In addition, there is an example of the sky. It just illustrates that a pervading entity can be in a tiny place as well. However, it should not be further construed that the sky is identical with *Brahman* in all respects. The expression *nicāyyatvāt* used in this *sūtra* (from the root *cāyṛ* to see) should be enough to show that the *Upāsanā* of *Brahman* as existing in all beings is not merely an assumptive worship but an act of sincere faith based on facts[1]. It means that meditation on *Brahman* present in one's own heart-cavity is not a symbolic act like saluting the flag of a nation, but an act of propitiating the *Paramātman* actually abiding in the heart.

V. S. Ghate says,[2] "It is interesting to note that the word *tadvyapadeśāt* lit. 'owing to the mention of that' is explained by all as meaning *alpatva(aṇutva)-vyapadeśāt* i.e. owing to the mention of minuteness and as stating one of the reasons in favour of the *Jīva* being referred to in the passage in question. Does it not imply an admission, on the part of the *Sūtrakāra*, of the minuteness of the *Jīva*, accepted by all except Śaṅkara, according to whom alone the *Jīva* is as omnipresent as the *Brahman*?"

The next *sūtra* clears another doubt regarding the presence of *Brahman* in the body of every being.

॥ ॐ सम्भोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् ॐ ॥ (1-2-8)

जीवपरयोरेकशरीरस्थत्वे समानभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न सामर्थ्यवैशेष्यात्।[3]

If it be said that because the individual soul and the Supreme Being reside in the same body, the Supreme Being may also have to experience the pleasure and pain along with the *Jīva*, it is not so, because there is difference in the ability of the two.

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1 BNK I p. 142.

2 VSG p-57.

3 M BSB 1-2-8.

Madhvācārya quotes a verse[1] from *Garuḍa-Purāṇa*, which explains the purport of this *sūtra*. "Lord is omniscient. *Jīva* knows little. Lord is omnipotent. *Jīva* has limited power. Lord is independent. *Jīva* is dependant. Because of this difference in the characteristics of the two, Lord does not have to experience pleasure and pain as *Jīva* does".

2 अत्तृत्वाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् ॐ ॥ **(1-2-9)**

अत्ता तत्तु (ब्रह्मैव) चराचरस्य अद्यतया ग्रहणात्।

The devourer is that *Brahman* only because of the taking in the (entire) movable and immovable (world) as eatable.

Earlier (*sūtra* 1-1-2) it was said that "*Brahman* is that which is responsible for the creation, subsistence and destruction etc. of the whole universe". This *sūtra* confirms that the destroyer or devourer of the entire movable and immovable world is *Brahman* only and not any other person like Aditi, the mother of deities.

There is no controversy amongst the commentators about the purport of this *sūtra*. But they explain the *sūtra* by referring to different passages in the Vedas. Madhvācārya refers to a passage from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, viz. "Whatever He created He resolved to eat. He eats everything. Hence all the devourership to Aditi"[2].

The word Aditi is normally understand as the name of a mythological Goddess. She had twelve sons called Ādityas, and the twelfth was Viṣṇu. But in the text quoted here from Bṛha. Up., the word *Aditi* denotes *Brahman* only who is referred to here by the masculine pronoun '*Saḥ*' at the beginning of the sentence,

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1 सर्वज्ञाल्पज्ञताभेदात्सर्वशक्त्यल्पशक्तितः। स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्याभ्यां संभोगो नेशजीवयोः। (M.BSB.1-2-8.)

2 स यद्यदेवासृजत तत्तदत्तुमध्रियत सर्वं वा अत्तीति तददितेरदितित्वम्। (Bṛha. Up. 1-2-5).

because the capacity to devour all the movable and immovable things in the universe can be attributed to *Brahman* only.

Śaṅkarācārya and, following him, others have explained this *Sutra*, referring to a passage from *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, viz. "for whom both the *brāhmaṇas* and the *kṣatriyas* become food, and for whom death is the sauce, who can know in this way, where He is?"[1]. But here, the sense of entire movable and immovable world has to be inferred from the secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*) of the words, *brāhmaṇas* and *kṣatriyas.*

In the *sūtra*, the subject *tat* repeated from a previous *sūtra* is in neuter gender whereas the predicate '*attā*' is in masculine gender, so as to be in conformity with the masculine words '*saḥ*', '*Ātmā*', '*Attā*' in the passage referred to from the *Śruti.*

The *Sūtrakāra* offers another reason for holding *Brahman* as the devourer, in the next *sūtra.*

॥ ॐ प्रकरणाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-2-10)**

अत्ता तत्तु (ब्रह्मैव) ब्रह्मप्रकरणात् च ।

And on account of the topic under discussion being the Supreme Being in the passages referred to from the *Śruti*, the devourer is that (*Brahman*) only. This applies equally to both the references, one from *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad* and another from *Kaṭhopaniṣad.*

3 गुहाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ॐ ॥ **(1-2-11)**

ऋतं पिबन्तौ इति योग्यतया अन्वेति । ऋतं पिबन्तौ गुहां प्रविष्टौ आत्मानौ आत्मान्तरात्माख्यब्रह्मरूपविशेषौ एव हि (श्रुतौ) तद्दर्शनात् ।

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1 यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च उभे भवत ओदनः । मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचनं क इत्था वेद यत्र सः ॥ (Katha. Up. 1-2-25).

The words '*ṛtam pibantau*' follow on account compatibility of sense. **The two who have entered into the cave (of a being), imbibing the fruits of good deeds, are the two special forms of *Brahman* only known as *Ātman* and *Antarātman* because that is stated so (in *Śrutis*).**

The passage considered by all the commentators for explaining this *sūtra* is a *mantra* from *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (1-3-1), viz. "The knowers of *Brahman*, the worshippers of five fires, and those who perform the Nāchiketa sacrifice thrice, compare to shade and light, the two enjoyers of the inevitable results of good work, who have entered within the body, into the cavity (of the heart) which is the supreme abode of the Supreme Being (*Brahman*)"[1]. Who are these two who have entered the cave of the heart and who enjoy the fruits of good deeds?

Śaṅkarācārya raises the questions[2] - (i) Are the two selves intelligence (*buddhi*) and the individual soul (*Jīva*) (*Pūrvapakṣa* i.e. opponent view from the *Sāṅkhya* stand point)?, or are they the individual soul and the Supreme Self (*Siddhānta* view)?. The *Sāṅkhya* view does not stand a chance because of the word *ātmānau*, which expects both as sentient principles whereas *buddhi* is insentient. Śaṅkarācārya supports this conclusion by the maxim that "When it is said that a second to this cow should be found, another cow only would be searched and not a horse or a man"[3]. The difficulty in accepting the second alternative is that the characteristic of enjoying the fruits of actions can no doubt, be attributed to the individual soul, but not to *Brahman*. Śaṅkarācārya however, assumes that the characteristic of enjoying the fruits of actions can be attributed to *Brahman* also figuratively on the analogy of *Chattrinyāya*. A group of people may be figuratively

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1 ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्ध्ये। छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति पञ्चाग्नयो ये च त्रिणाचिकेताः ॥ (Kaṭha. Up. 1-3-1).

2 SRK. p. 275.

3 अस्य गोर्द्वितीयोऽन्वेष्टव्यः इत्युक्ते गौरेव द्वितीयोऽन्विष्यते नाश्वः पुरुषो वा।

described as carrying umbrellas even though only some of them may be carrying the umbrellas. This is known as *Chattrinyāya*. Rāmānujācārya suggests another explanation. Even though the *Jīvātman* is the actual enjoyer, the other *Ātman* (*Brahman*) can be regarded as the enjoyer indirectly, since the (*Brahman*) causes or enables the *Jīvatman* to enjoy[1]. Both the above explanations involve understanding through secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*).

But Madhvācārya does not agree with these explanations. In the preliminary *sūtra* '*Tattu samanvayāt*' (1-1-4) the *Sūtrakāra* has promised to show in this *Samanvayādhyāya*, how the scriptural words and passages, when properly interpreted, characterize *Brahman*, in their highest primary sense. The emphatic particle *tu* in *tattu* indicates that the proper interpretation characterizes *Brahman* alone. In the above interpretations of Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, the mark of enjoyership is primarily attributed to *Jīvātman* and figuratively to *Brahman*. But the word *sukṛta* in the *mantra* (*Kaṭha* Up. 1-3-1) is worth noting. *Sukṛta* means the merits or good actions. The *mantra* refers to the enjoyment of the fruits of good actions only. *Jīva*, on the contrary, is obliged to enjoy the fruits of good actions (*sukṛta*) and experience the fruits of bad deeds (*duṣkṛta*). Therefore, since the word *sukṛta* alone is used, *Jīva* cannot find a place in the word *ātmānau*. And according to Śaṅkarācārya the characteristic of enjoying the fruits of actions cannot be attributed to *Brahman*. Thus, the arguments to prove that the word *pibantau* in the *Upaniṣad* conveys the individual soul and the Supreme Being, on the analogy of *Chattrinyāya* etc. are not convincing. Moreover, the *Sūtrakāra* appears to be aware of the controversy and the arguments made therein and that is why he has passed his judgement that the two who have entered into the cave of a being and who enjoy the fruits of good deeds are the two forms of *Brahman* only. Therefore,

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1 BNK. I. p. 158.

there is no use in continuing to make the same old arguments. Hence, Madhvācārya rejects the same saying that no *samanvaya* has been contemplated in the *Jīvātman* (by the *Sūtrakāra*)[1].

Madhvācārya suggests that the term *Ātmānau* conveys *Brahman* only and not *Brahman* and *Jīva*. For that, he has reasons too. On the specific request from Nachiketas, the God of Death Yama starts revealing the nature of *Brahman* from *mantra* 1-2-15 of *Kaṭhopaniṣad* and continues up to the *mantra* 1-3-2. He starts talking about the embodied Jīva from *mantra* 1-3-3. Therefore it is not in keeping with the flow of thoughts, to bring in *Jīva* along with *Brahman*, in *mantra* 1-3-1, which is under discussion here. This mantra "*Ṛtampibantau....*" is sandwitched between the two mantras *yasya Brahma ca kṣatraṁ ca* and "*Yas setur ījānānāṁ...*"(1-2-24 and 1-3-2) both of which refer to *Brahman.* Such a situation is known as '*Saṁdaṁśa*' (a pair of tongs) in *Mīmāṁsā śāstra*. According to *Mīmāṁsā*, in cases of *Saṁdaṁśa*, the topic of discussion in the interposed *mantra* is expected to be the same as that of the preceding and succeeding *mantras*.

Thus, technically the terms *Ṛtaṁ Pibanatau* here are expected to refer to *Brahman* and *Brahman* only. If we accept this proposition, we have to answer two questions, (i) Whether *Brahman* can be the enjoyer of fruits of action?, (ii) When *Brahman* is said to be one Supreme Being, why the term *Pibantau* in dual, is used?

The famous poetic metaphor in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* describes that "two birds bound one to the other in close friendship, perch on the same tree. One of them eats the fruits of the tree with relish, while the other looks on without eating"[2]. According to

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1 न च जीवे समन्वय उच्यते। (M. BSB. 1-2-11). (BNK. I. p. 153).

2 द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्न्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. SC. 3-1-1.)

Saṅkarācārya, out of these two birds, one which eats the fruits represents *Jīva*, which identifying itself with the body-mind complex experiences the results of actions whereas the other which looks on without eating represents the All-knowing Eternal Pure Consciousness i.e. *Brahman* in the form of Īshwara[1]. Thus *Brahman* does not partake the fruits of actions. However, according to Madhvācārya this non-partaking is limited to inauspicious fruits of bad deeds, and *Brahman* does partake the auspicious fruits of actions. Madhvācārya quotes an authority[2] from *Padma-Purāṇa* in favour of this notion. Jayatīrtha explains this view of Madhvācārya, when he comments[3] that because the proposition of attributing enjoyership to the Supreme Being is contradicted by the *Śruti* sentences like '*Anaśnannanyo abhicākasīti*', Madhvācārya says *śubham* etc. i.e. the reference to *Brahman* as not being susceptible to enjoyment has to be taken in the sense of not being liable to the enjoyment of inauspicious fruits. *Bhagavadgītā* also supports the view of attribution of enjoyership to the Supreme Being, when it says :

"(knowing) Me as the Enjoyer of sacrifices and austerities......"[4]

"I alone am the Enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices;...."[5]

"I enjoy what has been thus offered with devotion by that pure-hearted worshipper"[6].

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1 तयोः परिष्वक्तयोरन्यः एकः क्षेत्रज्ञो लिङ्गोपाधिवृक्षमाश्रितः पिप्पलं कर्मनिष्पन्नं सुखदुःखलक्षणं फलं स्वाद्वनेकविचित्रवेदनास्वादरूपं स्वादु अत्ति भक्षयति उपभुङ्क्ते अविवेकतः। अनश्नन्नन्य इतरो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः सर्वज्ञः सर्वसत्त्वोपाधिरीश्वरो नाश्नाति। (Muṇḍ.Up. *Saṅkarabhāṣya*.3-1-1).

2 शुभं पिबत्यसौ नित्यं नाशुभं स हरिः पिबेत्। पूर्णानन्दमयस्यास्य चेष्टा न ज्ञायते क्वचित्॥ M. BSB. 1-2-11.

3 विष्णोर्भोक्तृत्वाभ्युपगमेऽनश्नन्नन्य इत्यादि श्रुतिविरोध इत्यतो वाह। शुभमिति। अशुभभोगाभावविषयं तद्वाक्यमिति भावः। (TP. 1-2-11).

4 भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसां --------(BG. SC. 5-29).

5 अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च। (BG. SC. 9-24).

6 तदहं भक्त्युपहृतमश्नामि प्रयतात्मनः। (BG. AGK. 9-26).

The use of dual in *pibantau* and *ātmānau* has been explained by Madhvācārya as follows : "The two enjoyers of *karmaphala* (*pibantau*) referred to in the Upaniṣadic text should be viewed as the two forms of *Brahman* known as *Ātmā* (present in the *Svarūpadeha* of *Jīvas*) and the *Antarātmā* or inner controller of the embodied self as such"[1]. Madhvācārya quotes an authority in support of this view, from *Ṛgveda*[2]: "The two shining forms (*gharmā*) of the Lord, present everywhere, which have taken their abode specially in the body composed of the three elements (*Tejas*, *Ap* and *Anna*) and to which (body) Mātariśvan (*Vāyudeva*) has also repaired to wait upon those two"[3]. The use of the dual does not conflict with the oneness of *Brahman*. *Brahman* having unimaginable powers can manifest and remain in many forms simultaneously. This has been vouched by *śrutis*. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* clearly states that "just as fire, though one, having entered the world assumes separate forms in respect of different shapes, similarly, the Self inside all beings, though one, assumes a form in respect of each shape; and (yet) it is outside"[4]. The same *Upaniṣad* further states that "the One, controller and the inner Self of all, makes a single form multifarious"[5].

The mantra '*Ṛtaṁ pibantau....*'in *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, does not contain the term *Ātamānau*. The term *ātamānau* is used by the *Sūtrakāra* to emphasize that the two drinkers (*pibantau*) are but the two forms of *Brahman*. He further qualifies the word *Ātamānau* by the phrase *Guhāṁ praviṣṭau*. This entry into the cave (*guhāpraveśaḥ*) is an exclusive mark of *Brahman*, as shown by

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1 BNK I. p. 153.

2 घर्मा समन्ता त्रिवृतं व्यापतुः तयोर्जुष्टिं मातरिश्वाजगाम। (RV. 10-114-1).

3 BNK. I. p. 156.

4 अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव। एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च ॥ (Kaṭh. Up. SG. 2-2-9)

5 एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति । (Kaṭh. Up. SG. 2-2-12).

its usage in various *Śruti* sentences[1]. Therefore, this adjective *Guhāṁ praviṣṭau*, which is known in technical parlance as *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa*, shows the reason why the two drinkers of the fruit of *ṛta* should necessarily be identified with the two forms of the Supreme *Brahman* (*ātmānau*)[2]. *Hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa* is an adjective which neither indicates a distinguishing attribute (i.e. *vyāvartakaviśeṣaguṇa* e.g. red flower) of the *viśeṣya*, nor does it predicate an attribute (i.e. *vidheyaviśeṣaguṇa* e.g. the flower is red), but tells an essential characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the *viśeṣya*. Instead of adding something to the meaning of the *viśeṣya*, it tells its very meaning. It points out the reason (*hetu*) on account of which the *viśeṣya* is what it stands for. For example, no one says 'I want sweet sugar' or 'this sugar is sweet', because sugar is necessarily sweet. Sweetness is what makes it sugar i.e. sweetness is the *hetugarbhaviśeṣaguṇa* of sugar.

Another term *chāyātapau* used in the *mantra* to describe *pibantau* which has been identified with two forms of *Brahman*, has been explained by Madhvācārya to mean that *Brahman* is like the cool shade to those who perform good deeds and like the scorching Sun to the erring wicked[3].,

In the next *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* offers another reason (*hetu*) to consider the phrase '*Ṛtaṁ pibantau*' as conveying *Brahman* only.

॥ ॐ विशेषणाच्च ॐ ॥ (1-2-12)

ऋतं पिवन्तौ गुहां प्रविष्टौ आत्मानौ एव एकवचनेन सेतुत्वब्रह्मत्वादिना च विशेषणाच्च ।

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1 (i) ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् - यो वेद निहितं गुहायाम् । (Taitt.Up. 2-1).
(ii) गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम् । (Kaṭh.Up. 1-2-12).
(iii) गुहां प्रविश्य तिष्ठन्तीम् । (Kaṭh. Up. 2-1-7).

2 BNK. I. p. 156.

3 छायातपावित्यत्र सतां छायास्थानीयौ संसारधर्मश्रमहरावित्यर्थः । असतामातपावातपस्थानीयौ संतापकारिणावित्यर्थः । (GDK. 1-2-11)

And the two imbibing the fruits of good deeds who have entered into the cave (of a being) are the Selves only on account of the distinctive epithets like Supreme *Brahman* and a bridge to cross over the ocean of *saṁsāra*, used in singular.

After this mantra '*Ṛtaṁ pibantau...*' in *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, the next one says that we have known that, for those who perform Nāciketa sacrifice and wish to cross over the ocean of this mundane life (*saṁsāra*), "That Imperishable Fearless Supreme *Brahman* is like a bridge"[1]. In this verse, the two drinkers in the previous verse have been addressed in singular and described with distinctive epithets like Supreme *Brahman*, a bridge to cross over the ocean of *saṁsāra* etc. This is a further proof to show that '*Ṛtaṁ pibantau*' refers to two forms of *Brahman* only and not to *Jīva* and *Brahman*. Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya also have interpreted this *sūtra* in the same way, but they refer to the epithets used not in the immediately following verse but to those in a distant verse (1-3-9) so as to suit their interpretation of the previous *sūtra*.

Thus, the purport of this *Adhikaraṇa* is that the mark of enjoyership can be attributed to *Brahman* and that *Brahman* enjoys only fruits of good deeds done selflessly by his devotees and offered to him.

4 अन्तराधिकरणम् ।

|| ॐ अन्तर उपपत्तेः ॐ || **(1-2-13)**

तत्त्वित्यस्ति । चक्षुरन्तःस्थित्वा रममाणः अन्तराक्षिणि दृश्यमानः पुरुषः तत्तु अमृतत्वाभयत्वलिङ्गब्रह्मशब्दानां तत्रैव उपपत्तेः ।

The words '*tat tu*' are continued. **The Person abiding in the eye, enjoying and appearing within the eye is That *Brahman* only on account of the appropriateness of the use of words like immortality, fearlessness and *Brahman* for that Person only.**

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1 यः सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत् परम् । अभयं तितीर्षतां पारं नाचिकेतं शकेमहि ॥ (Kaṭh.Up. 1-3-2).

The passage (*viṣayavākya*) considered by all the commentators for explaining this *sūtra* is a *mantra* from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (4-15-1) viz. "This person who is seen in the eye, he is the '*Ātman*', said the teacher; this is the immortal, the fearless. This is *Brahman*. Hence even if one sprinkles clarified butter or water into the eye, it goes away to the edges"[1]. In one place earlier in the same *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the sacred fire called *Gārhapatya* instructs that "I am the Person seen in the Sun"[2]. In another place in the same *Upaniṣad* it is said that that person, effulgent as gold who is seen within the Sun, ... this person seen within the eye... The form of this is the same as the form of that[3]. Such statements may create a doubt whether the person seen in the eye is *Agni*. The sūtra clears the doubt saying that the "person seen in the eye is the Supreme Being, because immortality and fearlessness are mentioned as his characteristics and He has been directly named as *Brahman* and *Ātman*".

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. This topic has already been discussed by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya earlier with *sūtra* no. 1-1-20 and it is repeated here. Here the subject '*Tat*' is in neuter gender but the predicate '*Antaraḥ*' is in masculine so as to be in conformity with the words *Puruṣaḥ Ātmā* in the *Śruti* passage. Madhvācārya holds that the *sūtra* establishes not only the presence of *Brahman* in the eyes (and in the Sun) and His control over them but also that He enjoys the bliss there of. This, according to Madhvācārya, is indicated by the use of the term '*Antaraḥ*' instead of '*Antaḥ*'[4].

The next *sūtra* provides further evidence to confirm the conclusion reached here that the person appearing within the eye is *Brahman* only.

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1 य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यत एष आत्मेति होवाच एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्मेति तद्यद्यस्मिन्सर्पिर्वोदकं वा सिञ्चति वर्त्मनी एव गच्छति। (Chānd. Up. 4-15-1).

2 य एष आदित्ये पुरुषो दृश्यते सोऽहमस्मि। (Chānd. Up. 4-11-1).

3 य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषो दृश्यते (1-6-6) य एषोऽन्तरक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते... एतस्य तदेव रूपं.... (1-7-5).

4 अन्तरुपपदाद्रमतेर्अमन्ताड्डप्रत्ययेनान्तर इति निरदिक्षत्। (TDK. I. 1-2-13).

॥ ॐ स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ॐ ॥ (1-2-14)

स्थानमक्षि। आदिपदात् तदधिष्ठातृ गृह्यते। स्थानादिशब्दात् स्थानादिशक्तिरुपलक्ष्यते। अन्तरक्षिणि दृश्यमानः पुरुषः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव स्थानशक्तेः असङ्गत्वशक्तेः अधिष्ठातृत्वशक्तेः च व्यपदेशात्।

Here the word '*sthāna*' refers to eye. The word '*ādi*' refers to the controller of the eye i.e. *Paramātman*. The term '*sthānādi*' conveys the power of the eye and its controller, by secondary signification. **The person appearing within the eye is That *Brahman* only on account of the mention of power of the eye to remain untainted and that of the controlling person present within the eye.**

The passage (*viṣayavākya*) under consideration further states that "It is That by dint of whom the clarified butter or water dropped into the eye, flows out without staining the eye"[1]. It means that in virtue of the presence of *Brahman* in the eye, the eye also remains without being tainted. Remaining without being tainted is a characteristic of *Brahman*, which is echoed by a *mantra* in *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. It says "Just as the Sun, which is the eye of the whole world, is not tainted by the ocular and external defects, similarly, the Self, that is but one in all beings, is not tainted by the sorrows of the world"[2].

The *mantras* coming after the one under discussion here from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* describe the person seen in the eye thus: "He is the leader of the beautiful, the bestower of brilliance"[3]. According to Madhvācārya, this *sūtra* also establishes that it is by virtue of the power of *Brahman* present in the eye that women are endowed with grace and beauty and men are

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1 तद् यद् अस्मिन् सर्पिर् वा उदकं वा सिञ्चति वर्त्मनी एव गच्छति। (Chānd. Up. 4-15-1). यत् यस्मात् यस्य प्रभावात् (by dint of whom) (TP. 1-2-14)).

2 सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षुर्न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्बाह्यदोषैः। एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः॥ (Kaṭh. Up. 2-2-11).

3 एष उ एव वामनीः। (Chand up 4-15-3) एष उ एव भामनीः। (Chānd .Up. 4-15-4).

endowed with the splendour of manliness. Madhvācārya's interpretation echoes the spirit of the *Bhagavadgītā* verse[1], when Krishna says: "Whatever that is glorious, prosperous or powerful in any being, know that to be a manifestation of a part of My Splendour"[2].

In Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation, "the objection is raised that the omnipresent *Brahman* cannot be confined to the eye. The answer is that it is not the only locality that is assigned to the Lord. Earth and so on are mentioned as his residence (*Bṛha. Up.* 3-7-3). Not only place but also name and form are attributed to *Brahman* (*Chānd. Up.* 1-6-7). *Brahman*, though devoid of qualities, is spoken of as possessing qualities for purposes of meditation. To assign a definite locality is not contrary to reason, since it serves the purpose of meditation"[3]. The term *sthānādi* has been understood as 'place and other things'. This point as to how the omnipresent *Brahman* can be said to be confined to a small place like the eye, has already been discussed earlier with *sūtra* 1-2-7. Every *sūtra* brings forth some new glory and majesty of the Supreme Being.

In support of his interpretation Madhvācārya quotes some verses[4] from the branches of the *Śāstraṁ* (scripture) like *Purāṇa*, other than *Upaniṣads*, which are compiled and edited by the *Sūtrakāra* himself. The verses indicate that Madhvācārya's interpretation is in conformity with the thought process in the mind of *Sūtrakāra* while composing this *sūtra*, particularly the import of the term *sthānādi*, used in the *sūtra*.

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1. BNK. I. p. 168.
2. यद्यद्विभूतिमत्सत्त्वं श्रीमदूर्जितमेव वा। तत्तदेवावगच्छ त्वं मम तेजोंऽशसम्भवम्॥ (BG SC. 10-41).
3. SRK p. 276.
4. [illegible] ईशः सोऽसपत्नः स हरिः स परः स परोवरीयान्। यदिदं चक्षुषि सर्पिर्वोदकं वा सिञ्चति [illegible] एव गच्छति॥ स वामनः स भामनः स आनन्दः सोऽच्युतः इति चतुर्वेदशिखायाम्॥ [illegible]नात्वादिदं चक्षुरसङ्गं सर्ववस्तुभिः। स वामनः परोऽस्माकं गतिरित्येव चिन्तयेत्॥ [illegible] वामने॥ (M. BSB 1-2-14).

The next *sūtra* avers that the conclusion reached in the last two *sūtras* is confirmed by the context also.

॥ ॐ सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च ॐ ॥ **(1-2-15)**

अन्तरक्षिणि दृश्यमानः पुरुषः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव इति अनुवर्तते। विशिष्टं च तत्सुखं च सुखविशिष्टं "कडाराः कर्मधारये" इति परनिपातः। अन्तरक्षिणि दृश्यमानः पुरुषः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव 'कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म' इत्युपक्रमे कं सुखं ब्रह्म पूर्णम् इति पूर्णत्वविशिष्टसुखरूपत्वाभिधानात् एव च।

The words '*antarakṣiṇi dṛṣyamānaḥ Puruṣaḥ tattu Brahmaiva*' are continued. The predicate '*viśiṣṭa*' is placed second in the *Karmadhāraya* compound '*sukhaviśiṣṭa*' according to the option available under the Pāṇinīya sūtra '*kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*'[1].

The Person appearing within the eye is That *Brahman* only, also because of the mention of the characteristic of having happiness distinguished by its unlimitedness, since at the beginning (in Chānd. Up. 4-10-4) it is told as '*kaṁ Brahma khaṁ Brahma*' where *kaṁ* stands for happiness and *Brahma* stands for 'full of' or 'unlimited'.

At the beginning (*upakrama*) of the topic under discussion here, the sacred fires instruct Upakosala as "*Prāṇo Brahma kaṁ brahma khaṁ brahma* (*Chānd.Up.* 4-10-4)". According to *Madhvācārya*, *kaṁ* stands for happiness, bliss, and *Brahma* for full, unlimited, and *khaṁ* for knowledge. Thus, since the topic starts with a discussion of *Brahman* endowed with unlimited happiness, the person appearing within the eye mentioned further in the same chapter (*prakaraṇa*) has to be *Brahman*. The word *eva* used in the *sūtra* indicates, according to Madhvācārya, that eventhough the unlimited bliss and full knowledge are both

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1 In *Karmadhāraya* compounds, normally the first portion stands as the predicate of the second portion. But the *Pāṇinīya sūtra* '*kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*' (1-2-38) allows an option to place the predicate second.

mentioned as the characteristics of *Brahman*, the unlimited bliss alone is sufficient to establish the person appearing within the eye as *Brahman*[1].

Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra* as "on account also of the mention only of what is characterized by pleasure"[2] appears inadequate. For, the individual souls and various deities are also endowed with pleasure but their pleasure is not unlimited. *Brahman* is characterized by the distinctive (*viśiṣṭa*) unlimited superabundance of bliss.

The attribute of unlimited happiness mentioned at the beginning of the topic may be referring to *Brahman*. But why should we not consider that the person appearing within the eye refers to *Agni* ? The next *sūtra* answers the same.

॥ ॐ श्रुतोपनिषत्कगत्यभिधानाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-2-16)**

श्रुतेत्युपलक्षणम् । केति ब्रह्मवायू तन्त्रेणोक्तौ[3] । "प्राणो ब्रह्म कं ब्रह्म" इति तयोः प्रकृतत्वात् । अन्तरक्षिणि दृश्यमानः पुरुषः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव श्रुतोपनिषदां श्रुतमतध्यातैतद्विद्यानां पुंसां केन वायुना कस्य ब्रह्मणः गतेः प्राप्तेः अभिधानात् च ।

The word *śrutā* (heard) in the *sūtra* stands for *śruta* (heard), *mata* (reflected on) and *dhyāta* (meditated upon) by implication (*upalkṣaṇa*). '*Ka*' stands for *Brahman* and *Vāyu*, because both are under consideration as the *Upaniṣad* mentions '*Prāṇo Brahma kam Brahma*'. **The person appearing within the eye is That *Brahman* only, also because it is told that *Vāyu* takes those who have heard, reflected on and meditated upon this knowledge (about the person in the eye described in the Up.), to *Brahman*.**

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1 BNK. I. p. 168.

2 SRK p. 277 (सुखेन विशिष्टम् सुखविशिष्टम् ।)

3 सकृदुच्चरितस्य द्विरनुसन्धानं तन्त्रम् । (TDK. I. 1-2-16 fn). The technique of arranging a word uttered once, at two places, is known as *tantra*.

Having instructed the pupil Upakosala that the person appearing within the eye is That *Brahman*, the teacher Satyakāma Jābāla further tells him that those who know Him (and meditate upon Him) in this way attain gradual liberation (*krama-mukti*) through the path of the gods (*Devayāna*) and attain *Brahman*. Hence, according to Madhvācārya since the reward for the knowledge of the person within the eye is the attainment of *Brahman*, that knowledge cannot be of any person other than *Brahman*, like Agni or Āditya[1].

Following the description of the path of gradual liberation in the *Upaniṣad* as "he takes them to *Brahman*"[2]. Madhvācārya gives another interpretation of the word *ka*. *Ka* also means the wind god (*Vāyudeva*). Thus, according to Madhvācārya *Vāyudeva* takes them to *Brahman*[3].

Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted the *sūtra* a little differently as follows : The person appearing within the eye is *Brahman* only "also on account of the mention of the path of him who has heard the *Upaniṣads*"[4].

Obviously, Śaṅkarācārya has considered only, *gati* instead of *kagati*. The letter *ka* thus rendered surplus has been treated as an in-consequential optional suffix to the *Bahuvrīhi* compound *śrutopaniṣad*, which is allowed by grammar[5]. Other commentators have followed suit. *Sūtrakāras* are very frugal about words, and therefore the *Sūtrakāra* is not expected to use such superfluous letter *ka* in the *sūtra*. Moreover, in order to prove that the person appearing within the eye is *Brahman*, the mere mention of the

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1 न हि अन्यविद्यया अन्यगतिर्युक्ता। (M. BSB. 1-2-16)

2 स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति। (Chānd. Up. 4-15-5).

3 केन वायुना गतिरिति वा। (TP. 1-2-16).

4 SRK. p. 277.

5 शेषाद्विभाषा। (Pāṇini 5-4-154). यस्माद्बहुव्रीहेः समासान्तो न विहितः स शेषस्तस्माद्विभाषा कप् प्रत्ययो भवति। (Pāṇini 5-4-154).
After all other *Bahuvrīhi* compounds not covered by the foregoing rules the affix कप् may optionally be added.

path is not as strong evidence as that of the actual attainment of *Brahman* (*kagati*), which is clearly told in the *Śruti* (*Chānd. Up.* 4-15-5)[1].

The next *sūtra* will show how the disagreement with the view that the person appearing in the eye is *Brahman*, leads to a fallacy.

॥ ॐ अनवस्थितेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः ॐ ॥ **(1-2-17)**

अन्तराक्षिणि दृश्यमानः पुरुषः न इतरः अनवस्थितेः असम्भवात् च।

The Person appearing within the eye is none other (than *Brahman*) because otherwise it leads to infinite regression and because it is impossible.

Uptil now reasons are given in support of the fact that the person in the eye is *Brahman*. The person in the eye means the person who, remaining in the eye, impels and controls. This *sūtra* provides reasons to negate the proposition that the person seen in the eye is *Agni* as apparently indicated by some statements in the *Upaniṣad*. Since *Agni* is also an individual soul, *Jīva*, (though exalted), the *sūtra* avers that if *Agni* controls a *Jīva*, then *Agni* must have another *Jīva* as controller and that *Jīva* must have another *Jīva* and so on endlessly[2]. Thus, it leads to infinite regression, which is a fallacy. One may ask why *Agni* should not be treated as controller of a *Jīva*, inspite of infinite regression. In this endless regression one gets tired and has to stop somewhere. The last *Jīva* where one stops, loses its controllership because it itself is not having a controller. Then the earlier *Jīva* loses controllership in the absence of controller for itself and the reverse series starts and comes up to *Agni*. Thus *Agni* also loses its controllership. This is known as *mūlakṣati*. If the regression ends up in *Brahman*, who is the only independent entity, then why not

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1. [illegible]नान् ब्रह्म गमयतीति श्रुतैतद्विद्यानां ब्रह्मगत्यभिधानादितिभावः। (TP. 1-2-16).
2. [illegible]साम्यादनवस्थितिः। (TPD. 1-2-17).

consider *Brahman* only as the One remaining in the eye and controlling, instead of *Agni* ? Moreover, *Agni* and *Jīva*, both being individual souls, are not independent. Therefore, one controlling the other is an impossibility *(asaṁbhavaḥ)*[1].

Śaṅkarācārya and others have assumed a *Pūrvapakṣa* that the person seen in the eye is the reflection of another person in front of the eye, or the *Jīvātman* or a deity. Śaṅkarācārya has refuted the reflection on the ground that it does not always stay in the eye[2], *Jīvātman* on the ground that *Jīvātman* being in general connection with the whole body and the senses, cannot be said to be permanently located in the eye alone[3], and the deity on the ground that deities cannot be called as *Ātman* and cannot be attributed with characteristics like immortality[4].

Here the word *anavasthiti* in the *sūtra* has been taken as meaning non-permanence[5]. *Anavasthiti* or *anavasthā* denotes in logical parlance, the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*[6]. *Brahmasūtras* are in the nature of terse dialectics. Each sūtra gives a decision (*nirṇaya*) on a controversial point in *śāstra*, using the accepted principles of interpretation, the most important of which is logical justification (*upapatti*). These words '*anavasthiti* ' or '*anavasthā* ' and '*asaṁbhava*' used in the *sūtra* are technical terms used in logic, like many other terms such as *avyāpti*, *ativyāpti*, *pratiyogī*, *hetvābhāsa* and so on. Therefore, in the context of *Brahmasūtras*, it is more pertinent to treat the word '*anavasthiti*' as a technical term in logic and to interpret it as such. The words *anavasthiti* and *anavasthā* are synonyms, formed under different

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1 परतन्त्रसाम्यादसम्भवः। (TPD. 1-2-17).

2 न तावच्छायात्मनश्चक्षुषि नित्यमवस्थानं संभवति। (S. BSB 1-2-17).

3 तथा विज्ञानात्मनोऽपि साधारणे कृत्स्नशरीरेन्द्रियसंबन्धे सति चक्षुष्येवावस्थितत्वं न शक्यम्। (S. BSB. 1-2-17).

4 देवतात्मनस्तु... आत्मत्वं तावन्न संभवति... अमृतत्वादयोऽपि न संभवन्ति॥ (S. BSB. 1-2-17)

5 SRK. p. 277.

6 BNK. I p. 165.

rules[1]. It could be that the term *anavasthā* is more popular in logic, but that is not a sufficient argument to deny the status of a technical term to the word *anavasthiti*. The *Sūtrakāra* could have preferred the term '*anavasthiteḥ*' to the term *anavasthāprasaṅgāt* in order to economize on the letters. If he had in the mind the sense of non-permanence, he could have used a much simpler term like '*anityatvāt* '. Of course, the word *anavasthiti* has more than one meanings and the commentators are free to take any meaning that suits the context. But, since the word is used here in the company of another technical word *asambhava* with a conjunctive particle *ca*, one has to take *anavasthiti* as a technical term of logic. Therefore. Madhvācārya's interpretation is a better alternative than those of others.

५ अन्तर्याम्यधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् ॐ ॥

(1-2-18)

अधिदैवादिपदेन तत्तत्प्रकरणं लक्ष्यते। तदिति तन्त्रम्। तत्तु इति अस्ति। अधिदैवादिप्रकरणेषु अन्तर्यामी तत्तु ब्रह्मैव तस्य अन्तर्यामिणः सम्बन्धितया [illegible] ब्रह्मणः धर्मस्य व्यपदेशात्।

The term '*adhidaivādi* ' implies the respective chapters about the deities. The word '*tad*' is repeated. The words '*tat tu*' are continued. **The indwelling controlling spirit in the presiding deities and others mentioned in their respective sections, is That Supreme Being only because for that indwelling spirit the *Brahman*'s characteristic marks are told.**

In *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, the *Ṛṣi Yājñavalkya*, to a question by Uddālaka as to who is the indwelling controlling spirit[2], expounds that the controlling indwelling spirit in various presiding

1. स्थागापापचो भावे क्तिन् । (Pānini 3-3-95) आतश्चोपसर्गे अङ् । (Pāṇini 3-3-106).
2. अन्तर्यामिणं ब्रूहि। (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-2).

deities (*Adhidaivatas*) like the Earth, the Waters, the Sun, the Moon, various beings (*Adhibhūtas*) and the various bodily organs (*Adhyātmas*) of living beings, is the indwelling spirit in Uddālaka and it is immortal. There are a number of identical paragraphs, each referring to a particular entity. For example, the first paragraph dealing with the Earth, says[1] "He who, remaining in Earth, is different from it, whom the Earth does not comprehend (fully), whose body is Earth, who enjoys inside and controls the Earth, is your indwelling spirit and is immortal". Here one may have a doubt[2] as to whether this indwelling controlling spirit is the soul of the presiding deity, or a *yogin* having superhuman powers, or the Supreme Being or some other being. This *sūtra* decides that the indwelling controlling spirit is *Brahman* only because for that spirit His (*Brahman*'s) characteristics are mentioned. Dwelling within and ruling the entire created beings, inclusive of the presiding deities, immortality and incomprehensibility are the characteristic marks of *Brahman*. The objection that the Highest Self cannot be a ruler for he has no organs of action is untenable because organs of action may be ascribed to him since those whom he rules possess organs of action[3]. All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. According to Madhvācārya for interpreting the clause, "whom the Earth does not comprehend (fully)" in place of the insentient Earth, the presiding deity (*abhimānidevatā*) for Earth should be understood.

The conclusion of this *sūtra* that the indwelling ruler in all the beings is that *Brahman* ONLY, the claim of *Prakṛti* and *Jīva* for that attribute stands denied indirectly. The next *sūtra* directly refutes the claim of the two.

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1 यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः। (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-3).

2 स किमधिदैवाद्यभिमानी देवतात्मा कश्चित्किंवा प्राप्ताणिमाद्यैश्वर्यः कश्चिद्योगी किंवा परमात्मा किंवार्थान्तरं किंचिदित्यपूर्वसंज्ञादर्शनात्संशयः। (S. BSB. 1-2-18).

3 SRK. p. 278.

॥ ॐ न च स्मार्तमतद्धर्माभिलापात् ॐ ॥ (1-2-19)

चः त्वर्थे। शारीरश्च इत्यनुकृष्यते। स्मार्तं साङ्ख्यस्मृत्युक्तं प्रधानम्। अधिदैवादिप्रकरणेषु अन्तर्यामी तत्तु न तु साङ्ख्यस्मृत्युक्तं प्रधानं शारीरश्च त्रिगुणत्वसंसारित्वादीनाम् अभिलापाभावात्।[1]

Ca is used in the sense of but, not in the sense of and. The word *śārīraśca* is to be taken from the next *sūtra*. *Smārtaṁ* means *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* advocated by *Sāṅkhya smṛti*. **The indwelling controlling spirit in the presiding deities and others is That Supreme Being only but not the *pradhāna* of *Sāṅkhya-darśana* and the individual self (*Jīva*) because their characteristics are not mentioned.**

The characteristic marks of *Pradhāna* are its insentiency (*acetanatva*) and possession of three qualities (*Triguṇa*) *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*[2]. The characteristic of *Jīva* is *saṁsāra* i.e. transmigration and mundane existence. These are nowhere mentioned in the passages of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, referred to here. *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* is mentioned by the word *smārtaṁ* in the *sūtra*, to indicate that the *Prakṛti* as the cause of the world, is only an imagination of *Sāṅkhyasmṛti*.

According to Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya, the evidence '*ataddharmābhilāpāt*' in this *sūtra*, refutes the claim of *Prakṛti* for the attribute of being the indwelling controlling spirit, and the next *sūtra* refutes the claim of *Jīva* for the same. Rāmānujācārya and Raghavendratīrtha think that the evidence in this *sūtra* is sufficient to refute the claim of both *Prakṛti* and *Jīva*, and the phrase '*śārīrasca*' found between the second and third *sūtras* of this *Adhikaraṇa*, can be used in both the *sūtras*. Since these *sūtras* have come down orally, where to stop and how to count them, is a matter of tradition. Rāmānujācārya reads this second *sūtra* as '*na ca smārtamataddharmābhilāpācchārīraśca*' and

1. तयोः धर्माणाम् अभिलापाभावात् । (TDK. 1-2-19).
2. BSK p. 175.

repeats the phrase *śārīrasca* in the next *sūtra* (by *anuvṛtti*). Madhvācārya on the other hand, reads this *sūtra* as '*na ca smārtamataddharmābhilāpat*' as read by Śaṅkarācārya and takes the phrase '*śārīrasca*' from the next *sūtra* (by *anukarṣa*). *Anuvṛtti* and *anukarṣa* both are in vogue even in Pāṇini's grammar. However, some modern scholars think that *anukarṣa* is not as much logical as *anuvṛtti*. But, whichever way one may like to take, by *anuvṛtti* or by *anukarṣa*, the purports of these two *sūtras* do not change.

The next *sūtra* adduces another evidence to show that the embodied self is different from the indwelling ruler, the Supreme Being.

॥ ॐ शारीरश्चोभयेपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते ॐ ॥ (1-2-20)

न इति वर्तते । चः त्वर्थे । अधिदैवादिप्रकरणेषु अन्तर्यामी तत्तु ब्रह्मैव न तु शारीरः हि माध्यन्दिनशाखापाठः काण्वशाखापाठः इति उभयेपि पाठयोः अन्तर्यामिणः भेदेन एनं जीवम् अधीयते ।

The word '*na*' is continued. '*ca*' is in the sense of '*tu*' (but).

The *sūtra* asserts that "the indwelling spirit in the presiding deities and others is That Supreme Being only but not the embodied individual soul (*Jīva*) because in both the *Mādhyandina* and the *Kāṇva* recensions of the *Upaniṣad* also, the indwelling ruler has been taught as different from this *Jīva*".

Still according to Śaṅkarācārya the difference is not absolutely true[1]. V. S. Ghate observes that "*sūtra* 20 asserts the difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva*; and Śaṅkara, as usual, comes forth with his explanation that all these statements of difference are due to the limiting adjuncts, which themselves are the products of Nascience".

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1 शारीरान्तर्यामिणोर्भेदव्यपदेशो न पारमार्थिकः । (S. BSB. 1-2-20).

The *viṣayavākya* discussed in this *Adhikaraṇa* by all the commentators, is from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. This *Upaniṣad* forms a part of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, which belongs to *Śukla-Yajurveda*. There are two *śākhās* (sects) among the *Śukla-Yajurvedins* viz. *Kāṇva* and *Mādhyandina*. Both the sects[1] have their own recensions of *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is included in it. Hence, the term '*ubhaye*' in the above *sūtra* refers to these two recensions.

6 अदृश्यत्वाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः ॐ ॥ (1-2-21)

'यदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यम्' इत्युक्तम् अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकम् अक्षरं तत्तु ब्रह्मैव 'अथ परा यया तदक्षरम् अधिगम्यते' इति ऋगादिपरविद्याविषयत्वरूपधर्मोक्तेः ।

The entity *Akṣara* having attributes like invisibility, incomprehensibility and others is that *Brahman* only, because it is said that the knowledge, *Ṛgveda* etc., is held as higher knowledge when it reveals that *Akṣara*, and this is the characteristic of *Brahman* [2].

The passage (*viṣayavākya*) under discussion here is a *mantra* from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. This *mantra*[3] attempts to define the indefinable *Brahman*, as "that which is invisible, incomprehensible, unoriginated, indescribable (fully), that which has neither (physical) eyes nor ears nor hands nor legs, which is eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent, very subtle, that imperishable Being which the wise perceive as the source of all creation". But where is the doubt that these qualities may not be attributable to *Brahman*, which necessitated the composition of this *sūtra*? In

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1 *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* with *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, translated by Swami Madhavananda, p. xix.

2 अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते । (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-5).

3 यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम् । नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः ॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-6).

the above *mantra*, these qualities are ascribed to the "Source of all Creation". In the very next *mantra*[1] it is said that the universe came from the imperishable (*akṣara*). Then in another *mantra*[2] later, some Person (*Puruṣaḥ*) is described as self-resplendent, formless, unoriginated etc. and superior to what lies beyond the imperishable (*akṣara*).

This makes it difficult to identify *Brahman* the Supreme Being, with the imperishable (*Akṣara*), which is described as the Source of Creation and placed at a lower status than the Supreme Being. If not *Brahman*, who or what is this *Akṣara*, which is ascribed with the qualities, namely invisibility etc.?

(i) From the examples mentioned in the *mantra*, (*Muṇḍ. Up.* 1-1-7) the insentient *Prakṛti* (*Pradhāna*), which is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the universe, could be Akṣara.

(ii) The presiding deity of *Prakṛti*, which is sentient i.e. *Cit-Prakṛti*, which is described in *Bhagavadgītā* as *kūṭasthaḥ*[3], could also be called as *Akṣara.*

(iii) In the opening *mantra*[4] (*upakrama*), the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* refers to the first-born deity *Brahmā* (not to be confused with *Brahman*, the Supreme Being), as the creator and the protector of the universe. Therefore, the four-faced *Brahmā* could also be the *Akṣara.*

(iv) *Rudra* can also be taken as *Akṣara*, because in another *mantra*[5], *Īśa* is mentioned as the source of the Creator.

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1 यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः सम्भवन्ति। यथा सतः पुरुषात् केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात् सम्भवतीह विश्वम्॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-7).

2 ... पुरुषः ... अक्षरात् परतः परः। (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-2).

3 BG. 15-16.

4 ॐ ब्रह्मा देवानां प्रथमः सम्बभूव विश्वस्य कर्ता भुवनस्य गोप्ता। (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-1).

5 यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम्। (Muṇḍ Up. 3-1-3).

Thus, the doubt is that the *Akṣara*, which is the Source of Creation and is said to be having the qualities, invisibility etc., could be *Acetana-Prakṛti*, *Cit-Prakṛti*, *Brahmā*, or *Rudra*, but not *Brahman*, the Supreme Being, because there is somebody far superior to this *Akṣara*.

There is another doubt too. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* divides the whole knowledge into two groups, one *Parā* (higher) and another *Aparā* (lower). *Śāstras* which include *Ṛgveda* and others , are put into the lower group. The higher group of knowledge[1] is said to be that which reveals the *Akṣara*. We have learnt in *sūtras* 1-1-3 and 4 that *Brahman* is knowable only through *Śāstras*. Thus, *Akṣara* cannot be identified with *Brahman*, and it could be *Prakṛti* etc.

This *sūtra* refutes all these doubts and declares that the One possessing the qualities of invisibility and others is *Brahman* only, because His characteristics are mentioned. The term *Akṣara*, which is causing confusion here, is, according to Madhvācārya, used to denote (i) the insentient *Prakṛti*, (ii) the *Cit-Prakṛti* and (iii) *Paramātman*[2]. Hence, the term has to be interpreted with reference to context. In *mantra* 1-1-5 of *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, the whole knowledge has been divided in to two groups, *parā* and *aparā* and it is averred that *parā* is that knowledge which leads to the understanding of *Akṣara*. Madhvācārya, quoting other authority[3], says that the higher knowledge is that which leads to the understanding of *Brahman* only. Hence, the meaning of *Akṣara* here and in 1-1-7, as well as that of *bhūtayoni* in 1-1-6 cannot be taken as other than *Brahman*.

Then, in the phrase, *akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ*, the term *Akṣara* is used to denote *Prakṛti*.

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1. अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते। (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-5).
2. BNK. I. p. 183.
3. अथ परा यया स हरिर्वेदितव्यः योऽसावदृश्यो निर्गुणः परः परमात्मा। (M. BSB. 1-2-21).

Further, regarding the doubt whether the *śāstras*, *Ṛgveda* etc. fall under the category of *Parāvidyā* or *Aparāvidyā*, Madhvācārya explains that the same body of Vedic literature is to be looked upon as *Parā* and *Aparā* according as it is used in quest of *Brahman* or otherwise[1].

The purport of this *sūtra* according to Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya is the same as above. The only difference is that in the *Pūrvapakṣa* Śaṅkarācārya has considered *Akṣara* as *Prakṛti* or *Jīva*, Rāmānujācārya has restricted it to *Jīvātman* only.

The claim of others for recognition as the *Akṣara* having invisibility etc. is directly refuted in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ ॐ ॥ (1-2-22)

इतरौ न अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकौ तद्गुणकस्य अक्षरस्य सार्वज्ञपरतः परत्वादिविशेषण-व्यपदेशात् इतरयोः अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकात् अक्षरात् भेदव्यपदेशात् च । जडप्रकृतिश्च चित्प्रकृतिश्च न अदृश्यत्वादिगुणके तद्गुणकस्य अक्षरस्य सार्वज्ञविशेषणात् परत्वविशेषणात् च । तथा विरिञ्चिरुद्रौ न अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकौ तयोः तद्गुणकात् अक्षरात् भेदव्यपदेशात् च ।

The other two are not the ones having the attributes of invisibility etc. because of the mention of the distinctive attributes like omniscience and supremacy for that *Akṣara*, and because of the statement of difference of the other two from the *Akṣara* having the attributes of invisibility etc.

The insentient *Prakṛti* and its presiding deity *Cit-Prakṛti* are not the ones having the qualities invisibility etc. because of the mention of omniscience and supremacy for that *Akṣara*. Similarly the four-faced *Prajāpati* and *Rudra* are not the ones having the qualities of invisibility because they have been said to be different from the *Akṣara*, having those qualities.

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1 ऋगाद्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचकाः । ता एव परमा विद्या यदा विष्णोस्तु वाचकाः ॥ (Muṇḍ.Up. - MB).

Here, the *Sūtrakāra* adduces further reasons to confirm the purport arrived at in the previous *sūtra*. He points out to other epithets like *Sarvajña* (all-knowing), Sarvavit (knowing all particulars, possessing all, omnipresent) used in a following *mantra* [1] in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* and the epithet *Akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ* already referred to. These specific adjectives (*viśeṣaṇa*) confirm that the *Akṣara* described as the Source of all creation and as having the qualities of invisibility etc. is *Brahman*, and at the same time deny that status to *Prakṛti*. The same *mantra* referred to above also states that the four-faced Prajāpati (*Brahmā*) is born from that *Akṣara* and hence he is different from that *Akṣara* (*bheda*). In another *mantra* [2] of *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, this *Brahman*, the Supreme Being, is mentioned as *anyaḥ īśaḥ*. Thus, *Brahman* is different from the deity Rudra, who is normally called as *Īśa*. According to Madhvācārya, because of these differences (*bhedavyapadeśāt*), Prajāpati and Rudra are not entitled to the status of *Akṣara*. Actually the word *Īśa* is used here in the sense of Ruler or Master, and therefore, though it is a name of the deity the Rudra, that deity is not intended here in the *Upaniṣad*.

V. S. Ghate remarks that "here also *sūtra* 22 speaks of the difference of nature between *Brahman* and *Jīva*".

The *Sūtrakāra* gives another evidence to support the view that the one having the qualities of invisibility etc. is *Brahman* and to deny that status to others.

॥ ॐ रूपोपन्यासाच्च ॐ ॥ (1-2-23)

अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव रुक्मवर्णोपन्यासात् च ।

The one having the qualities of invisibility etc. is that *Brahman* only on account of the description of the golden colour (peculiar to *Brahman*).

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1 यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः। तस्मादेतद् ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते॥ (Muṇḍ.Up.1-1-9).

2 जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम् अस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः। (Muṇḍ. Up. 3-1-2).

The one having the qualities of invisibility etc. is further described in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* [1] as having pure self-resplendent golden colour. In the imagination of Vedic Seers, four pure colours viz. white, red, golden and black, are attributed to *Viṣṇu* and mixed colours for other deities and beings. Therefore, the One having the qualities of invisibility etc. is *Brahman* only. *Brahman* only is worshipped in the form of *Viṣṇu.*

Śaṅkarācārya has considered the term *rūpa* in the sense of form and has quoted another beautiful *mantra* (2-1-4) from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad.* In that a form is described as "Fire is his head; the Sun and the Moon are his eyes, the (ten) directions are his ears, his speech declares *Vedas*, the Wind is his breath; this universe is his heart (or mind); from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the indwelling spirit of all beings"[2]. Such a form can belong to *Brahman* only and not to Prakṛti or *Jīva.*

7 वैश्वानराधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ॐ ॥ (1-2-24)

तत्तु इति अस्ति। 'आत्मानं वैश्वानरम् उपास्ते' इत्यादौ श्रुतः वैश्वानरः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव न तु अग्निः अग्निविष्णुसाधारणस्य वैश्वानरशब्दस्य आत्मपदविशेषणात्।

The words '*tat tu*' are continued. **The term *Vaiśvānara*, heard in *Śruti* texts like 'whoever meditates on this *Vaiśvānara Ātman*', is that *Brahman* only but not fire, because the term, common to both fire and *Brahman* is qualified by the word *Ātman*.**

The passage under discussion here (*viṣayavākya*) is a *mantra*[3] from *Chāndogyopaniṣad.* It says that "Whoever meditates on this

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1 यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णम्। (Muṇḍ. Up. 3-1-3).

2 अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः। वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-4).

3 यस्त्वेतमेवं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानमात्मानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्वात्मस्वन्नमत्ति। तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धैव सुतेजाश्चक्षुर्विश्वरूपः ------ ॥ (Chānd. Up. 5-18).

Vaiśvānara Ātman occupying the space of a span in the heart and transcending all measures, enjoys all the world etc.... Of the aforesaid *Vaiśvānara atman*, the head being highly luminous is the resort of the heaven called Sutej, the eye being capable of seeing all the things is the resort of the Sun called *Viśvarūpa*,- -". In another *mantra*[1] from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, it is said that This *Agni*, which is here within a person is the *Vaiśvānara* by whom that which is eaten is digested.

The question posed is who is this *Vaiśvānara*?

Śaṅkarācārya raises the question (*Pūrvapakṣa*) whether the term *Vaiśvānara* refers to the gastric fire, elemental fire, or the presiding deity of fire. He also raises a doubt as to whether the term *Ātman* refers to individual soul or the Supreme Being. Rāmānujācārya has dropped the Individual Soul[2] from the list of these suspected referents of the term *Vaiśvānara*. Madhvācārya also has not considered the Individual soul, since he is of the firm view that *Ātman* primarily denotes *Brahman*, which view is confirmed by the Sūtrakāra in a following sūtra (1-3-1)[3].

The doubt that the term *Vaiśvānara* may convey here fire or the gastric fire or the presiding deity of fire arises because the word is used to denote them in ordinary language. This *sūtra* refutes this view because the word *Vaiśvānara*, though commonly used for fire, is qualified here by a distinctive epithet *Ātman*, and therefore the term *Vaiśvānara* connotes here *Brahman* only. This *siddhānta* view is established by Śaṅkarācārya on the basis of further description of the same *Vaiśvānara* as having the heaven as his head and the sun as his eye etc. Since the cause of creation of these heaven, sun etc. is *Brahman*, and since *Vedānta* philosophy believes that the cause remains in the effect, these descriptions like heaven as his head etc. are the characteristic marks of *Brahman*

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1 अयमग्निर्वैश्वानरो योऽयमन्तः पुरुषे येनेदमन्नं पच्यते । (Bṛha. Up. 5-9-1) (BNK I p. 189).
2 BNK. I. p. 193.
3 BNK. I p. 194.

only. Possibly Śaṅkarācārya feels the need to give such an elaborate evidence of *Brahman*'s distinctive glories, because in his opinion the term *Ātman* conveys both the Supreme Being and the individual soul. Rāmānujācārya has no such difficulty since he has dropped the individual soul from his *Pūrvapakṣa*. But, still, his explanation of the *sūtra* is on the same track as that of Śaṅkarācārya. According to Rāmānujācārya, "*Vaiśvānara* is the *Paramātman* on account of the common expression *Vaiśvānara* being particularized by the extraordinary glories of the *Paramātman*"[1]. Both the commentators mentioned above have relied on the characteristic marks (*liṅga*) of *Brahman*, to infer the *Siddhānta* view of the *sūtra*. But *liṅga* is considered as a weaker evidence than *Śruti* [2]. On the other hand, Madhvācārya, finds no such problem and has adduced a clinching argument to establish the *Siddhānta* view that *Vaiśvānara* is *Brahman*, on the ground of the use of the term *Ātman* itself, in apposition with *Vaiśvānara* in the *Śruti* text[3]. According to Madhvācārya, ..."*Vaiśvānara* referred to in the text under discussion is the Supreme *Brahman* alone. The reason is that *Vaiśvānara* is found qualified by the epithet *Ātmā* in the disputed passage; and *Ātmā* by settled acceptance denotes the highest *Brahman* and *Brahman* alone in its fullest primary sense"[4]. This is an easier and direct proof based on *Śruti* itself.

In the next *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* points to the popular statements in *Smṛti* texts as evidence in support of the purport of this *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ स्मर्यमाणमनुमानं स्यादिति ॐ ॥ **(1-2-25)**

वैश्वानरो ब्रह्म इत्यस्ति। तेन इतिशब्दान्वयः। वैश्वानरो ब्रह्म इत्यस्य स्मर्यमाणमनुमापकं स्यात्।

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1 वैश्वानरः परमात्मा ------- साधारणस्य वैश्वानरशब्दस्य परमात्मासाधारणैश्वर्यैर्विशेष्यमाणत्वात्। (Śrībhāṣya - RDK.-1-2-25).

2 आत्मानं वैश्वानरम् इति साक्षाद्वैश्वानरविशेषणात्मश्रुतिग्रहणसम्भवे प्राकरणिकलिङ्गरूपविशेषण-ग्रहणायोगाच्च। (TC. II. p. 52).

3 BNK. I p. 194.

4 BNK. I p. 190.

The phrase '*Vaiśvānaro Brahma*' is continued. The word '*iti*' goes with this phrase.

From what is stated in the *Smṛti*, it may be inferred that *Vaiśvānara* connotes *Brahman*.

Smṛti texts are composed on the basis of *Śrutis*. The purport of this *sūtra* is that what has been established in the previous *sūtra* can also be inferred from parallel statements in *Smṛti* texts.

For explaining this *sūtra*, Śaṅkarācārya refers to a verse from *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*[1]. "He whose mouth is fire whose head the heavenly world...." etc. From the shape described in the *Smṛti* passage, we infer a *Śruti* text on which the *Smṛti* rests and that is the *Chāndogya* passage mentioned in the previous *sūtra*[2]. Here, Śaṅkarācārya depends on the similar descriptions of the shape of *Brahman* in the *Śruti* and *Smṛti* passages. But in the verse quoted above from *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, there is no mention of the word *Vaiśvānara*. Rāmānujācārya also bases his argument on the shape of *Brahman*. Here also in the references quoted by Rāmānujācārya, one from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* and another from *Mahābhārata*, the word used is *Agni* but not *Vaiśvānara*[3].

Instead of inferring in such a roundabout way, Madhvācārya has chosen a very popular verse from *Bhagavadgītā*. The identity of *Vaiśvānara* with *Brahman* comes directly from the Lord Himself when He says, "Remaining as *Vaiśvānara* in the bodies of living beings, associated with *Prāṇa* and *Apāna*, I digest the four types of food"[4].

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1 यस्याग्निरास्यं द्यौर्मूर्धा खं नाभिश्चरणौ क्षितिः। सूर्यश्चक्षुर्दिशः श्रोत्रे तस्मै लोकात्मने नमः॥ (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*). (S. BSB. 1-2-25) (BNK. I. p. 195).

2 SRK. p. 283.

3 Śrī Bhāṣya - RDK.
(i) अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ । (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-4)
(ii) यस्याग्निरास्यं द्यौर्मूर्धा - । (Mbh. *Śāntiparva*. 47-68).
(This is the same verse, quoted by Śaṅkarācārya and shown above as from *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*).

4 अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा प्राणिनां देहमाश्रितः। प्राणापानसमायुक्तः पचाम्यन्नं चतुर्विधम्॥ (BG. 15-14).

The next *sūtra* answers another objection to the proposition that the term *Vaiśvānara* heard in *Śruti* texts connotes *Brahman.*

॥ ॐ शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानान्नेति चेन्न तथा
दृष्ट्युपदेशादसम्भवात् पुरुषविधमपि चैनमधीयते ॐ ॥

(1-2-26)

शब्दादिभ्यः 'अयमग्निः' इत्याद्यग्निशब्दात् 'वैश्वानरे तद्हुतम्' इति आदिपदोक्त-होमाधिकरणत्वाद्यग्निलिङ्गेभ्यः अन्तःप्रतिष्ठानात् पाचकत्वेन अन्तःप्रतिष्ठानात् वैश्वानरः न ब्रह्म इति चेत् न तथा अग्न्यादिनामलिङ्गकर्मवत्वेन दृष्ट्युपदेशात् उपासनोपदेशात् ब्रह्मणि अग्निशब्दसम्भवात् अग्नौ आत्मशब्दासम्भवात् पुरुषविधमपि च एनम् अधीयते। आदिपदात् लिङ्गानि। अन्तःप्रतिष्ठानेन तत्कर्मोपलक्ष्यते।

If it be said that, since *Vaiśvānara* is known by the name'*Agni* ' in statements like '*Ayamagniḥ*', and has been ascribed with characteristics of *Agni* like being the locus of oblations etc., and since *Vaiśvānara* abides within a person as the digester of the food, *Vaiśvānara* is not *Brahman*, it is not so, because that description of *Brahman* by the name, characteristics and functions of *Agni* is for the purpose of meditation, and because the term *Agni* can connote *Brahman* but it is not possible for the term *Ātman* to convey *Agni*, and also because this *Vaiśvānara* is learnt (in *Chānd. Up*. 5-18-2) with similar description as that of *Puruṣa* (in *Puruṣasūkta*).

The term *ādi* (in *śabdādibhyaḥ*) implies the characteristics, and the term *antaḥpratiṣthāna* implies the functions (of *Agni*).

In a previous *sūtra*, (1-2-24) it has been proved that Vaiśvānara in the disputed passage connoted *Brahman* only, on the strength of the term *Ātman* (which denoted *Brahman* only) used, in apposition with *Vaiśvānara* in the *Śruti* text. Now, the objector (*Pūrvapakṣa*) comes out with a formidable objection that the term *Vaiśvānara* denotes *Agni* and not *Brahman*, on the strength of express statements in *Śruti* itself.

In the passage[1], "This fire is *Vaiśvānara*, which is within a man and which digests the food eaten by the man" from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* it is clearly stated that *Vaiśvānara* is the gastric fire in a being. Therefore, the objection is that *Vaiśvānara* is not *Brahman.*

This *sūtra* refutes this contention. The *Siddhānta* view does not dispute the power (*abhidhāśakti*) of the word *Vaiśvānara* to denote elemental fire or gastric fire, but it rejects the conclusion that *Vaiśvānara* does not denote *Brahman*. The scriptures have prescribed a method of meditation on *Brahman*, by concentrating upon His form as *Vaiśvānara* (*dṛṣṭyupadeśa*) along with its characteristics such as being the digester of food (*pācakatva*) and indwellingness (*antaḥpratiṣṭhāna*). As an evidence, Madhvācārya quotes a *mantra*[2] from *Ṛgveda*, which states that "The gods have made *Vaiśvānara*, the source of the heavens, the feet of the world, the one born for right knowledge of men, the Supreme, all knowing Lord, all-exceeding Protector, the chief resort of all their activities"[3]. Not only in the form of *Vaiśvānara* but, according to Madhvācārya, *Brahman* is also to be meditated upon "as the One who can be addressed by all names, who is the guiding principle of all functions, who has all the characteristics and qualities, who is the accomplisher of all, who has all virtues and whose image is this universe"[4]. Thus, on the strength of passages, from *Śruti*, just as the word *Vaiśvānara* has the scope to denote *Agni* (fire), it also has the scope to denote *Brahman*. However, this cannot be said of the word *Ātman* which primarily denotes *Brahman* only and there is no possibility of it connoting *Agni* anywhere (*asaṁbhava*). Hence, in the disputed passage of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (5-18-1), the term *Vaiśvānara* denotes *Brahman* only, since the word is qualified by the adjective *Ātman*.

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1 अयमग्निर्वैश्वानरो योऽयमन्तः पुरुषे येनेदमन्नं पच्यते यदिदमद्यते। (Bṛha. Up. 5-9-1).

2 मूर्धानं दिवोऽरतिं पृथिव्या वैश्वानरमृत आजातमग्निम्। कविं सम्राजमतिथिं जनानाम् आसन्ना पात्रं जनयन्त देवाः॥ (Ṛ.V. 6-7-1).

3 BNK. I. p. 189.

4 सर्वनामा सर्वकर्मा सर्वलिङ्गः सर्वगुणः सर्वकामः सर्वधर्मः सर्वरूपः इति। (M. BSB. 1-2-26).

The *Sūtrakāra* further supports this view by stating that just as it is described in *Puruṣasūkta*, which is admittedly in praise of *Brahman*, that the heaven came from His head, the sun from his eye etc., the students of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* learn this *Vaiśvānara* as having similar metaphorical image. Śaṇkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have also come to the same conclusion with some variations in argument and quoting the authority of *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.

If one holds that, since the term *Vaiśvānara* is popularly used to denote the presiding deity of fire and the elemental fire, why not consider the term in that sense only, the next *sūtra* categorically refutes that contention.

॥ ॐ अत एव न देवता भूतं च ॐ ॥ (1-2-27)

अत एव आत्मशब्दादिहेतोरेव वैश्वानरः न अग्निदेवता न च भूताग्निः।

For the same reason, i.e. because of the word *Atman* etc. the *Vaiśvānara* (in the disputed passage) denotes neither the presiding deity of fire nor the elemental fire.

Here the *Sūtrakāra* reaffirms in unambiguous terms that because of the use of the adjective *Ātman* for the term *Vaiśvānara* and because of its description in a form similar to that of *Brahman* in *Puruṣasūkta*, *Vaiśvānara* in the disputed passage of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (5-18-1) does not convey either the presiding deity of fire or the elemental fire.

Uptil now in *Pāda* 1 and 2 of this *Samanvayādhyāya*, the *Sūtrakāra* has shown how certain typical and illustrative words, which popularly denote something other than *Brahman* (*anyatraprasiddhaśabdas*) are primarily applicable to *Brahman*. While commenting on the previous *Sūtra* (26) it has been told that all names are primarily applicable to *Brahman*. If this is accepted, day-to-day mundane communication will be difficult, nay impossible. If you ask someone to keep the milk on fire and he understands the words milk and / or fire as *Brahman*, then there

is a problem. According to linguistic principles, the meaning of every word as per its primary signification (*abhidhāvṛtti*) is to be considered first and only in case of its failure to give a coherent understanding, the secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*) of that word can be considered.

The next five *sūtras* address these problems. Instead of giving his views on these problems, Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa gives the opinions of some of his contemporary scholars.

|| ॐ साक्षादप्यविरोधं जैमिनिः ॐ || **(1-2-28)**

साक्षात् मुख्यवृत्त्या ब्रह्मणः अग्न्यादिशब्दार्थत्वे अपि व्यवहाराविरोधं जैमिनिः आह ।

Jaimini says that even if *Brahman* is primarily denoted by the words *Agni* etc., there is no contradiction in mundane transactions.

But the question is how? Since all the words like fire, water, sun etc. primarily denote *Brahman*, they become synonyms and then how to use them in ordinary parlance to connote different things?

Jayatīrtha explains Madhvācārya's view. "Even if the words fire etc. do not really denote fire etc. but denote *Brahman* only, still their popularity to convey those specific meanings is not contradicted. Because, the wise ones, knowing well that they denote *Brahman* only, use those words to convey respective things accepting the required proper word and rejecting the others. Other ignorant ones use the words in the sense assigned to them by language and lexicon. Thus, according to Jaimini, there is no contradiction between the use of words in ordinary parlance and their being primarily denotative of *Brahman*"[1].

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1 यद्यपि अग्न्यादिशब्दाः न अग्न्यादिवाचकाः किन्तु ब्रह्मवाचकाः एव तथापि न प्रसिद्धिविरोधः। अनन्ययोगेन ब्रह्मवाचकैरपि तैर्ज्ञानिनो हानादिसिद्ध्यर्थम् अन्यत्र अग्न्यादौ व्यवहरन्ति। तदन्येतु ज्ञानाभावादेव इत्यभ्युपगमात्। एवम् अभ्युपगमे च प्रसिद्धेः अन्यथा उपपत्तिसिद्धेः न तद्विरोध इति जैमिनिराचार्यो वक्तीत्यर्थः। (TP. 1-2-28).

In the passage quoted as footnote 1 on page 119, the phrase *hānādisiddhyarthaṁ* is difficult to understand. In his book *Gurvarthadīpikā*, Vādirājatīrtha explains only this phrase in his note on this *sūtra*. "*Hānādisiddhyarthaṁ* means while cooking, etc. rejecting (*hānaṁ*) others like water etc. and accepting (*upādānaṁ*) fire, similarly in case of grass etc. rejecting fire and accepting water, and in solar-cooking of herbal medicine etc. rejecting fire and accepting sun, and so on"[1]. Even if the words like fire, water, sun etc. logically become synonyms since they all primarily denote *Brahman*, the ability to choose or accept a particular word to convey a specific meaning, rejecting all other words, is known as *Hānādisiddhiḥ*.

If the scriptural words *Indra*, *Varuṇa*, *Agni* etc. primarily denote *Brahman*, then how can there be the distinction between *Indrasūkta*, *Varuṇasūkta* and *Agnisūkta* etc.? The next *sūtra* answers this question.

॥ ॐ अभिव्यक्तेरित्याश्मरथ्यः ॐ ॥ (1-2-29)

अग्न्यादिसूक्तादिनियम इति शेषः। अग्न्यादिसूक्तादिभिः ब्रह्मोपास्तौ अग्न्यादिषु एव तस्य अभिव्यक्तेः इति भावेन अग्न्यादिसूक्तादिनियम इति आश्मरथ्यो मन्यते।

If *Brahman* is worshipped with *Agni-sūkta* etc., *Brahman* manifests itself in the form of *Agni* etc. and therefore the distinction of *Agni-sūktas* etc. is made in Vedas, according to Āśmarathya.

This answers the objection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* that if the words *Indra*, *Varuṇa*, *Agni* etc. primarily denote *Brahman*, there would be no distinction between *Indra-sūkta*, *Varuṇa-sūkta* and *Agni-sūkta*, and all would be *Brahmasūktas*.

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1 हानादिसिध्यर्थमित्यस्य पाकादौ कर्तव्ये अन्यस्य जलादेः हानम् अग्नेः उपादानम्। एवं तृणादौ अग्नेर्हानं जलस्य उपादानम्। औषधादेः आतपपाके कर्तव्ये सति अग्नेर्हानं सूर्यस्य उपादानम् इत्यादिरूपेण हानादिसिद्ध्यर्थमित्यर्थः। (GDK. 1-2-28).

Aśmarathya takes his stand on *Brahman*'s distinctive manifestations in and through the respective deities and principles connected with them, in order to explain the extended application of words originally denoting *Brahman*[1].

The arrangement of distinctive *sūktas* in the scriptures is explained in a different way in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ अनुस्मृतेर्बादरिः ॐ ॥ **(1-2-30)**

ग्न्मूक्ताद्युपासकैः अग्न्यादिषु एव ब्रह्मणः अनुस्मृतेः हेतोः सूक्तादिव्यवस्था इति बादरिः मन्यते ।

According to Bādari, the *sūktas* are distinctively arranged as *Agni-sūkta* etc. with a purpose that the followers of respective *sūktas* should meditate on *Brahman*, respectively in the form of *Agni* etc. only.

The next *sūtra* explains the arrangement of various *sūktas* in scriptures, on another ground.

॥ ॐ सम्पत्तेरिति जैमिनिस्तथा हि दर्शयति ॐ ॥
(1-2-31)

यादिसूक्ताद्युपासकानाम् अग्न्यादिप्राप्तेः इति भावेन सूक्तनियम इति जैमिनिः मन्यते । तं तथा यथोपासते तदेव भवति इति हि श्रुतिः ।

According to Jaimini, because the followers of *Agni-sūkta* etc., obtain or reach *Agni* etc. (if they meditate on *Brahman* in *Agni* etc. with Agni-sūkta etc.)[2], the sūktas are arranged as *Agni-sūkta* etc. It is well known that Śruti adduces that he who meditates on a thing gets it.

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1. अत्र तत्र प्रसिद्धावप्यग्न्यादिषु ब्रह्मणोऽभिव्यक्तेरग्न्यादिसूक्तनियम इत्याश्मरथ्यः । (M. BSB 1-2-29) BNK I p. 193.
2. अग्न्यादिसूक्तादिषु परब्रह्मणः एव प्रतिपाद्यत्वे अपि अग्न्यादिसूक्तादिभिः अग्न्यादौ भगवदुपास्तौ अग्न्यादिप्राप्त्यभिप्रायेण सूक्तादिनियमः... । (TP. 1-2-31).

॥ ॐ आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् ॐ ॥ (1-2-32)

चशब्दः शङ्काव्यावर्तकः । एतत् (एतत् ब्रह्म) अस्मिन् अग्न्यादौ "यो अग्नौ तिष्ठन्" इत्यादिना आमनन्ति ।

The word *ca* is to dispel the doubt. ***Śruti* passages like "*yo agnau tiṣṭhan* (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-5)" etc. tell that this *Brahman* is (the *antaryāmin*) in this Agni etc.**

In the previous *sūtra* (31), it has been told that the followers of *Agni-sūkta* etc. reach *Agni* etc. if they meditate on *Brahman* in *Agni* etc. with *Agni-sūkta* etc. Naturally a doubt can arise as to how one meditating on *Brahman* can achieve *Agni* etc. The doubt is further strengthened by a verse from *Bhagavadgītā* that the worshippers of the *Devās* or gods go to the *Devās*; the worshippers of *Pitṛs* or ancestors go to the ancestors; the worshippers of *Bhūtas* or the elements go to the elements; but My worshippers come to Me[1].

In order to remove this doubt, this *sūtra* tells that the *Śruti* declares that *Brahman* only is the indweller and controller of the *Devatās* like *Agni* and therefore reaching *Agni* means reaching *Brahman* abiding in *Agni* [2]. The word *ca* is used to emphasize that the *Śruti* passages do declare this intention and there is no room for any doubt.

The interpretations of the last five *sūtras* by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya are on a different track. Both have taken the *sūtra* 28 *Sākṣādapyavirodhaṁ Jaiminiḥ* to mean that there is no contradiction even if the word *Agni* or*Vaiśvānara* is considered as directly denoting *Brahman* in the etymological sense of that word (*yogavṛtti*). Madhvācārya has been advocating from the

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1 यान्तिदेवव्रता देवान् पितॄन्यान्ति पितृव्रताः । भूतानि यान्ति भूतेज्या यान्ति मद्याजिनोऽपि माम् ॥ (BG. 9-25).

2 अग्न्यादिप्राप्तिपदेन तदन्तर्गतभगवत्प्राप्तेर्विवक्षितत्वात् । (TP. 1-2-32).

beginning that all such scriptural words like *Agni* can be shown to denote *Brahman* directly in their etymological sense. In fact he has already shown how some words like *Ākāśa*, *Prāṇa*, *Gāyatrī* etc. directly denote *Brahman* etymologically.

But the views of Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya are quite divergent on these last five *sūtras*. All have agreed that the purport of *sūtra* 24 is that Vaiśvānara refers to *Brahman* only, and the purport of *sūtra* 27 is that *Vaiśvānara* is neither the presiding deity of fire nor the elemental fire. It means that *Vaiśvānara* denotes *Brahman* directly. Yet, again in *sūtra* 28, as interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, it is told that in the opinion of Jaimini there is no contradiction even if the word *Vaiśvānara* is taken as directly denoting *Brahman*. In this purport, what is so novel or revolutionary a point to justify the necessity of taking the support of a contemporary thinker of the eminence of Jaimini?

Śaṅkarācārya feels that all the three *sūtras* 29, 30, and 31 justify, in different ways, the propriety of considering *Brahman*, who transcends all measures, as occupying the space of a span in the heart, as described by the adjectives *prādeśamātraṁ* and *abhivimānaṁ* in the disputed passage (Chānd. Up. 5-18-1). This point has already been taken care of in the phrase *Tathā dṛṣṭyupadeśāt* in *sūtra* 1-2-26. Śaṅkarācārya himself has explained as, "it is advised here that *Brahman* should be conceived in the form of *Vaiśvānara* in the gastric fire"[1]. Moreover, in an earlier *sūtra*, "*Arbhakaukastvāt...* (1-2-7)", this point has been already explained. So what is the need to prove the same point again, and that too by taking the support of others?

Rāmānujācārya thinks that these three *sūtras* consider different points. On *sūtra* 29 he says that, "the all-pervading

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1 जाठरवैश्वानरोपाधिः परमेश्वर इह द्रष्टव्यत्वेन उपदिश्यते। (S. BSB 1-2-26).

Brahman is described as being limited by heaven, etc.; Āśmarathya thinks that as the Lord manifests Himself like that to his devotees, He is described thus''[1]. On *sūtra* 30, he says that ''Bādari thinks that the Lord is so imagined in human form for the sake of *Upāsanā*''[2]. On *sūtra* 31, he says, ''This altar etc. is said to be the chest etc. of the *Vaiśvānara* in order to identify the offering to *Prāṇa* which is performed by the *upāsakas* (worshippers) with the *Agnihotra* sacrifice'' so says Jaimini[3].

The fact that the *Sūtrakāra* is mustering here the support of some eminent contemporary thinkers, suggests that the author is up against some serious and formidable objections. It is to be noted that the author is at the end of a stage in the development of these *Brahma-sūtras*. By the end of *Pāda* 2 of *Samanvayādhyāya*, *Sūtrakāra* has completed the *Samanvaya* into *Brahman*, of a class of scriptural words. *Śaṅkarācārya* has named this class of words as *spaṣṭabrahmaliṅga* words of *Pāda* 1 and *aspaṣṭabrahmaliṅga* words relating to *Saguṇa-Brahman* of *Pāda* 2. Madhvācārya has described this class of words dealt with in *Pāda* 1 and 2 as *Anyatraprasiddha* words. It is natural for the author to review the work done and to take stock of the possible objections, if any, on that work. And this, he appears to have done in these five *sūtras*. Though the five *sūtras* are taken as part of the *Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa*, they deserve to be treated as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*.

Madhvācārya has rightly guessed the possible objections to the entire exercise of *samanvaya* of all scriptural words into

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1 उपासकाभिव्यक्त्यर्थं प्रादेशमात्रत्वं परमात्मनः इति आश्मरथ्य आचार्यो मन्यते। द्यौर्मूर्धादित्यश्चक्षुः इत्यादिः। (Śrī-Bhāṣya 1-2-30).

2 तथा उपासनार्थमिति बादरिराचार्यो मन्यते। (Śrī-Bhāṣya 1-2-31).

3 अस्य परमात्मन एव वैश्वानरस्य द्युप्रभृतिपृथिव्यन्तशरीरस्य समाराधनभूताया उपासकैः अहरहः क्रियमाणायाः प्राणाहुतेः अग्निहोत्रत्वसंपादनाय अयम् उरःप्रभृतीनां वेदित्वाद्युपदेशः इति जैमिनिराचार्यो मन्यते। (Śrī-Bhāṣya 1-2-32).

Brahman. If all words are primarily applicable to *Brahman* alone, it would cripple all linguistic communication and bring the worldly transactions to a standstill. Even in Vedas, if all names denote *Brahman* only, then there would be no distinction of *Agni-sūkta* and *Varuṇa-sūkta* etc. And all would be *Brahma-sūktas*. This objection questions the very basis of *Samanvaya* and the purpose and utility of these *Brahma-sūtras*. According to Madhvācārya these last five *sūtras* answer these objections. Therefore, Madhvācārya's interpretation appears more ingenious, appealing and convincing.

Chapter V
Adhyāya I, *Pāda* 3
(प्रथमाध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः।)

1 द्युभ्वाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् ॐ ॥ **(1-3-1)**

तत्तु इति अस्ति। श्रुतौ स्वशब्दाभावात् तत्पर्यायात्मशब्दो ग्राह्यः। द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं द्यौः[1] भूः इत्यादीनाम् आयतनं तत्तु ब्रह्मैव स्वशब्दात् स्वशब्दपर्यायात्मशब्दात्।

The words '*tat tu*' are continued. In the absence of the word '*sva*' in the text under discussion, its synonym '*ātman*' is to be taken in its place. **The abode of the heaven, the earth and the rest is That *Brahman* only, because of the word *Ātman*, a synonym of '*sva*' (used there).**

The passage under discussion here is a *mantra*[2] from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. It says, --know Him alone, the *Ātman*, in Whom the heaven, the earth and the interspace are woven together with the mind and all the vital-breaths (*prāṇas*), and give up all other talk. This (knowledge) is the man's bridge to immortality.

The doubt raised is whether this substratum or abode of the heaven, the earth etc. is *Brahman* or the unintelligent matter, *Prakṛti* or the individual souls like the presiding deities Rudra or Vāyu etc. because, there are some *Śruti* statements which suggest them to be the abode. This *sūtra* declares that the abode of the heaven, the earth and the rest is *Brahman* only, since the word *Ātman* is used. The word *sva* used in the *sūtra*, is not found in the passage under discussion. Therefore its synonym *Ātman* is to be taken in its place just as the synonyms of *Rāja* are to be taken in the Pāṇinian *sūtra sabhā rājāmanuṣyapūrva* (Pāṇini 2-4-23).

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1 दिव उत्। (Pāṇini 6-1-131).

2 यस्मिन् द्यौः पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोतं मनः सह प्राणैश्च सर्वैः।
तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथामृतस्यैष सेतुः॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-2-5).

Instead of using the term *ātmaśabdāt* the *Sūtrakāra* has used the term *svaśabdāt*, possibly to drive at the point that the word *Ātman* exclusively belongs to the Supreme Being, *Brahman*, and to remind the speciality of that word[1]. All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*, though each one explains in his own way and draws further conclusions in line with his own philosophy.

The statement *amṛtasya eṣa setuḥ* in the passage under discussion allows different interpretations. *Amṛta* means immortal and it also conveys the sense of a released soul. *Amṛtaṁ* means immortality as well as the collective body of immortals. It also means the Supreme Spirit, *Brahman*. Hence, the meaning of the above quoted statement should be taken with reference to the context. The meaning which fits in the present context is that the knowledge of *Brahman* has been figuratively described as a bridge to reach immortality, that is to get released from the succession of births and deaths. Śaṅkarācārya's *Pūrvapakṣin* takes *amṛta* to mean *Brahman* and also understands *setuḥ* literally as a bridge. Therefore, he argues that if *Brahman* is to be reached by a bridge, *Brahman* should have a bank or edge. That renders *Brahman* a limited entity and hence the abode of heaven etc. cannot be taken as *Brahman*. Śaṇkarācārya explains the *Siddhānta* that *setuḥ* describes the knowledge of *Brahman* and it is to be taken as a means or instrument to achieve immortality[2].

Rāmānujācārya has restricted the *Pūrvapakṣa* to individual souls (*Jīvātman*) only and has dropped out *Pradhāna* from its scope. But this is not tenable. Because, the *Sūtrakāra* himself has refuted the claim of both *Pradhāna* and the individual souls to the status of the abode of heaven etc., in the immediately following *sūtras* of this *Adhikaraṇa*. As such, both must be at the back of his mind as *Pūrvapakṣa*, while composing this *sūtra*.

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1 आत्मशब्दादिति वाच्ये स्वेत्युक्तिः स्वस्य ब्रह्मण एव शब्द इत्यपि विग्रहेणासाधारण्यं ज्ञापयितुम्। (TDK 1-3-1).

2 तत्र अमृतत्वसाधनत्वात् अमृतस्यैष सेतुः इति सेतुश्रुत्या संकीर्त्यते। (S. BSB 1-3-1).

After the passage discussed above, the next *mantra*[1] in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* says that "where all the arteries meet like the spokes of a chariot wheel in the hub, there within the heart He moves, becoming manifold". This looks like the characteristic mark of individual souls. Therefore, one may think that the abode of the heaven, the earth etc. may be the individual soul. The next *sūtra* refutes such a contention.

|| ॐ मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् ॐ || **(1-3-2)**

द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं ब्रह्मैव मुक्तोपसृप्यत्वव्यपदेशात्।

The abode of the heaven, the earth and the rest is That *Brahman* only, because the characteristic mark of being the one to be approached by the released souls, is spoken of for that.

Here the *Sūtrakāra* adduces another reason (*hetu*) in support of the conclusion established by the previous *sūtra*. That is why Rāmānujācārya adds *ca* at the end of this *sūtra*. Though the word *upasṛpya* used in the *sūtra* is in the form of an adjective, it is interpreted in the sense of an abstract noun *upasṛpyatva* on the analogy of the Pāninian *sūtra dvyekayoḥ dvivacanaikavacane* (Pāṇini 1-4-22)[2].

The statement *amṛtasya eṣa setuḥ* in the passage under discussion (*viṣayavākya*) is also interpreted in the sense that this (*Ātman*) is the final goal towards which the released souls move, similar to the sense of *muktānāṁ paramā gatiḥ*. The word *amṛta* is taken as the released soul and it is used in the singular to represent the whole class of innumerable released souls. The word *setuḥ* is taken as the limit or the goal. Thus, the purport of the *sūtra* is that, the abode of the heaven etc. in the passage is

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1 अरा इव रथनाभौ संहता यत्र नाड्यः । स एषोऽन्तश्चरते बहुधा जायमानः ॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-2-6).

2 द्व्येकयोरित्यादाविव भावप्रधानोऽयम्। TDK 1-3-2.

Brahman only and it cannot be an individual soul (*Jīvātman*), since it is described as the goal towards which the released individual souls move (*upasṛpya*).

Based on scriptural statements like "*Rudro vā va lokādhāraḥ*", "*bhūtaṁ ca bhavacca bhaviṣyacca*" etc., why should we not consider the deity Rudra or *Prakṛti* as the abode of heaven etc.? The next two *sūtras* answer this question.

|| ॐ नानुमानमतच्छब्दात् ॐ || **(1-3-3)**

द्युभ्वाद्यायतनमित्यस्ति। अनुमानशब्दाच्छैशिषिकेऽणि[1] कृते आनुमानं प्रधानम् इत्यर्थः। आनुमानं (प्रधानं) न द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं तच्छब्दाभावात् त्रिगुणात्मकप्रकृतिशब्दाभावात् ।

The term '*dyubhvādyāyatanaṁ*' is continued. From the word *anumāna* (inference), the word *ānumāna* is derived by adding the suffix '*aṇ*' as per Pāṇinīya *sūtra* '*śeṣe* (*aṇ*) (4-2-92)' in the section *Taddhiteṣu Śaiṣikāḥ*'. *Ānumāna* means *anumānena parikalpitaṁ*, that which is determined by inference; it implies the *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna*. **That which is determined by inference i.e. *Pradhāna*, is not the abode of heaven etc. because of the absence of a word like *triguṇātmakaprakṛti* in the text (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-2-5).**

In *Vedānta* philosophy, generally *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* is understood by the phrase "that which is inferred". The argument is that every effect must have a cause and that cause another and so on until we reach an uncaused first cause. As the effects are non concious the cause is inferred to be non-conscious since the cause and the effect are assumed to be of similar nature. This is the reasoning adopted by the *Sāṅkhya* system to establish the reality of *Pradhāna*[2].

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1. शेषे (अण्) । (Pāṇini 4-2-92). In the remainder of (i.e. other than *cāturarthaka*) senses too, let there be the affix *aṇ* & c. It is both a *vidhi* and an *adhikāra sūtra*. (*Siddhānta Kaumudi*, S. No. 1312, Tr. by S. C. Vasu).
2. SRK p. 287.

The plain purport of the *sūtra* is that *Pradhāna* is not the abode of heaven etc. However, Śaṅkarācārya considers the deity *Vāyu* also within the scope of *ānumāna*. Madhvācārya has taken *ānumāna* to mean the deity *Rudra*. Rāghavedratīrtha has taken *ānumāna* as *Rudra* and *Pradhāna*. Rāmānujācārya has clubbed this *sūtra* with the next one, which denies the status of abode of heaven etc. to the individual souls, and treated the mention of *Pradhāna* as an example[1] to deny that status of abode of heaven etc. to individual souls. Since Rāmānujācārya has excluded the *Pradhāna* from the scope of his *Pūrvapakṣa*, possibly he could not treat this as an independent *sūtra* refuting the claim of *Pradhāna*. Of course, there is no denying the fact that the deities *Vāyu* and *Rudra* can be considered within the scope of the word *ānumāna* based on some statements in *Śruti* and *agama* texts. But the *Sūtrakāra* is going to refute the claims of all the individual souls including the exalted ones, to the status of the abode of heaven etc., in the immediate next *sūtra*. Therefore, I feel that there is no urgency to refute the claims of *Vāyu*, *Rudra* and *Jīvas* in this *sūtra* itself.

From the *sūtras* seen so far, one can find that Bādarāyaṇavyāsa follows some set pattern of teaching. By and large, there are three claimants to the characteristics discussed in these *Brahmasūtras*. viz. *Brahman*, *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* and the class of individual souls including the exalted ones like the various presiding deities. First he declares that a particular characteristic mark is applicable to *Brahman* alone and specifies a reason (*hetu*) for that. In the next one or two *sūtras* he adduces further evidence, if any, in support of his first statement. The phrase "applicable to *Brahman* alone" indirectly denies the claim of the remaining two. Then again in the following *sūtras* he directly refutes the claim of the other two individually or jointly with reasons.

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1 यथा... प्रधानं न प्रतिपाद्यम् एवं प्राणभृत् अपि इत्यर्थः । (Śrī-Bhāṣya 1-3-3) (BNK. I.p. 210)

In keeping with this scheme, the *Sūtrakāra* has declared in *sūtra* 1-3-1 that the abode of heaven etc. is *Brahman* only because of the use of the word *Ātman*. In the next *sūtra* he offers another reason in support of this declaration. In this *sūtra* 1-3-3, he is directly refuting the claim of *Pradhāna* to the status of the said abode. This *sūtra* is identical with an earlier one, namely *na ca smārtaṁ ataddharmābhilāpāt* (1-2-19). In the next *sūtra prāṇabhṛcca* (1-3-4)" the *Sūtrakāra* is going to directly deny the characteristic of abode of heaven etc. to all the individual souls, including the various deities. Hence, I feel that there is no need to mix up the things.

|| ॐ प्राणभृच्च ॐ || **(1-3-4)**

प्राणभृत् (जीवः) च न द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं तच्छब्दाभावात् जीववायुरुद्रादि शब्दाभावात्।

The individual soul also is not the abode of heaven etc. because there is no word in the *Śruti*, like *Jīva*, *Vāyu*, *Rudra* etc.

All the deities like *Vāyu*, *Rudra* and others are also in this class of individual souls, since they too are individual souls only, though exalted. This *sūtra* could have been clubbed with the previous one. But it is kept separately in order to enable it to be repeated in the next *sūtra*.

Since the characteristics mentioned in the passage under discussion, convey both the *Brahman* and *Jīva*, why should we not accept the identity of *Brahman* and *Jīva*? The next *sūtra* clarifies this doubt.

|| ॐ भेदव्यपदेशात् ॐ || **(1-3-5)**

प्राणभृतः जीवस्य ब्रह्मणः भेदव्यपदेशात् च प्राणभृत् न द्युभ्वाद्यायतनम्।

And because it is told that the individual soul is different from *Brahman*, the individual soul is not the abode of heaven etc.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*, but they explain the same with reference to different passages (*viṣayavākya*) from *Śruti*. Śaṅkarācārya takes the same *mantra* from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (2-2-5) which was discussed with *sūtra* 1-3-1. Since it is told that "you know that *Ātman* alone"[1], a distinction is made between the individual soul, the knower, and the *Ātman*, to be known. Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya consider here a *mantra* [2] from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. It says: "The individual soul abiding on the same tree, being bewildered, grieves; but when he sees the other one, the worshipful Lord, and knows His glory, he crosses over his grief".

Thus, this *sūtra* stresses the difference between *Brahman* and the individual souls. Why should we take the word '*īśa*' (Lord) as conveying *Brahman*? Next *sūtra* answers:

॥ ॐ प्रकरणात् ॐ ॥ **(1-3-6)**

द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं ब्रह्मैव न च प्रधानं जीवो वा ब्रह्मप्रकरणात्।

The abode of heaven etc. is *Brahman* only, and not the *Pradhāna* or an individual soul, since the subject of discussion in the section is the Supreme Being only.

The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* starts (*upakrama*) with a *mantra*, which says that the first-born deity *Caturmukha Brahmā* (not to be confused with *Brahman*) gave the knowledge of *Brahman*, *Brahmavidyā*, to his eldest son Atharva[3]. Then the whole of the *Upaniṣad* talks of the Supreme Being only. Here, in this *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* is using *Prakaraṇa*, which is one amongst the group of six *Tātparyaliṅgas*[4], to prove the contention of the *Adhikaraṇa*.

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1 तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानम् इति ज्ञेयज्ञातृभावेन। (Ś. BSB. 1-3-5).

2 समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः। जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमितिवीतशोकः॥ (Muṇḍa. Up. 3-1-2).

3 ॐ ब्रह्मा देवानां प्रथमः सम्बभूव विश्वस्य कर्ता भुवनस्य गोप्ता। स ब्रह्मविद्यां सर्वविद्याप्रतिष्ठामथर्वाय ज्येष्ठपुत्राय प्राह॥ (Muṇḍa. Up. 1-1-1).

4 श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात्। (PMS. 3-1-13).

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have interpreted this *sūtra* on these lines only. Madhvācārya however feels that this *sūtra* advocates that the word *īśa* used in the *mantra* 3-1-2 of *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (quoted as footnote on the previous page) refers to *Brahman*, since the subject of discussion in the section is *Brahman* only[1]. He has felt this way possibly because the word *īśa* denotes a ruler as well as Rudra, and in some scriptures[2] the deity Rudra has been described as the creator of this universe. Therefore, some may get confused that Rudra only is *Brahman*. In Vedic religion, there are a number of functional presiding deities (*abhimānī devatā*) and among the followers of Vedic religion every one has his own personal deity (*upāsya devatā*). While worshipping or meditating on his personal deity, he addresses the deity as the creator and the protector of the world and as the Supreme God only. Since all the powers exercised by the deities are those delegated to them by the Supreme Being, a devotee worshipping his personal deity, is indirectly worshipping the Supreme *Brahman* only. *Bhagavadgītā* corroborates this belief when it says,: "I give unswerving faith to each devotee who seeks to worship with faith whatever divine form (he chooses). With that faith, he wishes to worship that form. From that divinity he obtains the objects of his desires; for I Myself have ordained them"[3].

This is what practically happens. But, *Brahma-sūtras*, being theoretical treatises, teach that,[4] "That *Brahman*, the Supreme Being, is different from the deities Indra etc. on account of the declaration of the difference". The Supreme *Brahman* is the inner

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1 प्रकरणात् ईशशब्दार्थो ब्रह्म इत्यर्थः। (TDK 1-3-6).

2 यो देवानां प्रभवश्चोद्भवश्च विश्वाधिपो रुद्रो महर्षिः हिरण्यगर्भं जनयामास पूर्वं स नो बुद्धया शुभ या संयुनक्तु॥ (Śvetā. Up. 3-4).

3 यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्तः श्रद्धयाऽर्चितुमिच्छति। तस्य तस्याचलां श्रद्धां तामेव विदधाम्यहम्॥ (BG. 7-21).

4 ॥ ॐ भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॐ॥ (BS. 1-1-21).

ruler of these deities and all the powers exercised by these deities flow from the grace of that Supreme Being. Possibly because of such a situation Madhvācārya thought it fit to forewarn against such confusion.

In addition to the evidence of *Śruti* and *Prakaraṇa* for establishing the difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva*, shown here, the next *sūtra* provides the testimony of *liṅga* (characteristic mark) for the same.

॥ ॐ स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च ॐ ॥ **(1-3-7)**

स्थितिः कर्मफलोपजीवनं विना अवस्थानम्। अदनं तदुपजीवनम्। स्थित्यदनाभ्यां स्थितेः कर्मफलोपजीवनं विना अवस्थानत्वात् अदनात् कर्मफलोपजीवनत्वात् च जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदव्यपदेशात् द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं ब्रह्मैव न च जीवः।

'*Sthiti*' is the characteristic of abiding without being responsible for the fruits of actions. *Adanaṁ* is the characteristic of being subjected to the fruits of actions. **Because of the two distinguishing characteristic marks, one of *Brahman* who abides without being responsible for the fruits of actions, and the other of an individual soul who is subjected to the fruits of actions, the difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva* is told. On account of the mention of the difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman*, the abode of heaven etc. is That *Brahman* only and not Jīva.**

The passage (*viṣayavākya*) referred to here is the same famous metaphor of *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (3-1-1)[1] where *Brahman* and *Jīva* are considered as two birds perching on the same tree. Because of this difference of nature between *Brahman* and *Jīva*, *Brahman* alone can be the abode of heaven etc. and not the *Jīva*. All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. However, Śaṅkarācārya points out that the distinction between the individual soul and *Brahman* is no more real than that between the ether

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1 द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥ (Muṇḍa. Up. 3-1-1).

within a jar and the universal ether[1]. V. S. Ghate remarks: "It is to be noted that the *sūtras* 2, 5, and 7 specially refer to the difference of nature between *Brahman* and *Jīva*".

2 भूमाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ भूमा सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशात् ॐ ॥ **(1-3-8)**

भूमा तत्तु ब्रह्मैव सम्यक्प्रसादवत्वात् सर्वाधिकत्वेन तद्व्यपदेशात् (च) ।

The word *Bhūman* meaning abundance or plenitude connotes the Supreme Being only on account of His infinite bliss and on account of the scriptural teaching about His all-transcending glory.

In this *sūtra*, the predicate is *bhūmā* and the subject is *tat*, which is continued (*anuvṛtta*) from sūtra 1-1-4. Though the subject is in neuter gender, the predicate is in masculine, in order to be compatible with the statements in the *Śruti* under discussion, as usual. The word *bhūman*, derived from *bahu* [2] (many), conveys abundance or plenitude. Though it is an abstract noun by derivation, it is used as a noun.

The topic under discussion here is a passage (*viṣayavākya*) from *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, which tells that[3]: "Happiness is in (getting) Him, Who alone has abundance or plenitude. There is no happiness in anything which is little or mortal. Infinite abundance alone is happiness. But one should desire to understand Him, in Whom there is plentitude (*Bhūma*)".

The question arises as to who is this *bhūman*. This *sūtra* predicates that *bhūman* is That *Brahman* only. There is no difference of opinion amongst the commentators about this

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1 SRK. p. 288.

2 बहु + इमन् । पृथ्वादिभ्य इमनिज्वा । (Pāṇini 5-1-122) बहु → भू + (इ) मन् । बहोर्लोपो भू च बहोः । भूमन् (Pāṇini 6-4-158).

3 यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति भूमैव सुखं भूमा त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यः । (Chāṇd. Up. 7-23-1).

predicate as well as about the passage under discussion. But the difference is in the reasoning through which the predicate has been arrived at.

Besides the word *bhūma*, there are two other words in the *sūtra*, viz. *samprasādāt* and *adhyupadeśāt*, both in ablative. We know that the reason (*hetu*) is mentioned in the sūtras normally with a word having an ablative case-ending. The question, therefore, arises as to whether these two words in ablative supply two reasons for arriving at the conclusion mentioned by the predicate or whether one is the reason and the other modifies that reason.

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have taken the second view[1]. The phrase *samprasādāt adhyupadeśāt* has been interpreted as "on account of information / instruction about it being given subsequent to / additional to / transcending *samprasāda*".

Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted this *sūtra* thus[2]: "The Supreme Self alone deserves to be *bhūman* and not *Prāṇa*. Why? Because *bhūman* is mentioned as transcending *Prāṇa*, vital air (*saṁprasāda*)".

The context for this line of argument is a conversation between the student Nārada and his teacher Sanatkumāra, mentioned in the seventh chapter of *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. Nārada approaches Sanatkumāra and says, "I have heard from persons like your revered self that a knower of *Ātman* goes beyond grief. I am in a state of grief. May your revered self take me across it". The teacher, following the teaching method- 'from known to unknown', first ascertains from the student what he has already learnt. Nārada narrates a long list of subjects like *Ṛgveda* etc. which he has learnt and then confesses that he is a knower of verbal texts only and not a knower of *Ātman*. The teacher says, "What you know is a

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1 VSG p. 59.

2 परमात्मैवेह भूमा भवितुमर्हति न प्राणः। कस्मात्? सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशात्।... प्राणोऽत्र सम्प्रसादोऽभि-प्रेयते। प्राणादूर्ध्वं भूम्न उपादिश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः। (S. BSB. 1-3-8).

name. Worship (continue the study of) the name (texts) and you will get whatever is within the reach of name." Nārada enquires as to whether there is any thing greater than the name. The teacher answers, "Surely, speech is greater than name." Thus, the conversation continues and the teacher reveals an ascending series of principles like name (*nāma*), speech (*vāk*), mind (*manaḥ*), will (*saṅkalpaḥ*), intelligence (*cittaṁ*), contemplation (*dhyānaṁ*), understanding (*vijñānaṁ*), strength (*balaṁ*), food (*annaṁ*), water (*Āpaḥ*), fire (*tejaḥ*), ether (*ākāśaḥ*), memory (*smaraḥ*), aspiration (*āśā*) and the vital airs (*prāṇa*) i.e. the life principle. The teacher then eulogizes that one who knows (the Supremacy of) *prāṇa* thus, is considered as eloquent (*ativādī*).

Now, the teacher switches on to a higher gear and takes the student zooming to a higher level. Having praised the one knowing the hierarchy of mundane principles as eloquent, the teacher reveals: "But (*tu*), the real eloquent is he who talks out of realization of Truth." Now Nārada does not ask such questions like who is greater than this or that. He must have guessed that the teacher was talking about the Greatest Truth, *Ātman* for which he came to the teacher. Nevertheless, Nārada does not stop conversing. He responds quickly and positively to each statement of the teacher. When the teacher says "But, one must desire to understand the Truth", Nārada immediately expresses, "revered Sir, I desire to understand the Truth". The teacher dilates the requirements for knowing the Truth, as desire (*jijñāsā*), understanding (*vijñānaṁ*) faith (*śraddhā*), steadfastness (*niṣṭhā*) and activity (*kṛtiḥ*), and states the well-known axiom that "When one obtains happiness, then alone does one act". For that, one must know what or where is happiness. At this point, the teacher discloses that, "happiness is in (getting) Him, Who alone has abundance or plenitude (*bhūma*). There is no happiness in anything which is little or mortal. Infinite abundance alone is happiness. But one should desire to understand Him, in Whom there is plenitude (*bhūma*)". This is the passage under discussion here, which poses the question as to who is this *Bhūman*.

Śaṅkarācārya's pūrvapakṣin argues on the ground that the series of questions and answers between Nārada and Sanatkumāra ends with *Prāṇa*. Then *bhūman* is spoken of. Therefore, *bhūman* must be referring to *Prāṇa* only. Interpreting this *sūtra* (1-3-8) Śaṅkarācārya states his *siddhānta* that[1] "The Supreme Self (*Paramātman*) alone deserves to be *bhūman* and not *Prāṇa*. *Samprasāda* is the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*) as it is mentioned in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* along with the states of waking and dream. Since *Prāṇa* (vital air) alone remains functioning in this state of deep sleep, *Prāṇa* is referred to here by the term *Samprasāda* (by way of *Lakṣaṇā*). Because *Bhūman* is mentioned subsequent to or as transcending *Prāṇa* (*Prāṇādūrdhvaṁ*), the term *Bhūman* represents the Supreme Self only".

Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of the term *Samprasāda* as vital air (*Prāṇa*) by secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*) appears too far-fetched. It is like taking the word 'Bank-holiday' as 'Bank-watchman', because he alone is on duty on holidays. Even accepting *Samprasāda* as vital air, one cannot ignore that vital air is an insentient principle according to Śaṅkarācārya. On the contrary *Bhūman*, who is said to be happiness personified (*Bhūmaiva sukhaṁ*) must necessarily refer to a sentient principle, because happiness is an attribute of a sentient being. To overcome this difficulty Rāmānujācārya takes *Jīva* in place of *Prāṇa*. Still, the explanation fails to convince. It is true that *Prāṇa* is great in the company of other principles described along with it. It is true that the Supreme Self transcends *Prāṇa* as he transcends every other thing. It is equally true that *Bhūman* (plenitude of all auspicious attributes) refers to the Supreme Being. Yet the transcendence of the Supreme Self over *Prāṇa* cannot be said to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the Supreme Self to be *Bhūman*.

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1 परमात्मैवेह भूमा भवितुमर्हति न प्राणः। कस्मात्? सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशात्। सम्प्रसाद इति सुषुप्त स्थानमुच्यते सम्यक् प्रसीदति अस्मिन् इति निर्वचनात् वृहदारण्यके च स्वप्नजागरितस्थानाभ्यां सह पाठात्। तस्यां च सम्प्रसादावस्थायां प्राणो जागर्तीति प्राणोऽत्र सम्प्रसादोऽभिप्रेयते। प्राणादूर्ध्वं भूम्न उपादिश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः। (Ś. BSB. 1-3-8).

While expounding the highest Truth the teacher has, no doubt, described a hierarchy of various principles and *Prāṇa* occupies the top rung in that ladder. But by the time the teacher introduces the term *Bhūman*, he is talking of happiness as an inspiration for the sentient beings to act and *Bhūman* as an infinite source of happiness. *Prāṇa* is left behind in the discussion and hence one need not hang on to *Prāṇa*.

The *sūtra* has been explained above, as "*Bhūman* is the Supreme Self only and not *Prāṇa*". But the *sūtra* actually has only an affirmative proposition and "not *Prāṇa*" is only a conjecture. If the *Sūtrakāra* intended to negate the status of *bhūman* to *Prāṇa*, he would have said so as he has done in other cases, e.g. "*netaro'nupapatteḥ* (1-1-16)", "*Anavasthiterasambhavācca netaraḥ* (1-2-17)", "*Na ca smārtamataddharmābhilapāt* (1-2-19)", "*Ata eva na devatā bhūtaṁ ca* (1-2-27)". Therefore the above line of explanation followed by some commentators is not found convincing. If the *Sūtrakāra* had in mind a comparative reference to *Prāṇa*, he was expected to prefer a simpler phrase like '*Prāṇādadhyupadeśāt*' (*lāghavaṁ*) to a cumbersome phrase as '*Samprasādādadhyupadeśāt*' (*Gauravaṁ*).

Madhvācārya is the only commentator who has taken a fresh view of this *sūtra*. He has treated both the terms with ablative case-ending in the *sūtra* as two separate reasons (*hetu*) for establishing the proposition that *bhūman* is *Brahman* only. But V. S. Ghate considers this as "not reasonable owing to the absence of *ca*"[1]. However, the absence of *ca* presents no problem since *ca* can be taken[2] (*anukarṣaṇaṁ*) from the next *sūtra* with sanctity. Moreover, since the *Brahma-sūtras* have come down the ages through oral transmission, there are variations in the reading and the total number of *sūtras*. For example, the

1 VSG. p. 59.

2 अनन्तरश्चकारोऽत्रानुकृष्यते । (TDK. 1-3-8).

term *śārīraśca*, which forms a part of *sutra* 1-2-20 according to Śaṅkarācārya, Madhvācārya, Nimbārkācārya and Vallabhācārya, has been read with *sūtra* 1-2-19 by Rāmānujācārya. Further, the whole term *śarīraśca* of *sūtra* 1-2-20, has been taken by Rāghavendratīrtha while composing the *vṛtti* of *sūtra* 1-2-19. Thus, taking a word from the next *sūtra* is neither novel nor forbidden though modern scholars do not accept this. Hence it is not unreasonable. Moreover, in all probability, *sūtra* 1-3-8 and 1-3-9 could both together have formed one *sūtra* only as "*Bhūmā samprasādāt adhyupadeśāt dharmopapatteśca*". Then where is the question of absence of *ca*?

According to Madhvācārya, this *sūtra* adduces two reasons (*hetu*) to establish the proposition that *bhūman* refers to *Brahman*, viz. *samprasāda* and *adhyupadeśa*. *Samprasāda* means infinite bliss (*pūrṇasukham*)[1]. Some may think that even though *Brahman* may have abundance of happiness, He may also have a little of sorrow somewhere sometimes. As per Rāghavendratīrtha[2], instead of using the word *pūrṇasukhatvāt*, the term *samprasādāt* is used to indicate that the (*Brahman*'s) bliss is unmixed with any kind of sorrow. "This is brought out in the *sūtra*, according to the *Tātparyacandrikā* of Vyāsatīrtha, by the use of the word *samprasāda* whose derivation carries the sense of destruction of all pain''[3]. In other words, *samprasāda* means infinite bliss, which causes a continuous unending state (feeling) of serene, composed joy unmixed with any sorrow. The second reason *adhyupadeśa* means scriptural teaching about *Brahman*'s all-transcending glory[4]. It is to be noted that the greatness of other principles like *Nāma*, *Vāk*, etc. is told with reference to some other principle in that

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1 प्रसीदति अनेन इति प्रसादः सुखम्। सम्यक् प्रसादः सम्प्रसादः। (NS. 1-3-8) (BNK. p. 215).

2 पूर्णसुखत्वादिति वाच्ये सम्प्रसादादिति यौगिकोक्तिः ईशस्य सुखित्वे दुःखित्वं स्यादिति न शङ्क्यम्। पूर्णसुखकार्येण प्रसादेन दुःखाभावनिश्चयादिति सूचयितुम्। (TDK 1-3-8).

3 सम्प्रेत्युपसर्गद्वयपूर्वकात् 'षदॢ' विशरणगत्यवसादनेतिधातोरकर्तरि च कारके संज्ञायामिति करणे घञ् प्रत्यये रुपम्। (TCP. p. 574) (BNK. p. 216).

4 BNK. P. 216.

group, whereas the all-transcendence (*sarvottamatva*) of *Brahman* has been revealed without referring to or comparing with any other principle. Thus, the purport of the *sūtra* is that *bhūman* refers to *Brahman* only because of the teaching (by *Chāndogyopaniṣad*) that (i) He who is *Bhūman* is bliss[1] and that (ii) He transcends all other principles.

The next *sūtra* adduces another reason to establish that the term *Bhūman* refers to *Brahman* only.

॥ ॐ धर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ **(1-3-9)**

भूमा ब्रह्मैव सर्वगतत्वादितद्धर्माणामुपपत्तेश्च ।

The term *Bhūman* conveys the Supreme Being only because the characteristics like omnipresence told (in Chānd. Up.), suit Him only.

Chāndogyopaniṣad describes further some characteristic properties like omnipresence[2] etc. for *Bhūman*. Since these properties are befitting for *Brahman* only, the term *Bhūman* refers to *Brahman*.

3 अक्षराधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः ॐ ॥ **(1-3-10)**

अक्षरं तत्तु ब्रह्मैव अम्बरान्तधृतेः आकाशाख्यचित्प्रकृत्यन्तस्य धारणात् ।

The term *Akṣara* (mentioned in Bṛha. Up. 3-8-8) refers to *Brahman* only because it is said to be the support of everything upto and including *Ākāśa* signifying *Cit-Prakṛti*.

The topic under discussion here is a conversation between *Ṛṣi* Yajnavalkya and Gārgī mentioned in the eighth section of third chapter of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. Gārgī fires two questions to

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1. यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति । (Chānd. Up. 7-23-1).
2. स एवाधस्तात् स उपरिष्टात् ----- । (Chānd. Up. 7-25).

Yājñavalkya. The first[1] is "by what is that pervaded which is above heaven and below the earth, which is this heaven and earth as well as between them, and which they say was, is and will be?" The *Ṛṣi* answers[2] as, "that is pervaded by the empty space *Ākāśa*". Then she asks the second question: "By what is the *Ākāśa* pervaded"?[3] The *Ṛṣi* replies[4]: "The knowers of *Brahman* express that this Imperishable (*akṣaraṁ*) indeed is that". Then Yājñavalkya unfolds a series of characteristic marks of that Imperishable in enigmatic terms like neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, unseen but seeing etc. Literally the word *akṣara*[5] means imperishable and it is found used in scriptures to denote (i) a syllable (ii) *jaḍa-prakṛti* (iii) *Cit-prakṛti* as well as (iv) *Brahman*. Hence the question arises as to what is referred to by the term *Akṣara* in Yājñavalkya's reply cited above, which is said to have pervaded the empty space occupied by the Earth, the Heaven, between the two and beyond the two and which is described by the said series of enigmatic epithets. This sūtra avers that *Akṣara* mentioned in the present discourse (between Yājñavalkya and Gārgī) refers to the Supreme *Brahman*, because it sustains everything from the Earth to the sky, i.e. entire cosmos (*ambarāntadhrateḥ*).

There is no difference of opinion among the commentators about the purport of this *sūtra*, but they differ in their method of explanation and in the assumption of *Pūrvapakṣa*.

Śaṅkarācārya considers the doubt whether the term '*akṣara*' here conveys a syllable or *Brahman*. His objector (*Pūrvapakṣin*) argues that *akṣara* popularly denotes a syllable and this fact cannot be ignored. Moreover, he says, another *Upaniṣad* tells

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1 यदूर्ध्वं दिवः यदवाक् पृथिव्याः यदन्तरा द्यावापृथिवी इमे यद्भूतं च भवच्च भविष्यच्चेत्याचक्षते कस्मिंस्तदोतं च प्रोतं च। (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-4).

2 आकाशे तदोतं च प्रोतं च। (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-4).

3 कस्मिन्नु खलु आकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च। (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-7).

4 एतद्वै तदक्षरं ब्राह्मणा अभिवदन्ति। (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-8).

5 न क्षरति इति अक्षरम् नित्यम् इत्यर्थः।

that, "all this is the syllable *Oṁ* only"[1] Śaṅkarācārya explains the *siddhānta* that *Akṣara* conveys Brahman (the Supreme Being) only because It Supports the entire universe of effects, from the earth to the sky[2]. *Oṁ* is a symbol of *Brahman* to aid meditation on *Brahman*, and in order to emphasize its importance it is told that, "all this is the syllable Oṁ only"[3]. *Akṣara* in the sense of being imperishable (*na kṣarati*) and all-pervading (*aśnute*) conveys the Supreme *Brahman* only.

The claim of the syllable *Oṁ* to the status of *Brahman* is very weak because the syllables are by nature insentient things whereas the *Akṣara* here is described as seer etc. which are characteristics of a sentient being.

Rāmānujācārya considers the claim of *Jaḍa-Prakṛti* and the individual soul. His *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that it is *Jaḍa-Prakṛti* i.e. *Pradhāna* which is referred to here, because Scriptures also refer to *Pradhāna* as *Akṣara*. *Pradhāna* is the cause of *Ākāśa*. The *Ākāśa* which is said to be the support of everything of the past, present and future is the unmanifest *Pradhāna* or *Avyākṛta-Ākāśa* and not mere ether. The *Śruti* tells that this unmanifest *Ākāśa* is woven like warp and woof (i.e. supported), by *Akṣara*. Therefore, Rāmānujācārya contends that the *Akṣara* here cannot be the *Pradhāna*, for *Pradhāna* cannot be its own support[4]. Moreover, *Pradhāna* being insentient principle cannot see, hear, and so on. "The description of *Akṣara* as that which sees, hears, and so on, excludes *Pradhāna* and the descriptions of *Akṣara* as seeing all while remaining unperceived by others excludes *Jīvātman*. So, the conclusion is that *Akṣara* is *Brahman*"[5].

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1 ॐकार एवेदं सर्वम्। (Chānd. Up. 2-23-3).

2 पृथिव्यादेराकाशान्तस्य विकारजातस्य धारणात्। (Ś. BSB. 1-3-10).

3 यदपि ॐकार एवेदं सर्वम् इति तदपि ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिसाधनत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थं द्रष्टव्यम्। (Ś. BSB. 1-3-10).

4 Śrībhāṣya - SV 1-3-9.

5 HNK- I. p. 235.

Madhvācārya considers the claim of *Cit-Prakṛti*, the presiding deity of *Jada-Prakṛti*, which is known as the Śrī-*tattva*. The doubt is whether the term *Akṣara* here refers to *Brahman* or *Cit-Prakṛti* (*Śrītattva*) because the scriptures describe both as *akṣara* i.e. imperishable. Since the *Akṣara* is characterized here as the seer, hearer and so on, the *Jada-Prakṛti* or *Omkāra* have no room in the doubt[1]. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that *Akṣara* here refers to *Śrītattva*, because *Śrītattva* is popularly known and described by the term *akṣara*[2]. Moreover, in the same context of *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad* (3-8-9) it is told that the sun and the moon are held up in their positions by the *Akṣara* [3]. From *Vāgāmbhranī Sūkta*[4] (*Ṛgveda* 10-125-2) we know that it is the *Śrītattva* which supports the sun, the moon and all other lesser deities. The characteristics of incomprehensibility (*adṛśyatva*) etc. mentioned here for *Akṣara*, have been told for the *Cit-Prakṛti* i.e. *Śrītattva* in *Bhagvadgītā* (12-3)[5]. Moreover, the *Śruti* tells that It (*Akṣara*) does not eat anything, nor is It eaten by anybody[6]. But we have already seen in an earlier *sūtra* that *Brahman* is the devourer of the entire moveable and immovable world[7]. *Cit-Prakṛti* has nowhere been described as the eater of anything. So there is no objection in accepting *Cit-Prakṛti* as non-eater[8]. Hence the term *Akṣara* must be connoting here *Cit-Prakṛti* only and not *Brahman*. Thus, the *Pūrvapakṣin* comes up with a very strong argument in favour of *Cit-Prakṛti*.

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1 तदक्षरं विषयः। किं विष्णुरुत चेतनप्रकृतिरिति सन्देहः। उक्तसाधारण्यं च सन्देहबीजम्। द्रष्टृत्वादिश्रवणाज्जडप्रकृतिरोंकारस्य च न सन्देहनिविष्टत्वम्। (TP. 1-3-10).

2 तत्र अक्षरशब्दस्य प्रसिद्धेः। (TP. 1-3-10).

3 एतस्य वाऽक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः इत्यादिना अक्षरस्य चन्द्रसूर्याद्याधारत्वप्रतीतेश्च। (TP. 1-3-10).

4 अहं सोममाहनसं विभर्म्यहम्त्वष्टारमुतपूषणं भगम्। (RV. 10-125-2).

5 अदृश्यत्वादिगुणानां मध्यमाक्षरेऽपि सम्भवात्। तथा च स्मृतिः। "ये त्वक्षरमनिर्देश्यमव्यक्तं पर्युपासते। सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यं च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम्" इत्यादि। (TP. 1-3-10).

6 न तदश्नाति किञ्चन न तदश्नाति कश्चन। (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-8).

7 अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात्। (BS. 1-2-9).

8 न च मध्यमाक्षरस्यानशनाङ्गीकारे विरोधोऽस्ति। (TP. 1-3-10).

This *sūtra* refutes the above argument and establishes the conclusion that the term *Akṣara* in the present discourse conveys *Brahman* only. Yājñavalkya first tells that it is *ākāśa*[1], the empty space (*avyākṛta ākāśa*) which pervades the heaven, the earth, between the two and beyond the two and which is said as was, is and will be. (This *avyākṛta ākāśa* denotes *Cit-Prakṛti*). Having told thus, he further says that this *ākāśa* itself is pervaded like warp and woof by *Akṣara*. Thus, because this *Akṣara* pervades i.e. supports everything from this earth to *ākāśa* (*Cit-Prakṛti*), including *ākāśa*, (*ambarāntadhṛteḥ*), *Akṣara* connotes here *Brahman* only.

Akṣara conveys *Brahman* only on account of another reason too, being given by the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ सा च प्रशासनात् ॐ ॥ (1-3-11)

उच्यत इति शेषः। सा अम्बरान्तधृतिः च प्रशासनात् अक्षरस्य आज्ञामात्रात् उच्यते।

The term '*ucyate*' is supplied to complete the construction. **That support to everything from this earth to *Ākāśa* is also told to be through the supreme command of this *Akṣara*.**

Śāsana means command. *Praśāsana* conveys Supreme Command. The *Sūtrakāra* explains that *Brahman*'s support to everything from this earth to *ākāśa* i.e. *ambarāntadhṛti* should be understood not as *Akṣara* directly and literally supporting everything, but as everything having its support by the Supreme Command of this *Akṣara*. This refers to the next *mantra* in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* that "under the Supreme Command of this *Akṣara*, O Gārgi, the sun and moon are held in their positions,

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1 आकाश एव तदोतं च प्रोतं च इत्याकाशाख्यप्रकृतेः सर्वाधारत्वमुक्त्वा एतस्मिन्खल्वक्षरे गार्ग्याकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च इत्यक्षरस्य तदाधारत्व श्रवणादित्यर्थः। (TP. 1-3-10).

heaven and earth maintain their positions, and so on"[1]. Hence, this *Akṣara* connotes *Brahman* only.

The *Sūtrakāra* adduces another reason for accepting *Akṣara* as *Brahman*, in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ (1-3-12)

अन्येषां वस्तूनां भावानां अन्योन्यव्यावर्तकानां स्थौल्यादिधर्माणाम् अक्षरे व्यावृत्त्युक्तेश्च अक्षरं ब्रह्मैव ।

The *Akṣara* connotes *Brahman* only on account of the exclusion of *mutually exclusive* attributes like grossness etc. observed in the other ordinary things in nature, from that *Akṣara*.

Yājñavalkya describes, "This *Akṣara* is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long etc. It does not eat anything nor is It eaten by anyone"[2]. These attributes like grossness and minuteness etc. mentioned here, belong to the objects experienced in nature and they are found in mutual exclusion. These attributes are collectively described in the *sūtra* by the term *anyabhāva*. As interpreted by Madhvācārya, this *sūtra* asserts that "The *Akṣara* connotes *Brahman* only on account of the exclusion of mutually exclusive attributes found in nature (*anyabhāvavyāvṛtteḥ*) from that *Akṣara*". The *Sutrakāra* does not directly state as "on account of exclusion of grossness etc. (*sthoulyādivyāvṛtteḥ*)". Had he directly excluded from *Akṣara* all conceivable characteristics (as *Akṣara* is neither gross nor minute etc.), then it would have reduced *Akṣara* i.e. *Brahman* to a blank or zero or something devoid of any qualities (*nirguṇa*), as some people believe. By

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1 एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः ----- द्यावापृथिव्यौ विधृते तिष्ठतः ----- । (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-9).

2 --- अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम् --- न तदश्नाति किञ्चन । न तदश्नाति कश्चन । (Bṛha. Up. 3-88).

excluding from *Brahman*, only the characteristics, which the limited human intelligence can conceive in nature (*prākṛtaguṇāḥ*), the *Sūtrakāra* indicates[1] that *Brahman*, though devoid of characteristics found in nature (hence *nirguṇa*), can still possess innumerable trans-empirical characteristics (hence *saguṇa*) in which even the otherwise mutually exclusive characteristics can co-exist. This is exactly what the *Śruti* tries to drive at when it says that "*Brahman* is subtler than the subtle and bigger than the big[2]". The statement about *Akṣara* 'not eating anything' is to be understood in the sense that the Supreme *Brahman* has no necessity of eating anything to sustain itself like other creatures[3]. The purport of the *sūtra* is that such exclusion of characteristics observed in nature, mentioned with reference to *Akṣara*, will not suit anyone except *Brahman* [4].

Śaṅkarācārya has taken *anyabhāvavyāvṛtti* as exclusion of other alternatives. He has interpreted the *sūtra* as asserting that "The Imperishable cannot be the *Pradhāna* for the *Akṣara* is said to be the seeing, hearing and perceiving which *Pradhāna* is not capable of'[5].

Rāmānujācārya has interpreted the *sūtra* on similar lines. According to him[6]; "The insentient *Pradhāna* is excluded because the text says that the *Akṣara* is an intelligent principle inasmuch as it is a seer, hearer etc. The individual self is excluded, as the *Akṣara* is all-seeing but never seen etc. Therefore, this exclusion in *Akṣara*, of what has a nature other than that of *Brahman*, confirms the view that It is *Brahman*".

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1 स्थौल्यादीति वाच्ये अन्यभावेत्युक्तिः स्थौल्यादिहीनमक्षरं ब्रह्म चेत् निःस्वभावं स्यादिति न शङ्क्यम्। अन्यवस्तुस्वभावस्य प्राकृतस्यैव स्थौल्यादेर्व्यावृत्त्युक्तेरिति सूचयितुम्। (TDK 1-3-12).

2 अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान् ----- । (Kaṭha. Up. 1-2-20).

3 न तदश्नाति किञ्चन इत्येतदपि जीवस्वभावभूतोपजीवनार्थाशनव्यावृत्त्यर्थमिति सूचितम् भवति। (TP 1-3-12) (BNK I. p. 230).

4 न हि तादृशं निरपेक्षं स्थौल्यादिराहित्यम् अन्यस्य युज्यत इति भावः। (TDK 1-3-12).

5 SRK. p. 291.

6 Śrī-bhāṣya- SV 1-3-11.

Madhvācārya's interpretation seems more ingenious and convincing than the other two. Repeated references to *Pradhāna* appear superfluous.

4 सदधिकरणम्

॥ ॐ ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः ॐ ॥ (1-3-13)

सः परमात्मा ---- ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्।

As mentioned twice earlier (BS. 1-1-5 and 1-2-1) a *Brahmasūtra* is normally expected to have an assertion (*pratijñā*) and a probans (*hetu*) to prove that assertion. In case of a *sūtra* in an *Adhikaraṇa*, where there is no assertion and the *sūtra* contains only a probans, then it is expected to be a supplementary probans for the assertion in the immediately preceding *sūtra* or in the first main *sūtra* of that *Adhikaraṇa*.

This *sūtra* 1-3-13, now under discussion, has been treated as an independent *Adhikaraṇa* by all the well-known commentators. The *sūtra* contains a compound word in ablative '*īkṣatikarmavyapadeśāt*', which can be treated as a probans. The other word left in the *sūtra* is the pronoun '*saḥ*' obviously standing for the *Paramātman*, the Supreme Being, since we are discussing Him only throughout this *Adhyāya*. This word alone cannot indicate any definite assertion. As a result, wide variations are observed in the assertions assumed by various commentators.

According to Śaṅkarācārya the interpretation of this *sūtra* is that, "on account of the mention as the object of seeing, he (is the highest self)". He considers a *mantra* from *Praśnopaniṣad* as the topic under discussion (*viṣayavākya*) for this *sūtra*. The *mantra* states that "he who meditates on this Highest Self with the aid of the syllable *Oṁ*, with all its three constituent elements (*mātrās*), merges with the Sun consisting of light. As a snake becomes freed

from its slough, in the same way he becomes freed from sins and he is lifted up to the world of *Brahmā* (*Hiraṇyagarbha*) by the *Sāmamantras*. From this total mass of creatures (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha), he sees the *Puruṣa* who abides in (everyone's) body and who is superior to the higher one (viz. *Hiraṇyagarbha*)''[1]. A doubt arises here as whether the Self to be meditated upon is the Supreme Brahman i.e. *Nirviśeṣa Brahman* or the four-faced *Brahmā*. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that since the meditator is led to *Brahma-loka*, the object of meditation could be the limited (*apara*) Brahmā only. The *Siddhāntapakṣin* states that the object of meditation here has to be the Supreme (*para*) *Brahman*, because the *Upaniṣad* further says that "he (meditator) sees (*īkṣate*) the Person who dwells in the body, the One who is higher than the highest concentration of life (*jīvaghanāt*)"[2] The *sūtra* under discussion corroborates this Siddhānta view that the object of meditation here is the Supreme Self since it is mentioned as the object of seeing (realizing).

Rāmānujācārya has split[3] the word *īkṣatikarmavyapadeśāt* into two words, *īkṣatikarma* and *vyapadeśāt*. He treats "*īkṣatikarma saḥ*" as the assertion (*pratijñā*) and '*vyapadeśāt*' as the reason (*hetu*). Then the word *vyapadeśāt* becomes ambiguous and needs another word like '*Paramātmatvena*' to make it meaningful. Thus, the purport of the *sūtra*, according to Rāmānujācārya is that "the object of meditation (*īkṣatikarma*) is Supreme *Brahman* and not *Hiraṇyagarbha* (*Brahmā*) because it is later mentioned (*vyapadeśāt*) as the *Paramātman*"[4]. V. S. Ghate says that if the *sūtra* is to be understood this way, then it should have been in

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1 यः पुनरेतं त्रिमात्रेणोमित्येतेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमध्यायीत स तेजसि सूर्ये संपन्नः। यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्तः स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकं स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते। (Praśna. Up. 5-5).

2 एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषम् ईक्षते। (Praśna. Up. 5-5), BNK I p. 238.

3 ईक्षतिकर्म सः परमात्मा। कुतः व्यपदेशात्। व्यपदिश्यते हि ईक्षतिकर्म परमात्मत्वेन। (Śrībhāṣya 1-3-12), BNK I. p. 239.

4 VSG. p. 60.

the form "*īkṣatikarma sa vyapadeśāt*"[1]. B. N. K. Sharma also holds the view that such a reason (*hetu*), which needs another word to make it meaningful, is not in keeping with the normal practice of the Sūtrakāra[2].

Madhvācārya assumes as *viṣayavākyas* a number of sentences pertaining to the creation of the world, such as those in which the word '*sat*' occurs. They are[3]: (i) In the beginning, dear boy, there was only the *sat*, without a second. (ii) All these beings have *sat* for their source, *sat* as their abode, *sat* as their support. (iii) All these beings having come from *sat*, do not know that "we have come from *sat*".

The doubt envisaged here is whether this '*sat*' refers to *Pradhāna* (*Jaḍaprakṛti*) or *Brahman*. The *sūtra* decides, according to Madhvācārya, that since the act of thinking[4] (*īkṣati*) and of creating[5] (*karma*) have been attributed (*vyapadeśāt*) to *sat*, *sat* refers to *Brahman*[6] (which is considered as a sentient principle) and it cannot convey the insentient *Pradhāna*.

No doubt from the standpoint of the commentators, regarding the purport of this *sūtra*, these erudite comments are indisputable. However, I fail to see any clear indication in the wording of the *sūtra* to suggest that the purpose of the *sūtra* is to decide either the object of meditation with the aid of the syllable *Oṁ*, or the referent of '*sat*' used in some ontological statements. There is no clear and independent purpose mentioned in the *sūtra*. As per *Pūrvamīmāṁsā śāstra* if an injunction is without a clear purpose

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1 VSG. p. 60.

2 BNK, I. p. 239.

3 (i) सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । (Chānd. Up. 6-2-1).
(ii) सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः। (Chānd. Up. 6-8-6).
(iii) इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सत आगम्य न विदुः सत आगच्छामह इति। (Chānd. Up. 6-10-2)

4 तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्राजायेयेति। (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3)

5 Same as above (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3).

6 "सदेव सोम्य" इत्यादौ श्रुतं सत् स एव विष्णुरेव। न प्रधानम्। ईक्षतिरूपं च तत्कर्म च तस्य व्यपदेशात् "तदैक्षत" इतीक्षणाख्य व्यापारोक्तेर्जडे तदयोगादित्यर्थः। (TDK 1-3-13).

(*prayojana / phala*) then it should be treated as a part of nearby injunction having clear purpose[1]. Similarly, there should be no objection if this *sūtra* 1-3-13 is considered as a part of the preceding *Akṣarādhikaraṇa* on the evidence of the *sūtra*'s position[2] (*sthāna*). Then, the interpretation becomes straightforward and easy as follows

Continuing (*anuvṛtti*) the term *Akṣara* from *sūtra* 1-3-10 and *tu*[3] from 1-1-4, the *sūtra-vṛtti* becomes, सः (परमात्मा) तु अक्षरः ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्। That *Pramātman*, the Supreme Being only is *Akṣara*, since the act of seeing (thinking) is ascribed to *Akṣara*. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* states[4] that this *Akṣara* is the seer and that there is no other (independent) seer than this. This act of seeing or thinking can be attributed to a sentient Being like *Brahman* and not to *Jaḍaprakṛti*. This sūtra 1-3-13, if interpreted this way, serves as another reason (*hetu*) for the conclusion established by *sūtra* 1-3-10. If someone has an objection that the conjunctive particle '*ca*' is missing, it can be taken from the earlier *sūtra* 1-3-12.

Now the question arises as to which one of these interpretations can be considered as more acceptable. The wording of the *sūtra* does not appear to indicate that the *sūtra* talks about and decides the object of meditation, as interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya. The last interpretation, suggested by me, which considers the *sūtra* as part of the preceding *Akṣarādhikaraṇa* may appear technically correct, but it tells the same thing which has been amply proved earlier and therefore adds little to the understanding of the reader.

Though the *sūtra* does not contain the word '*sat* ', Madhvācārya, however, thinks that the *sūtra* should be interpreted as follows :

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1 फलवत्संनिधौ अफलं तदङ्गम्। (PMS. 4-4-4).

2 श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यम् अर्थविप्रकर्षात्। (PMS. 3-3-14).

3 तु इत्यनेन तत्त्विति तुरन्वेति। (TDK 1-3-13).

4 एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यदृष्टं द्रष्टृ -------- नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ। (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-11).

'सदेव सोम्य' इत्यादौ श्रुतं सत् सः अक्षरः (परमात्मा) एव ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् ईक्षणसृष्टिक्रिययोः व्यपदेशात्।

The word *sat* occurring in various contexts of *Śruti* such as '*sadeva somya*' etc. refers to the Imperishable Supreme Being only, because the acts of thinking (*īkṣaṇa*) and creating (*sṛṣṭikriyā*) have been ascribed to *sat*.

It can easily be seen that, so far, in each *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* has considered a debatable topic in *Vedānta*, originally discussed in some well-known scriptural text, taking a key-word used in the text repeatedly, and has given his decision in the matter, thereby revealing certain attribute of the Supreme Being. For example, in *Akṣarādhikaraṇa*, the key-word is '*Akṣara*' and the topic refers to the nature of the Supreme Being, discussed in a conversation between Yajñavalkya and Gārgī, in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (chapter III, Section VIII), in which the key-word '*Akṣara*' has been repeatedly used.

In *Chāndogyopaniṣad* there are, in all, eight chapters. The first five of these mainly talk about various rituals and the remaining three discuss metaphysical topics. In chapter VI, there is a conversation between Uddālaka and his son Śvetaketu about the nature of the Supreme Being. This is a very important and popular chapter, in which the father tells the son repeatedly the oft-quoted and oft-debated sentences: तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि।

In chapter VII, there is a conversation between Sanatkumāra and Nārada about the nature of the Supreme Being and the key-word used is "*Bhūmā*". In chapter VIII, there is a conversation between Prajāpati and his disciple about the nature of *Brahman*, as the one that dwells in the tiny space, '*Dahara*', in the heart of a living being. The key-word in this discussion is *dahara*. These three conversations are quite independent of each other.

Now, having covered the topic of chapter VII in '*Bhūmādhikaraṇa*' and the topic of chapter VIII in

'*Daharādhikaraṇa*' the Sūtrakāra is not expected to overlook or miss the most important topic of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* in chapter VI, wherein the key-word used for *Brahman* is '*sat*'. Therefore, possibly Madhvācārya might have guessed that the key-word at the back of Sūtrakāra's mind while composing this *sūtra*, in the vicinity of *Bhūmādhikaraṇa* and *Daharādhikaraṇa*, could be '*sat*', on the strength of the positioning (*sthāna*)[1] of the *sūtra*. Thus, if Madhvācārya's interpretation is accepted, then the *sūtra* becomes more meaningful.

5 दहराधिकरणम् ।

In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* confirms the Vedic concept that the Supreme Being dwells in the heart of every living being. In *sūtra* 1-2-18 earlier also, the author has established that the Supreme Being is the indwelling controller in everyone. The main *sūtra* here is:

॥ ॐ दहर उत्तरेभ्यः ॐ ॥ **(1-3-14)**

By and large all the commentators agree on the purport of this *Adhikaraṇa* though there are some variations in reading the wording of the *sūtra*.

The word *dahara* means small or tiny and is an adjective. But the term *daharaḥ* is a noun meaning a tiny cavity in the heart of a living being. In this *sūtra*, the term *dahara* is followed by a vowel. Hence, it can be taken either as *daharaḥ*[2] or as *dahare*[3].

Śaṅkarācārya reads the word as *daharaḥ* and interprets the *sūtra* thus[4]:"The small space in the heart is *Brahman*, but not elemental ether (*bhūtākāśa*) or individual soul (*Jīva*), on account

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1 श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यम् अर्थविप्रकर्षात् । (PMS. 3-3-14).

2 भोभगोअघोअपूर्वस्य योऽशि । (Pāṇini 8-3-17), लोपः शाकल्यस्य । (Pāṇini 8-3-79).

3 एचोऽयवायावः । (Pāṇini 6-1-78), लोपः शाकल्यस्य । (Pāṇini 8-3-79).

4 परमेश्वर एवात्र दहराकाशो भवितुमर्हति न भूताकाशो जीवो वा । कस्मात् । उत्तरेभ्यो वाक्यशेषगतेभ्यो हेतुभ्यः । (S. BSB. 1-3-14).

of what follows". The topic under discussion (*viṣayavākya*) here is a passage from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* [1] namely: "Now, in this city of *Brahman*, there is a mansion in the shape of a small lotus; in it is a small space (*ākāśa*). What is within that is to be sought; that indeed, one should desire to understand". The doubt[2] here, according to Śaṅkarācārya, is whether the small space in the heart refers to the elemental space (*bhūtākāśa*) or the individual soul (*Jīva*) or *Brahman*. Therefore, he says, the *sūtra* decides that *daharaḥ* refers to *Brahman* but not to others because it has been asked to be searched and understood, and in later passages it is said to be as large as the outer ether, the support of heaven and earth etc. and is free from sin etc. These qualities cannot apply to the elemental *ākāśa* or *Jīva*.

Rāmānujācārya also has interpreted the *sūtra* on the same line. However, the reading as '*daharaḥ*' by these commentators and their conclusion that the small space in the heart itself is *Brahman* is not in keeping with the wording of the statement from *Chandogyopaniṣad* under discussion (*viṣayavākya*). The *Upaniṣad* clearly states[3] that, "There is a mansion in the shape of a small lotus. In it is a small space. What is **WITHIN THAT** is to be sought". The *Bhāmatī* has tried to defend Śaṅkarācārya's reading by arguing that the pronoun '*tasmin*' refers not to the immediately preceding word *ākāśaḥ* but to the remotely preceding word '*hṛtpuṇḍarika*'[4]. B. N. K. Sharma counter-argues that in that case, instead of the pronouns '*yad*' and '*tad*' in the *viṣayavākya*, we should expect to find their masculine forms '*yaḥ*' and '*saḥ*' with

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1 अथ यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यं तद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यमिति। (Chānd. Up. 8-1-1).

2 तत्र योऽयं दहरे हृदयपुण्डरीके दहर आकाशः श्रुतः स किं भूताकाशोऽथवा विज्ञानात्माथवा परमात्मेति संशय्यते। (Ś. BSB. 1-3-14).

3 दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म। दहरः अस्मिन् अन्तराकाशः। तस्मिन् यत् अन्तः तत् अन्वेष्टव्यम्।
(Chānd. Up. 8-1-1).

4 तस्मिन्यदन्तः इत्यत्र तच्छब्दो अनन्तरमप्याकाशमतिलङ्घ्य हृत्पुण्डरीकम्परामृशति।
(Bhāmatī 1-3-14, BNK I. p. 245).

reference to the word *daharaḥ* [1]. Therefore, Madhvācārya rightly reads the term *dahara* in the *sūtra* as *dahare*. Then, the interpretation of the *sūtra* would be as follows :

त्त्वित्यस्ति । द्युभ्वाद्यायतनमिति मण्डूकप्लुत्याऽन्वेति । पूर्वस्मात् सदिति च ।
द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं सत् दहरे हृत्पद्मे तत्तु ब्रह्मैव उत्तरवाक्यस्थापहतपाप्मादिधर्मेभ्यः ।

The words '*tat tu*' are continued. The term '*dyubhvādyāyatanaṁ*' is continued from *sūtra* 1-3-7 skipping over the intermediate *sūtras*. The word '*sat*' is also continued from the preceding *sūtra*. **What is inside the tiny space in the heart is *Brahman* only, the support of heaven and earth etc. on account of the characteristics like freedom from sin etc. mentioned in the following sentences.**

The *sūtra* contends that what dwells inside the small space in the heart of a being is *Brahman*, described as the support of heaven and earth etc. and not the elemental ether or *Jīva*, because the same entity is later described as free from sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, thirst and so on[2]. These characteristics cannot apply to the elemental ether or individual soul.

The *Sūtrakāra* offers some more reasons in the next *sūtra*, to vindicate the concept that *Brahman* dwells in the heart of every being. The same *Chāndogyopaniṣad* further tells[3] that, "all these creatures here, though they daily go into the realm of *Brahman* (in their heart, during deep sleep), yet do not find it. Hence the next sūtra asserts as shown herebelow.

॥ ॐ गतिशब्दाभ्यां तथा हि दृष्टं लिङ्गं च ॐ ॥

(1-3-15)

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1 BNK I. p. 245.

2 य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघित्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः ------ ।(Chānd. Up. 8-7-1).

3 इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः अहरहर्गच्छन्त्य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति----- । (Chānd. Up. 8-3-2).

दहरे तत्त्वित्यस्ति। गतिः सुप्तप्राप्तिः। शब्दो ब्रह्मशब्दः। दहरे तत्तु ब्रह्मैव सुप्तगम्यत्वलिङ्गब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यां च। तथा हि अन्यश्रुतौ च सुधासमुद्राश्रयत्वलिङ्गं हृत्पद्मस्थगं दृष्टम्।

The words '*dahare*', '*tat tu*' are continued. The word '*gati*' stands for the repose obtained during deep sleep. *Śabda* stands for the 'word *Brahman*'. **On account of the mention of the characteristic of being the daily repose and the use of the word *Brahman* (in *Brahmaloka*), what dwells in the tiny cavity of the heart is *Brahman* only. Similarly, it is seen indeed in other *Śrutis* also that the One dwelling in the heart-lotus has the characteristic of dwelling in a world having oceans of ambrosia.**

Having introduced the concept in *mantra* 8-1-1, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* further describes[1] the entity in the heart-lotus as the supporter of all these worlds. This attribute applies to *Brahman* only. Secondly, in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* also there is a parallel statement[2] which tells that "He who lies in the ether that is within the heart is the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all is the protector of all these worlds". Hence the *Sūtrakāra* adduces two more reasons in the next *sūtra* in support of the proposition that *Brahman* dwells in the heart-lotus of every being.

॥ ॐ धृतेश्च महिम्नोऽस्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः ॐ ॥

(1-3-16)

धृतिपदेन धृतियुक्तं वाक्यं गृह्यते। च शब्द उपलब्धेश्चेत्यन्वेति। दहरे ब्रह्मैव धृतेः 'एष सेतुर्विधारण' इति धृतिप्रतिपादकवाक्यात् अस्य ब्रह्मणः महिम्नः अस्मिन् हृत्पद्मस्थे बृहदारण्यकेपि उपलब्धेश्च।

From the term '*dhṛti*', a sentence having the word *dhṛti* is to be understood. '*Ca*' is taken in the sense of '*upalabdheśca*'.

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1 अथ य आत्मा स सेतुर्विधृतिरेषां लोकानामसंभेदाय। (Chānd. Up. 8-4-1).

2 य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः सर्वस्याधिपतिः ॥ऋ एष सेतुर्विधारण एषां लोकानामसंभेदाय। (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-22).

What lies in the heart-lotus is *Brahman* only, on account of (i) the distinctive attribute of being the protector of all these worlds and (ii) the *Brahman*'s glory found attributed to what lies in the heart-lotus, in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* too.

The next *sūtra* provides another reason for holding that *Brahman* dwells in the heart-lotus of all beings.

॥ ॐ प्रसिद्धेश्च ॐ ॥　　**(1-3-17)**

दहरं ब्रह्मैव "दहरं विपाप्मम्" इत्यादितैत्तिरीये ब्रह्मणः हृत्पद्मस्थत्वप्रसिद्धेः च ।

What lies in the tiny cavity of heart is *Brahman* only because the concept of *Brahman* dwelling in the heart-lotus is well established in *Śruti* texts like '*daharaṁ vipāpmaṁ*' etc. in *Taittirīya Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*.

As an example, Madhvācārya quotes a *mantra*[1] from *Nārāyaṇopaniṣad* of *Taittirīya Śākhā*. It says that; "In the midst of the heart-city there is a small lotus free from sin. It is the abode of the Supreme Being. In that is a tiny space. The one, who is free from sins, free from sorrow and dwells in that (tiny space) should be meditated upon". Thus, the concept of the Supreme Being abiding in the heart-lotus is quite well-known.

When *Chāndogyopaniṣad* addresses the entity dwelling in the heart-lotus as *Ātman* and also addresses the liberated individual soul as *Ātman* and *Brahman*, why should we not consider that, what dwells in the heart is *Jīva*? The next *sūtra* answers this question.

॥ ॐ इतरपरामर्शात्स इति चेन्नासम्भवात् ॐ ॥
(1-3-18)

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1. दहरं विपाप्मं परवेश्म भूतं यत् पुण्डरीकं पुरमध्यसंस्थम् तत्रापि दहरं गगनं विशोकः तस्मिन् यदन्तस्तदुपासितव्यम् ॥ (M. BSB. 1-3-17).

Chāndogyopaniṣad first asks[1] us to investigate and understand that which dwells inside the tiny space in the heart of a being. It addresses[2] the entity as '*Ātman*' and describes the same as free from sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, thirst and so on. Further, the *Upaniṣad* tells what happens when an embodied individual soul gets liberated or emancipated. It says[3] that 'this (individual soul), having obtained the grace of the Supreme Being, rises out of this body, reaches the effulgent Supreme Being and appears (and remains) in its own original (bodiless) form. This individual soul too has been addressed[4] by the *Upaniṣad* as *Ātman* and *Brahman*. The *Upaniṣad* says, "he who moves about adored in dreams, is the *Ātman*. He is the immortal, the fearless. He is *Brahman*". Therefore, someone may argue that since the individual soul is referred to here as *Ātman* and the entity dwelling in the tiny space in the heart of a being has also been referred to as *Ātman*, what dwells in the tiny space in the heart is the individual soul. This *sūtra* refutes such a contention.

इतरस्य जीवस्य हृत्पद्मस्थात्मपदेन परामर्शात् दहरे सः जीवः इति चेत् न अपहतपाप्मत्वादिधर्माणाम् अमृतत्वादेश्च जीवे असम्भवात्।

If it is said that, since the individual soul, which is other than the Supreme Being, is referred to by the word *Ātman*, which word was earlier referred to the entity dwelling in the heart-lotus, it is the individual soul that dwells in the tiny space in the heart, (we say) it is not so, because it is impossible to have the characteristics of being free from sin etc. and of immortality etc. in individual souls.

The entity dwelling in the tiny space inside heart-lotus has been earlier described as free from sin, old age, death, hunger,

1 Chānd. Up. 8-1-1. (Footnote under BS. 1-3-14).

2 Chānd. Up. 8-7-1. (Footnote under BS. 1-3-14).

3 एष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते -----। (Chānd. Up. 8-12-3).

4 य एष स्वप्ने महीयमानश्चरत्येष आत्मेति होवाचैतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्मेति-- । (Chānd. Up. 8-10-1).

thirst etc. It is impossible to attribute these characteristics to the individual soul. A liberated individual soul may acquire such attributes. Therefore, if someone argues[1] that since it is possible for a liberated individual soul to acquire these attributes, the individual soul only is said to dwell in the heart-lotus in view of its future liberated status, it is not tenable because even for the liberated individual soul it is impossible to acquire such attributes independent of the grace of the Supreme Being.

It may be with the grace of the Supreme Being, but when it is possible for the *Jīva* to acquire freedom from sin, oldage etc., as seen from the later description then why should we not consider that it is the *Jīva* dwelling in the heart-lotus which is asked to be investigated and understood? The next *sūtra* answers this question.

॥ ॐ उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु ॐ ॥ **(1-3-19)**

व। स इति दहर इति च अस्ति। नेति शेषः। 'स तत्र पर्यैति' इति रवाक्यात् दहरे सः जीव इति चेत् न तत्र आविर्भूतस्वरूपः मुक्तः देहरहितः उच्यते।

'*Tu*' here means 'only'. The words '*saḥ*' and '*dahare*' are continued. '*Na*' is supplied to complete the construction. **If it be said that the individual soul only dwells in the heart-lotus on account of (the description in) the subsequent sentence 'there he moves about' etc., it is not so, because what is said in that sentence is about a liberated soul only appearing in its own original bodiless form.**

The objector insists that since the liberated individual soul has been described in the subsequent sentence[2] as moving about enjoying (eating), playing, rejoicing with women, vehicles or

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1. याच्यं मुक्तजीवे तत्सम्भवाज्जीव एव भाविभावेनोच्यते इति मुक्तस्याप्यस्वातन्त्र्येण तदसम्भवात्। (IP 1-3-18)
2. पर्यैति जक्षत्क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा नोपजनं स्मरन्निदं शरीरं। (Chānd. Up. 8-12-3).

relations, not remembering this body in which he was born etc., the characteristics of freedom from sin, old age, death, hunger, thirst etc. can be attributed to the liberated individual soul and hence that only is the one who dwells in the heart-lotus. This *sūtra* refutes this contention.

The idea is that we are discussing here about that which is free from sin, death etc. and dwells in the heart-lotus of a living being. It is impossible for an individual soul to be free from sin, death etc., while living with a body and a heart. When it (*jīva*) may acquire these attributes after liberation, it will have neither a body nor a heart. Here, the reader may have a genuine doubt that when a liberated soul has neither body nor any organs, how the *Upaniṣad* tells that the liberated soul moves about enjoying (eating), playing, rejoicing with women etc. How can the liberated souls be distinguished as male and female? Apparently, the statement looks contradictory. The Upaniṣadic Statements are not to be taken in their literal sense. In the statement under reference above, what the *Upaniṣad* tries to drive at is that the liberated soul remains in a state of absolute happiness. But the mundane audience cannot imagine happiness without reference to the sensual enjoyments. In their conception, a man is happy when he gets everything that he wants. Therefore, it is customary for religious books to use such a language as is done in the *Upaniṣad* above. Qur'an, the sacred book of Islam, expresses similar sentiments. It says[1] that, "the description of paradise which the pious persons have been promised is that in it are rivers of water, the taste and smell of which are not changed, rivers of milk of which the taste never changes; rivers of wine delicious to those who drink; and rivers of clarified honey; there in for them is every kind of fruit; and forgiveness from their Lord (Allāḥ)".

The persistent argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin* that it is the *Jīva* dwelling in the heart which is asked to be investigated, since it

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1 Qur'an. Sura (Chapter) 47, verse 15.

is later described as *Ātman* and *Brahman*, is refuted in the next *sutra* on another standpoint.

॥ ॐ अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः ॐ ॥ **(1-3-20)**

च एव। अन्यः अर्थः विषयः यस्य सः अन्यार्थः। एष आत्मा इति परामर्शः अन्यार्थः परमात्मविषयः एव न जीवविषयः।[1]

'*Ca*' here means 'only'. '*Anyārtha*' means that which has a different topic (under discussion). **The reference as "this *Ātman*" speaks about something else i.e. the Supreme Being only, and not about the individual soul.**

In *sūtra* 1-3-18 earlier, the objector (*Pūrvapakṣin*) had argued that, "it is the individual soul which dwells in the heart-lotus because it is referred to by the term *Ātman*". This was refuted by the *Sūtrakāra* by pointing out the impossibility of attributing the characteristics like freedom from sin, death etc. to an individual soul. Here in this sūtra, the *Sūtrakāra* takes a different stand to refute the same argument of the objector. The *sūtra*, as interpreted by Madhvācārya says that the reference as "this *Ātman*" speaks about something else i.e. the Supreme Being only, and not about the individual soul.

This *sūtra* is so laconic that it permits different interpretations. According to Śaṅkarācārya, the *sūtra* tells that[2] the reference to the individual soul has a different meaning, i.e. to make us aware of its real nature. Rāmānujācārya interprets thus[3]: "And the reference (to the individual soul) is for a different purpose".

However, the interpretation of Madhvācārya has been found to be in keeping with and supporting the central theme of this *Adhikaraṇa* that it is the Supreme Being who dwells in the tiny space in the heart-lotus of a living being, and not the individual soul.

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1 VKM. 1-3-20.
2 SRK 1-3-20.
3 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 1-3-19.

If one doubts how *Brahman* can exist in such a tiny space in the heart of a living being, then the next *sūtra* deals with this doubt.

॥ ॐ अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् ॐ ॥ (1-3-21)

न इति शेषः। अल्पस्थानस्य श्रवणात् दहरे सः न ब्रह्म इति चेत् न। तत् अल्पस्थानस्थत्वं निचाय्यत्वादित्यादिना उक्तम्।

The word *na* is supplied to complete the construction. **If it is said that, what dwells in the heart-lotus of a living being cannot be *Brahman* because the space available within the heart-lotus is understood to be tiny, it is not so. It has already been explained earlier (in *sūtra* 1-2-7) that like space (*Ākāśa*), the omnipresent *Brahman* may be said to occupy a tiny and limited space for the purpose of meditation.**

6 अनुकृत्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अनुकृतेस्तस्य च ॐ ॥ (1-3-22)

Here again, in this *sūtra*, there is no express assertion (*pratijñā*) to be proved. The words only indicate the probans (*hetu*). The term '*anukṛteḥ*' in the ablative is clearly the probans. The pronoun '*tasya*' in the genitive, obviously standing for the Supreme Being since He is being discussed, only qualifies the term '*anukṛteḥ*'. As already said during the discussion on *sūtra* 1-3-13, when a *sūtra* contains only a probans or when there is no clear assertion (*pratijñā*), then the *sūtra* can be considered as a member of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. The conjunctive particle '*ca*' in the *sūtra* supports this view and indicates that this *sūtra* provides an additional probans to prove the assertion in a preceding *sūtra*. Naturally, Rāmānujācārya has treated this and the next *sūtra* as part of the preceding *Daharādhikaraṇa*[1]. The term '*anukṛti*' literally means either imitation or similarity i.e. parity of attributes

1 VSG. p. 61.

Rāmānujācārya has taken the term *anukṛti*[1] in the sense of individual soul's (*Jīvātman*'s) attaining parity of attributes (*sāmyaṁ*) with *Brahman*, in liberation (*mokṣa*). In *Chāndogyopaniṣad* Prajapati tells his disciple that, "now, that serene (i.e. completely satisfied) being, rising out of this body and reaching the Supreme Light, appears in his true form. This is the *Ātman*, it is said. This is the immortal, the fearless. This is *Brahman*"[2]. Thus, in Prajapati's teaching, the individual soul attains similarity with *Brahman*, after liberation. As already said earlier (*sūtra* 1-3-14), Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have contended that the tiny space (*daharaḥ*) in the heart-lotus, instead of the one within that tiny space, is *Brahman*. Rāmānujācārya holds that[3], as the individual soul is said to attain the likeness of the Supreme Light, the small *Ākāśa* (*daharaḥ*), by meditating on it the individual soul cannot be this small *Ākāśa*. Therefore, Rāmānujācārya's interpretation[4] of this *sūtra* is that, the one which attains this likeness, (viz. the individual soul) and the one whose likeness is attained (the small *Ākāśa*, the Supreme *Brahman*) are different. Thus this *sūtra* supplements the contention of *sūtras* 18 and 19 earlier that '*daharaḥ*' is Brahman only and not the individual soul.

However, Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya have read more meaning in this *sūtra* based on the significance of the words used therein. Therefore, they have treated this *sūtra* and the next one as forming a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. They think that this *sūtra* refers to a popular *mantra*[5], appearing in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (2-2-15),

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1. BNK I. p. 252.
2. अथ य एष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यत एष आत्मेति होवाचैतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्मेति । (Chānd. Up. 8-3-4).
3. Śrībhāṣya - SV. 1-3-21.
4. अनुकर्ता प्रजापतिवाक्ये निर्दिष्टोऽनुकार्यं ब्रह्म दहराकाशः । Śrībhāṣya - SV 1-3-21.
5. BNK p. 297.

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः । तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥ This *mantra* is normally chanted while performing Ārati during Pūjā.

Muṇḍakopaniṣad (2-2-10) and *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* (6-14). The *mantra* states that, "There the sun does not shine, nor the moon nor the stars; these lightenings also do not shine; then how can this fire (shine)? Only when He shines, everything shines after Him. This whole world is illumined with His light". Possibly the similarity between the words '*anukṛti* ' and '*tasya*' used in the *sūtra* and the words '*anūbhāti* ' and '*tasya*' used in the *mantra*, might have led Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya to conclude that this *mantra* could be the *viṣayavākya* for the *sūtra*.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the doubt here, which the *sūtra* supposedly seeks to clarify, is whether the one after whose shining everything shines, whose shining illumines this whole world, is some physical luminous body or the Supreme Self[1]. The *sūtra* declares that it is the Supreme Self only. The *Śruti* says that *Brahman* is of the nature of light (*bhārūpaḥ*)[2] and *Brahman* is the Light of lights (*jyotiṣāṁ jyotiḥ*)[3]. However, such a doubt is less likely. While explaining the intention of the *sūtra*, Śaṅkarācārya has quoted the mantra[4], "*hiraṇmaye pare kośe*", which just precedes the *mantra* under discussion, in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. Therefore, it seems that the *viṣayavākya* before Śaṅkarācārya is as it appears in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. But in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, the *mantras* immediately preceding and following the *viṣayavākya*, expressly talk of *Brahman* only According to *Pūrvamimāṁsā śāstra*, such a situation where a statement is sandwiched between two statements, it is known as '*sandaṁśa*'[5] (a pair of tongs). In such a case, the sandwiched statement is expected to talk of the same thing as is done by the preceding and following statements. Therefore, there is no room

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1 यं भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं यस्य च भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति स किं तेजोधातुः कश्चिदुत प्राज्ञ आत्मा। (S. BSB. 1-3-22).

2 Chānd. Up. 3-14-2.

3 Bṛha. Up. 4-4-16., Muṇḍ. Up. 2-2-9.

4 Muṇḍ. Up. 2-2-9.

5 एकाङ्गानुवादेन विधीयमानयोरङ्गयोरन्तराले विहितत्वं सन्दशः (*Arthasangraha* 54).

for any doubt as to whether the *viṣayavākya* talks of *Brahman* or of some other luminous body, as raised by the Śaṅkarācārya's *Pūrvapakṣin*.

If the *sūtra* were to just answer the question as to whether everything shines after and the whole world is illumined by*Brahman* or some physical luminous body, then the *Sūtrakāra* could have used the word '*anubhānāt*' instead of '*anukṛteḥ*' in the *sūtra*. *Anukṛti* is a general term and *anubhānaṁ* is a particular case. Eventhough the word *anukṛti* literally means imitation or similarity, in the statement "everything shines after Him" in the *viṣayavākya*, more than imitation or similarity there is a sense absolute dependence[1].

Madhvācārya has also considered the same *viṣavavākya*, not as appearing in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* but as standing in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* [2]. He has held the *mantra* not as posing any doubt but as offering an answer to the question posed by the preceding *mantra*. In the just concluded *Daharādhikaraṇa* it has been established that the Supreme Being dwells in the heart of every living being. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* repeatedly tells that[3] "only those who realize Him who is present in themselves have eternal bliss and not others". The *Upaniṣad* further says that[4] "of this they hold that it is the highest indescribable bliss. How can I comprehend it? Will it dawn or not?" The doubt here, which the disciple (Nachiketas) yearns to know, refers to the bliss of those who have realized *Brahman* or to *Brahman* Himself. While answering Naciketas' question "whether it will dawn or not", the teacher Yama (the god of death), clarifies the doubt, just raised, also in the succeeding

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1. अनुभानं नाम तदिच्छानुरोधेन भानम्। अनुकृतिशब्देन अनुभानमुच्यते। भानस्यापि क्रियारूपत्वात्। सर्वकृतीनामप्युपसङ्ग्रहार्थमनुकृतेरित्युक्तम्। नहि काचिदपि कृतिर्हरीच्छानुरोधनमन्तरेण भवति। (TPD. 1-3-22).
2. Katha. Up. 2-2-15.
3. तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां शान्तिः शाश्वती नेतरेषाम्। (Kaṭha Up. 2-2-12,13)
4. तदेतदिति मन्यन्तेऽनिर्देश्यं परमं सुखम्। कथं नु तद्विजानीयां किमु भाति न भाति वा॥ (Katha Up. 2-2-14).

mantra. It expresses two attributes of *Brahman*. The first is that everything shines after Him which means that every activity in the world is absolutely dependent on the will and compliance of *Brahman*. The second attribute is that this whole world is illumined with His light. The two terms in the *sūtra viz. 'anukṛteḥ'* and *'tasya'* adduce these two attributes as the reasons for holding that the highest indescribable bliss which Naciketas yearned to know, refers to *Brahman*, and not to the bliss of those *(jñānins)* who have realized *Brahman*, because it cannot be said that everything shines after the bliss of *jñānins*, nor can it be said that this whole world is illumined by the light of *jñānins'* bliss[1].

It is universally accepted that everyone strives for happiness and that too for unadulterated and eternal happiness. So, having heard from his teacher (Yama) that "only those who realize Him *(Brahman)* who is present in themselves have eternal bliss and not others", Naciketas expresses his earnest desire to know (experience) that in the words[2], "How can I know It? Will It dawn or not?". The optative[3] form of the verb *vijānīyāṁ* indicates a prayer[4]. This eternal bliss prayed for to be known / experienced *(jñānārthaṁ prārthitaṁ)*, is termed by Madhvācārya as *'ānukūlyena gṛhyamāṇaṁ'*, in his *'Nyāyavivaraṇaṁ'*, which is his another work on *Brahmasūtras*. *Anukūla (iṣṭa)* means desirable, pleasing. *Ānukūlya* is the desirable feeling. *Gṛhyamāṇaṁ*[5] is the passive present participle of the root *grah*, to accept. Thus, *ānukūlyena gṛhyamāṇaṁ* is that which is accepted as the most desirable feeling i.e. eternal bliss, because, no other thing is more desired than happiness[6].

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1 न हि ज्ञानिसुखमनुभाति सर्वम्। न च तद्भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति। (M. BSB. 1-3-22).

2 कथं तद्विजानीयां किमु भाति न भाति वा। (Kaṭha. Up. 2-2-14)

3 विधिनिमन्त्रणामन्त्रणाधीष्टसंप्रश्नप्रार्थनेषु लिङ्। (Pāṇini 3-3-161).

4 जानीयामिति प्रार्थनायां लिङ्। (KKD 2-2-14).

5 लटः शतृ-शानचावप्रथमासमानाधिकरणे। (Pāṇini 3-2-126).

6 आनुकूल्येन गृह्यमाणत्वेति। आनुकूल्येन अनुकूलत्वेन अत्यन्तम् इष्टत्वेन गृह्यमाणं 'कथम् आनु-भवामि' इत्यनेन प्रकारेण ज्ञानार्थं प्रार्थितं सुखं तस्य भावः तत्वम्। सुखादन्यस्य अत्यन्तामिष्टत्वा-भावात्। (VKM. 1-3-22).

According to Madhvācārya this *sūtra* establishes the attribute *ānukūlyena gṛhyamāṇatvaṁ'* of Brahman. Therefore, the exposition (*vṛtti*) of this sūtra will be as follows.

आनुकूल्येन गृह्यमाणमिति योग्यतयाऽन्वेति। तस्येति तन्त्रम्। तत्त्वित्यस्ति। आनुकूल्येन अत्यन्तम् इष्टत्वेन गृह्यमाणं तत्तु ब्रह्मैव तस्य आनुकूल्येन गृह्यमाणस्य अनुकृतेः 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वम्' इति सर्वेषां तदिच्छानुरोधेन कृतेः तथा च 'तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' इति सर्वस्य तत्प्रकाश्यत्वोक्तेः।

The phrase *'ānukūlyena gṛhyamāṇaṁ'* is taken for compatibility of sense. The word *'tasya'* is repeated. The words *'tat tu'* are continued. **The eternal bliss prayed for to be known/ experienced is that Supreme Being only, on account of the activities of all, being subject to His will and compliance and the whole finite reality manifesting in His light.** The reasons for this contention are provided by the two words in the *sūtra*, *anukṛteḥ* and *tasya*. The first one states that every activity in the realm of finite reality is subject to the will and compliance of *Brahman*. Knowledge/ experience is also an intellectual activity. The second word *tasya* specifies that the whole finite reality manifests in His light.

Confirmation of this conclusion comes from the *Smṛti* texts also, as shown in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ अपि स्मर्यते ॐ ॥ **(1-3-23)**

श्रुतार्थं स्मर्यते अपि।

What is declared by *Śruti* is recollected by *Smṛti* (Bhagavadgītā) also.

In keeping with their respective interpretations of the previous *sūtra*, various commentators have referred to different verses from *Bhagavadgītā*. Rāmānujācārya quotes the verse 14-2[1], which

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1. इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः। सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च॥ (BG. 14-2).

says that, "resorting to this knowledge, they have attained attributes similar to those of Me; they are not born at the time of creation (of the world), nor are they distressed at the time of (its) dissolution". This corroborates the individual soul's attaining the likeness of *Brahman* in attributes, after liberation.

Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya refer to stanzas 15-6 and 12 of Bhagavdgītā. The first[1] one tells that, "the sun does not illumine that; neither does the moon nor the fire. That is My Supreme abode, reaching which none returns here." The second[2] verse says that, "the brilliance of the sun which illumines this whole world, that which is in the moon, that which is in fire, know that as mine". The purports of these two verses confirm the contention of the *mantra*, taken as *viṣayavākya* by Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya, for the previous *sūtra.*

7 प्रमिताधिकरणम् / वामनाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ शब्दादेव प्रमितः ॐ ॥ (1-3-24)

Here, the phrase *'śabdāt eva'* means 'because of the word (used in the text) itself'. The word *'pramitaḥ'* has two meanings, one as 'measured or limited' and the other as 'proved or established'. Therefore, there is scope for the commentators to assume their own doubt and to clarify it with the help of this *sūtra*. Each commentator is right in his own way.

However, the passage (*viṣayavākya*) considered for discussion, by all the commentators, is the same. It says[3]; "the person of the size of a thumb resides in the middle of the body. Knowing Him, who is the ruler of the past and the future, one need not try to

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1 न तद्भासयते सूर्यो न शशाङ्को न पावकः । यद्गत्वा न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम ॥ (BG. 15-6)

2 यदादित्यगतं तेजो जगद्भासयतेऽखिलम् । यच्चन्द्रमसि यच्चाग्नौ तत्तेजो विद्धि मामकम् ॥ (BG. 15-12).

3 अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति । ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते । एतद् वै तत् ॥ (Kaṭha. Up. 2-1-12).

save himself (i.e. he becomes fearless). This verily is That (which you asked for)''.

The doubt here, according to Śaṅkarācārya is whether the person *(puruṣaḥ)* referred to is the individual soul or the Supreme Being. Śaṅkarācārya has taken the word *pramitaḥ* to mean measured or limited. So, according to him the exposition (*vṛtti*) of the sūtra is; अङ्गुष्ठमात्रप्रमितः तत्तु (ब्रह्मैव) शब्दादेव । The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that the all-pervading *Brahman* cannot be limited to the size of a thumb; the embodied individual soul limited by adjuncts may, however, be thought of as limited to the size of a thumb. In support of his contention he quotes an instance from Mahābhārata in which Yama, the god of death, is said to have dragged the thumb-sized soul of Sāvitrī's husband Satyavān. The sūtra refutes this contention. It says that the person of the size of a thumb residing in the middle of the body can be the Supreme Being alone because he has been described by the word ruler (*Īśāna*) of the past and the future. None other can control the past and the future.

Rāmānujācārya also has followed the same line of interpretation. His *pūrvapakṣin* quotes a *mantra* from *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*[1] in support of his objection, where there is a clear reference to the individual soul of the size of a thumb, and having desires and egoism.

For explaining this *sūtra*, Madhvācārya has taken the word *pramita* to mean 'established'. He doubts the word *Īśāna* itself, as whether it conveys *Brahman* or *Prāṇa*. Because the same *Īśāna* has been described further in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* as the one who pushes the *prāṇa (vāyu)* upword and impels the *apāna (vāyu)* downward and as Vāmana sitting in the middle whom all deities worship. Controlling the breath, being in the

1. अङ्गुष्ठमात्रो रवितुल्यरूपः सङ्कल्पाहङ्कारसमन्वितो यः । बुद्धेर्गुणेनात्मगुणेन चैव आराग्रमात्रो ह्यपरोऽपि दृष्टः ॥ (Śveta. Up. 5-8).

middle and being worshipped by all deities refer to the characteristic marks *(liṅga)* of *Prāṇa*. Therefore, the *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that *Īśāna* conveys *Prāṇa* and not *Brahman*. The *sūtra* refutes this contention. The exposition (*vṛtti*) of this sūtra, according to Madhvācārya is;

ईशानः ब्रह्मैव इति वामनशब्दवाचित्वेन प्रमितः। वामनशब्दः नित्यं विष्णुवाचकः न कदापि वायुवाचकः।

It is established that the word *Īśāna* conveys *Brahman* only, on account of the use of the word *Vāmana* for him. The word *'Vāmana'* invariably signifies *Vishnu* and never *Prāṇa*. Therefore, even though the *mantra*[1] mentions the characteristic marks (*liṅga*) of *Prāṇa* for *Īśāna*, the *śrutimantra* clearly says that *Īśāna* is *Vāmana*. By convention (*rūḍhārthanirdeśa i.e. Śruti*), the word *'Vāmana'* signifies *Viṣṇu* and not *Vāyu*. The *Śruti* is always considered as stronger[2] than and overriding the *liṅga*. Hence, *Īśāna* conveys the Supreme Being and consequently the person of the size of a thumb (*aṅguṣṭhamātrapuruṣaḥ*) residing in the middle of the body refers to the Supreme Being only.

How can *Brahman* be of the size of a thumb? This doubt is cleared by the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ॐ ॥ **(1-3-25)**

ब्रह्माख्यपुरुषः अङ्गुष्ठमात्र इति मानवहृदयावकाशापेक्षया एव उच्यते ब्रह्मविद्याया मनुष्याधिकारत्वात्।

The omnipresent *Brahman* is said to be of the size of a thumb with reference to the space available in human heart only because human beings alone are eligible to study scriptures.

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1 ऊर्ध्वं प्राणमुन्नयत्यपानं प्रत्यगस्यति। मध्ये वामनमासीनं विश्वे देवा उपासते॥ (Kaṭha. Up. 2-2-3).

2 श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात्। (PMS. 3-3-13).

The doubt here is that, since the Supreme Being resides in the heart of every living being and the size of the heart varies in different classes of beings, how can the size of the Supreme Being be limited to that of a thumb. The *sūtra* clarifies that *Brahman* is said to be of the size of a thumb with reference to men only, because men alone are capable of understanding Supreme Being residing in their heart and meditating on Him.

There is unanimity among the commentators on the purport of this *sūtra*.

8 देवताधिकरणम्। 9 अपशूद्राधिकरणम्।

Adhikaraṇa no.s 8 and 9, comprising *sūtras* 1-3-26 to 1-3-38 incidentally talk about the eligibility of human beings as well as super human beings like deities, for the study of *Brahmavidyā* in the scriptures. As such, there appears to be some digression and these *sūtras* are not concerned with the characteristic marks of *Brahman*, aimed at in this study. Hence, these *sūtras* are skipped over.

10 कम्पनाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ कम्पनात् ॐ ॥ **(1-3-39)**

This *sūtra* contains only one word in the ablative case, which can only be a probans (*hetu*). It means 'on account of trembling'. There is no express mention of any assertion (*pratijñā*) to be proved. Therefore, Rāmānujācārya has found it fit to be taken as an additional probans for the assertion in the previous *Pramitādhikaraṇa*, that the person of the size of a thumb residing in the middle of the body is the Supreme Being. Rāmānujācārya has taken as the passage (*viṣayavākya*) for discussion a *mantra*[1] from *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. The *mantra* says[2], "whatever there is in the whole

1 यदिदं किं च जगत् सर्वं प्राण एजति निःसृतम्। महद्भयं वज्रमुद्यतं य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति॥ (Katha. Up. 2-3-2).

2 Śrībhāṣya - SV.

world, when it comes out of Him, trembles in His breath. He is a great terror like the raised thunderbolt. Those who know this become immortal". According to Rāmānujācārya, this text tells us that the whole world trembles from great fear of Him who is of the size of a thumb, and who is referred to in the above text as *Prāṇa*. Such power before which everything trembles, can be *Brahman* only, as seen from other texts also. For example, *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says[1] that, "from Its fear the wind blows, from fear the sun rises, etc." Hence, the person of the size of a thumb residing in the middle of the body is *Brahman* only.

The passage (*viṣayavākya*) discussed above by Rāmānujācārya is the same as that taken earlier by Śaṅkarācārya. But his interpretation of the *mantra* and conception of the doubt are different. According to Śaṅkarācārya, the *mantra* tells that, "this whole world, having emerged, throbs with the help of *Prāṇa* [2] (the life principle). It is a great terror, an uplifted thunderbolt. Those who know this become immortal". The doubt here is who is this *Prāṇa* and what is this terrific *Vajra* [3]. Śaṅkarācārya has treated this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. His *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that this *Prāṇa* is the air that sustains life and *Vajra* is the thunderbolt generated by moving air during rain. Immortality also is due to the knowledge of air. The *sūtra* refutes this contention. According to Śaṅkarācārya, this *mantra* talks of *Brahman* only, because the preceding and succeeding *mantras* discuss the Supreme Being. How can we say that the air is described in the middle? From the sentence that "this whole world throbs with the help of *Prāṇa*", it is understood that the *Prāṇa* is the substratum or refuge for the world and that the word *Prāṇa* is used in the sense of *Brahman* only. In *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (4-4-18) *Brahman* has been described as *"Prāṇa* of *Prāṇa"* i.e. the Vital Force of vital air. Moreover, as the whole world starting from fire, air, sun etc. do

1 भीषाऽस्माद् वातः पवते। भीषोदेति सूर्यः। (Tait. Up. 2-8-1).
2 सर्वमिदं जगत् प्राणाश्रयं स्पन्दते। (S. BSB. 1-3-39).
3 कोऽसौ प्राणः किं तत् भयानकं वज्रम्। (S. BSB. 1-3-39).

the appointed duties fearing this *Brahman*[1] only, what is compared to the terrific thunderbolt is *Brahman* only[2]. Further, since its knowledge leads to immortality it should be *Brahman* only, because *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*[3] tells that, "after knowing Him only one becomes immortal; there is no other way to go". This section (in which this *mantra* is included) is about the Supreme Being only.

On the same line as that taken by Śaṅkarācārya, Madhvācārya has also treated this sūtra as a separate *Adhikaraṇa* and the *viṣayavākya* is also the same. However, Madhvācārya has not doubted the word *Prāṇa*, possibly because it has been conclusively established in the first *Pāda* that *Prāṇa* connotes *Brahman*. The doubt, according to Madhvācārya is what is this word *Vajra* conveying in the passage under discussion. His *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that *Vajra* is popularly known as the name of Indra's weapon. The *sūtra* says that this is not true "on account of throbbing (*kampanāt*)".

उद्यतवज्रं ब्रह्मैव न तु इन्द्रायुधं कम्पनात् जगच्चेष्टकत्वात्।

Udyatavajra, **conveys *Brahman* only but not Indra's weapon, on account of throbbing**. The *mantra* under discussion is understood by Madhvācārya in three ways as thus:

Those who know That terrific *Udyatavajra* (1) because of whose impelling this whole world, born of *Prāṇa* (*Brahman*), and remaining in *Prāṇa* (*Brahman*), throbs, (2) because of whom this whole world and *Prāṇa* (the wind-god, vital air) are born and throb, (3) because of whose impelling the *Prāṇa* (the wind-god, vital air) from whom this whole world is born, throbs, become immortal. Since this *Vajra* is said to be the impelling force behind the whole world, which is an exclusive attribute of *Brahman*, *Vajra* conveys *Brahman* only.

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1 भयादस्याग्निस्तपति भयात्तपति सूर्यः।भयादिन्द्रश्च वायुश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः॥ (Katha Up. 2-3-3).

2 तदग्निवायुसूर्यादिकं जगत् अस्मादेव ब्रह्मणो बिभ्यत् नियमेन स्वव्यापारे प्रवर्तत इति भयानकं वज्रोपमितं ब्रह्म। (S. BSB. 1-3-39).

3 तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय। (Śvetā. Up. 6-15).

In the opinion of Madhvācārya, the word *Vajra* is not used here as a simile, but it directly denotes *Brahman* etymologically (*yogavṛttyā*) and by usage among the learned (*vidvadrūḍhivṛttyā*). In support of his contention he quotes a verse from *Brahmavaivartapurāṇa* which tells that "He is called a *Chakra* because He rotates the individual beings in the transmigratory world; He is called as *Vajra* because He is free from blemish; He is called as *Khaḍga* because He destroys the wicked; thus, the One who is denoted by the names of weapons is the Supreme Being Himself"[1].

11 ज्योतिरधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ ज्योतिर्दर्शनात् ॐ ॥ **(1-3-40)**

ज्योतिः तत्तु (ब्रह्मैव) दर्शनात् ।

The word '*jyotiḥ*' conveys *Brahman* only because it is seen/understood (in/from scripture).

For explaining this *sūtra*, the passage (*viṣayavākya*) assumed by Śaṅkarācārya, is a *mantra*[2] from *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, which tells that "this serene one rises out of this body, reaches the highest light and appears in his own form. He is the highest person". The doubt here is whether the term 'light' here refers to some visible luminous body or *Brahman*. Śaṅkarācārya is aware of the fact that in an earlier *sūtra* '*Jyotiścaraṇābhidhānāt*' (1-1-24), it has been established that the term *jyotiḥ* referred to *Brahman*. Therefore, his *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that; "while explaining an earlier *sūtra* (1-1-24) it has been said, with reference to another passage from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (3-13-7) that *jyotiḥ* conveyed Brahman, on the strength of context (*prakaraṇa*) i.e.

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1 चक्रं चङ्क्रमणादेष वर्जनाद्वज्र उच्यते। खण्डनात्खड्ग एवैष हेतिनामा स्वयं हरिः ॥ (M. BSB. 1-3-39).

2 एष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स उत्तमः पुरुषः। (Chānd. Up. 8-12-3).

that the whole section was talking of *Brahman*. But here, the section talks of arteries of a living being and his departure from the body towards the sun (Chānd. Up. 8-6-5). Therefore, one has to take the popular meaning of the word *jyotiḥ* as a physical luminous body like sun". Śaṅkarācārya replies; "(as the *sūtra* asserts) *jyotiḥ* conveys *Brahman* only because the same meaning is clearly seen (*darśanāt*). The discussion from 8-7-1 (*in* Chānd Up.) is about the One who is free from sin, who should be sought, who should be enquired into etc. The discussion about *Brahman* only is seen here. Chānd. Up. 8-12-1 talks of the individual soul who can become free from pleasure and pain when he gets freedom from the body. Further, it is said that for getting freedom from the body, the individual soul becomes one with *Brahman*[1]. Moreover, the adjectives like 'the highest Light' and 'the highest person' are used. The release of the individual soul departing from the body and reaching the sun (told in Chānd. Up. 8-6-5), is not the ultimate release, because it involves movement and modification. In ultimate release movement and modification are absent".

Śaṅkarācārya suggests here that the release of an individual soul after reaching the sun is not the ultimate release, but his release after reaching the highest Light is the ultimate release and therefore the Light (*jyotiḥ*) connotes *Brahman*. In monistic philosophy (*advaita*) the final release (*mokṣa*) comes when an individual (*Jīva*) realizes his identity with the *nirguṇa* (devoid of attributes) *Brahman* and merges with It[2]. Here above in the passage from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* referred to by Śaṅkarācārya, the individual having reached the highest Light is called as the highest person and is further described[3] as moving about eating, playing, rejoicing with women, vehicles or relations etc. This description can hardly befit the *nirguṇa Brahman.*

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1 भावाच्चान्यत्राशरीरतानुपपत्तेः । (S. BSB. 1-3-40).

2 OIP. P. 339.

3 स उत्तमः पुरुषः स तत्र पर्येति जक्षत्क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा -- . (Chānd. Up. 8-12-3).

On the other hand, Rāmānujācārya takes the *sūtra* as one compound word in the ablative case and treats it as an additional probans for the assertion in the preceding *Pramitādhikaraṇa*. According to him, the Person of the size of a thumb residing in the middle of the body is the Supreme Being, on account of the brilliance[1] understood / seen (*jyotirdarśanāt*) in the text which says[2] "there the sun does not shine, nor the moon and the stars...". This interpretation appears more reasonable in view of the fact that it has already been established earlier (BS. 1-1-24) that "the term *jyotiḥ* connotes *Brahman*".

Like Śaṅkarācārya, Madhvācārya also has treated this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. But his passage (*viṣayavākya*) taken for discussion is different. It is a *mantra*[3] from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. In that section of the *Upaniṣad*, king Janaka questions Yājñavalkya as to what is the leading light for living beings, which enables them to carry out activities. Yājñavalkya replies that (during the waking state) the sun, the moon, the fire and the speech serve as leading lights; but (during the sleeping state) when the sun, the moon, the fire and the speech are inoperative, it is the Supreme Being who serves as the leading light. In this *mantra* under discussion Yājñavalkya describes the characteristics of the Supreme Being. He says that "He who is knowledgeable, who dwells in the organs and the heart as the (self-effulgent) light, becoming one (with the individual being, *Jīva*) accompanies (the *Jīva*) between the two worlds (waking and sleeping), as though He (the Supreme Being) thinks, moves". Here, the doubt is whether the light in the heart (intellect) is *Jīva* or *Brahman*, because the characteristics of being knowledgeable, dwelling in the organs and the heart and moving between waking and sleeping states are common for both *Jīva* and *Brahman*. This *sūtra*, according to

1 Śrībhāṣya- SV 1-3-41.

2 Kaṭha. Up. 2-2-15.

3 योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसंचरति ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव; (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-7).

Madhvācārya, asserts that the light (*jyotis*) in the heart here is *Brahman* only because the scriptures say so (*darśanāt*). The word *darśana* in this sūtra is taken by Madhvācārya to mean religious knowledge in the scriptures. And he quotes a statement from another scripture to support this view. Thus, the exposition of this *sūtra* according to Madhvācārya is :

'योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः' इत्युक्तज्योतिः ब्रह्मैव न तु जीवः दर्शनात् श्रुतेः ।

The light described as "He who is knowledgeable, who dwells in the organs and the heart as the self-effulgent light (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-7) is *Brahman* only but not the individual soul because it is seen/told as such in scriptures.

12 आकाशाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् ॐ ॥ **(1-3-41)**

अन्यः अर्थः अर्थान्तरम् । विलक्षणः अर्थः । तस्य भावः तत्त्वम् । आकाशः ब्रह्मैव नामरूपराहित्यरूपविलक्षणार्थत्वव्यपदेशात् ।

The word *Ākāśa* conveys *Brahman* only because it is spoken of as something different (from names and forms) and so on.

There is unanimity among the commentators about the purport of this *sūtra* and the passage (*viṣayavākya*) for discussion. The passage is a *mantra* [1] from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* which says, "verily, what is called *Ākāśa* is the sustainer (of the world) of name and form. That within which they (name and form) are is *Brahman*, That is the immortal, That is the *Ātman*".

According to Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya, the doubt here is whether the word *Ākāśa* denotes the physical elemental ether or *Brahman*. Because the elemental ether is popularly known as

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1 आकाशो वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म तदमृतं स आत्मा-- । (Chand.Up. 8-14-1).

ākāśa and the characteristic of being the support of the world of names and forms can be attributed to it. The *sūtra* refutes this view. It says that the word *ākāśa* here connotes *Brahman* only (but not ether), because it is spoken of as something different from names and forms. The *Upaniṣad* says that the *Ākāśa* contains within it the names and forms. It means that the *Ākāśa* is not one of the names and forms and it is something different from names and forms. On the other hand the elemental ether is one of the five created elements having names and forms, viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether. Moreover, the *Ākāśa* is further expressly said to be *Brahman, immortal* and *Ātman.*

However, *Brahman* is addressed with so many names and described in so many forms. In fact all names are said to convey the Supreme Being. Then how can we say that *Brahman* is different from names and forms? Since no name can completely describe Him or represent Him, the Supreme Being is beyond names. Since He is not having a physical form, the Supreme Being is beyond forms. Madhvācārya quotes a passage from *Brahmapurāṇa* in support of this view. It says that "since the Supreme Being is beyond comprehension in all His fullness He is said to be nameless and since He has no physical body He is said to be formless[1]".

The doubt according to Rāmānujācārya is whether *ākāśa* here conveys *Brahman* or a released individual soul; because the individual soul (*Jīva*) can be looked upon as the support of names and forms, and in the released state it is beyond all names and forms. Then it is refuted by saying that the evolver of names and forms does not mean one who takes those forms, *Jīva*, but one who evolves these names and forms for it[2].

The above doubt held by Rāmānujācārya is rather far-fetched. The word *Ākāśa* is not used to denote a *Jīva* and there is no

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1 अनामा सोऽप्रसिद्धत्वादरूपो भूतवर्जनात् इति ब्राह्मे । (M. BSB. 1-3-41)

2 Śrībhāṣya - SV 1-3-42.

specific characteristic mark in the *viṣayavākya* to suggest that *Ākāśa* denotes *Jīva*.

13 सुषुप्त्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन ॐ ॥ **(1-3-42)**

व्यपदेशादित्यस्ति । सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन व्यपदेशात् ।

Repeating (*anuvṛtti*) the term *'vyapadeśāt'* from the previous *sūtra*, this *sūtra* means "on account of the mention of the difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Being in the states of deep sleep and departure from this body".

Since the *sūtra* furnishes only a probans (*hetu*) and there is no mention of any assertion (*pratijñā*), the *sūtra* is expected to be taken as an additional probans for the assertion in the previous *sūtra*. That is exactly what is done by Rāmānujācārya[1]. Rāmānujācārya's *Pūrvapakṣin* says that some scriptural texts declare the identity of individual souls and *Brahman* and deny duality. 'The highest *Brahman*' refers only to the individual soul in release. The attainer, the individual soul, and the attained, the *Brahman*-world, are not different. Therefore, the word *'Ākāśa'* (discussed in the previous *sūtra*) refers to the individual soul in release.

According to Rāmānujācārya this *sūtra* refutes the above contention. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* says that (during deep sleep) "this person (individual soul) fully embraced by the All-knowing (Supreme) Self, knows nothing either external or internal"[2]. This shows that in the state of deep sleep the individual soul is different from *Brahman*. So also at the time of death, the scripture says[3] that "the (individual) self in the body mounted (driven) by the

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1 Śrībhāṣya- SV 1-3-43
2 अयं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेन आत्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद न अन्तरम् । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-21)
3 अयं शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेन आत्मना अन्वारूढः उत्सर्जन्याति । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-35).

All-knowing (Supreme) Self, quits". Thus, as the *sūtra* puts it, on account of the mention of the difference between the individual self and the Supreme Self in the states of deep sleep and departure from the body, the Supreme Self is clearly different from the individual soul.

During the discussion on the previous *sūtra*, Rāmānujācārya's *Pūrvapakṣin* had contended that the individual soul in release, could have been referred to by the word *Ākāśa*, because in the released condition the individual soul was different from names and forms. This contention was obviously based on the premise of difference between *Brahman* and the individual soul as otherwise the objection had no *locus standi*. In his *Tātparyacandrikā*, *Vyāsatīrtha* questions, "having accepted thus the difference, how can the *Pūrvapakṣin* shift his ground and raise an objection here based on the identity of *Brahman* and *Jīva*"?[1] Moreover, the topic that *Ākāśa* refers to *Brahman* has been already established once earlier in the first *pāda* (*sūtra* 1-1-22). Here incidentally it is mentioned again, may be because, as some commentators put it[2], the word *Ākāśa* is popularly known to denote both *Brahman* and the elemental ether. Hence, *Pūrvapakṣin* has some scope to object again. However, by providing two more probanses using two more *sūtras* to establish the same thing again, as done by Rāmānujācārya, little purpose is served.

Based on the words used in the *sūtra*, Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya think that in this *sūtra* the *Sūtrakāra* is up to establish something more important. Śaṅkarācārya has considered this and the next sūtra as forming a separate *adhikaraṇa*, and as referring to the entire gamut of the discourse by Yājñavalkya to the king Janaka, in the third and fourth sections of the fourth *Adhyāya* of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. In this conversation, Janaka asks "who

1 M. BSB - AHB 1-3-43.
2 प्राक् समन्वितत्वेऽप्युभयत्र प्रसिद्धत्वेन पृथगुक्तिः । (TDK. 1-3-40).

is Ātman?"[1] In order to enable the king to comprehend and identify who is *Ātman*, Yājñavalkya describes in detail how *Ātman* steers the individual souls through all of their states of life viz. waking, dreaming, deep sleep and death, back and forth, in their transmigratory groove. The doubt[2] here, according to Śaṅkarācārya, is whether this discourse is just to summarize the mundane life of individual soul (*Jīva*) or to establish the nature/identity of the Supreme Being (*Atman*). Śaṅkarācārya's *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that since the beginning, the middle and the concluding parts of this discourse deal with the details of the life of a *Jīva*, that must be the topic of the discourse. The established (*Siddhānta*) view[3] is that this discourse is for teaching the concept of *Brahman* only and not for recapitulating the nature of *Jīva*, because of the mention of the Supreme Being as different from *Jīva*, in the state of deep sleep and at the time of departure from the body. Having said thus, Śaṅkarācārya further opines that the purpose of mentioning the details of the characteristics of *Jīva* in the discourse is to expose the nature of *Jīva* and to show its identity with *Brahman* [4] (!). But he does not quote any passage which clearly shows that the intention of the discourse is to establish this identity. All the phrases and extracts quoted there-with go to describe *Brahman* only.

It appears that in order to answer Janaka's question "who is *Atman*?", Yājñavalkya details the mundane life of a *Jīva* steered through all the stages of life by *Brahman*, as a medium through which the Supreme Being expresses Himself and through which Janaka may perceive and identify *Brahman*.

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1 कतम आत्मा इति । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-7)

2 तत्किं संसारिस्वरूपमात्रान्वाख्यानपरं वाक्यम् उत असंसारिस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरमिति विशयः। (S. BSB -VA 1-3-42).

3 परमेश्वरोपदेशपरमेवेदं वाक्यं न शारीरमात्रान्वाख्यानपरम् कस्मात् सुषुप्तावुत्क्रान्तौ च शारीराद्भेदेन परमेश्वरस्य व्यपदेशात्। (S. BSB - 1-3-42)

4 आद्यन्तमध्येषु शारीरलिङ्गात् - अनूद्य संसारिस्वरूपं परेण ब्रह्मणा अस्य एकतां विवक्षति। (S. BSB - 1-3-42).

He tells that[1] "this all-knowing Person, remaining as the (self-effulgent) light in the heart of a *Jīva*, being one with the organs, controls them, as though He thinks, He moves, and accompanies the *Jīva* through waking and dream worlds". In the dream state whatever the *Jīva* experiences, *Brahman* also witnesses, but[2] "He is untouched by whatever He sees in that state, for this Person is unattached". In between Janaka repeatedly requests Yājñavalkya to instruct him how one can extricate himself (from the transmigration). Ignoring the request for the time being, Yājñavalkya continues his description of the presence of *Brahman* in other states of *Jīva*. In deep sleep, he says that[3] "this person (*Jīva*) fully embraced by the All-knowing *Ātman*, does not know anything at all, either external or internal". For the *Jīva*, this state of deep sleep is, perhaps a foretaste of liberation. The teacher describes how in that state *Jīva* is free from desire, grief, and evil woes, etc. Then at the time of death[4], ''this *Jīvātman* in the body, mounted (driven) by the All-knowing Supreme Being, quits (the body)''. Further, he tells the process of transmigration. Now he answers the oft-repeated query about the release from this transmigratory bondage saying[5], "when all the desires that dwell in his heart (mind) are shed away, then he, the mortal, becomes immortal, and experiences and enjoys the presence of *Brahman* in this very body". Then there is eulogy of the released *Jīvas*. Finally, Yājñavalkya recapitulates his discourse on the nature of *Ātman* saying[6], "that great birthless omniscient *Ātman*, being one with the organs, lies (dwells) in the ether within the heart (of a *Jīva*). He is the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all".

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1 योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसंचरति ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-7).

2 स यत्तत्र किंचित्पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-15).

3 अयं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम् । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-21).

4 अयं शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेन आत्मना अन्वारूढ उत्सर्जद् याति । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-35).

5 यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः । अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुत इति ॥ (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-7).

6 स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः सर्वस्याधिपतिः । (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-22).

Thus, the whole exercise seems to be aimed at revealing the nature and identity of *Brahman* as the indwelling spirit that controls all the activities of beings in all the stages of their life in the transmigratory path. The *sūtra*, under discussion, avers that *Brahman* is different from the individual souls (even) in the states of deep sleep and departure from a body. Rāmānujācārya has held[1] *Brahman* as different from individual souls even in their released condition. Hence, in the absence of any specific statement of the *Śruti* mentioned by Śaṅkarācārya in support of identity between *Brahman* and the individual souls, his conclusion that the aim of this discourse is to expose the nature of *Jīva* and to show its identity with *Brahman*, becomes incomprehensible and unconvincing. In *Tātparyacandrikā*, Vyāsatīrtha tells a monist (*advaitin*), "the philosophy of identity (between *Brahman* and *Jīvas*) is definitely not told by the scripture (*Śruti*) as well as by the *sūtra*. And, the difference (between *Brahman* and *Jīvas*), which is told there, is not a philosophy in your opinion"[2].

Madhvācārya also holds that this *sūtra* refers to the discourse by Yājñavalkya to Janaka, mentioned in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. The passage (*viṣayavākya*) sought to be discussed, according to him, is the *mantra*[3] which says that, "after delighting in the state of deep sleep, roaming about, merely seeing good and evil, again comes back to the dream state according to the merits and demerits of different species; he remains unaffected by whatever he sees there (in the dreams), for this person is indeed unattached to everything". The doubt here is whether the person, described as moving from deep sleep to dreaming state and as seeing the dreams, is the individual soul (*Jīva*) or *Brahman*. Since it is

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1 Refer Rāmānujācārya's commentary on BS. 1-3-42.

2 यत्त्वमैक्यं तन्नैव कीर्त्यते श्रुतिसूत्रयोः। तत्र यः कीर्त्यते भेदः तच्च तत्त्वं न ते मते॥ (TC. II. p. 155).

3 स वा एष एतस्मिन्संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नायैव स यत्तत्र किंचित्पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इति। (Brha. Up. 4-3-15).

popularly known that it is the *Jīva* which sees the dreams, the *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that the passage refers to *Jīva* only as the seer of dreams. Excluding the body, the organs, the mind and intellect, the remaining spirit or pure consciousness (*caitanya* or *Jīvātman*) can be considered as the one described as "unattached". Eventhough the characteristic mark of "being unattached to everything" belongs to *Brahman*, the same can be ascribed to *Jīva* since there is identity of essence between *Brahman* and *Jīva*. But because of this identity, *Brahman* cannot be said to be the seer of dreams, since the identity is only between *Brahman* and *Jīva* as pure consciousness, where as *Jīva* sees the dreams when he is with his adjuncts.

The established (*siddhānta*) view is that the unaffected seer of dreams, deep sleep etc. (of *Jīvas*) is *Brahman* only since he is described as 'unattached' (*asaṅga*). The scripture says that He merely witnesses the dreams without being affected by them. This is not possible for a *Jīva*. Even accepting *Jīvātman* as pure consciousness, when *Jīva* is the seer of dreams he cannot escape their experiences. However unreal the dreams may be, their experiences are very much real. *Jīva* cannot be said to be 'absolutely unattached'. In fact, it is *Jīva* only who has attachments, but not *jaḍaprakṛti* or *Brahman*. It is because of attachments that *Jīva* is what he is. It cannot be argued that *Jīva* can be looked upon as the unattached seer of dreams, deep sleep etc. on the strength of identity of essence between *Brahman* and *Jīva*, because the *sūtra* expressly refutes this identity saying that *Brahman* is different from *Jīva* (even) in the states of deep sleep and departure from the body. Hence, the person described in the *Śruti* passage as delighting in deep sleep, moving to dreaming state and seeing the dreams unattached, is *Brahman* only.

स्वप्नादिद्रष्टा ब्रह्मैव ‘‘अनन्वागतस्तेन भवति असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष’’ इति असङ्गत्वलिङ्गात्। न च जीवेशाभेदेन जीवस्य असङ्गत्वलिङ्गोपपत्तिः। सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्तिप्रकरणयोः जीवेशभेदेन व्यपदेशात्।

The seer of dreams (referred to in Bṛha. Up. 4-3-15 mentioned earlier) is the Supreme Being only because the attribute of being unattachted is ascribed to him in the *Śruti* which says that "he remains unaffected by whatever he sees there (in the dreams) for this person is indeed unattached to everything". It cannot be argued that *Jīva* as pure consciousness can be ascribed with the attribute of being unaffected since there is identity of essence between *Brahman* and *Jīva*, because in the context of deep sleep (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-21 mentioned earlier) and death (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-35 referred to earlier) the difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva* has been clearly stated.

Further, the *Śruti* passage describes this person as roaming about in the state of deep sleep. A *Jīva* cannot be imagined to be roaming even mentally in deep sleep. In another *mantra* [1] earlier, the *Śruti* says, "having united the embodied self with sleep, the sleepless One looks on, upon the sleeping ones". Thus, Yājñavalkya is clearly describing the Supreme Being as the One steering the individual souls through the states of dreams and deep sleep etc., while remaining Himself unattached.

14 ब्राह्मणाधिकरणम्

॥ ॐ पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ॐ ॥ **(1-3-43)**

The *sūtra* comprises only one compound word in the ablative case, meaning "on account of the words, lord etc". In the absence of any assertion (*pratijñā*) here, Śaṅkarācārya has treated this *sūtra* as an additional probans (*hetu*) for the assertion established by the previous *sūtra*. According to him this *sūtra* refers to the *mantra* [2] in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* which states that, "that great

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1 स्वप्नेन शारीरमभिप्रहत्यासुप्तः सुप्तानभिचाकशीति । (Bṛha. Up. 4-3-11).

2 स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः सर्वस्याधिपतिः स न साधुना कर्मणा भूयान् नो एवासाधुना कनीयान्। (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-22).

birthless omniscient *Ātman*, being one with the organs, dwells in the ether within the heart (of a *Jīva*); He is the controller of all, the Lord of all, the ruler of all; He does not become better through good work nor worse through bad work". As the *sūtra* mentions, on account of the words, lord etc. used in the *mantra*, this discourse is for teaching the concept of *Brahman* only and not for recapitulating the nature of *Jīva* (which view is established by the previous *sūtra*). The words lord etc. cannot refer to the *Jīva*. The *mantra* also expresses the characteristic mark of becoming neither better through good deeds nor worse through bad deeds. This mark cannot be ascribed to any one except the Supreme Being.

Along with the preceding *sūtra*, Rāmānujācārya has considered this *sūtra* also as an additional probans for the assertion that "the word *Ākāśa* conveys *Brahman* only", which has been established in the previous '*Ākāśādhikaraṇa*'.

Madhvācārya has treated this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. According to him, the passage under discussion here is the next *mantra* of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* [1] which says that, "the glory of this *Brāhmaṇa* is perpetual; it neither increases nor decreases through work. One should know the dignity of that alone. Knowing that, one is not tainted by evil deeds". The doubt here is who is connoted by the word *Brāhmaṇa*, whether it conveys *Brahman* or the four-faced Prajāpati. Because the characteristic mark of having perpetual glory can be ascribed to Prajāpati also and moreover that person with perpetual glory has been further denoted by '*Aja*', which word can connote the Prajāpati also. The established (*siddhānta*) view is that the term *Brāhmaṇa* here conveys *Brahman* only because, as the *sūtra* says, that Person is described by

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1 एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य न वर्धते कर्मणा नो कनीयान् ।
तस्यैव स्यात्पदवित् तं विदित्वा न लिप्यते कर्मणा पापकेन ॥ (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-23).

the epithets like the lord of all, the controller of all, the ruler of all etc., which characteristics can be ascribed to *Brahman* only.

ब्राह्मणः ब्रह्मैव सर्वाधिपत्यादिवाचिशब्देभ्यः ।

The term *Brāhmaṇa* (in the *mantra* 4-4-23 of Bṛha. Up.) conveys *Brahman* only on account of the words lord of all etc. (used to describe him).

Because of the extremely laconic form of this *sūtra* and the preceding one, the interpretations of different commentators appear varied and farfetched, to suit the context of their interpretations of the previous *sūtras*.

Chapter VI

Adhyāya I, Pāda 4

(प्रथमाध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।)

1 आनुमानिकाधिकरणम् ।

॥ॐ आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च ॐ॥ **(1-4-1)**

Śaṅkarācārya has already proved earlier while commenting on *sūtra* 1-1-5 that the *Pradhāna* of *Sāṅkhya* system cannot be the cause of the world since it has no support in the scriptures *(aśabdaṁ)* and that *Brahman* is the cause of the world as defined by *sūtra* 1-1-2. Here, according to Śaṅkarācārya, his *pūrvapakṣin* comes forth with evidence to show that the *Pradhāna*, which is derived by inference (*ānumanikaṁ*) finds a mention in certain branches of scriptures and therefore[1], it is not proper to say that it has no support in the scriptures, and the same is the cause of the world. The passage under discussion (*viṣayavākya*) is provided by two *mantras*[2] in *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. They say: "The sense-objects are higher than the senses and the mind is higher than the sense-objects; but the intellect is higher than the mind, and the Great Soul is higher than the intellect. The Unmanifested (*Avyaktaṁ*) is higher than *Mahat; Puruṣa* is higher than the Unmanifested. There is nothing higher than *Puruṣa*. He is the culmination, He is the highest goal". The word *Avyakta* is a synonym for *Pradhāna* in *Sāṅkhya* parlance. The words *Mahat*, *Avyakta* and *Puruṣa* are used here in the same sense and order as in the *Sāṅkhya* system. Thus, the term *Avyakta* here denotes *Pradhāna*.

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1 अतः तस्य शब्दवत्वात् अशब्दत्वम् अनुपपन्नं तदेव च जगतः कारणं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धिभ्य।। (S. BSB. 1-4-1).

2 इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः। मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान्परः॥ महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः। पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः॥ (Kaṭha. Up. - SG. 1-3-10 & 11).

Śaṅkarācārya refutes this contention by arguing that the *Sāṅkhyas* could be using the word *Avyakta* to denote *Pradhāna*, in their technical terminology, but in general convention the word simply means "that which is unmanifested"[1]. Now Śaṅkarācārya interprets the phrase "*śarīrarūpakavinyastagṛhīteḥ*" in the *sūtra*, which literally means "on account of understanding what is referred to in the metaphor of the body". Just before this passage under discussion, there is another passage in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (1-3-3 to 9) in which there is a famous metaphor where the individual soul is considered as the master of the chariot and the body as the chariot. In both the passages the words, 'the senses', 'the sense-objects', 'the mind' and 'the intellect' are mentioned. For the *Jīvātman*, the master of the chariot in the metaphor, the parallel word used in the second passage, is *'Puruṣa'* i.e. *Paramātman*, because, in reality, there is no difference between *Jīvātman* and *Paramātman*. The only word left out in the passage under discussion is '*Avyakta*'. Hence, the term '*Avyakta*' has to be understood to convey the physical body. In all this, there is no place for the *Pradhāna*, inferred by the *Sāṅkhyas*.

No doubt, the ***Vedānta*** system is opposed to the *Sāṅkhya* view of *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti* as the uncaused original cause of the world. But *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti* as a principle can still find a place in the scriptures. It need not be banished from the scriptures as *aśabdaṁ*, as argued[2] by Śaṅkarācārya. Secondly, the passage under discussion here simply says that *Avyakta* (a synonym of *Pradhāna* according to *Sāṅkhyas*) is higher than *Mahat* and *Puruṣa* is higher than the *Avyakta*. It does not say that *Avyakta* is the cause of the world. If the term higher (*para*) is taken as meaning originator, then the *Puruṣa* becomes the originator of *Avyakta*. Thus, there is no scope for the *Pūrvapakṣin* to claim *Avyakta* as the cause of the world, based on this passage, as expected by Śaṅkarācārya. Śaṅkarācārya has first argued that *Avyakta* means

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1 न व्यक्तम् अव्यक्तम्। (S. BSB. 1-4-1).

2 नास्त्यत्र परपरिकल्पितस्य प्रधानस्यावकाशः। (S. BSB. 1-4-1).

that which is unmanifested and further concludes that *Avyakta* here connotes *śarīra*, the physical body which is very much manifested. Thus, the argument looks self-contradictory. Moreover, this *Avyakta* is placed at a higher status than *Mahat*. Śaṅkarācārya has started[1] the discussion to confirm that *Pradhāna* cannot be the cause of the world and that *Paramātman* is the cause of the world. But here he arrives at the conclusion that the world comes into existence due to *Avidyā* (illusion)[2]. Thus, the status as the cause of the world is denied to *Pradhāna* and assigned to *Avidyā*. Therefore, Vyāsatīrtha comments that "if the stolen sheep is rescued from the wolf with great efforts and handed over to a tiger, then what is the gain?"[3]. Further, if the *Sūtrakāra* intended to suggest that '*Avyakta*' in the passage under discussion referred to *śarīra* in the metaphor, he would have said '*śarīragṛhiteḥ*' or '*rūpakavinyastaśarīragṛhiteḥ*'[4]. The adjectival adjunct '*rūpakavinyasta*' should have preceded the substantive '*śarīra*'[5].

In Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation, the words '*darśayati ca*' appearing in the *sūtra* have not received any importance and they appear superfluous. Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra* looks clumsy, far-fetched and unconvincing. Possibly it misses the point, the *Sūtrakāra* is driving at.

Rāmānujācārya has interpreted this *sūtra* on the same line as that followed by Śaṅkarācārya.

Madhvācārya also has considered the same *mantras* of *Kaṭhopaniṣad* as the *viṣayavākya* for this *sūtra*. But he has taken

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1 गतिसामान्यं च वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मकारणवादं प्रति विद्यते न प्रधानकारणवादं प्रति। (S. BSB. Introduction to 1-4).

2 शरीरेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनासंयुक्तस्य हि अविद्यावतो भोक्तुः शरीरादीनां रथादिरूपककल्पनया संसारमोक्षगतिनिरूपणेन प्रत्यगात्मब्रह्मावगतिरिह विवक्षिता। (S. BSB. 1-4-1).

3 वृकेणापहृतं मेषमादायातिप्रयत्नतः। स चेत् व्याघ्राय दीयेत को लाभस्तेन सिध्यति॥ (TC. II. p. 165).

4 BNK. I. p. 268, 269.

5 विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम्। (Pāṇini 2-1-57), BNK. I. p. 268.
प्रथमानिर्दिष्टं समास उपसर्जनम्। (Pāṇini 1-2-43).
उपसर्जनं पूर्वम्। (Pāṇini 2-2-30).

an entirely different view of this *Adhikaraṇa*. According to Madhvācārya, the *sūtra* tells that the term '*Avyakta*', which is popularly understood to denote an unmanifest principle *Prakṛti* other than and inferior to *Brahman*, primarily denotes *Brahman*, and denotes *Prakṛti* etc. in a lesser sense (*amukhyārtha*). Similarly, by the implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*), other words like *Jīva, Duḥkhin, Baddha, Avara* etc. found in scriptures, primarily denote *Brahman*[1].

अव्यक्तशब्दः योग्यतया अन्वेति। तत्तु इत्यस्ति। अपिः एवार्थे। आनुमानिकं ङ्ख्यानुमानगम्यं प्रधानम् एव एकेषां शाखासु अव्यक्तशब्देन उच्यते इति चेत् न। अव्यक्तं परममुख्यवृत्त्या तत्तु ब्रह्मैव शरीररूपकप्रधाने विन्यस्तस्य धतस्य ब्रह्मणः अव्यक्तपदेन गृहीतेः। तथा दर्शयति च।

The term '*avyakta*' follows here on account of compatibility of sense. The word '*tattu*' remains. The word '*api*' is in the sense of 'only'.

If it be said that the term *Avyakta*, appearing in some sections of scriptures, conveys *Pradhāna* (i.e. *Prakṛti*) only, it is not so. *Avyakta* primarily connotes *Brahman* only, on account of understanding the term *Avyakta* as referring to *Brahman* lodged in the so-called mean body form of *Pradhāna*. The scriptures also corroborate the same.

The point raised by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is that the term *Avyakta* appearing in the passage[2] (from *Kaṭhopaniṣad*) under discussion, conveys *Pradhāna* only as it is popularly understood so[3]. It cannot refer to *Brahman* since it is placed in a position inferior to that of *Puruṣa*[4]. The *sūtra* refutes this contention and states that *Avyakta* primarily connotes *Brahman* only. Then the *Pūrvapakṣin* comes up with a natural question that if *Avyakta* denotes *Brahman*

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1. अत्र सर्वत्र अव्यक्तपदं जीवाद्युपलक्षणार्थम्। (TP. 1-4-1).
2. महतः परमव्यक्तम् अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः। (Katha. Up. 1-3-11).
3. अव्यक्तादिशब्दानां प्रधानादावेव प्रसिद्धेः। (TP. 1-4-1).
4. तत्र अव्यक्तस्य पुरुषावरत्वश्रवणात्। (TP. 1-4-1).

only, then how is it used to denote *Pradhāna*?[1] The *sūtra* answers in the words "*śarīrarūpakavinyastagṛhīteḥ*".

शरीरस्य रूपमिव रूपं यस्य तच्छरीररूपम्। कुत्सितं शरीररूपं शरीररूपकं प्रधानम्। तत्र विन्यस्तस्य स्थितस्य ब्रह्मणः अव्यक्तपदेन गृहीतेः इत्यर्थः।

The *sūtra* explains :- The term *Avyakta* is generally used to denote the principle, *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti*, on account of understanding the term *Avyakta* as primarily referring to *Brahman* lodged in the so called mean body form of *Pradhāna*, and therefore referring to *Pradhāna* because of *Brahman*'s association with the principle as its controller. The *sūtra* does not say that *Pradhāna* has a physical body. It is unmanifested (*Avyakta*). It only suggests that just as a *Jīva* exists in a body and controls it, the *Pradhāna* with its three qualities (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) exists in some form controlled by *Brahman* [2]. That is why the words '*śarīrasya rūpamiva rūpaṁ*' are used. Further, to prevent one from assuming that *Pradhāna* is the main body form for *Brahman* to exist, the *Sūtrakāra* has used the suffix '*ka*'[3] to suggest that *Pradhāna* is a trifle when compared to *Brahman*. Instead of using the word '*sthita*', the term '*vinyasta*' is used to suggest that '*Avyakta*' does not connote *Brahman* in general, but it conveys *Brahman* abiding in *Pradhāna* and controlling it[4].

The same argument is extendable to other terms like *Jīva*, *Baddha*, *Duḥkhī* etc. by implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*) Thus, the *Sūtrakāra* is advocating here, according to Madhvācārya, that the words which are popularly known to denote exclusively certain entities other than *Brahman*, (*anyatraivaprasiddhaśabdāḥ*), primarily connote *Brahman* only. Possibly, the *Sūtrakāra* is aware of the difficulty for the ordinary students to swallow and digest

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1 परमात्मन एवाव्यक्तादिशब्दवाच्यत्वे कथं प्रधानादौ तद्व्यवहारः। (TP. 1-4-1).

2 जीवशरीरं यथा तत्तन्त्रं तथा प्रधानाद्यपि ब्रह्मतन्त्रम्। (TDK. 1-4-1).

3 ह्रस्वे। (Pānini 5-3-86).

4 स्थितेति वाच्ये विन्यस्तेत्युक्तिः प्रधानादिविशिष्टस्यैवाव्यक्तादिपदेन गृहीतिर्न केवलस्येति वक्तुम्। (TDK. 1-4-1).

this proposition, he assures them, saying that the scriptures support this view, with the words '*darśayati ca*'[1].

Madhvācārya quotes relevant extracts from scriptures in support of *Sūtrakāra*'s contention. The *Nāsadīya Sūkta*[2] bears witness to the all-pervasive *Brahman* (*ābhu*) abiding in the *Avyakta* (*tuccha*) and remaining enveloped by it (*apihitaṁ*) in the primordial state[3]. He quotes another mantra[4] from *Pippalādaśākhā* and a verse[5] from *Bhagavadgītā* where the term *Avyakta* is used as an epithet of *Paramātman*.

The *Sūtrakāra* provides another reason from the semantic point of view, to show how the term *Avyakta* is fit to convey *Brahman*, in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् ॐ ॥ **(1-4-2)**

[illegible]। तदिति तन्त्रम्। सूक्ष्ममेव अव्यक्तशब्दवाच्यं तस्य सूक्ष्मस्य तस्य [illegible]क्तत्वस्य अर्हत्वात्।

Here '*tu*' means only, alone. '*Tad*' is to be repeated. ***Sūkṣmaṁ*, the subtle all-pervading spirit, *Brahman* alone is denoted by the term *Avyakta*, the unmanifest, because *Brahman* deserves to possess that attribute of *avyakta* i.e. *avyaktatvaṁ*.**

The interpretation of this *sūtra* as given by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya is that even though the physical body is gross and cannot be deemed to be unmanifested (*avyakta*), what is really meant here by the term *Avyakta* is the subtle causal body (*kāraṇaśarīra*) of which this gross physical body is constituted[6].

[illegible] श्रुतिः। च शब्देन स्मृतिः। (TDK. 1-4-1).

[illegible]नाभ्वपिहितं यदासीत्। (RV. 10-129-3).

[illegible]NK. I. p. 264.

[illegible]मचलं शान्तं निष्कलं निष्क्रियं परम्। यो वेद हरिमात्मानं स भयादनुमुच्यते॥ (M. BSB.1-4-1).

[illegible] ब्रह्म परमम्। (BG. 8-3), अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तः। (BG. 8-21).

[illegible]NK. I. p. 269.

Having come to the conclusion that the term *Avyakta* in the *viṣayavākya* conveyed the physical body, (while interpreting the previous *sūtra*), Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya are forced to interpret this *sūtra* in this way. Just as their interpretation of previous *sūtra* was felt farfetched, the interpretation of this *sūtra* too is not found cogent.

The competence of the term *Avyakta* to convey *Brahman* can be agreed to, on the basis of this *sūtra*. But how can we accept *Brahman* as *Duḥkhin* etc. when we are told earlier that *Brahman* is happiness personified, *Ānandamayaḥ* (BS. 1-1-12)? The next *sūtra* clears this doubt.

॥ ॐ तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् ॐ ॥ **(1-4-3)**

दुःखिप्रभृतिशब्दजातं ब्रह्मणि अर्थवत् न व्यर्थं दुःखित्वादितन्निमित्तधर्माणां तस्य ब्रह्मणः अधीनत्वात् च ।

It is quite meaningful and not vain to apply the terms *Duḥkhin* (distressed) *Avara* (inferior), etc. to *Brahman*, on account of *Brahman*'s overall control over the functioning of the properties denoted by these terms also.

This *sūtra* enunciates the principle governing the application of epithets. An epithet can be applied to a person in two ways[1] One, the person should possess the properties denoted by the epithet. Two, he should have an overall control over the functioning of those properties in another. For example, when it is said that 'the king is brave', the king is believed to possess braveness. But when it is said that 'the king is the winner in the war', the king might not have visited the war front even once and might not have fired a single shot. Still, the king is accepted as the winner because he exercised overall control over the war. The first alternative is known to everyone, but the second one is not easily discernible Possibly, to remind the reader that a second alternative is possible

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1 अन्यगतशब्दार्थनियन्तृत्वं तदधिकरणत्वं चेति द्विधा हि शब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्। (TP. 1-4-3)

Madhvācārya adds a word '*ca*' (also) in his *vṛtti*, which word is not found in the *sūtra*. Had the *Sūtrakāra* himself added the word *ca* in the *sūtra*, it would have meant that this *sūtra* provided another probans (*hetu*) for the assertion (*pratijñā*) proved in the preceding sūtra. In support of his contention, Madhvācārya quotes a relevant verse[1] from *Skandapurāṇa*. The purport of the *sūtra* is that all the words are significant (*arthavat*) for *Brahman*, because of Its overall control over the attributes connoted by those words.

Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted this *sūtra* in a different way as follows: "Had we admitted an independent previous unmanifest condition of the world as the cause of the world, then it would have been as though we have accepted the *Sāṅkhya* view that *Pradhāna* is the cause of the world. But we accept that this prior condition of the world is dependent on *Parameśvara* (the Supreme God), not independent. Such a prior condition has to be accepted, because its acceptance is meaningful. Without that, the creatorship of *Parameśvara* cannot be justified, because without that power He cannot commence the creation"[2].

There is a pronoun '*tad*' in the *sūtra*, which expects a referent in the preceding paragraphs. Śaṅkarācārya has assumed its referent as *Parameśvara*, which word is not found in his commentary on the earlier two sūtras[3].

The *sūtra* contains two words. One compound word '*tadadhīnatvāt*' in the ablative case, which obviously stands for a probans. The other word '*arthavat*' is the predicate indicating the assertion (*pratijñā*) proved. The two together should yield a coherent statement. In the commentary above, what Śaṅkarācārya is telling, in essence, is,

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1. [illegible] गुणो यस्य तद्गुणी सोऽभिधीयते। यथा जीवः परात्मेति यथा राजा जयीत्यपि॥ (M. BSB. 1-4-3).
2. [illegible] वयं स्वतन्त्राम् कांचित् प्रागवस्थां जगतः कारणत्वेन अभ्युपगच्छेम प्रसञ्जयेम तदा [illegible]कारणवादम्; परमेश्वराधीना तु इयम् अस्माभिः प्रागवस्था जगतो अभ्युपगम्यते न [illegible] सा च अवश्यम् अभ्युपगन्तव्या; अर्थवती हि सा न हि तया विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं [illegible] शक्तिरहितस्य तस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। (S. BSB. 1-4-3).
3. [illegible] I. 270.

(1) previous unmanifest condition of the world is not *Pradhāna* because of its dependence on *Parameśvara* (*tadadhīnatvāt*), and

(2) acceptance of such a prior condition is meaningful (*arthavat*) because without that the creatorship of *Parameśvara* cannot be proved.

Thus, an assertion has been devised for the probans in the *sūtra*, and another probans has been supplied for the predicate in the *sūtra*. Accordingly the *sūtra* yields two statements. Therefore, the interpretation involves the defect of split-sentence (*vākyabhedadoṣaḥ*)[1] and hence it is found unconvincing. Here, Śaṅkarācārya has held that the potential primordial power of the Supreme God is known by the terms *Avyakta*, *Avidyā*, *Māyā* etc.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets this *sūtra* on similar lines that "(matter in the subtle state) serves an end (of man) on account of its dependence on Him (the Lord)[2].

The *Sūtrakāra* provides another reason in support of his view that the terms *Avyakta* etc. primarily convey *Brahman* only, in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ॐ ॥ (1-4-4)

ब्रह्मणि एव अव्यक्तादिशब्दजातं अर्थवत् तस्यैव मुमुक्षुज्ञेयत्ववचनात् प्रधानादेः मुमुक्षुज्ञेयत्वावचनात् च ।[3]

It is quite meaningful to apply the terms *Avyakta* etc. to *Brahman*, because the knowledge of *Brahman* alone is recommended (by *Śruti*) for *Mokṣa* (emancipation) and the knowledge of *Pradhāna* etc. has not been recommended.

1 BNK. I. p. 270.
2 Śrībhāṣya- SV 1-4-3.
3 VKM. 1-4-4.

The conjunctive particle '*ca*' in the *sūtra* serves two purposes, one of joining together of the two probanses mentioned above, and the other of telling that these are additional probanses for the assertion made in the previous *sūtra*.

Muṇḍakopaniṣad says[1], "Know Him, the *Ātman* alone and give up all other talk; this is the bridge to immortality". Therefore, it is pertinent to understand that the terms *Avyakta* etc. in scriptures primarily convey *Brahman* and not *Prakṛti* etc.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, whereas for the *Sāṅkhya* system, knowledge of *Pradhāna* as distinct from *Puruṣa* is said to be essential for achieving the liberation of the soul, in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* passages, *Avyakta* is not mentioned as an object of knowledge or meditation. The word *Avyakta* is used incidentally for body[2]. Therefore, *Avyakta* cannot be taken as *Pradhāna*. Rāmānujācārya interprets exactly in the same way: "And because it is not mentioned (that the (*Avyakta*) Unevolved) is to be known (it cannot be the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas*)"[3].

Though there is no specific statement in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* that *Avyakta* should be known or meditated upon, when the *Upaniṣad* declares that *Avyakta* is superior to *Mahat* and inferior to *Puruṣa*, it is intended that the term, for whatever it stands, has to be known[4].

The contention that the *Pradhāna* is also told to be known for achieving liberation, is being refuted in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि ॐ ॥ (1-4-5)

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1. तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानम् अन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ अमृतस्यैष सेतुः। (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-2-5).
2. SBK p. 315.
3. Śrībhāṣya SV 1-4-4.
4. BNK I p. 270.

"महतः परं निचाय्य मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते"[1] इति श्रुतिः प्रधानस्यापि मुमुक्षुज्ञेयत्वं वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञः परमात्मा हि[2] अत्र उच्यते।

Relying on the text that "by knowing the one beyond the *Mahat*, one is freed from death", if it be said that the scripture (*Kaṭhopaniṣad*) tells that the knowledge of *Pradhāna / Prakṛti* also leads to liberation, it is not so, because the Supreme Being (*Prājña*) is meant here.

In the previous *sūtra*, it has been argued that the term *Avyakta* is primarily applicable to *Brahman*, because the knowledge of *Brahman* alone leads to *Mokṣa* and not of others. The *Pūrvapakṣin* comes up arguing that according to *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (1-3-15), the knowledge of that beyond the *Mahat*, that is *Pradhāna / Prakṛti* in view of *mantra* 1-3-11, also leads to *Mokṣa*. The *sūtra* refutes this contention saying that what is meant here by 'that beyond the *Mahat*' is not *Pradhāna / Prakṛti* but *Brahman*. Because, *Brahman* has been declared earlier[3] as "subtler than the subtle and greater than the great" and thus the absolute greatness of *Brahman* includes the greatness over *Mahat* also.

There is unanimity among the commentators about the purport of this *sūtra* that the phrase '*Mahataḥ paraṁ*' in *mantra* 1-3-15 of *Kaṭhopaniṣad* conveys *Paramātman* and not *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna*

The question why *Paramātman* alone is to be taken by the phrase '*mahatḥ paraṁ*' is answered in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ प्रकरणात् ॐ ॥ (1-4-6)

प्राज्ञः परमात्मा तत्र उच्यते विष्णुप्रकरणात्।[4]

***Paramātman* is meant (by the phrase '*Mahataḥ paraṁ*') because the chapter refers to Viṣṇu.**

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1 अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत्। अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तं मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते ॥ (Katha. Up. 1-3-15).

2 सूत्रभाष्यगत हि शब्दार्थः यत इति। (BVB 1-4-5).

3 अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान्। (Katha. Up. 1-2-20).

4 सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्। (Katha. Up. 1-3-9).

One may raise a question that when *Prakṛti* and *Paramātman* are both meant by the phrase '*Mahataḥ paraṁ*' (in *mantra* 1-3-11), why *Paramātman* alone is to be taken by the same phrase in *mantra* 1-3-15. The *sūtra* answers saying that the topic here is the disclosure of the Viṣṇu's highest position as the end of the road, the culmination and the highest goal.

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya consider '*Prakaraṇāt*' as part of the previous *sūtra* 5, but Madhvācārya reads it as a separate *sūtra*.

The next *sūtra* provides another reason why *Paramātman* alone is to be taken by the phrase '*mahataḥ paraṁ*'.

॥ ॐ त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च ॐ ॥ (1-4-7)

बुद्धिस्थत्वात् एतदुपनिषदीत्यन्वेति। एवं एतदुपनिषदि पितृसौमनस्य स्वर्ग्याग्निपरमात्मनां त्रयाणामेव प्रश्नः उपन्यासश्च यतः अतः च प्राज्ञ एव तत्र गृह्यते।

The words 'in this *Upaniṣad*' follow here because the discussion of this (*Kaṭha*) *Upaniṣad* still lingers in our mind.

So also, in this *Upaniṣad*, the query (by Naciketas) and (the subsequent) statement (by Yama) are about three things only, (namely) father's well-being, the sacrificial fire which leads to heaven, and the knowledge of *Brahman*, and therefore the Supreme *Brahman* only is meant there. There is no question asked about *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* and therefore, there is no ground to take *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* by the expression '*mahataḥ paraṁ*' in *mantra* 1-3-15.

Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation is also on similar lines, but he counts the three things asked for by Naciketas, as relating to the sacrificial fire, the individual soul and the Highest Self. Thus, he argues, there is no separate question and answer in regard to *Pradhāna* and so it cannot be said to be either the object of

knowledge or indicated by the word 'Avyakta'[1]. Incidentally, Śaṅkarācārya explains here, his theory of the identity of the individual soul and the Highest Self.

Rāmānujācārya considers that in the text under discussion there is the mention of three things only as objects of knowledge viz. the object of the meditation (*upeya*), the nature of the meditation (*upāya*) and the person meditating (*upetṛ*), and questions are only with reference to those three. There is no mention of, or question relating to, the *Pradhāna*[2].

The important point emphasized by the *Sūtrakāra* is that *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* is not one of the three things asked for and discussed in the text. All commentators agree on this point. The three things themselves are of secondary importance in this *sūtra*. As the *Sūtrakāra* has not enumerated the three things expressly, it is expected of the readers to take the three things, which are popularly known to have been discussed in *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. The students of *Kaṭhopaniṣad* know well that Naciketas got three boons and accordingly he raised only three questions and received answers to them only, from Yama. Some commentators have unnecessarily complicated this minor point.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that though *Brahman* having the characteristics like subtlety etc. is fit to be called as *Avyakta* etc., such terms are not popularly used to denote *Brahman* and therefore the terms do not primarily convey *Brahman*. The next *sūtra* refutes this contention.

॥ ॐ महद्वच्च ॐ ॥ (1-4-8)

च शब्दात् अव्यक्तादिशब्दवाच्यं ब्रह्मैव इति समुच्चीयते। अव्यक्तादिशब्दवाच्यं ब्रह्मैव महद्वत्। यथा महच्छब्दस्य अन्यत्र प्रसिद्धत्वेपि 'महान्तं विभुम्'[3] इत्यत्र महच्छब्दवाच्यं ब्रह्म तथा अन्यत्रप्रसिद्धाव्यक्तादिशब्दवाच्यं ब्रह्म एव।[4]

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1 SRK. p. 316.

2 Śrībhāṣya - SV 1-4-6.

3 महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति। (Katha. Up. 1-2-22).

4 VKM. 1-4-8.

On the strength of the word *ca* in the *sūtra*, the sentence, "the words *Avyakta* etc. convey *Brahman* only" is added.

Just as the term '*Mahat*', which popularly refers to '*Mahat*'-principle, is used in the sense of *Brahman* in the texts like '*mahāntaṁ vibhuṁ*', the terms '*Avyakta*' etc. though they ordinarily denote something else, primarily convey *Brahman* only. And the term '*Avyakta*' is actually used to denote *Brahman* in some texts (e.g. Bhagavadgītā, 8-20 & 21).

The interpretation of Śaṅkarācārya is in a different direction, as follows[1]. The *Sāṅkhyas* have used the word '*Mahat*' in the sense of only *sattā* (existence) or *buddhi* (total intellect), which is the first product of *Pradhāna*. But that word does not denote the same sense in Vedic sentences, because the word is used in apposition with the word *ātman*, in phrases like '*mahāntaṁ vibhuṁ ātmānaṁ*' etc. Similarly the term *Avyakta* also cannot denote *Pradhāna* in Vedic parlance.

No doubt, the terms like *mahat*, *Avyakta* etc. primarily convey *Brahman* in scriptures and at places, they are actually used to denote *Brahman*. But the fact that such terms are popularly understood to denote principles, other than *Brahman*, cannot be denied. That is why, they are called as *anyatraivaprasiddhaśabdas*'. Accordingly, the term *Avyakta* is known to denote the principle of *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna*. Though *Vedānta* does not consider *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* as the independent cause of creation, yet its existence as a principle in the gradation of principles to show the supreme status of *Brahman*, cannot be washed away. Śaṅkarācārya's argument seems to be that, since *mahat* has been used to denote *Brahman*, *Avyakta* described as *mahataḥ paraṁ* (superior to *mahat*), can not convey *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* (which is known to be inferior to *Brahman*). If this

1. यथा महच्छब्दः साङ्ख्यैः सत्तामात्रेऽपि प्रथमजे प्रयुक्तः न तमेव वैदिकेऽपि प्रयोगेऽभिधत्ते महान्तं विभुमात्मानम् इत्येवमादावात्मशब्दप्रयोगादिभ्यो हेतुभ्यः तथा अव्यक्तशब्दोऽपि न वैदिके प्रयोगे प्रधानमभिधातुमर्हति। (S. BSB. 1-4-7).

argument is accepted, then by the same reasoning, *Avyakta* cannot convey *avidyā* or *māyā* [1] as held by Śaṅkarācārya[2]. Hence, such sweeping remark that the term *Avyakta* cannot denote *Pradhāna* in Vedic parlance, does not become convincing.

Rāmānujācārya's interpretation is on the same line as that of Śaṅkarācārya.

The next *sūtra* gives another example to show how a word popularly understood in one sense is taken in a different sense in the context of *Śruti*.

|| ॐ चमसवदविशेषात् ॐ || **(1-4-9)**

चमसशब्दः यज्ञपात्रे प्रसिद्धोऽपि यथा श्रुतिबलेन शिरसि मुख्यः तथा अव्यक्तादिशब्दोऽपि ब्रह्मणि मुख्यः 'नामानि सर्वाणि' इति श्रुतेः 'इदं तच्छिरः' इति श्रुत्या अविशेषात् तत्साम्यात्।[3]

Just as the word '*camasa*', though popularly known as a sacrificial bowl, is prescribed to mean a head on the strength of scripture, in the same way a term like *Avyakta* primarily connotes *Brahman*, because there is no difference but similarity between the *Śruti* sentences, '*nāmāni sarvāṇi yaṁ āviśanti*'[4] which says that all names are to be applied to *Brahman*, and '*arvāgbilaścamasa ūrdhvabudhnaḥ itīdaṁ tacchiraḥ*'[5] which prescribes that the bowl that has its opening below and bulge at the top is the head.

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have considered this *sūtra* as a part of next *Adhikaraṇa*.

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1 BNK. I. p. 271.

2 अविद्यात्मिका हि सा वीजशक्तिरव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी महासुषुप्तिः। (S. BSB. 1-4-3).

3 TDK. 1-4-9., VKM. 1-4-9.

4 नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशन्ति तं वै विष्णुं परममुदाहरन्ति। इति भाल्लवेय श्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 1-1-1).

5 Bṛha. Up. 2-2-3.

2 चमसाधिकरणम् / ज्योतिरुपक्रमाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ चमसवदविशेषात् ॐ ॥ **(1-4-9)**

नास्मिन्मन्त्रे प्रधानमेवाजाभिप्रेतेति शक्यते अविशेषात् चमसवत्।

The '*ajā* ' cannot mean *Pradhāna*, because of the absence of special characteristics, as in the case of the bowl (camasa)[1].

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as shown above. According to him, the topic under discussion (*viṣayavākya*) here is a *mantra*[2] from *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* which says that, "the One Unborn (*ajā*), red, white and black, who produces manifold offspring similar to herself in form; the One Unborn (*aja*), pleased with her (*ajām*) sleeps with her; Another Unborn (*ajonyaḥ*), having enjoyed her, abandons her". Here, there is a pun on the word *aja*, which means the unborn as well as a goat (*aja* means he-goat and *ajā* means she-goat).

The *Sāṅkhyas* advocate that, *ajā* the unborn principle described here as red, white and black, is the *Jaḍa-prakṛti*, and the three colours refer to the three *guṇas* (characteristics or strands) *rajas*, *sattva* and *tamas* respectively. The *aja* stands for *Puruṣa*, the soul. On account of attachment to *Prakṛti*, some souls are deluded and pass through *saṁsāra*; others on account of discrimination and non-attachment attain release[3]. Thus, they claim scriptural authority for their doctrine of *Prakṛti* (*Pradhāna*) and *Puruṣa*.

According to Śaṅkarācārya this *sūtra* refutes the above contention saying that, in this *mantra* there are no special features (*aviśeṣāt*) to justify that *Pradhāna* is meant by the term *ajā*. The *sūtra* quotes an illustration of the sacrificial bowl (*camasa*). In

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1 SRK. p. 316.

2 अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः। अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः॥ (Śvetā. Up. 4-5).

3 SRK. p. 316.

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, there is a passage[1]: 'there is a bowl that has its mouth below and bulge at the top'. This sentence is vague. The next sentence makes it clear that the bowl refers to the head. In the present case there is no such clarification.

Rāmānujācārya interprets on similar lines and concludes that *ajā* is not *Prakṛti*. He holds that, "this *sūtra* refutes the *Sāṅkhya* view which declares a *Prakṛti*, *Mahat*, Ego etc. independent of *Brahman*, it does not, however, refute these categories themselves as dependent on the Supreme *Brahman*, and having *Brahman* for their Self". He accepts *Prakṛti* as the cause of creation, but not as an independent cause[2].

In an *Adhikaraṇa*, a specific topic is discussed in the light of five constituents, (1) subject (*viṣaya*) (2) doubt (*viśaya*) (3) objection (*pūrvapakṣa*) (4) conclusion (*siddhānta*) and (5) advantage (*prayojana*). Here, there is no hint in the *sūtra* about the subject to be discussed and the nature of doubt there in. All that the *sūtra* contains is a probans '*aviśeṣāt*' and an illustration '*camasavat*'. It has been said twice earlier (*sūtra* 1-1-5 and 2-1-1) that normally a probans in a *sūtra* establishes some predicate/assertion (*pratijñā*) in the same *sūtra* or in a previous *sūtra* of the same *Adhikaraṇa*. The present one is the first *sūtra* of this *Adhikaraṇa*. Therefore, in the absence of any assertion in the *sūtra*, it is easy for the commentator to choose any suitable topic of his liking and to discuss it. It is equally easy for the reader not to accept it since there is no indication in the *sūtra* to show that this is the point at issue[3]. Moreover, since the conclusion reached here is the same oft-repeated one that the *Sāṅkhya* *Pradhāna* has no support in the scriptures, there is no advantage accruing from the discussion. Hence, the above interpretation of the *sūtra* is found farfetched and unconvincing.

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1 अर्वाग्बिलश्चमस ऊर्ध्वबुध्नः । (Bṛha. Up. 2-2-3).

2 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 1-4-8.

3 BNK. I. p. 279.

॥ ॐ ज्योतिरुपक्रमात्तु तथा ह्यधीयत एके ॐ ॥

(1-4-10)

In this *sūtra*, in place of '*jyotirupakramāt tu*', the reading by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya is '*jyotirupakramā tu*'.

Having rejected the *Sāṅkhya* contention that *ajā* in *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* meant *Pradhāna*, Śaṅkarācārya holds, on the basis of this *sūtra*, that *ajā* stands for '*Tejo'banna*', i.e. a tripartite of three elements *tejas* (fire), *ap* (water) and *anna* (food). The three colours red, white and black mentioned in that *Upaniṣad*, refer to the three subtle elements fire, water and food, according to *Śaṅkarācārya* and he finds a support for his contention in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* [1]. Thus, the interpretation of this *sūtra*, according to Śaṅkarācārya, is that "*Ajā*, however, means the three elements beginning with light, for some read their text in that manner"[2].

It is difficult to accept this interpretation. (1) The predicate about the tricoloured *Ajā*, which has no indication anywhere in the *sūtras* of this *Adhikaraṇa*, needs to be brought in. (2) The primary sense of *Ajā* expected in the *Upaniṣad* is as 'unborn'[3], but the three members of the tripartite *Tejo'banna* are all born[4]. (3) The word '*jyotiḥ*' appearing in the *sūtra* has to be understood as *agni*. '*Jyotiḥ*' means light or luster, and it is one of the properties of *agni*. The term *jyotiḥ* is rarely used to denote *agni*. (4) Since brevity (*alpākṣaratva*) has to be maintained in a *sūtra*, if the *Sūtrakāra* wanted to tell that *ajā* conveys tejo'*banna*, he could have used a shorter and simpler word like *tejādi* or *agnyādi*

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1. यदग्नेः रोहितं रूपं तेजस्तद्रूपम् यच्छुक्लं तदपां यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्य----- ।
   (Chand. Up. 6-4-1)
2. SRK. p. 317.
3. न जायते सा अजा।
4. तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशस्सम्भूतः। आकाशाद्वायुः। वायोरग्निः। अग्नेरापः । अद्भ्यः पृथिवी। पृथिव्या ओषधयः। ओषधीभ्योऽन्नम्। (Tait. Up. 2-1).

instead of the complex term '*jyotirupakrama*'[1]. (5) The *Upaniṣad* talks of the 'One Unborn' (*ajā ekā*), but the tripartite *tejo'banna* is a group of three.

Rāmānujācārya has the same general purport for the *adhikaraṇa*, but in accordance with his doctrine, that the *ajā* more particularly means the '*sūkṣma-cid-acid-vastu*' the intelligent and material world in its subtle condition, which forms the very body of the *Paramātman*[2]. This looks like the description of *Prakṛti* only in other words. Quoting *Taittirīya* text, (*Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*), which also mentions the *mantra* from the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* (4-5), Rāmānujācārya concludes that the Unborn (*ajā*) also is produced from *Brahman* and has *Brahman* for its Self[3]. B. N. K. Sharma argues at length and concludes[4]: "It is indeed difficult to see how Rāmānujācārya can seriously insist on regarding his *Acit-Prakṛti* as produced by *Brahman*. That would be quite against the clear statement of the *Śruti*, 'A cow she is without beginning and end' (*cūlikopaniṣad*) cited by Rāmānujācārya himself in his commentary on *sūtra* 1-4-8". In his commentary, Rāmānujācārya has not agreed with the identity of *ajā* with *tejo'banna*. Further he has not found any hint to show that this is the issue at hand in this *Adhikaraṇa*. Thus, his interpretation too is unconvincing.

The *sūtra* quoted above is as it is read by Madhvācārya and Vallabhācārya. The interpretation of this *sūtra* by Madhvācārya is in an entirely different direction. Based on the introductory *sūtras*, '*śāstrayonitvāt* (1-1-3)' and '*tattu samanvayāt* (1-1-4)', Madhvācārya holds that the innumerable attributes of *Brahman* can be known only through proper interpretation of scriptural words and phrases. According to him, in *Pāda* 1 and 2 earlier

1 BNK I p. 279.
2 VSG. p. 64.
3 Śrībhāṣya- SV 1-4-9.
4 BNK I. p. 281.

the *Sūtrakāra* has shown some representative scriptural words, which are popularly known to denote something other than *Brahman* (*anyatraprasiddhaśabdas*), actually convey *Brahman*. In *Pāda* 3, he has shown some representative words and phrases, which are known to denote both *Brahman* and something else (*ubhayatraprasiddhaśabdas*), actually convey *Brahman* in the scriptural context. The scriptural words and phrases, which are found to refer exclusively to something other than *Brahman* (*anyatraivaprasiddhaśabdas*), which are difficult to be shown to convey *Brahman*, by ordinary methods of interpretation, are taken up in *Pāda* 4. The *Sūtrakāra* uses some special techniques to show that they too convey *Brahman* only. So far, the *Sūtrakāra* has dealt with words and phrases, which are either non-significant[1] terms or descriptive significant[2] terms. According to Madhvācārya, now the *Sūtrakāra* is taking a bigger stride and pointing towards a sweeping scriptural declaration, which is stunning and *prima facie* unbelievable. All the words, syllables and accents in scriptural sentences, interpreted so far in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇas*, as well as those which have not been interpreted else-where, are being sought to be shown as primarily conveying some attribute of *Brahman* [3].

[illegible] सर्वे शब्दा वर्णपदादिरूपेण समन्वीयन्ते। तत्तु इत्यस्ति। [illegible]। ल्यब्लोपनिमित्ता पञ्चमी। उपक्रमात् तु उपक्रमं विधाय एव।[4] [illegible]। तदित्यावर्तते। ज्योतिः तत्तु ब्रह्मैव हि यस्माद् एके शाखिनः [illegible]णि शतच्र्यादिशब्दवाच्यत्वम् उपक्रम्य एव तद् ब्रह्म तथा सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वेन [illegible]यते।

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1 [illegible]त्मकशब्दाः धर्मिबोधकशब्दाः। (TP. - RR 1-1-12).

[2] [illegible]त्मकशब्दाः धर्मबोधकशब्दाः। (TP. RR 1-1-12).

3 [illegible]न्येषु समन्वितानां अन्यत्र असमन्वितानां च वाक्यानां पदवर्णस्वरादिभेदेन इह समन्वीयमानत्वात् [illegible] रूपेण उदाहरणत्वम् इत्यर्थः। (BVD 1-4-10).

[4] [illegible]लोपे कर्मण्यधिकरणे पञ्चमी। (Pāṇini 1-4-31 *Vārtika*) The fifth case is employed in denoting the object or location, when the verbal participle ending in '*lyap*' is elided, e.g. प्रासादमारुह्य प्रेक्षते = प्रासादात् प्रेक्षते। आसने उपविश्य प्रेक्षते = आसनात् [illegible]। (Siddhānta Kaumudī Tr. by S. C. Vasu).

Here (in this *Adhikaraṇa*), the comprehensive harmonious principal purport (*samanvaya*) of the entire words and letters (in scriptures) is being shown. The words '*tat tu*' are continued. '*Tu*' is in the sense of only. The phrase '*upakramāt tu*' means 'just after commencement'. The term '*hi* ' is in the sense of 'because'. The word '*tat* ' is to be repeated.

The word *jyotiḥ* conveys *Brahman* only, because some (i.e. *Aitareya Śākhins*) having started with the (illustrative) word *śatarcin* which is etymologically shown as referring to *Brahman*, immediately read all the words as conveying *Brahman*.

Since the word '*jyotiḥ*' denoting light, has already been shown to convey *Brahman*, in an earlier *sūtra* '*jyotiścaraṇābhidhānāt*' (1-1-24), the same meaning is not expected here again. The term '*jyotiḥ*' stands here, according to Madhvācārya, for the *Jyotiṣṭomayāga*, a popular sacrifice, and the *viṣayavākya* is "*vasante vasante jyotiṣā yajeta*".

The *Pūrvapakṣin* strongly objects this view. The term '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' i.e. '*jyotiṣām stomaḥ*' is popularly known as the name of a sacrifice, etymologically (*yogavṛttyā*) as well as by traditional usage (*ruḍhivṛttyā*). If it is said that *jyotis* denotes *Brahman*, *stoma* denotes *Brahman*, *jyotiṣṭoma* denotes *Brahman*, *vasante* denotes *Brahman* and *yajeta* denotes *Brahman* then the whole sentence reduces to a string of names of *Brahman* and carries no sense. Similarly, the scriptural texts called '*Brāhmaṇa*' texts, which are believed to specify the procedure and prospects of various sacrifices will become infructuous. As a result, all the activities of sacrifice etc. will come to a standstill. If the words are considered as conveying *Brahman* by etymology (*yogavṛtti*) and other things by usage (*ruḍhivṛtti*), then the other things carry the primary sense and not *Brahman*[1]. If the words are taken as conveying *Brahman* by usage and other things by etymology,

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1 योगाद्रूढिर्बलीयसी । (TP- 1-4-10).

then *Brahman* cannot be considered as having all the attributes conveyed by various words[1]. In case it is accepted that all the words denote *Brahman* by both etymology and usage i.e. by primary signification (*mukhyārtha*, *abhidhāvṛtti*), then the other things will have to be known by the secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*) of words, as a result of their relation with the main referent *Brahman* as their indwelling controller. However, this is not the general understanding in the worldly convention and cannot be accepted. The only way left out is not to accept the proposition that all the words primarily convey *Brahman*. Otherwise the language will lose its ability to communicate thoughts.

The contention of the *sūtra* that all the scriptural words are expressive of *Brahman* is based on the teaching of *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. Madhvācārya quotes the relevant extract from *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, which says: "This *Paramātman* entered the bodies of gods and the human beings, as their *Antaryāmin*. He is *Prāṇa* who scorches. He entered therein for a hundred years. So human life is for a hundred years. Because He entered for a hundred years, He who is Himself '*Śatarcinaḥ*' etc., they call Him '*Śatarcinaḥ*' etc."[2]. Thus, the *Upaniṣad* shows that the names of Ṛṣis like Śatarcin, Madhyamā, Viśvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Atraya, Bharadvāja, Vasiṣṭha, Pragāthā, Pāvamānya as well as the terms like *Sūkta*, *Ṛca*, *Ardharca*, *Akṣara* primarily convey Him the *Paramātman* only. Then the *Upaniṣad* says[3]:- "All these *Ṛcās*, all these Vedas, all these sounds are to be understood as denoting only One Being,

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1 A thing customarily denoted by a word, may not possess the characteristics conveyed by the word. For example, a bridge in Pune, known as Lakadi Pool (Wooden bridge) is a regular concrete bridge. Similarly, in Mumbai, an area called Dhobi Talao (Washerman tank) has no tank at all.

2 एष इमं लोकमभ्यार्चत् पुरुषरूपेण य एष तपति। प्राणो वाव तदभ्यार्चत्। प्राणो ह्येष य एष तपति।तं शतं वर्षाण्यभ्यार्चत्।तस्माच्छतं वर्षाणि पुरुषायुषो भवन्ति। तं यच्छतं वर्षाण्यभ्यार्चत् तस्माच्छतर्चिनस्तमाच्छतर्चिन इत्याचक्षत एतमेव सन्तम्। -----ता वा एताः सर्वा ऋचः सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषाः एकैव व्याहृतिः प्राण एव। प्राण ऋच इत्येव विद्यात्। (A.Ā. 2-2-1 & 2).

3 BNK I. p. 274.

Prāṇa. They should be taken as *ṛcās* addressed to *Prāṇa* i.e. Brahman''. The way in which the *Upaniṣad* derives the meaning of the words for denoting *Brahman* by the learned ones is known as *Vidvadrūḍhi*. The words ''He who is Himself that (*etameva santaṁ*)'' indicates that the meaning is by *Abhidhāvṛtti* and not by *Lakṣaṇāvṛtti*. Thus, the meaning is by way of *Paramamukhyārtha*. Based on the above declaration of *Aitareya Upaniṣad* that ''all these *Ṛcās*, all these Vedas, all these sounds denote One Being- know all of them to be *Ṛcās* addressed to *Prāṇa*'', Madhvācārya has interpreted the *sūtra* as above, saying that the word *jyotiḥ* standing for *Jyotiṣṭomayāga* conveys *Brahman*.

The fear expressed by the *pūrvapakṣin* that with the acceptance of the above mentioned declaration of *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, the *Brāhmaṇa* texts will become infructuous, the *Karmakāṇḍa* will come to a stop, and the language will lose its ability to communicate thoughts, is being cleared by the *Sūtrakāra* in the next *sūtra*, with an appropriate illustration.

॥ ॐ कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिवदविरोधः ॐ ॥ **(1-4-11)**

यथा 'असावादित्यो देवमधु'[1] इत्यत्र मधुशब्दस्य आदित्यस्थितब्रह्मणः उपासनार्थम् उक्तत्वेपि न क्षौद्रकादौ व्यवहारविरोधः तथा ब्रह्मणः ज्योतिष्टोमादिसर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वं तत्तद्वाचित्वमनिवार्यं उपासनार्थमेव महायोगवृत्त्या कल्पनायाः उपासनाया। उपदेशात् एव न कर्मविरोधः।

Just as the term '*madhu*' is used to connote *Brahman* indwelling in the Sun, for the purpose of meditation, and yet there is no objection for applying the term to honey in worldly usage, in the same way if all the terms like *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc. are prescribed to be applied to *Brahman* on the basis of higher etymology (*Mahayogavṛtti*) for the purpose of meditation only, without abandoning their usage in their respective senses, there should be no obstruction to the activities of sacrifices etc.

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1 Chānd. Up. 3-1-1.

Thus, the *Sūtrakāra* allays the fear expressed by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that the *Karmakāṇḍa* would come to a halt and the language may lose its powers. The *Śruti* does not interfere with the conventional methods of etymology, grammar, usage etc. in determining the senses of the words in the common parlance. It only commends the use of all the scriptural words to understand the majesty of *Brahman*, through the deeper sense of the words with the help of *Mahāyogavṛtti* and *Vidvadrūḍhi*, and to meditate on *Brahman* with that understanding. If the mystics are able to address *Paramātman* and meditate upon Him, using even apparently meaningless words like '*hrāṁ*' '*hrīṁ*' '*hrūṁ*' etc., it is beyond our scope to question or doubt their experience.

3 न संख्योपसंग्रहाधिकरणम् ।

Having told that all the words, syllables and accents in scriptures primarily convey some aspect of *Brahman*'s majesty, the *Sūtrakāra* is now considering certain apparent difficulties in accepting some words as expressive of *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च ॐ ॥

(1-4-12)

The topic under discussion (*viṣayavākya*) assumed here by all the commentators is the same. It is a *mantra*[1] from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* which says: "that in which the five groups of five people and space are established, I regard that alone as *Ātman* (*Brahman*); knowing that Immortal *Brahman*, one becomes immortal".

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that the five groups of five here make twenty-five and that figure refers to the twenty five principles accepted by the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. The five organs of perception (*jñānendriyas*), the five organs of

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1 यस्मिन्पञ्च पञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठितः ।
तमेव मन्य आत्मानं विद्वान्ब्रह्मामृतोऽमृतम् ॥ (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-17).

action (*Karmendriyas*),the mind (*manas*), the five subtle elements (*tanmātrās*), the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*), the self-sense (*ahankāra*), the understanding (*Mahat /buddhi*), Prakṛti (*Pradhāna*) and *Puruṣa* make up twenty-five. Therefore, the *Pradhāna* has recognition by the *Śruti*.

The *sūtra* refutes this contention according to Śankarācārya. *Pradhāna* etc. cannot be expected to have recognition in *Śruti* even on account of the mention of the number (twenty-five), because the principles (of the *Sānkhya* system) are diverse and cannot be classified into groups of five due to the absence of a common attribute to facilitate such a grouping; and secondly the number in the *Śruti* exceeds twenty five because *Ātman* and *Ākāśa* are mentioned as additional[1]. According to Pāṇini[2], words indicating direction or number are compounded with other words and then mean only a name of something or a person. The word '*pañcajanāḥ*' indicates a particular class of beings which are five in number[3]. The next *sūtra* will tell who the five are.

Śankarācārya's conclusion that what is mentioned in the *mantra* (*Bṛha*. Up. 4-4-17) does not refer to the twenty-five principles enunciated by the *Sānkhya*, is acceptable. But the twenty five principles are found mentioned in scriptures and therefore cannot be denied recognition altogether[4]. They are also recognized more or less by the same names in all the schools of *Vedānta*[5]. Moreover, they cannot be said 'as difficult to be classified in groups of five. They can be grouped[6] as (i) *Jñānendriyas*, (ii) *Karmendriyas*, (iii) *Tanmātras*, (iv) *Mahābhūtas* and (v) others. Śankarācārya has already discussed many times in earlier

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1 न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि प्रधानादीनां श्रुतिमत्त्वं प्रत्याशा कर्तव्या नानाभावात् --- नैषां पञ्चशः पञ्चशः साधारणो धर्मोऽस्ति ----- अतिरेकात् च। (S. BSB. 1-4-11).

2 दिक्संख्ये संज्ञायाम्। (Pāṇini 2-1-50).

3 पञ्चजना नाम ये केचित् ते च पञ्च एव। (S. BSB. 1-4-11).

4 पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वानि श्रुतिस्मृतिसमाजतः। प्रमितान्यपलप्यन्ते कथं वैदिकमानिना ॥ (TC. II. p. 181)

5 BNK I. p. 286.

6 BNK I. p. 287, TC. II. P. 182.

Adhikaraṇas the denial of scriptural recognition to the *Sāṅkhya Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna*. Here again, if the same point is stressed, it would appear that the *Sūtrakāra* is covering no new ground.

Rāmānujācārya also has interpreted the *sūtra* on the same lines.

Madhvācārya thinks that this *sūtra* considers how the words in plural and words referring to things contained (*ādheya*) in others can be expressive of *Paramātman* who is one and the support (*ādhāra*) of all.

"यस्मिन् पञ्च पञ्च जनाः आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठितः तमेव मन्य आत्मानम् (बृह. ४.४.१७)" इत्युक्तौ 'पञ्च जना' इति बहुत्वसंख्योपसंग्रहादपि यस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि …काधाराधेयभावादपि 'पञ्च जना' इति शब्दस्य ब्रह्मवाचकत्वे न विरोधः …भावात् नानारूपाणां सत्त्वात् अतिरेकात् रूपभेदात् च ।

In the *viṣayavākya*, "that in which the five groups of five people and space are established, I regard that alone as *Brahman*", there should be no objection for considering the phrase '*pañcajanāḥ*' as expressive of *Brahman* though its sense is plural and it signifies some-ones contained in *Brahman* (the container), because *Brahman* manifests itself in different forms and *Brahman* as the container is distinct from the forms of *Brahman* described as contained in the former.

The view of *Pūrvapakṣin* is that the phrase *pañca janāḥ* being plural cannot convey *Brahman*, well-known as being One. Moreover, the *pañca janāḥ* are described as established in *Brahman* and therefore the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained. The *sūtra* refutes this view. The five persons referred to by the phrase *pañca janāḥ* are the five forms of *Brahman* present as the indwelling controller in the five principles of life, in every being, specified in the next complementary passage. The maxim that the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained may be applicable to ordinary things, but *Brahman* is an exception to that rule. It is possible for *Brahman* to be his own

support (*ādhāra*)[1], just as we say "time exists at all times" and "space is everywhere". The existence of time and space are told respectively with reference to time and space only.

Which are these five forms of *Brahman* present in every being? The next *sūtra* answers this question.

॥ ॐ प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् ॐ ॥ **(1-4-13)**

The passage (*viṣayavākya*) under discussion here, according to all the commentators, is a *mantra*[2] from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, placed next to the one considered under the previous *sūtra*. It specifies the five forms of *Brahman* dwelling in each being. The *mantra* tells that, "they who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of the food and the mind of the mind, they have realized the ancient primordial *Brahman*". Thus, the *mantra* indicates that the breath (vital force), the eye etc. mentioned in the accusative case are the five forms of *Brahman* which confer on the breath (vital air), the eye etc. mentioned in the genitive case, their respective powers for functioning as the five operating principles in a living being. The exposition of this *sūtra* would be as follows.

"प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुः" इत्यादिद्वितीयान्तनिर्दिष्टप्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्रान्न-मनःशब्दिताः पञ्च जनाः "प्राणस्य प्राणम्" इत्यादि वाक्यशेषात्।

The five forms of *Brahman* (referred to in the preceding *sūtra*) are indicated by words *Prāṇa* (vital breath), *cakṣus* (eye) etc. mentioned in the accusative case in the complementary passage (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-18) as 'the breath of breath' etc. There is no controversy among the commentators regarding the interpretation of this *sūtra*.

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1 युक्तं च ब्रह्मणः स्वाश्रयत्वम्।आधाराधेयभावो हि भेदाभावेपि युज्यते। कालः सदास्ति देशोस्ति सर्वत्रेत्यादिभानतः ॥ (TC. II. p. 180).

2 प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुः। श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रमन्नस्यान्नं मनसो मनः ॥ (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-18).

The objection that all the five forms of *Brahman* are not heard in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* recited by some schools, is answered by the next sūtra.

॥ ॐ ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने ॐ ॥ (1-4-14)

एकेषां काण्वानां शाखायामन्ने अन्नाख्यरूपे असत्यपि 'ज्योतिषां ज्योति'रिति प्रागुक्तज्योतिषा पञ्चत्वं बोध्यम्।

Even though in some sections i.e. in the *Kāṇva* recension[1] of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* there is no mention of the form of food, the fifth form may be understood as *jyotis*, which is mentioned in the preceding *mantra*[2]. It is proper to take that either both the words, *annaṁ* and *jyotis*, convey the same sense, or these are two separate sets of five forms each[3]. All the commentators agree on the interpretation of this *sūtra*.

4 कारणत्वाधिकरणम् / आकाशाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः ॐ ॥ (1-4-15)

All the commentators have identified the same scriptural passages, in various *Upaniṣads*, which refer to the creation of the universe, for discussion here under this *sūtra*. However, the location of the problem and the conclusion reached based on this *sūtra*, vary from one commentator to the other.

Taittirīya Upaniṣad says that[4], "from this *Ātman* ether arose; from ether air; from air fire; from fire water; from water the earth

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1. प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुरुत श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो ये मनो विदुः। ते निचिक्युर्ब्रह्म पुराणमग्र्यम्॥ (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-18).
2. यस्मादर्वाक्संवत्सरोऽहोभिः परिवर्तते।तद्देवा ज्योतिषां ज्योतिरायुर्होपासतेऽमृतम्॥ (Bṛha. Up. 4- 4-16).
3. अत्र ज्योतिरन्नशब्दयोरेकार्थत्वं पृथक् पञ्चकं वा इत्युपपन्नम् । (TP. 1-4-14).
4. तस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः। आकाशाद्वायुः। वायोरग्निः। अग्नेरापः। अद्भ्यः पृथिवी। (Tait.Up.2-1).

and so on''. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* tells that[1], ''That (*Sat* i.e. Being) willed, 'may I become many'; It created fire; that fire willed, 'may I become many'; It created water, and so on''. *Praśnopaniṣad* declares that[2], ''He (*Paramātman*) created the vital breath (*Prāṇa*) and then from *Prāṇa* faith, ether, air, light, water, earth etc''.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the problem is that the scriptural passages dealing with the creation of the world appear contradictory; there is no uniformity in the order of created principles and in the causality of *Brahman*. Some texts attribute the creation of the world to non-being[3] and some say that the world came into being on its own without a creator[4]. This *sūtra* refutes these contentions saying[5] that though there may be contradictions in the order of creation, there is no such contradiction regarding the creator. He is described in all passages as omniscient, lord of all, the inner soul of everything and as the one and only cause without the second[6].

Thus, according to Śaṅkarācārya, this *sūtra* deals with an alleged internal contradiction in *Śrutis*. However, in the first *Adhyāya* named as *Samanvayādhyāya*, the *Sūtrakāra* proposes to show how scriptural sentences, phrases and words describe and disclose the nature, attributes and majesty of *Brahman*. The treatment of external objections and internal contradictions seems to have been contemplated in the second *Adhyāya* known as *Avirodhādhyāya*. The *Sūtrakāra* does discuss apparent internal

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1 तदैक्षत वहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत तत्तेज ऐक्षत वहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽसृजत। (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3).

2 स प्राणमसृजत। प्राणात् श्रद्धां खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवीम्। (Praśna. Up. 6-4).

3 असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्। ततो वै सदजायत। (Tait. Up. 2-7).

4 तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्तन्नामरूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियतासौनामायमिदंरूप इति। (Bṛha. Up. 1-4-7).

5 सत्यपि प्रतिवेदान्तं सृज्यमानेष्वाकाशादिषु क्रमादिद्वारके विगाने न स्रष्टरि किञ्चिद्विगानमस्ति यथा व्यपदिष्टोक्तेः। यथाभूतो ह्येकस्मिन्वेदान्ते सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरः सर्वात्मैकोऽद्वितीयः कारणत्वेन व्यपदिष्टः। (S. BSB. 1-4-14).

6 SRK p. 320..

contradictions of *Śruti*, in the third and fourth *Pādas* of the second *Adhyāya*[1]. Therefore, the topic of internal contradictions is not expected to find a place here.

Rāmānujācārya holds that this *sūtra* continues to deny the scriptural recognition to the *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna*. His *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that in the *śruti* texts no particular single agent is declared to be the cause of this world and therefore *Brahman* cannot be the sole first cause; but on the other hand it is possible to infer that the *Pradhāna* is the first cause[2]. This *sūtra* refutes the view of *Pūrvapakṣin* and affirms that *Brahman* alone, endowed with the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and the rest as described (*yatha vyapadiṣtokteḥ*), is the cause of the universe[3].

The denial of scriptural recognition to *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna* has been concluded so many times up till now, and in a laconic work like *Brahmasūtra* the same topic is not expected again and again. Moreover, the treatment of external objections and internal contradictions is planned in the second *Adhyāya*. On this count also, the polemics of Rāmānujācārya mentioned above is not expected here under the present *sūtra*.

As already said earlier (under *sūtra* 1-4-10), Madhvācārya holds that this fourth *Pāda* deals with the scriptural words and phrases which are difficult to be shown to convey *Brahman*, by the ordinary methods of interpretation. On the basis of the declarations of *śruti*, Madhvācārya is of the firm view that all scriptural words convey *Brahman*, in their primary sense. In the first *Pāda*, the *sūtra* *'Ākāśastallingāt'* (1-1-22) has already concluded that all the five *Adhibhūta* - entities like *Akāśa*, etc. connote *Brahman* in their highest sense (*paramamukhyārthavṛtti*). The same words are again taken up here for *samanvaya* in *Brahman*, because in the context of creation of the world where they are

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1 BNK. I. p. 292

2 Śrībhāṣya- SV 1-4-14.

3 SRK. p. 320.

described as one originating from another[1], any attempt to make these words denote *Brahman* in their primary sense, would lead to some awkward results[2]. For example, *vāyu* is said to have originated from *Ākāśa*, i.e. *vāyu* is an effect (*kāryaṁ*) of *Ākāśa*. If *vāyu* denotes *Brahman*, it means that *Brahman* is an effect of *Ākāśa*. But this is not tenable because *śruti* says that "*Brahman* is neither born nor does It die"[3] and "*Brahman* is without beginning and without end"[4], and therefore *Brahman* cannot be an effect of anyone or anything. Then, if we say that *Ākāśa* and *Vāyu* both denote *Brahman*, it would mean that *Brahman* is the cause (*kāraṇaṁ*) of Itself. A thing cannot be its own cause and its own effect[5]. Cause always precedes the effect in time. But it is absurd to say that *Brahman* precedes Itself[6]. Based on this method of *reductio ad absurdum*, it can be said that the assumption, that *Ākāśa* etc. denote *Brahman* in their primary sense, itself must be invalid.

The *sūtra* refutes such a contention according to Madhvācārya. It says:

चः कार्यत्वसमुच्चायकः। तत्तु स एव इत्यस्ति। आकाशादिषु इति आवृत्तिः। कारणत्वेन कार्यत्वेन च आकाशादिषु स एव यथा येन प्रकारेण 'स योऽतोऽश्रुतः' इत्यादौ अविदित्वादिना व्यपदिष्टः तस्यैव परमात्मनः आकाशादिषु 'यमाकाशो न वेद' इत्यादिना उक्तेः उक्तत्वात्।[7]

On the strength of '*ca*' in the *sūtra*, *kāryatva* is also to be taken with *kāraṇatva*. The words *tat tu* i.e. *sa eva* (He alone) are to be continued. The word '*ākāśādiṣu*' is repeated.

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1 एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः।आकाशाद्वायुः। वायोरग्निः। अग्नेरापः।अद्भ्यः पृथिवी। (Tait.Up.2-1).

2 BNK. I. p. 289.

3 न जायते म्रियते वा। (Katha. Up. 1-2-18).

4 अनाद्यनन्तम्। (Katha. Up. 1-3-15).

5 BNK I. p. 290.

6 BNK I. p. 289.

7 आकाशादिषु अवान्तरकारणत्वेन स एव स्थितः। यथा व्यपदिष्टस्यैव परस्य 'य आकाशेतिष्ठन् (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-12)' इत्यादिना आकाशादिषु उक्तेः। (M. BSB. 1-4-15) कार्यत्वे सति कारणमवान्तरकारणम्। (TP. 1-4-15).

He alone is present in *Ākāśa* etc. as the cause and the effect, (and He who is present in *Ākāśa* etc. is *Paramātman* only) because, just as in *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*[1] *Paramātman* is signified (*vyapadiṣṭaḥ*) as incomprehensible, in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*[2] the same *Paramātman* is expressed (*uktaḥ*) as the indwelling spirit in *Ākāśa* etc. whom the *Ākāśa* etc. do not know.

The empirical formula that a thing cannot be its own cause and its own effect is not applicable to the supernatural logic of Brahman[3]. While describing the cosmic evolution *Śruti* says; "*Paramātman* desired to become many. He thought over it and created all this, whatever there is. Having created He entered it (as the indwelling controller)"[4]. Similarly, in the creation of the *Mahābhūta*-entities *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. as one originating from another in a succession[5], *Parmātman* is the initial cause, and at every step further He enters the thing created as its indwelling controller, and becomes the intermediate and proximate cause for the next stage. Thus, *Paramātman* manifests His corresponding form in each and every principle like *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. in the chain of cause and effect. The cosmic evolution is carried forward with *Paramātman*'s immanence and impulsion at every stage in the chain. Therefore, *Paramātman* is the intermediate and proximate cause of cosmic evolution, for which Madhvācārya uses[6] the word '*avāntarakāraṇaṁ*'. Jayatīrtha defines the term as '*kāryatve sati kāraṇaṁ, avāntarakāraṇaṁ*'. As such, there should be no objection if *Brahman* is viewed both as the cause and the effect[7]. Hence,

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1. योऽतोऽश्रुतः । (TP. 1-4-15).
2. आकाशे तिष्ठन् आकाशात् अन्तरः यमाकाशो न वेद यस्याकाशः शरीरं य आकाशमन्तरो यमयति स ते आत्मा अन्तर्यामी अमृतः। (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-12).
3. BNK. I. p. 290.
4. सोऽकामयत । बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति । स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा इदं सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किञ्च । तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्। (Tait. Up. 2-6).
5. Tait. Up. 2-1.
6. आकाशादिषु अवान्तरकारणत्वेन स एव स्थितः। (M. BSB. 1-4-15).
7. यः कारणं च कार्यं च कारणस्यापि कारणम्। कार्यस्यापि च यः कार्यं प्रसीदतु स नो हरिः। (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1-9-47. BNK. I. p. 291).

the words *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. which are ordinarily understood to denote certain material principles are capable of conveying *Brahman* in their highest primary sense, despite their being in a cause and effect relationship in the chain of cosmic evolution. Therefore, the proposition that all scriptural words connote *Brahman* [1] in their highest primary sense i.e. *Sarvaśabdasamanvaya* in *Brahman*, holds good without any exception.

॥ ॐ समाकर्षात् ॐ ॥ (1-4-16)

The *sūtra* contains only one word with an ablative case ending. Obviously it indicates a probans (*hetu*). In the absence of any specific assertion (*pratijñā*) in the *sūtra*, the probans can naturally be treated as an additional probans for the assertion in the preceding *sūtra*. Accordingly, Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have related this *sūtra* with the previous one and treated the *sūtra* as part of the *Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇaṁ*.

In Śaṅkarācārya's view, the term '*samākarṣāt*' means 'on account of connection or link up'[2]. While commenting on the last *sūtra*, a reference was made to the statement that "all this, verily, was in the beginning non-being (*asat*)"[3]. This does not mean that in the beginning it was absolute non-existence. Because, prior to this statement, it is said that "if one understands *Brahman* as non-being he becomes non-being only; if one understands *Brahman* as existent he becomes existent"[4]. In these earlier statements, the non-existence of *Brahman* is rejected and *Brahman*'s existence is established. The same *Brahman* is connected further (*samākṛṣyate*) to the One in the statement '*asadvā idamagra āsīt*'. If *sat* indicates the being of *Brahman* with all the manifest

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1 नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशन्ति। (*Bhallaveya Śrutiḥ* M. BSB. 1-1-1).

2 SRK p. 320.

3 असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्। (Tait. Up. 2-7).

4 असन्नेव स भवति।असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत्।अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद।सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति। (Tait.Up. 2-6).

names and forms, *asat* indicates the Being of *Brahman* without names and forms[1]. Thus, with the help of this *sūtra*, Śaṅkarācārya establishes that the term *asat* refers to real existent *Brahman* without names and forms. He also establishes that there is no internal controversy among the statements of *Śruti*.

In his opening remarks for this fourth *Pāda*, Śaṅkarācārya observes that, "in the first three *Pādas* it is shown that all the *Vedānta* statements expound that *Brahman* is the cause of this world and *Pradhāna* is not the cause; but regarding *Pradhāna* there still lingers a doubt and that is being addressed hereafter". If this is the purpose of the fourth *Pāda*, then this *sūtra* which shows that there is no internal controversy in *Vedānta* statements, should find a place in the second *Adhyāya* but not here, as observed earlier in the discussion on the previous *sūtra*. Therefore the interpretation of this *sūtra* appears far-fetched and unconvincing.

Rāmānujācārya also has taken the word '*samākarṣāt*' to mean 'on account of the connection' and interpreted the *sūtra* on similar lines as above. According to him, the *sūtra* tells that "on account of connection (with the passages referring to *Brahman*, Non being does not mean absolute Non-being)[2]. Rāmānujācārya quotes some statements from *Taittarīya Upaniṣad* like "He, the self desired, may I become many, ---- He projected all this, whatever there is here. Having brought it fourth, verily, He entered it"[3] etc. The same *Brahman* is referred to further as Non-being. In the state of dissolution when there is no distinction of name and form, *Brahman* is said to be non-being. The text "This then was Unmanifest"[4] does not refer to *Pradhāna* but to *Brahman* whose body is not yet evolved into gross form. Based on the words "It thought", Rāmānujācārya arrives at the same conclusion

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1. SRK p. 321.
2. Śribhāṣya- SV 1-4-15.
3. Tait. Up. 2-6.
4. तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्। (Bṛha. Up. 1-4-7).

that (the sentient) *Brahman* is the sole cause of creation but not (the insentient) *Pradhāna*, as it was reached in the previous *sūtra*. Hence, the same observations made under the preceding *sūtra* apply here too.

5 समाकर्षाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ समाकर्षात् ॐ ॥ (1-4-16)

This *sūtra* and the next one viz. '*Jagadvācitvāt* ', both contain only one word each, in the ablative. In the absence of any specific predicate in the *sūtras*, they should naturally be part of the argument in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. Therefore, Madhvācārya has included these two as well as the next six *sūtras* in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* only. His two direct disciples, Padmanābhtīrtha and Trivikramapaṇḍitācārya, each of whom has written a gloss[1] on Madhvācārya's *Sūtrabhāṣya*, have also treated these eight *sūtras* as part of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. It is Jayatīrtha, the fourteenth century commentator *par excellence*, known as Ṭīkācārya in the *Dvaita* tradition in recognition of his erudite and systematic commentaries on all the important works of Madhvācārya, who first treated these eight *sūtras* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*, in view of the generality of the topic they discuss, which concerns not only the previous *Adhikaraṇa* but also the entire exercise by the *Sūtrakāra* in this *Adhyāya*. All the later commentators like Rāghavendratīrtha have followed suit.

The topic of discussion in these eight *sūtras* is in the nature of a review of the entire work of *Śāstrasamanvaya* in *Brahman*, at almost the fagend of the *Samanvayādhyāya*. It deals with the lingering doubt about the validity and practicability of *samanvaya* of all scriptural words and phrases in *Brahman*. A similar review has been done at the end of second *pāda*, through its last five *sūtras*.

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1 *Sattarkadīpāvali* is the gloss by Padmanābhatīrtha and *Tattvapradīpikā* is the gloss by Trivikramapaṇḍitācārya.

A natural doubt that still lingers on is that[1] if all the scriptural words convey *Brahman* in their highest primary sense, how can they be used for mundane communication? This doubt has been considered earlier in *vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa* at the end of second *pāda*. However, having heard all the arguments till the preceding *sūtra*, i.e. almost at the end of *Samanvayādhyāya*, the *Pūrvapakṣin* appears to be not yet fully convinced and therefore comes up with his hypothesis that the statement 'all the scriptural words and phrases convey *Brahman* in their primary sense' does not seem to be rational because in that case they cannot be used in common parlance[2]. It has been explained earlier in *Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa* by the *sūtra* '*sākṣādapyavirodhaṁ jaiminiḥ*' (1-2-28) that the wise ones, knowing well that all the scriptural words denote *Brahman* only, use those words in mundane dealing to convey respective things accepting the required proper word and rejecting the others, and the other ignorant ones use the words in the sense assigned to them by language and lexicon. This may lead to irregularity[3].

Secondly, it has been advocated in the opening *sūtra*[4] of this *Pāda* that the words, which are popularly known to denote exclusively certain entities other than *Brahman* (*anyatraivaprasiddhaśadbas*), primarily denote *Brahman* present in those entities as their controller. This also is not proper, because, in that case, in worldly transactions people will have no other way except using all the words by their secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*)[5]. Then, in the eleventh *sūtra*[6] of this *pāda*, the

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1 सर्वशब्दानां परमात्मवाचकत्वे कथमन्यत्र व्यवहारः। (M. BSB. 1-4-16).

2 यदुक्तं सर्वशब्दानां परमात्मैकवाचित्वं तदयुक्तम्। तथात्वे अन्यत्रव्यवहाराभावापातात्। (TP. 1-4-16).

3 यदपि साक्षादप्यविरोधमित्युक्तमस्य समाधानं तदयुक्तम्। अवाचकैर्व्यवहारेऽव्यवस्थापातात्। (TP. 1-4-16).

4 आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च। (BS 1-4-1).

5 यदप्यत्रोक्तं शरीररूपकविन्यस्तेतीश्वरसंबन्धादन्यत्र शब्दप्रवृत्तिरिति तदपि न साधु। तथा सति लोके लक्षणेतरवृत्त्यभावापत्तेः। (TP. 1-4-16).

6 कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिवदविरोधः। (BS. 1-4-11).

Śruti accepts the worldly usage of scriptural words in their primary sense according to their etymology (*yoga*) and convention (*rūḍhi*), but recommends the use of scriptural words to understand the majesty of *Brahman*, through the deeper meaning of the words with the help of *Mahāyogavṛtti* and *Vidvadrūḍhi*, for the purpose of meditation. This too is not a smart piece of argument. If this is accepted then, the scriptural words would be denotative of things other than *Brahman* also, in their primary sense, and as a result the assertion that all the scriptural words primarily denote *Brahman* only, which is sought to be established in the first *Adhyāya*, would stand contradicted[1]. Therefore, the validity of the hypothesis that all the scriptural words are primarily denotative of *Brahman* only, appears to be doubtful.

This *sūtra*, '*samākarṣāt* ' refutes the above arguments. It says that words primarily denoting *Brahman* are drawn upon i.e borrowed and used elsewhere in common parlance.

परमात्मवाचिनः शब्दाः अन्यत्र समाकृष्य व्यवह्रियन्ते[2]। ब्रह्मवाचकशब्दानां जगति व्यवहारे समाकर्षात् वृत्तिसाम्यापत्या ब्रह्मणः सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वस्य न विरोधः।

The words denotative of *Brahman* are diverted and used for worldly transactions. The hypothesis that all scriptural words denote *Brahman* only, is not contradicted on account of the diversion of the words denotative of *Brahman* for worldly usage and the resulting common usage.

The words get their denotative power (*Abhidhāśakti*) through usage (*rūḍhi*) and etymology (*yoga*). Words primarily denoting *Brahman*, when diverted for use in worldly transactions, come to acquire the sanction of established usage and etymology. However it should not be construed that all words can be treated as

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1 यत्तु कल्पनोपदेशादित्यत्र रूढ्याद्यभ्युपेत्य समाधानं तदपि न शोभां बिभर्ति। तथा सत्यन्यत्रापि मुख्यवाच्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन परमात्मन एव मुख्यवाच्यत्वमिति प्रतिज्ञाव्याघातात्। (TP. 1-4-16).

2 M. BSB. 1-4-16.

homonyms having *Brahman* as one referent and one (or more) of worldly matters as the other, just as the word '*saindhava*' refers to a horse as well as to rock-salt. Otherwise the hypothesis that all the scriptural words primarily denote *Brahman* only, would fail. Further, the *sūtra* does not envisage that the words refer to *Brahman* in their primary sense (*mukhyavṛtti*) and the worldly things in their secondary sense (*amukhyavṛtti or lakṣaṇāvṛtti*)[1]. Two levels of primary denotation are understood. Words refer to worldly things in their primary sense based on usage (*rūḍhi*) and etymology (*yoga*). The same words denote *Brahman* in their highest primary sense (*Paramamukhyavṛtti*) based on higher etymology (*Mahāyoga*) and higher etymology-cum-convention (*Mahāyogarūḍhi* or *Vidvadrūḍhi*). This understanding would uphold the propriety of the hypothesis that all scriptural words denote *Brahman* in their highest primary sense[2].

These are two different levels of knowledge, one mundane and the other transcendental. The same sentiment is voiced[3] by *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* when it says[4], "there are two kinds of knowledge to be acquired, namely, the higher one (*parā*) and the lower one (*aparā*). The higher knowledge is defined as that by which the *Brahman* is known". In this dispensation, the Vedas would constitute higher knowledge if they are utilized to comprehend *Paramātman* and they form lower knowledge when they are used to perform sacrifices for earning worldly favours.

For example, the word '*Ap*' is popularly known to denote water, in classical Sanskrit as well as in Vedas. But in *Aitareya Araṇyaka* '*Ap*' is said to denote *Brahman*. Similarly, '*agni* ' also denotes *Brahman* by *paramamukhyārthavṛtti*. But the two words

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1 [illegible]वृत्तिरन्यत्र मुख्यत्वमेव न लक्षणादिरिति सूचनाय। TDK. 1-4-16.
[illegible]कर्षोक्त्या विष्णौ परममुख्यवृत्तिः अन्यत्र मुख्यवृत्तिः इति मुख्यतारतम्यसूचनात् तत्तु (ब्रह्मैव) [illegible] अवधारणोपपत्तिः इति भावः। (TDK 1-4-16).

3 HNK I. p. 297.

4 द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये ... परा चैवापरा च। (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-4). अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते। (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-5).

ap and *agni*, when diverted for worldly use, are not considered as synonyms, and *ap* would denote water only but not fire, and vice versa[1].

Is not this proposition, that all the scriptural words denote *Brahman* in their highest primary sense and at the same time denote some worldly things in their primary sense, contradicted by the three *sūtras* discussed earlier in the *Pūrvapakṣa*? No. The first *sūtra* (no. 1-2-28) intends to tell that the words do not become denotative of other things (in the world) independently[2]. In the second one (1-4-1) it is mentioned that all words become denotative of mundane things because of *Paramātman*'s association with them (as their controller)[3]. In the third *sūtra* (1-4-11), it is accepted that words denote their respective referents by convention (*rūḍhi*)[4], but it is not discussed in detail. Here, it is discussed. Thus, there is no controversy among the *sūtras*. Madhvācārya quotes an appropriate verse from *Padmapurāṇa*[5], which fully corroborates his interpretation of the *sūtra*.

If all the words denote *Brahman* only in their highest primary sense, then how are they popularly understood in the worldly sense? The next *sūtra* answers this question.

॥ ॐ जगद्वाचित्वात् ॐ ॥ (1-4-17)

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1 (i) आपाइत्यापइतितदिदमापएवेदं वैमूलमदस्तूलम्। (A.Ā. 2-1-8).
(ii) आप इत्येव नामैषां भवतीत्याह स प्रभुः। इदं मदाख्यं यद्ब्रह्म ह्याप इत्यभिधीयते॥
आ पूर्णत्वाद्गुणैः सर्वैस्तन्मूलमखिलस्य च तूलभूतं तदन्यत्तु पिता ह्येष जनार्दनः॥
(A.Ā. *Mādhvabhāṣya*).
(iii) इदं महदाख्यं यद् ब्रह्म तद् आप एव अप् नामकम् एव।
इदं मदाख्यं यद् ब्रह्म तद् अखिलस्य मूलम् अदः अखिलं जन्म मूलं कार्यम्।
(A.Ā. *Tāmraparṇīya*)

2 प्रथमसूत्रे स्वातन्त्र्येण वाच्यत्वाभावस्याभिप्रेतत्वात्। (TP. 1-4-16).

3 द्वितीये परमात्मसंबन्धोक्त्यात्रोक्तस्यैवाभिसंहितत्वात्। (TP. 1-4-16).

4 तृतीये चाविवेचितरूढ्यादिमात्राभ्युपगतेः। (TP. 1-4-16).

5 परस्य वाचकाः शब्दाः समाकृष्येतरेष्वपि।
व्यवह्रियन्ते सततं लोकवेदानुसारतः॥ इति पाद्मे। (M. BSB. 1-4-16).

शब्दानामित्यस्ति। जगति प्रसिद्धिरिति शेषः। सर्वशब्दानां परमात्मवाचकत्वेऽपि शब्दानां जगति प्रसिद्धिः जगद्वाचित्वात् जगत्येव तेषां भूरिप्रयोगात् तथा परमात्मनि सामान्यलोकानां बहुलव्यापाराभावात् मुख्यार्थज्ञानाभावात्।

The word '*śabdānāṁ*' is continued. The phrase '*jagati prasiddhiḥ*' is supplied to complete the construction. **Though all the words are denotative of *Paramātman* in their highest primary sense, the words are popularly understood as denotative of worldly things because they are largely used in mundane activities only and because people have nothing much to do with *Paramātman* and consequently they are ignorant of the highest primary meanings of words.** For example, while playing cards, the words king and queen are understood to denote some specific cards only, and the real personalities who are referred to by these words, are long forgotten.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, this *sūtra* refers to a conversation between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru, in *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad.* Ajātaśatru says[1], "O Bālāki, He who verily is the maker of these persons and whose work is this, is to be known". The doubt here is whether what is to be known is the individual soul (*Jīva*) or the chief breath (*Mukhya Prāṇa*) or *Paramātman*. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that it is *Jīva* or *Mukhya Prāṇa*. The Siddhānta is that[2], "the perceived world is referred to by the pronoun '*etat*'; that which is made is *karma* and it refers to this world only; the creator of the world only is prescribed to be known. It has been stressed throughout *Vedānta* that *Paramātman* is the creator of this entire world".

Rāmānujācārya has interpreted the *sūtra* on the same lines as followed by Śaṅkarācārya. However, he has omitted *Mukhya Prāṇa* from his *Pūrvapakṣa*, which makes his interpretation inconsistent with the next *sūtra*, which mentions *Mukhya Prāṇa*[3].

1. यो वै बालाक एतेषां पुरुषाणां कर्ता यस्य वैतत्कर्म स वैवेदितव्यः। (S. BSB. 1-4-16).
2. प्रत्यक्षसन्निहितं जगत् सर्वनाम्ना एतच्छब्देन निर्दिश्यते। क्रियत इति तदेव जगत्कर्म। जगतः कर्ता वेदितव्यतया उपदिश्यते। परमेश्वरश्च सर्व जगतः कर्ता सर्व वेदान्तेषु अवधारितः। (S. BSB.1-4-16).
3. BNK. I. p. 298.

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have treated this *sūtra* and the next two as forming one *Adhikaraṇa*. Then, the following four *sūtras* are treated as another *Adhikaraṇa*. In four out of these seven *sūtras*, the views of four contemporary sages, namely Jaimini, Āśmarathya, Audulomi and Kāśakṛtsna are mentioned. It is expected that the views could be on one given topic and it would be in the fitness of things to consider the *sūtras* as forming one *Adhikaraṇa* only, as in *Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa* in second *pāda*. If Jaimini's opinion is separated from the other three and included in the earlier *Adhikaraṇa*, the mention of his name becomes superfluous. Only when there are different views, it is worth saying that Jaimini opines like this[1].

This *sūtra* contains only one word in ablative case, which is a probans. In the absence of any predicate in the *sūtra*, this has to be treated as an additional probans for the assertion in a preceding *sūtra* of the same *Adhikaraṇa*, or a continuation of the argument in the previous *sūtra*. If the *Adhikaraṇa* starts with this *sūtra* itself, as treated by Śaṅkarācārya, then the predicate would be left wide open to the imagination of the commentators. It becomes doubtful whether the *Sūtrakāra* had in mind all this discussion under this *sūtra* and hence the interpretation appears farfetched and unconvincing.

In his introductory remarks to the fourth *pāda*, Śaṅkarācārya holds that the first three *pādas* show how all the statements in *Vedānta* go to establish that *Brahman* alone is the cause of this creation and that the *Pradhāna* is not the cause. But still, he says, there remains a doubt whether *Pradhāna* can be denied the status as the cause of the world when great sages like Kapila etc. accept *Pradhāna* as the cause relying on some branches of Vedas. The next chapter (i.e. fourth *pāda*) proceeds to show, according to

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1 मतान्तरस्याभावेन जैमिनिपदवैयर्थ्याच्च। आश्मरथ्यौडुलोमिकाशकृत्स्नमतानां विकल्पप्रतीतेश्च चतुष्टयप्रतिपादकसूत्राणां वैश्वानराधिकरणस्थानां 'अभिव्यक्ते'रित्यादिसूत्राणाम् एकाधिकरणत्वस्यैवन्याय्यत्वात्। (TC. II. p. 189).

Śaṅkarācārya, that the purport of statements in those branches of Vedas is not so[1]. Thus, the first three *Adhikaraṇas* of this *pāda* have been interpreted as refuting scriptural recognition (*śabdatva*) for *Pradhāna* as the cause of creation. Then, the fourth *Adhikaraṇa* deals with a side issue of removing an internal contradiction in *Śruti* regarding creation. Here, in this fifth *Adhikaraṇa*, Śaṅkarācārya reverts to the exercise of showing how the statements of *Vedānta* establish *Brahman* as the cause of creation, which should have been included in the first three *pādas* only[2]. Therefore, if these interpretations of Śaṅkarācārya are accepted, then the composition of *Brahmasūtras* will look not as a planned work but as a bunch of stray thoughts.

Why should we not consider that all the scriptural words denote *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa* also in the primary sense, since they too have overall control over the activities and properties of all? The next *sūtra* answers this question.

॥ ॐ जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गादिति चेत्तद्व्याख्यातम् ॐ ॥

(1-4-18)

'[illegible]धीनत्वादर्थवत् (सूत्र १-४-३)' इति न युक्तं जीवमुख्यप्राणयोः तदधीनत्वलिङ्गात् [illegible]रपि शब्दजातम् अर्थवत् इति चेत् न यतः तल्लिङ्गं तदन्तर्यामिसम्बन्धितया [illegible] पूर्वं व्याख्यातम् (सूत्र १-१-३१)।

If it be said that the purport of the *sūtra* '*tadadhīnatvādarthavat* (1-4-3)' is not proper since *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa* have the characteristic of having overall control of the attributes of others and therefore they too are fit to be

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1. [illegible]सामान्यं च वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मकारणवादं प्रति विद्यते न प्रधानकारणवादं प्रतीति प्रपञ्चितं गतेन [illegible]न्थेन। इदं त्विदानीमवशिष्टमाशङ्क्यते - यदुक्तं प्रधानस्याशब्दत्वं तदसिद्धं कासुचिच्छाखासु [illegible]नसमर्पणाभासानां शब्दानां श्रूयमाणत्वात्। अतः प्रधानस्य कारणत्वं वेदसिद्धमेव महद्भिः [illegible]र्षिभिः कपिलप्रभृतिभिः प्रतिगृहीतमिति प्रसज्यते। तद्यावत्तेषां शब्दानामन्यपरत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते [illegible]त्सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणमिति प्रतिपादितमप्याकुलीभवेत्। अतस्तेषाम्अन्यपरत्वं दर्शयितुं परः [illegible]र्भः प्रवर्तते। (S. BSB. 1-4-1).
2. [illegible]पादत्रये समन्वयमेतत्पादीयानुमानिकाद्यधिकरणत्रये च प्रधानस्याशाब्दत्वं 'कारणत्वेने' [illegible]धिकरणे श्रुतीनामविगानं चोक्त्वा पुनरिह समन्वयोक्तेरसङ्गतत्वात्। (TC. II. p. 189).

conveyed by all the words, it is not so because it has been explained earlier that that characteristic (exercised by *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa*) is due to the presence of *Paramātman* in them as the indwelling controller.

Here, the *Pūrvapakṣin* doubts the sanctity of a previous *sūtra* '*tadadhīnatvādarthavat*' (1-4-3), which says that all the words are significant for *Brahman*, because of His overall control over the attributes connoted by those words. The contention of the *Pūrvapakṣin* is that *Brahman* is not the only One to have overall control over the attributes of others, but the individual soul (*Jīva*) and the chief vital force (*Mukhyaprāṇa*) also have that characteristic (*liṅga*). He quotes a *mantra*[1] from *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, which says that "if the life (*Jīva*) leaves one branch of this (*tree*) then that branch dries up". Similarly he quotes another *mantra*[2] from *Śruti*, which says that "all people are governed in their activities by the Chief vital breath only". Thus, since *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa* are said to have the characteristic of having overall control over the attributes of others, they too are fit to be conveyed by all the words. The *sūtra* refutes this contention. It says that the characteristic of having control over the properties of others, exercised by *Jīva* and *Mukhyaprāṇa*, is due to the presence of *Paramātman* in them as the indwelling controller and not independent of Him; this has been explained earlier (in *sūtra* 1-1-31).

Since liberation is possible only through the knowledge of *Brahman* and since those desirous of liberation are not interested in anything except that, then what is the rationale of diverting the scriptural words for worldly transactions? The next *sūtra* clears this doubt.

॥ ॐ अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके ॐ ॥

(1-4-19)

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1 अस्य यदेकां शाखां जीवो जहाति अथ सा शुष्यति। (Chānd. Up. 6-11-12).

2 वायुना हि सर्वे लोका नेनीयन्ते। (M. BSB. 1-4-18).

जगद्वाचित्वमित्यस्ति। शव्दानामिति च। अन्य इति प्रकृतजीवाद्यन्यब्रह्मवाची सन् तज्ज्ञानपरः। तुरेव। वैदिकशब्दानां कर्मदेवतादिजगद्वाचित्वं अन्यार्थं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थमेव इति जैमिनिः। कुतः। शौनकाङ्गिरसयोः तथा श्वेतकेतूद्दालकयोः च प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्याम्। अपि च एवम् एके शाखिनः पठन्ति।

The word '*jagadvācitvaṁ*' is continued and the term '*śabdānāṁ*' also. The word '*anya*' denoting *Brahman* Who is other than *Jīva* etc. in the world under consideration, stands here for 'the knowledge of *Brahman*'. '*Tu*' is in the sense of 'only'.

According to Jaimini, (apart from their higher connotation of *Brahman*) the denotation of rites and deities by the scriptural words in the ordinary parlance is for the sake of knowledge of *Brahman* only[1]. How? It is so indicated on account of the question and answer between Shaunaka and Angirasa in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*[2] and between Śvetaketu and Uddālaka in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (6-1,3 & 4). Moreocver, the followers of some branch of Vedas (*Ṛgveda*) recite so.

Shaunaka asks, "my Lord, by knowing what, all this becomes known?" Shaunaka had the knowledge of sacrifices and he was a regular performer of prescribed rites. In effect, what he was asking was, by knowing what, his knowledge of sacrifices would be fruitful. The teacher Angirasa explains[3], "there are two kinds of knowledge to be acquired, namely *Parā*, the higher one and *Aparā*, the lower one. There, the lower one comprises *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda* etc. (which offer the knowledge of sacrifices and other worldly rites and things) and the higher knowledge is that (provided by the same set of scriptures)[4], which leads to the comprehension of *Brahman*".

1. कर्मकाण्डस्यापि भगवज्ज्ञानमेवोद्देश्यम्। (GDK. 1-4-19).
2. कस्मिन् नु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति। (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-3).
3. द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये परा चैव अपरा च। तत्र अपरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः --- अथ परा यया तदक्षरम् अधिगम्यते। (Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-4 & 5).
4. सामान्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचकाः।ता एव परमा विद्या यदा विष्णोस्तु वाचकाः। इति परमसंहितायाम्। (Muṇḍ. Up.- MB).

Thus, the conversation indicates that the scriptural words and sentences directly convey *Brahman* in their highest primary sense and they convey the rites and deities in their primary sense, the knowledge and performance of which also leads to the knowledge of *Brahman* in due course. Moreover, in some branch of Vedas, it is explicitly mentioned that, "if people do not understand that *Brahman* alone is the aim of Vedas then what is the use of their studying the Vedas?"[1]

Since every Vedic word is denotative of *Brahman* and thus Vedas can directly reveal *Brahman*, then what is the propriety in diverting the Vedic words for worldly transactions for the sake of knowing *Brahman*? The next *sūtra* answers this question.

॥ ॐ वाक्यान्वयात् ॐ ॥ (1-4-20)

निमित्तपञ्चमीयम्। वाक्यान्वयो नाम पृथग् पृथगर्थेषु वाचकतया स्थितवाक्यस्य अन्ततो भगवत्परत्वम्[2], वैदिकशब्दानां जगद्वाचित्वम् अन्यार्थं कर्मदेवतादि-वाचितया स्थितवाक्यानाम् अन्ततो ब्रह्मपरत्वम् इत्येवंवाक्यान्वयरूपनिमित्तात्। तदभावे मन्दानां प्रतिपदान्वयायोग्यतया तत्र वैमुख्यं स्यात्।

The ablative case here is in the sense of cause[3]. The word '*vākyānvaya*' is understood in the sense that the various scriptural sentences individually carrying different meanings finally produce a purport (*anvaya*) conveying Brahman only. **The scriptural words denote different mundane things for the sake of conveying *Brahman* because the various scriptural sentences describing rites and deities finally converge to a purport conveying *Brahman* only.** Otherwise, the ordinary people who are incapable of comprehending *Brahman* by etymologically interpreting each scriptural word in its highest primary sense, would become averse to the inquiry into and the knowledge of *Brahman*.

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1 यस्तन्न वेद किमृचा करिष्यति। (ṚV. 1-164-39) (M. BSB. 1-4-19).

2 TP. 1-4-20.

3 विभाषा गुणेऽस्त्रियाम्। (Pāṇini 2-3-25).

Śaṅkarācārya and following him Rāmānujācārya and others treat this *sūtra* and the next three, as a separate *Adhikaraṇa* and as an important one. The topic discussed under this *Adhikaraṇa* is the famous discourse by Yājñavalkya to his wife Maitreyī in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.* He tells, "not for the sake of the husband does the husband become dear but for the sake of the self, husband becomes dear.------ Verily, the *Ātman* is to be seen, heard, perceived and meditated upon. When the *Ātman* is seen, heard, perceived and known, all this is known"[1]. Then a question is raised as how is it that while the passage "*ātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati* (everything is dear for the pleasure of the self)" is referred to the *Jīva*, the subsequent passage "when the *Ātman* is seen, heard, perceived and known, all this is known", is to be maintained as referring to the *Brahman*; and three different views are stated under the names of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛtsna, the last representing the Siddhānta. Kāśakṛtsna opines[2], according to Śaṅkarācārya, that because (the Highest Self) exists in the condition, '*avasthiteḥ*' (of the individual soul); i.e. because the Highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul. According to Rāmānujācārya and Nimbārkācārya, however, the word *avasthiteḥ* means 'on account of (*Brahman*'s) abiding (within the individual soul)', i.e. the words denoting the *Jīva* are applied to *Brahman*, because *Brahman* abides as its self within the individual soul, which thus constitutes *Brahman*'s body. Thus, Rāmānujācārya refers to the *Antaryāmin*, 'the ruler within', implying a difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva*[3].

The *sūtra* contains only one word in the ablative case. It can, at best, serve as an additional probans for the assertion in the previous sūtra or the main *sūtra* of the *Adhikaraṇa*. It has to

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1. न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति। ...आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यो मैत्रेयि। आत्मनो वा अरे दर्शनेन श्रवणेन मत्या विज्ञानेन इदं सर्वं विदितम्। (Bṛha. Up. 2-4-5).
2. अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः। (BS. 1-4-23).
3. [illegible] p. 66.

express a continuity of argument from the previous *sūtra*. All this is not possible here, since it is considered as the opening *sūtra* of an *Adhikaraṇa*. It has been observed more than once earlier that in the absence of any predicate in the opening *sūtra* of an *Adhikaraṇa*, the commentators will be free to choose any topic of their liking for discussion. Moreover, the literal meaning of the only word in the *sūtra* is that, "on account of the purport of the sentences". It is so vague that any topic in the scriptures can be discussed under it. There is no clue in the *sūtra* to suggest that the *Sūtrakāra* intends to discuss Yājñavalkya's discourse to his wife Maitreyī. Therefore, apart from the erudite discussion on merits and demerits of it, how can one accept this as a convincing interpretation of the *sūtra*?

Moreover incidentally, Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of Yājñavalkya's discourse to Maitreyī does not seem to be convincing. Maitreyī desires to know the means of immortality[1] i.e. the knowledge of *Brahman*. In reply, the sage tells her, according to Śaṅkarācārya that, "it is not for the sake of the husband that wife loves him, but for her own sake she loves him". In that paragraph, there are ten such statements where the sage tells "for her sake wife loves husband, for his sake the father loves sons, and so on". Then he suddenly says that *Ātman* is to be seen, heard, perceived and meditated upon. If one says that "this is what A does, this is what B does,---, this is what J does", and then says 'Z' should be understood", then these statements would be semantically incompatible and inconsistent. If the sage wanted to say as understood by Śaṅkarācārya, the sage could have said, "*jāyāyāḥ kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati, patyuḥ kāmāya jāyā priyā bhavati, pituḥ kāmāya putrāḥ priyāḥ bhavanti*, and so on" But the sage has used the phrase '*ātmanastu kāmāya*' in his statements and then has said that the *Ātman* is to be seen, heard

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1 सा होवाच मैत्रेयी येनाहं नामृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्याम् । यदेव भगवान्वेद तदेव मे ब्रूहीति ।
(Bṛha. Up. 2-4-3).

etc. He has used the word *Ātman* throughout. We have seen earlier in *Dyubhvādhikaraṇa* that the term '*Ātman*' stands for the Supreme *Brahman* i.e. *Paramātman*. Therefore, there is another view that the sage is driving at the fact that all worldly relations and behaviour are as per the will of *Paramātman* and then he is telling that such *Paramātman* should be seen, heard, perceived and meditated upon.

(Gurudeva) R. D. Ranade has expressed the same view[1]: "God-love must be regarded as the only bond of union between any two relatives and friends. This reminds us of the famous doctrine of Leibnitz in his Monodology that monads which are all important have no direct relationship with one another except through the central monad and that the only relationship that can subsist between any two monads is the indirect relation through God. God, thus, becomes the *viniculum substantiale*. God according to Leibnitz is the *monas monadum* and all the monads are bound to this central monad by the bond of substantiality. Similarly according to Tulsi Dās, God is the bond of subsistence between two relatives or friends.

This is also otherwise expressed in an *Upaniṣad*, which tells us that the spokes of a wheel are connected with each other not directly but only through the central hub, which is God. Also we can easily recall the famous *Upaniṣadic* utterance *na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati ātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati*. The mother should be dear to us not for her own sake but through God. Everything not for its own sake but only through God''.

The *Sūtrakāra* explains further in the next *sūtra* how the diversion of Vedic words for mundane activities finally leads towards the knowledge of *Brahman*.

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1 "Pathway to God in Hindi Literature" by R. D. Ranade (1954) p. 62-63 (HNK. I. p. 301).

॥ ॐ प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः ॐ ॥ **(1-4-21)**

'नान्यः पन्था अयनाय' इति ज्ञानमेव मुक्तिहेतुरिति प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेः प्रतिज्ञातार्थनिश्चयस्य शब्दानां जगद्वाचित्वं लिङ्गं जनकं सत् अन्यार्थं (ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थं) भवति इति आश्मरथ्यो मन्यते।

In the opinion of Āśmarathya, the denotation of mundane things by the scriptural words is a means of proving (*liṅgaṁ*) the declaration (*pratijñā*) that there are no other ways for salvation except the knowledge (of *Brahman*) and thus conveys *Brahman* only (in the end). In other words, the scriptural words in their worldly sense describe the scope and limitations of pursuing the path of sacrifices etc. and create a sense of aversion (*vairāgya*) in the seeker towards the worldly pursuits and disclose the necessity of acquiring the knowledge of *Brahman.*

The *Sūtrakāra* explains in another way in the next *sūtra* how the diversion of Vedic words for worldly transaction finally leads towards the knowledge of *Brahman.*

॥ ॐ उत्क्रमिष्यत एवं भावादित्यौडुलोमिः ॐ ॥

(1-4-22)

उत्क्रमिष्यतः मुमुक्षोः एवं ज्ञानहेतुतया कर्मादेः अवश्यम्भावात् शब्दानां जगद्वाचित्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थम् इति औडुलोमिः मन्यते।

Auḍulomi holds that the denotation of worldly things by the scriptural words is for the sake of the knowledge of *Brahman*, because, for those desirous of liberation, the performance of religious rites thus becomes necessary in order to get the knowledge of *Brahman*. The idea is that the performance of the prescribed religious rites cleanses the mind of the seeker and renders it able and ready to acquire the knowledge of *Brahman*. The scriptural words with their worldly meanings facilitate the performance of religious rites and thus help the seeker to get the knowledge of *Brahman.*

The *Sūtrakāra* explains from another standpoint in the next *sūtra* how the diversion of Vedic words for worldly activities helps to know *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॐ ॥ (1-4-23)

कर्मदेवतादिजगतो ब्रह्मणि अवस्थितेः सर्वाधारत्वप्रकारकब्रह्मज्ञानोत्पत्त्यर्थम् आधेयरूपकर्मादिजगद्वाचित्वम् इति काशकृत्स्नः मन्यते ।

Kāśakṛtsna holds that, since the whole world of rites, deities and other things exist (*avasthiteḥ*) in *Brahman* as their substratum, in order to make one understand that *Brahman* is the support (*ādhāra*) for everything, the scriptural words connote the supported (*ādheya*) world.

6 प्रकृत्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॐ ॥
(1-4-24)

...न्वित्यस्ति । प्रकृत्यादि तत्तु ब्रह्मैव "हन्त एतमेव पुरुषं सर्वाणि नामानि अभिवदन्ति" इति प्रतिज्ञा "यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रायणाः समुद्रम् अभिविशन्ति एवमेव एतानि नामानि" इति दृष्टान्तः इति प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तयोः अनुपरोधात् तदनुसारात् ।

The words '*tat tu*' are continued. **The (feminine) words like *Prakṛti* etc. connote *Brahman* only, in keeping with the scriptural statement, "Oh! all the names signify this MAN (*Paramātman*) only" and the subsequent elucidating illustration, "just as all the rivers destined to reach the sea flow towards it and enter it; likewise, all names find their fulfillment in *Brahman*"[1].**

The term '*Prakṛti*' has already been shown to convey *Brahman* in *sūtra* 1-4-1. It was considered in the sense of a principle in

[1] हन्त एतमेव पुरुषं सर्वाणि नामानि अभिवदन्ति यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रायणाः समुद्रमभिविशन्ति एवमेव एतानि नामानि सर्वाणि पुरुषं अभिविशन्ति । (M. BSB. 1-4-24) (BNK. I. p. 304)

the series *Puruṣa Avyakta*, *Mahat*, *Buddhi* etc. But here, the word *Prakṛti* stands as a representative of feminine words like *Strī*, *Yoni* etc. (by *upalakṣaṇa*). The doubt here is how can such feminine words be used to connote *Brahman* when there is a saying that "no one describes this *Paramātman* by feminine words"[1]. The *sūtra* refutes this contention, and says that in conformity with the authoritative assertion that all names signify *Brahman* and the illustration of all rivers entering the sea, the feminine words also can denote *Brahman*. The word '*ca*' in the *sūtra* indicates that *Brahman* can be referred to by both the feminine and masculine words because *Brahman* brings forth the world in both the senses without any difficulty[2]. *Paramātman* created the world from His own Self, at will, which (world) was swallowed by Him earlier, just like the parents (giving birth to a child) and the spider (projecting the web)[3].

The interpretation of this *sūtra* according to Śaṅkarācārya is that[4], "*Brahman* is not only the operative cause (*nimitta kāraṇaṁ*) of the world, but the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇaṁ*) as well, because this view is in accordance with the assertion (*pratijñā*) and the illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*)". The assertion referred to here is that[5], "by knowing one (*Brahman*) everything else, though unknown, becomes known".

The illustration quoted here is that[6], "just as through a single clod of clay, all that is made of clay would become known" However, on the basis of this assertion and the illustration from *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, one can know all that is made of clay by

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1 नैनं वाचा स्त्रियं ब्रुवन्। (TP. 1-4-24).

2 न केवलं पुमान् किन्तु अव्यवहितसूतिहेतुत्वरूपस्त्रीत्वात् प्रकृत्यादिसर्वशब्दवाच्यो विष्णुरिति चशब्दः सर्वस्त्रीलिङ्गशब्दान् समुच्चिनोति। (TDK. 1-4-24).

3 स्वदेहादिच्छया विश्वं भुक्तपूर्वं जनार्दनः। ससर्ज मातापितृवदूर्णनाभिवदेव च॥ (TC. II. p. 197)

4 प्रकृतिश्चोपादानकारणं च ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यम् निमित्तकारणं च न केवलं निमित्तकारणमेव। एवं हि प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तौ श्रौतौ। (S. BSB. 1-4-23).

5 एकेन विज्ञातेन सर्वम् अन्यद् अविज्ञातमपि विज्ञातं भवति। (S. BSB. 1-4-23).

6 एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्। (S. BSB. 1-4-23).

knowing a single clod of clay, but how can he know the potter?[1] Anyway, as per this interpretation, *Brahman* is *Prakṛti* as well.

Earlier we have seen that the words like *Ākāśa*[2], *Jyoti*[3], *Vaiśvānara*[4] connote *Brahman*. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* states that the names of *Ṛṣis* such as Śatarcin, Mādhyama, Gṛtsamada, Viśvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Atri, Bharadvāja, Vasiṣṭha etc. all denote *Brahman* only and it gives the etymological interpretation[5] of these words to show how they convey *Brahman*, in their primary sense. These words are borrowed and used in the common parlance (*Samākarṣat* B. S. 1-4-16), to denote the respective *Ṛṣis*, just as the words king and queen are used to denote some playing cards. Now, when the *sūtra* (1-4-24) states that the term *Prakṛti* connotes *Brahman* in its primary etymological sense, the interpretation of Śaṅkarācārya is in the converse sense that *Brahman* is *Prakṛti*, the material cause of the world, as it is generally understood. On the same analogy, we have to say that *Brahman* is *Ākāśa*, *Jyoti*, *Vaiśvānara*, Bharadvāja, Vasiṣṭha and so on[6]. It is as good as saying that king and queen are 'playing-cards'. This is not convincing. Of course, the proposition that *Brahman* is everything, fits in the doctrine of *Vivartavāda*[7], advocated by Śaṅkarācārya, according to which the world is a phenomenal appearance superimposed on *nirguṇa Brahman*, just as a snake is seen in place of a rope. But in this doctrine, there is no scope for material cause and operative cause, which are the considerations in the doctrine of *pariṇāmavāda*. The rope is not said to be the material cause of the illusory snake. From the standpoint of *Vivartavāda*, the correct knowledge

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1. क्ताभ्यां प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्ताभ्यामुपादानत्वस्य सिद्धावपि निमित्तत्वस्य असिद्धेः। (TC. II. p. 193).
2. आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात्। (BS. 1-1-22).
3. ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात्। (BS. 1-1-24).
4. वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात्। (BS. 1-2-24).
5. एषउएवबिभ्रद्वाजः प्रजावैवाजस्ताएषबिभर्तियद्बिर्तितस्माद्भरद्वाजस्तस्माद्भरद्वाजइत्याचक्षत एतमेवसंतम्। (A.Ā. 2-2-2).
6. अस्य सूत्रस्य प्रकृतिशब्दसमन्वयपरत्वत्यागेन प्रकृतित्वव्युत्पादकत्वे "आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गा" दित्यादेरप्या-काशत्वादि व्युत्पादनपरत्वापाताच्च। (TC. II. p. 193).
7. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन। ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरम्॥ (Śaṅkarācārya)

of the substratum sublates the superimposed object. But then all that is made of clay is not superimposed on the clod of clay. Even when clay and clayness come to be known, they do not bring about the disappearance of the products of clay''[1].

Moreover, in his introductory remarks to this *Pāda*, Śaṅkarācārya observes that this *Pāda* proceeds to prove the absence of scriptural recognition for the *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti*. But, here the interpretation of this *Adhikaraṇa* does not conform to the opening remarks. V. S. Ghate opines that[2], ''*Śaṅkara* is, no doubt, inconsistent with himself in not referring about half of the *Pāda* to the refutation of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine, though in introducing the *Pāda* he remarks that this *Pāda* has for its special aim, the demonstration that certain words and passages claimed by the *Sāṅkhya* as supporting their doctrine can really speaking only refer to certain things connected with the *Vedānta* doctrine''.

The interpretation of Rāmānujācārya is on the same lines that[3]. ''(*Brahman*) is the material cause also, (on account of this view alone) not being contradictory to the proposition and illustrations (cited in the *Śruti*)''. The assertion (*pratijñā*) and illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) quoted by Rāmānujācārya are the same ones from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* as cited by Śaṅkarācārya. But here, the *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that *Brahman* is only the operative cause, but not the material cause of the world, and therefore, one has to infer the existence of *Pradhāna*, which serves as the material cause, though not clearly declared in the scriptures. This *sūtra* is said to refute the above contention. It is seen here that, Rāmānujācārya sticks to the declared position of refuting the doctrine of *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna* throughout the *Pāda*. On the strength of this *sūtra* Rāmānujācārya holds that *Brahman* is both

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1 नहि सर्पस्य रज्जुः प्रकृतिरित्युच्यते। हेतुश्चायुक्तः। सूत्रोक्ते श्रौतमृत्पिण्डादिदृष्टान्ते मृन्मयाद्यभि[illegible] नत्वाभावात्। नहि मृन्मयं मृद्यध्यस्तम्। मृत्तत्वज्ञानेप्यनिवृत्तेः। (TC. II. p. 194) (BNK. I. p. 310).

2 VSG. p. 67.

3 Śrībhāṣya- SV 1-4-23.

the operative and material cause of the universe. Rāmānujācārya further propounds that[1] *Brahman* has for Its body the whole world of sentient and insentient things in both the modes, one evolved as names and forms and the other as unevolved (*avyakta*), and *Brahman* is present all the time, in and through everything, (evolved and unevolved). The manifest world of names and forms is said to be the manifold effect (*kārya*) and the unmanifest state is the cause, one without a second. Thus, according to Rāmānujācārya, what changes from subtle to gross state is the insentient factor *Prakṛti*, which has no separate existence apart from *Brahman*, and the sentient factor, *Brahmacaitanya* does not undergo change and does not transform itself into the world of matter.

Apart from the merits and demerits of such ontological doctrines, the point here is whether such a discussion is intended by the *Sūtrakāra* in this *Samanvayādhyāya*. The difficulties in accepting this line of interpretation that *Brahman* is *Prakṛti* as well, have been mentioned earlier above.

The proof given by this sūtra is of a general nature that, since all the names signify *Brahman*, the feminine words like *Prakṛti* connote *Brahman*. The next *sūtra* provides another evidence to show how *Prakṛti* denotes *Brahman*, based on tradition (*rūḍhi*).

॥ ॐ अभिध्योपदेशाच्च ॐ ॥ **(1-4-25)**

प्रकृतिः ब्रह्मैव प्रकृतिशब्दवाच्यत्वेन ब्रह्मणः अभिध्यायाः इच्छायाः उपदेशात् तथा ब्रह्मणः अभिध्यात्वोपदेशात् च ।

***Prakṛti* connotes *Brahman* only, on account of *Brahman*'s will being referred to (by scriptures) as *Prakṛti* and on account of *Brahman* being described as volition personified.**

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1 सर्वचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया सर्वदा सर्वात्मभूतं परं ब्रह्म कदाचित् विभक्तनामरूपं कदाचिच्चाविभक्तनामरूपम्। यदा विभक्तनामरूपं तदा तदेव बहुत्वेन कार्यत्वेन चोच्यते। यदा चाविभक्तनामरूपं तदा एकमद्वितीयं कारणमिति च। (Śrībhāṣya 1-4-23).

The scriptures refer[1] to *Brahman*'s will as *Prakṛti*, *Māyā*, *Mahāmāyā*, *Avidyā*, *Niyati*, *Mohinī* and *Vāsanā*. They also tell that *Paramātman* and His volition, impulsion, wisdom, bliss etc. are all one and the same[2]. Therefore, the term *Prakṛti* can be considered as connoting *Brahman*. In support of his contention, Madhvācārya quotes a verse from *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*. It says; "though He (*Paramātman*) is fit to be meditated upon He is likened to be the meditator; though He is happiness personified He is said to be happy; because of His omnipotence He is addressed by words having divergent meanings like one conveying the possessor of an attribute (*dharmī*) and the other denoting the attribute (*dharma*) itself"[3].

In addition to the general proof in the last *sūtra* and the evidence based on tradition in this *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* states in the next *sūtra* that *Paramātman* has been directly addressed as *Strī*, *Prakṛti* etc. in *Śruti*.

॥ ॐ साक्षाच्चोभयाम्नानात् ॐ ॥ (1-4-26)

च एव। प्रकृत्यादि ब्रह्मैव साक्षादेव सामान्यपारम्पर्ये विना प्रकृत्यादिशब्दत्वस्य पुरुषत्वस्य च आम्नानात्।

'*Ca*' here means 'only'. **The terms *Prakṛti* etc. connote *Brahman* only, on account of the direct mention of *Brahman* in *Śruti* (sacred texts), by both the types of words, one *Prakṛti* etc. expressive of female principle and the other *Puruṣa* etc. expressive of male principle, without taking recourse to the general and traditional practices.**

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1 (a) मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्धि मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्। (Sveta. Up. 4 - 10). (b) महामायेति अविद्येति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च। प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येवं तवेच्छाऽनन्त कथ्यते। इति वचनात् तद् अभिध्या एव प्रकृतिशब्देन उच्यते। (M. BSB. 1-4-25).

2 "सोऽभिध्या स जूतिः स प्रज्ञा स आनन्दः" इति श्रुतेः अभिध्यापि स्वरूपमेव। (M. BSB. 1-4-25).

3 "ध्यायति ध्यानरूपोऽसौ सुखी सुखमतीव च। परमैश्वर्ययोगेन विरुद्धार्थतयेष्यते ॥" इति ब्रह्माण्डे। (M. BSB. 1-4-25).

In the first *sūtra* of this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* asserts that the terms like *Prakṛti*, expressing female principle, convey *Brahman*, on the basis of a general testimony that all names signify *Brahman* only. In the second *sūtra*, he adduces an evidence of traditional usage of the term *Prakṛti* for *Brahman*'s volition and *Brahman*'s description as volition personified. Here, in this *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* offers a direct evidence of *Śruti* where *Brahman* is referred to by both types of terms, feminine and masculine. As an example of this proof, Madhvācārya quotes a *mantra* from *Paiṅgi Śruti* in which *Brahman* is described as *Strī* (woman), *Puruṣa* (man), *Prakṛti* (nature or source material), *Ātman* (supreme soul), *Brahman*, world, light, Hari, beginning of the world, beginningless, endless, end of the world, greater than the greatest and universe personified[1].

Not only by convention (*rūḍhi*) but even by etymology (*yoga*) the word *Prakṛti* denotes *Brahman*, as shown by the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् ॐ ॥ (1-4-27)

परिणामादिति ल्यब्लोपे पञ्चमी[2]। प्रकृतौ अनुप्रविश्य प्रकृतेः परिणामं विधाय तत्र स्थित्वा तत्प्रेरणाय आत्मनः प्रकृतेः बहुधाकरणात् प्रकृतिः ब्रह्म। प्रकृष्टा कृतिः यस्य इति योगसम्भवात्।

The term *pariṇāmāt* in the ablative, is in the sense of '*pariṇāmaṁ vidhāya*' i.e. having modified.

***Brahman* is called *Prakṛti*, because *Brahman*, having entered into and modified (the insentient principle) *Prakṛti* (from the subtle to the grosser states), assumes many forms of Its own in order to impel them (the grosser states) by abiding in them. (According to Madhvācārya) it is possible**

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1 एष स्त्री एष पुरुषः एष प्रकृतिः एष आत्मा एष ब्रह्म एष लोकः एष आलोकः योऽसौ हरिः आदिः अनादिः अनन्तोऽन्तः परमः पराद् विश्वरूपः। इति पैङ्गिश्रुतौ साक्षादेव प्रकृतिपुरुषत्वाम्नात्। (M. BSB. 1-4-26).

2 ल्यब्लोपे कर्मण्यधिकरणे च। (Pāṇini 1-4-31 *Vārtika*). (See footnote under *sūtra* 1-4-10).

to have the etymological interpretation of the term *Prakṛti* as the One whose creative activity (*kṛti*) is indeed stupendous (*pra-kṛṣṭa*).

Having shown the scriptural convention of using terms expressive of female principle like *Prakṛti*, Strī etc. for *Brahman* in the previous *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* points out here in this *sūtra*, the denotative basis and significance of such terms applied to *Brahman*.

Based on scriptures, Madhvācārya holds that : "*Jaḍa-Prakṛti* (matter) cannot evolve of its own accord, because of its dependent position. It is very necessary that *Brahman* should educe the development of *Prakṛti* from within, by inner impulsion. This presupposes the entry of *Brahman* into *Prakṛti ab initio*. The subsequent stages of Prākṛtic evolution are equally dependent on the impulsion given by *Brahman* at every stage...... *Brahman* assumes as many manifestations of Its own form as It deems necessary, according to the evolutionary states of matter to sustain them from within"[1].

॥ ॐ योनिश्च हि गीयते ॐ ॥ **(1-4-28)**

हि यस्मात् "यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः"[2] इति श्रुतौ योनिश्च स्वदेहादुत्पादकं ब्रह्म गीयते अतः प्रकृत्यादि ब्रह्मैव ।

Since *Brahman* is described as *Yoni* etc. i.e. That which creates from Its own Self, in scriptural statements like "That Which the wise ones perçeive as the creator (source) of all that exists", the terms *Prakṛti* etc. connote *Brahman* only.

The doubt here is that though in the preceding *sūtra* it has been shown that the terms like *Prakṛti* etc. can be applied to *Brahman* on the denotative basis (*pravṛttinimitta*) by interpreting *Prakṛti* as the one whose creative activity (*kṛti*) is stupendous

1 BNK. I. p. 305.

2 Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-6.

(*prakṛṣṭa*), this however, does not necessarily imply *Brahman*'s creativity directly from Its own Self without the intervention of something else, which is the characteristic of female principle. The *sūtra* clarifies that since *Brahman* is said to be the *yoni*, *Brahman* has the capability to create directly without the intervention of anything. In support of this contention, Madhvācārya quotes two verses from *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*[1]. "The wise ones say that creating with the intervention of someone else is the characteristic of male principle and bringing forth directly without the intervention of anybody else is the characteristic of female principle (*prakṛtitva*). The Supreme Being, the *Parama Puruṣa* having both the characteristics of directly bringing forth and indirectly bringing forth (through *Jaḍa-Prakṛti*) is spoken of as both the female (*Prakṛti*) and male (*Puruṣa*) principles and therefore denoted by words expressive of both genders".

The word '*ca*' in the *sūtra* indicates that the term *Prakṛti* stands for other feminine words like *strī* etc. by the implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*)[2]. The prohibition to use feminine words for *Brahman* in the saying, "no one describes this *Paramātman* by feminine words", purports that *Brahman* is not to be understood and meditated upon as a woman alone, (and subservient to someone else)[3].

7 सर्वव्याख्यानाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः ॐ ॥

(1-4-29)

एतेन प्रागुक्तहेतुजातेन सर्वे शून्यासदादिशब्दाः तत्तु मुख्यवृत्त्या ब्रह्मैव इति व्याख्याताः प्रतिपादिताः । प्रागुक्तसर्वप्रमेयावधारणार्था द्विरुक्तिः ।

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1. व्यवधानेन सूतिस्तु पुंस्त्वं विद्वद्भिरुच्यते । सूतिरव्यवधानेन प्रकृतित्वमिति स्थितिः ॥ उभयात्मकसूतित्वात् वासुदेवः परः पुमान् । प्रकृतिः पुरुषश्चेति शब्दैरेकोऽभिधीयते ॥ इति ब्रह्माण्डे । (M. BSB. 1-4-28).
2. प्रकृतिशब्दनिमित्तेन सह तदुपलक्षितस्त्रीशब्दमात्रनिमित्तसमुच्चये चः । (TDK. 1-4-28).
3. "नैनं वाचा स्त्रियं ब्रुवन्" इति (a) निषेधस्तु अज्ञेयतामात्रार्थः । (TP. 1-4-28).
(b) निषेधस्तु स्त्रीत्वेन उपासनानिषेधपरः । (VVM. 1-4-28).

With this group of principles of interpretation mentioned earlier, all the words including the (exceptional) words like *Śūnya* (void), *Asat* (non-existent) etc. stand established as connotative of *Brahman* only in their primary sense. The term '*vyākhyātāḥ*' in the *sūtra*, has been repeated in order to emphasize that all the propositions mentioned earlier are proved.

This being the concluding *sūtra* of this *Samanvayādhāya*, the *Sūtrakāra* perorates, that he started with the proposition that the *Brahman* to be inquired into, who is the Originator etc. of the world, can be known only through scriptures, by properly interpreting them and knowing that all words therein convey *Brahman* only in their highest primary sense, that proposition stands established.

In this fourth *Pāda*, the *Sūtrakāra* has considered words, which exclusively convey something other than *Brahman* and are difficult to be shown to connote *Brahman* by ordinary canons of interpretation. He has devised here some special techniques to interpret these *Anyatraivaprasiddha* words. For example, the terms like *duḥkhī* (miserable) and *baddha* (bound) were shown to convey *Brahman* on account of *Brahman*'s presence behind them as the controlling principle (*Tadadhīnatvād arthavat*). However, in spite of such devices, there still remain some words like *Śūnya* (void), *Asat* (non-existent), *Abhāva* (non-existence), *Tuccha* (worthless) etc. which do not have a positive referent and have a sense of total negation. If such terms are applied to *Brahman* on their denotative basis (*pravṛttinimitta*), as they are understood in ordinary language, it will lead to absurdity and reduce *Brahman* to a nullity. If they are not shown to convey *Brahman*, then the starting proposition that all scriptural words convey *Brahman* in their primary sense, stands disproved. To overcome this dilemma, Madhvācārya has shown, on the strength of scriptures[1], that even these words are

1 एष ह्येव शून्यः एष ह्येव तुच्छः एष ह्येव अभावः एष ह्येव अव्यक्तः अदृश्योऽचिन्त्यो निर्गुणश्च। इति महोपनिषदि। (M. BSB. 1-4-29).

applied to *Brahman*, not in the sense in which they are ordinarily understood, but in their esoteric etymological senses. He has also shown how these words are interpreted in *Mahakūrmapurāṇa* [1]. *Paramātman* is called *Śūnya*, since He reduces the happiness of the wicked; *Tuccha* because He brings misery to the unrightous, remaining hidden from them; *Abhāva* because He cannot be fully comprehended by anyone else; *Nāśa* because He cannot be consumed by others,

Therefore, the *Sūtrakāra* claims in this *sūtra* that all the words in Vedas, should be understood to have been established as applicable to *Brahman*.

According to Śaṅkarācārya this *sūtra* asserts that[2], ''with this group of various methods used for refuting the claim of *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna* to be the independent cause of the world, all other doctrines concerning the origin of the world, such as the atomic theory, also stand refuted.'' Thus, in this concluding *sūtra* of this *Adhyāya*, Śaṅkarācārya has admitted that throughout this *adhyāya*, he has put in all his efforts[3] to refute the *Sānkhya* theory of *Pradhāna* as the independent cause of creation. But it appears doubtful whether the *Sūtrakāra* intended only this much. Having introduced the subject matter of the work in the opening *sūtra*, as an inquiry into *Brahman*, the *Sūtrakāra* defines *Brahman* in the second *sūtra* as the One who is the author of creation *et cetera*. Thus, creation is one of the distinguishing characteristics of *Brahman*. Since That entity, whatever it may be, which has the characteristics of creation etc., is called *Brahman*, and the nature and attributes of that *Brahman* are proposed to be discussed in

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1 ...मूनं कुरुते विष्णुरदृश्यः सन्परः स्वयम्। तस्माच्छून्य इति प्रोक्तस्तोदनात्तुच्छ उच्यते॥ ...न भावयितुं योग्यः केनचित्पुरुषोत्तमः। अतोऽभावं वदन्त्येनं नाशयत्वान्नाश इत्यपि। ...स्य तदधीनत्वात्तत्तच्छब्दाभिधेयता। अन्येषां व्यवहारार्थमिष्यते व्यवहर्तृभिः॥ इति महाकौर्मे। (M. BSB. 1-4-29).

2 ...न प्रधानकारणवादप्रतिषेधन्यायकलापेन सर्वे अण्वादिकारणवादा अपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता ...तव्याः। (S. BSB. 1-4-28).

3 ...प्रतिषेधे एव यत्नोऽतीव कृतः। (S. BSB. 1-4-28).

the first *Adhyāya*, by proper interpretation of the scriptures, there appears no room here to doubt whether *Brahman* is the cause of creation or whether *Sānkhya Pradhāna* could be the cause of creation. Of course, the *Sūtrakāra* is aware of the existence of other ontological doctrines like *Pradhānakāraṇavāda*, *Paramāṇukāraṇavāda*, *Śūnyavāda*, etc. and he is going to refute them in the second *pāda* (known as *Samayapāda*), of the second *Adhyāya* (*Avirodhādhyāya*)[1]. Therefore, Śaṅkarācārya's attempt to extend his arguments used for refuting *Pradhānakāraṇavāda*, which themselves are on doubtful grounds, to other doctrines like *Paramāṇukāraṇavāda* etc., (i.e. *atideśa*), in this concluding *sūtra* appears far fetched and hence unconvincing. The term '*sarve*' in the concluding *sūtra* should have been taken to refer to things discussed in the *Adhyāya* itself and not to other doctrines like *Paramāṇukāraṇavāda*. The interpretation of the word '*vyakhyātāḥ*' as 'refuted' (*pratiṣiddhatayā vyākhyātāḥ*) is also not satisfactory[2].

According to Rāmānujācārya, the *sūtra* tells that "by this i.e. by the arguments hither to given in the four *Pādas*, all the *Vedānta* texts propounding the cause of the world are explained as propounding the omniscient, omnipotent *Brahman* different from the animate and inanimate (world)"[3]. However, in addition to the cause of creation, the *sūtrakāra* has discussed in this *Adhyāya*, many more things about the nature and characteristics of *Brahman*.

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1 प्रधानपरमाण्वादिकारणवादानां समयपादे निरसिष्यमाणत्वात्। (TC. II. p. 196).

2 सर्व इत्यस्याप्यध्यायार्थत्वेन प्रकृतसमन्वेतव्यशब्दजातीयपरत्वे संभवति नाण्वादिपरता युक्ता। व्याख्याता इत्यस्य निरस्ता इत्यर्थश्च न स्वरसः। (TC. II. p. 196).

3 एतेन पादचतुष्टयोक्तन्यायकलापेन सर्ववेदान्तेषु जगत्कारणप्रतिपादनपराः सर्वे वाक्यविशेषा-श्चेतनाचेतनविलक्षणसर्वज्ञसर्वशक्तिब्रह्मप्रतिपादनपरा व्याख्याताः । (Śrībhāṣya- SV. 1-4-29)

Chapter VII
Introduction to Adhyāya II

In the first *Adhyāya* i.e. *Samanvayādhyāya*, the *Sūtrakāra* recommends an enquiry into i.e. a study of the nature and attributes of *Brahman*, the Supreme Being in order to get freedom from the cycle of births and deaths and to obtain the state of pure bliss i.e. *Mokṣa*. Then he defines that *Brahman* as the source of eight-fold dispensation, creation etc., of this insentient and sentient world. Further, he asserts that the *Brahman* can be known only through Scriptures, by proper interpretation of scriptural texts. In the rest of the *adhyāya*, the *Sūtrakāra* illustrates how certain selected representative words and phrases from *Śruti*, in their highest primary sense, disclose some facets of the majesty of *Brahman*. He thus, indicates that all the scriptural words are expressive of *Brahman*. This whole edifice of arguments is based on the concept of *Brahman* as the source of all the eight-fold dispensation of matter and souls. But, there could be some objections or contradictions (*virodha*) to this concept of *Brahman* itself, and there are many. Therefore, this definition of *Brahman* would be a mere hypothesis, unless and until all possible objections and contradictions to it are convincingly refuted. That is exactly what the *Sūtrakāra* proceeds to accomplish in this second *adhyāya*, appropriately named as *Avirodhādhyāya*.

The broad arrangement of *Pādas* in this *Adhyāya* according to the three commentators is more or less on similar lines as follows.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, "the first part (i.e. *Pāda*) is devoted to show that there is no contradiction between the conclusions of the first chapter (i.e. *Adhyāya*) and the statements of certain *Smṛtis*; the second part shows that opinions about *Pradhāna* and others are based on defective reasoning; the third and fourth parts

show that the *Śruti* passages do not contradict one another when they deal with cosmology, individual soul and the sense organs''[1].

Rāmānujācārya holds that, ''*Pāda* i repulses possible objections against the *Sūtrakāra*'s own view of *Brahman* as the world cause. *Pāda* ii lays bare the defects to be found in the conception of the originating cause of the world as entertained by various systems of philosophy which are hostile to Bādarāyaṇa's. *Pādas* iii and iv disarm objections which are likely to be raised in respect of the nature and modes of the *Kārya* or the world of *Cit* and *Acit* produced by *Brahman* as described in the *Śrutis*''[2].

Madhvācārya finds that the objections based on pure reasonings are considered in first *Pāda*. In the second, various competing schools of Indian philosophy established by individual thinkers and their followers, are refuted. Apparent contradictions in the *Śrutis* themselves are dealt with and cleared in the third *Pāda* At the same time, the *Sūtrakāra* states the Vedic concepts of creation of the world of matter and souls as well. In the fourth *Pāda* he deals with the internal conflicts of *Śrutis* supported by reasoning furnished by other *Śrutis* and authoritative statements

Chapter VIII
Adhyāya II, *Pāda* I
(द्वितीयाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।)

। स्मृत्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इतिचेन्नाऽन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् ॐ ॥

(2-1-1)

"If it be said that there will result the defect of not allowing room for certain *Smṛti*s (we say) not so, because there will result the defect of not allowing room for some other *Smṛti*s"[1].

The scriptural texts known as Vedas (which include *mantra*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka* and *Upaniṣad* texts) form the floating intelligence, which has come down the ages by oral transmission, from time immemorial. The authorship of these texts cannot be attributed to any historical person. Though the texts themselves contain some names of sages like Viśvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Vasiṣṭha as the seers of some *mantras*, they are all mythological characters, and they are said to have heard those *mantras*. Hence, these Vedas are known as *Śrutis* i.e. revelations. These are considered as Super-human (*apauruṣeya*) and an authority.

On the contrary, *Smṛtis* are scriptural texts composed by historically known thinkers having intuition about the truths they have written. These are many. Some *Smṛtis* accept the authority of Vedas and others do not. But these authors are reputed to be knowledgeable and reliable persons, having no ill intention of deceiving the followers, i.e. they are trustworthy (*āpta*). Hence, their words also have the sanctity of an evidence or authority (*śabdaprāmāṇya*).

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1 SRK. p. 333.

This *sūtra* considers a situation when there is a contradiction between *Smṛti* and *Śruti*. Śaṅkarācārya takes the *Smṛti* as the *Sāṅkhyasmṛti* and many other commentators follow suit. His *pūrvapakṣin* argues that[1], "it is not proper to say that the omniscient *Brahman* is the cause of the universe, because in that case Kapila's *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* and the others (*Āsuri* and *Pañcaśikhā-smṛtis*) following it become invalid, since they urge that the cause of the universe is the independent nonconscious *Pradhāna*. And it is regarded that the intuitive knowledge of sages like Kapila cannot be challenged". The *sūtra* refutes this contention[2]. If the authorship of *Brahman* as the cause of the world is objected to because it renders *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* invalid, then by the same argument, the other *Smṛtis*, which support the authorship of *Brahman* will be rendered invalid, (in case, the contention of *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* is accepted). Moreover, according to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*[3], when there is a conflict between *Smṛtis*, those, which follow the *Śruti* are to be accepted and those which conflict with *Śruti* are to be disregarded[4]. Rāmānujācārya also has interpreted the *sūtra* on these lines only.

The *Sūtrakāra* has used a general word '*Smṛti*' in the *sūtra* Śaṅkarācārya, however, has restricted the scope of the discussion to *Sāṅkhya Smṛti* only. The *Sūtrakāra* is taking here a sweep against all the *Smṛtis*, Vedāntic or non-Vedāntic, which contradict the concept of *Brahman* as the author of creation etc. He contends that if someone contradicts the authorship of *Brahman* on the strength of some *Smṛti* which claims validity as an *Āptavākya* i.e

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1 यदुक्तं ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणम् इति तदयुक्तम् कुतः स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात्। स्मृतिश्च तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिप्रणीता शिष्टपरिगृहीता अन्याश्च तदनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः ता एवं सति अनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन्। तासु हि अचेतनं प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रं जगतः कारणम् उपनिबध्यते। कपिलप्रभृतीनां च आर्षं ज्ञानम् अप्रतिहतं स्मर्यते। (S. BSB. 2-1-1).

2 यदि स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेनेश्वरकारणवाद आक्षिप्येत एवमपि अन्या ईश्वरकारणवादिन्यः स्मृतयः अनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन्। (S. BSB. 2-1-1).

3 विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम्। (PMS. 1-3-3).

4 विप्रतिपत्तौ च स्मृतीनाम् अवश्यकर्तव्ये अन्यतरपरिग्रहे अन्यतरपरित्यागे च श्रुत्यनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः प्रमाणम् अनपेक्ष्या इतराः। (S. BSB. 2-1-1).

an utterance of a knowledgeable and trustworthy person, then there are other *Smṛtis* which also have the validity as an *Āptavākya* and which accept the authorship of *Brahman*. The refutation of doctrines opposing the authorship of *Brahman* is being taken up one by one in the next *Pāda*.

According to the views of Madhvācārya, the interpretation of the *sūtra* reads as follows:

तीनां शैवसाङ्ख्यकाणादादिस्मृतीनां बौद्धार्हतादिस्मृतीनां च अन्यपरत्वा-
रूपानवकाशेन तासामेव आप्तोक्तानाम् अप्रामाण्यदोषप्रसङ्ग इति तद्विरुद्धश्रुतिर्न
नम् इति चेत् न पञ्चरात्राद्यन्यस्मृतीनां श्रौतश्रुतीनाम् अनवकाशेन श्रौतश्रुतीनामेव
प्रामाण्यदोषप्रसङ्गात्।

If it be argued that since the *Smṛtis*, *Śaiva* (*Pāśupata*), *Sāṅkhya*, *Kāṇāda* etc. and *Bauddha*, *Jaina* etc., have no room except for what they stand for, these *Smṛtis* composed by knowledgeable and credible persons, will be rendered invalid and therefore the *Śrutis* against these *Smṛtis* are not valid, (we say) no, because in that case other *Smṛtis* like *Pañcarātra* etc. which are in accordance with the *Śrutis* and have no room otherwise, would likewise have the defect of invalidity.

In other words, the *Pūrvapakṣin* stresses here on the point that *Śrutis* having no known author / authors of their own, cannot claim validity as an *Āptavākya*, while their *Smṛtis* have such authenticity. The *Siddhāntin* counters that since there are some *Smṛtis*, which are authentic as *Āptavākya* and which are in agreement with *Śrutis*, the defect of invalidity falls on those *Smṛtis* also, which is equally unwelcome. Since the latter set of *Smṛtis* is in the agreement with *Śruti*, the position stated in the *Śruti* has greater force.

Anticipating a further claim by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that when the benefits promised by their *Smṛtis* can be realized on the performance of the rites prescribed by them, they should be treated as valid, the next *sūtra* refutes the same.

॥ ॐ इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः ॐ ॥ (2-1-2)

नास्ति उपलब्धिः यस्य तद् अनुपलब्धि [1] अदृष्टफलम्। अनुपलब्धेरिति सौत्रशब्दः आवृत्त्या काकाक्षिवदुभयत्र अन्वेति।[2] अनुपलब्धेः अदृष्टफलाद् इतरेषाम् उपलब्धियोग्यानां तासु स्मृतिषूक्तानां फलानां प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धेः तासाम् अप्रामाण्यं युक्तम्।[3]

'*Anupalabdhi*' means that (benefit) which is not perceptible or not realizable i.e. imperceptible (benefit). The term '*anupalabdhi* ' in the *sūtra* is repeated and applied to both the clauses like the *crow*'s *eye*.[4]

Since (even) the perceivable benefits promised by those *Smṛtis* are not actually realizable, those are fit to be treated as unauthoritative and incredible. The word *ca* in the *sūtra* accepts that a few benefits could be realizable. One cannot get away saying that the non-realization of promised benefits could be due to defective performance of prescribed rites or inadequate qualifications of the performer and hence the validity of those *Smṛtis* cannot be doubted. "It is only when the validity of a particular *āgama* has been established on independent grounds that cases of discrepancy of results may be otherwise explained as being due to deficiencies in the performance or inadequacy"[5]. Even if a promised benefit is realized in a rare case, it could be coincidental[6].

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1 The compound '*anupalabdhi*' is in neuter form. In ablative case, it should have been '*anupalabdhinaḥ*'. But the word is treated as a masculine term and its ablative form '*anupalabdheḥ*' is taken here, according to the *sūtra*. तृतीयादिषु भाषितपुंस्कं पुंवद् गालवस्य। (Pāṇini 7-1-74).

2 BVD. 2-1-2.

3 M. BSB. 2-1-2.

4 A crow is supposed to have only one eyeball which it can move from one socket to the other as required. Similarly, a word or a phrase used once in a sentence may serve two purposes. This maxim is known as '*Kākākṣigolanyāya*' (SED. p. 305).

5 प्रामाण्यस्य हेत्वन्तरेण सिद्धावेव च वैगुण्यनिमित्तकताविसंवादस्य। (TC. III. p. 8), BNK I. p. 331.

6 क्वचित् संवादस्तु काकतालीयः। (TC. III. p. 8).

According to Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, the *Sūtra* states that the principles *Mahat* etc., other than the *Pradhāna* and considered as resulting from *Pradhāna* by the *Sāṅkhya smṛti* [1], are not perceived either in the Vedas or in ordinary experience. This interpretation cannot be accepted, since it is seen in an earlier *sutra* 1-4-12, that the principles *Mahat* etc. appear in the scriptures[2].

It may be argued that the *Pātañjalayogasmṛti* and other *yoga* disciplines cannot be treated as incredible since the benefits promised therein can be realized if one practices the prescribed disciplines. The next *sūtra* repudiates this assumption.

॥ ॐ एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ॐ ॥ **(2-1-3)**

एतेन प्रागुक्तफलानुपलम्भेन योगशास्त्रमपि प्रत्युक्तं निरस्तम् ।

The validity of *yoga-smṛtis* (in respect of creatorship etc.) also stands refuted by the same reason mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, that even the perceivable benefits promised by the *Smṛtis* are not all realizable within the reasonable time[3].

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have, however, treated this *sutra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. Since the argument put up in the previous *sūtra* only is extended here, this *sūtra* can safely be included in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*.

2 न विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ॐ ॥
(2-1-4)

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* and the next seven *sūtras* as one *Adhikaraṇa*. They assume the whole of this

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1. प्रधानादितराणि यानि प्रधानपरिणामत्वेन स्मृतौ कल्पितानि महदादीनि न तानि वेदे लोके च उपलभ्यन्ते । (S. BSB. 2-1-2).
2. सांख्योपसंग्रहादित्यत्रैव श्रुत्यादिषु महदादीनाम् उपलब्धेः दर्शितत्वात् । (TC. III p. 9).
3. यथोक्ताभ्यासे कृते यथोक्तकाल एव तत्तत्फलादृष्टेः । (TPD. 2-1-3).

sūtra and the next one as the *Pūrvapakṣa* from the *Sāṅkhya* viewpoint.

The exposition (*vṛtti*) of this *sūtra*, according to Śaṅkarācārya, is that: "(*Brahman* can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of difference of nature of this (the world) and its being such (i.e. different from *Brahman*) (is known) from scripture"[1].

The established view (*siddhānta*) according to Śaṅkarācarya and Rāmānujācārya is that the conscious *Brahman* is both the efficient and material cause of the world. The *Pūrvapakṣin* objects this view through this *sūtra* saying that there is a difference of nature between the cause, the *Brahman*, and the effect, the world. The world is insentient and impure. *Brahman* is conscious and pure. The relation as material cause and effect, is not seen between two things different in nature[2]. For example, gold ornaments are not made of earth and earthenware are not made of gold. Similarly, this world, which is insentient and comprises pleasure, pain and infatuation, can be the effect of a cause, which is insentient and comprises pleasure, pain and infatuation, but not of *Brahman* having different characteristics[3]. If it is argued that the world also could be treated as conscious and there is not much of a distinction between *Brahman* and the world, the difference in nature between the two (*tathātvaṁ*) is borne out by the *Śruti* (*śabda*). The *Śruti* speaks of *Brahman* as manifesting itself in two forms, intelligent and non-intelligent (*vijñānaṁ cāvijñānaṁ ca. Tait. Up.* 2-6). If it is said that there are passages in the *Śrutis* such as 'the earth spoke', 'the waters spoke' etc., attributing intelligence to the elements, the *Pūrvapakṣin* answers in the next *sūtra* (2-1-5).

अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ।

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1 SRK. p. 335.

2 न च विलक्षणत्वे प्रकृतिविकारभावो दृष्टः। (S. BSB. 2-1-4).

3 तथा इदमपि जगत् अचेतनं सुखदुःखमोहान्वितं सत् अचेतनस्यैव सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य कारणस्य कार्यं भवितुम् अर्हति इति न विलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणः। (S. BSB. 2-1-4).

"But the reference is to the presiding deities on account of the distinctive nature and relatedness"[1]. When the *Śruti* says 'the earth spoke', 'the waters spoke' etc. the reference is to the presiding deities of the elements controlling them, but not to the elements. Thus, the world being different in nature, *Brahman* cannot be its material cause[2]. This objection of *Pūrvapakṣin* raised in the last two *sūtras*, is being answered, according to Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, in the next *sūtra* (2-1-6).

दृश्यते तु ।

"But (it) is seen"[3]. The word 'but' (*tu*) refutes the contention of the *Pūrvapakṣin*. The view, that a thing being different in nature from its cause cannot have it as its material cause, is not universally true. For, it is seen in the world that insentient things like hairs and nails are produced from sentient beings like men, and sentient beings like scorpions spring from insentient cow-dung. Whatever may be the counter-argument, one cannot deny that in both the above examples, there is a difference in the nature between the cause and the effect. And it has to be so. Otherwise, if there were complete identity between the two, then there would be no distinction between cause and effect. Śaṅkarācārya has considered three alternatives of difference in nature between *Brahman* and the world. (i) Non-occurrence of all the characteristics of *Brahman* in the world. This is not expected. Without some difference in characteristics between two things, there can be no cause and effect relation between the two. (ii) Non-occurrence of any characteristic of *Brahman* in the world. This is not acceptable since the characteristic of *Brahman*, called as existence (*sattā*) is seen in the world too. (iii) Non-occurrence of the characteristic of being sentient. There is no example for the third hypothesis.

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1 SRK. p. 337.

2 तस्माद् विलक्षणम् एव इदं ब्रह्मणो जगत् विलक्षणत्वाच्च न ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकम् इत्याक्षिप्यते । (Ś. BSB. 2-1-5).

3 SRK. p. 337.

The opponent cannot bring forth an example of a substance which is not pervaded by consciousness and which does not have *Brahman* as its material cause; for the (*Advaita*) *Vedāntin* holds that *Brahman* is the material cause of all the substances in the world[1]. (This argument is not convincing. Śaṅkarācārya seems to be trying to refute the opponent's contention on the strength of his very hypothesis which is questioned by the opponent). Thus, *Brahman* is the material cause of all the things in this world. Scripture supports this view. Śaṅkarācārya stretches the discussion further to, and advocates the doctrine of identity between individual souls and *Brahman*. Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on these lines only except the last discussion about identity of *Brahman* and individual souls. All the commentators except Madhvācārya agree[2] on the purport of this *Adhikaraṇa*, that despite the difference in characteristics, *Brahman* can be the cause of the world[3].

However, this interpretation and the ensuing erudite discussion appear farfetched on account of the following observations.

(1) Uptill now we have seen a variety of *sūtras*. In some *sūtras*, an established view (*Siddhānta*) is stated, and it is supported by a probans, e.g. '*Ānandamayo'bhyāsāt* (BS. 1-1-12)' or '*Dyubhvādyāyatanaṁ svaśabdāt* (BS. 1-3-1)'. Here, a suitable objection (*Pūrvapakṣa*) is to be constructed. In some *sūtras*, there is only an additional probans or an illustration in support of a view already established e.g. '*Muktopasṛpyavyapadeśāt* (1-3-2)' '*Camasavadaviśeṣāt* (1-4-9)'. Some state only a probans, where both the *Siddhānta* and the *Pūrvapakṣa* are to be composed in keeping with the words in the probans, e.g. '*Kampanāt* (BS 1-3-39)', '*Patyādiśabdebhyaḥ* (1-3-43)'. *Pūrvapakṣa* is clearly stated and refuted in some *sūtras*, e.g. '*vikāraśabdānneti cenna*

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1 तृतीये तु दृष्टान्ताभावः किं हि यच्चैतन्येनानन्वितं तदब्रह्मप्रकृतिकं दृष्टमिति ब्रह्मकारणवादिनं प्रति उदाह्रियेत, समस्तस्यास्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। (S. BSB. 2-1-6)

2 VSG. p. 69.

3 ब्रह्मविलक्षणस्यापि जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वं नानुपपन्नम्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-6).

prācuryāt (B. S. 1-1-13)'. But nowhere have we seen an entire *sūtra* dedicated for *Pūrvapakṣa*. The *Kalpasūtras* and the *sūtras* of Pāṇini have no separate *Pūrvapakṣa sūtras*[1]. Hence, it is doubtful whether the *Sūtrakāra* has stated a *Pūrvapakṣa* only in *sūtras* 2-1-4 and 2-1-5, as assumed by Śaṅkarācārya and followed suit by others.

(2) For such an elaborate *Pūrvapakṣa* running over two *sūtras* as assumed, the *Sūtrakāra*'s reply is a simple '*tu*' (but), in the *sūtra* '*dṛśyate tu*'. It is difficult to accept this *sūtra* as a clinching argument to silence a strong *Pūrvapakṣa*. Earlier also, the *Sūtrakāra* has used such *sūtras* like '*darśayati ca* (1-4-1)' '*api smaryate* (1-3-23)', '*smṛteśca* (1-2-6)', not as the principal argument but as a collateral evidence to confirm what is already proved.

(3) The whole attempt in the discussion here is to refute the proposition of the *Pūrvapakṣin* in the opening *sūtra* (BS. 2-1-4) that "*Brahman* cannot be the material cause of the world". But the proposition is based on a single term '*na*' (not) in the *sūtra* and all other terms in the sentence are supplied by the commentator. A similar attempt is observed in Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of *sūtra* 1-1-5.

(4) According to Śaṅkarācārya, "in the first chapter (i.e. *Adhyāya*) dealing with the concordance or harmony of texts, it is established that the omniscient Lord of all, is the material and efficient cause of the universe. He is the Self of all. The *Sāṅkhya* view that *Pradhāna* is the cause of the universe is shown to be lacking in scriptural authority"[2]. In the previous *Adhikaraṇa* also, Śaṅkarācārya has discussed the same topic of *Sāṅkhya Pradhāna*. If the same topic is discussed here too, then it amounts to repetition of the same thing again and again.

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1. BNK. I. p. 350.
[illegible]ऽध्याये सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरो जगत उत्पत्तिकारणं मृत्सुवर्णादय इव घटरुचकादीनाम्। उत्पन्नस्य [illegible]तो नियन्तृत्वेन स्थितिकारणं मायावीव मायायाः स एव च सर्वेषां न (अस्माकम्) [illegible]मेत्येतद्वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयप्रतिपादनेन प्रतिपादितम्। प्रधानादिकारणवादाश्चाशब्दत्वेन निराकृताः।
2. (BSB. Introduction to *Adhyāya* 2) SRK p. 333.

(5) Here, the *Pūrvapakṣin* is arguing his case that *Brahman* cannot be the material cause of the world because of diversity of nature between cause and effect. *Brahman* being sentient, the world is found to be comprising both sentient and insentient things. To prove this nature of the world, he is supposed to be quoting *Śruti*, which speaks of *Brahman* as manifesting itself in two forms, intelligent and non-intelligent. The *Śruti* quoted to prove the nature of the world as comprising sentient and insentient things, also confirms *Brahman* as the cause of the world, which the *Pūrvapakṣin* is trying to refute. It is true that in such dialectic works, the *Siddhāntin* always outwits the *Pūrvapakṣin*. But the *Pūrvapakṣin* is not expected to be so simple as to quote such evidence, hostile to himself.

(6) Moreover, the *Siddhānta*-view discussed with reference to the concepts of cause and effect, efficient cause and material cause etc., forms a part of *Pariṇāmavāda* and it has little relevance in *Vivartavāda*. V. S. Ghate observes[1]: "It is to be noticed that this *Adhikaraṇa* rests upon the doctrine of *pariṇāma* and the instances quoted in commenting on *sūtra* 6 by all including Śaṅkara are such as lend support to *pariṇāma*; and none implies the idea of *vivarta*"

Thus, the above interpretation of the *sūtra* and the ensuing discussion are unconvincing. Therefore, Madhvācārya has taken a fresh view of the *sūtra* in keeping with the continuity of thoughts from the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. The *Sūtrakāra* has considered in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, two sets of scriptural texts. One comprises *Śrutis*, and *Smṛtis* which concur with *Śrutis* and derive their authority from them. The other set comprises *Smṛtis*, which disagree with Śrutis and have their own doctrines. The first set unanimously holds that *Brahman* is the source of creation etc. The *Smṛtis* in the second set have their own independent doctrines about the creation. All these doctrines in respect of the cause of

1 VSG. p. 70.

the world, cannot be verified either by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or by inference (*anumāna*). Such a doctrine has to be accepted on verbal testimony (*śabdapramāṇa*) only and that evidence is as valid as the authoritativeness of the concerned person or text. In the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Smṛti*s opposed to *Śruti*s are held unauthoritative on the ground that even certain perceivable benefits promised by them are not always actually realizable. It is quite natural that the *Pūrvapakṣin* can come up with the same argument against the *Śruti*s and say that this is found in the case of *Śruti*s also. E.g. the *Śruti* promises the rulership to one who performs the Vājapeya-sacrifice. Some one Vajapeyee may get it, but not everyone who performs that sacrifice. Therefore, the *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that the *Śruti*s also may be unauthoritative. This contention is refuted in this *Adhikaraṇa*, according to Madhvācārya.

There are two demonstrative pronouns in the *sūtra*, whose proper referents have to be located in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. The term '*asya*' (of his) refers to the set of *Śruti*s and *Smṛti*s faithful to them, according to Madhvācārya. The term '*tathātvaṁ*' meaning 'being so' or 'being in that way' refers to the invalidity of the impugned *Smṛti*s on account of their inability to produce the promised benefits without fail. The same term '*tathātvaṁ*' is repeated to refer to the extraordinary status of *Śruti*s (*vailakṣaṇyaṁ*) mentioned in the earlier part of the *sūtra*. Thus, the interpretation of this *sūtra* reads:

अस्य श्रुतिरूपस्य तदनुसारिस्मृतिरूपस्य च शास्त्रस्य तथात्वं तदुक्तफलानुपलब्धेः अप्रामाण्यं नास्ति विलक्षणत्वात् श्रुतेः नित्यत्वेन अपौरुषेयत्वेन स्वतःप्रामाण्येन श्रौतस्मृतेः तदनुसारित्वेन च विलक्षणत्वात् तथात्वं च तद्वैलक्षण्यं शब्दात् प्रतीयते ।[1]

The *Śruti*s and the *Smṛti*s faithful to them, are not exposed to invalidity on account of miscarriage of promised results (if any), because they have an extraordinary status, due to *Śruti*s

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[1] M BSB. 2-1-4.

being eternal without an author (superhuman) and having intrinsic validity, and the *Smṛti*s being faithful to the *Śruti*s; and this distinct position is understood through verbal testimony.

To prove the eternality of *Śruti*, Madhvācārya quotes[1] a *mantra* from *Ṛgveda*, which says, "O sage Virūpa, indeed praise well that effulgent, omnipotent *Paramātman* with the *eternal* (Vedic) words". Once the *Śruti*s are held eternal, there is no question of any composer or author for them and therefore they are held as superhuman. To uphold the intrinsic validity of *Śruti*, Madhvācārya quotes[2] a *mantra* from *Bhāllaveya Śruti*. It says, "neither the organs of perception like the eye, the ear, nor the logic of inference, nor the texts composed by human beings can reveal This (*Paramātman*); indeed Vedas alone reveal Him". However, this attempt of the *Sūtrakāra* to prop the intrinsic validity of *Śruti* by such statements in *Śruti* itself is open to the charge of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). That is, the *Śruti*s and its statements depend on each other for their validity. Hence, the intrinsic validity of *Śruti* is doubtful. The *Siddhāntin* refutes this charge. How?

A statement is invalid if it cannot convey a cogent sense or conveys a false sense. Ultimately, the defect of such statements is due to the drawback of the person making the statements. But, *Śruti*s are free from such drawbacks since they are *ex hypothesi* without an author. *Śruti*s form a body of words representing the collective wisdom floating down the ages and their validity is axiomatic. If this intrinsic validity is not accepted, it leads to an infinite regression (*anavasthiti*)[3]. If the *Śruti* is to be cross-checked with another text and its validity accepted only on its agreement (*saṁvāda*) with that text, then the validity of that text also needs to be verified by checking it with a third text and so

1 तस्मै नूनमभिद्यवे वाचा विरूप नित्यया। वृष्णे चोदस्व सुष्टुतिम्। (RV. 8-75-6).
2 'न चक्षुर्न श्रोत्रं न तर्को न स्मृतिर्वेदा ह्येवैनं वेदयन्ति' इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतेश्च। (M. BSB. 2-1-4)
3 स्वतश्च प्रामाण्यम्। अन्यथा अनवस्थितेः। (M. BSB. 2-1-4).

on. Therefore, the validity of *Śruti*s is to be accepted without expecting their agreement with any other knowledge (*saṁvādanirapekṣa*). Even the opponent here is not expressing disbelief in the validity of Vedas, but he is expressing a fear of undesirable conclusion (*aniṣṭāpatti*) for Vedas, that in case his *Smṛti* is treated as invalid on account of its inability to produce the promised benefits without fail, then the *Śruti*s also face the same risk on that count[1]. But there is no such problem. Once the validity of a Vedic statement is thus established as *sui generis* (of its own kind), cases of miscarriage of results can be satisfactorily accounted for, as due to some defect in the performer (*kartṛvaiguṇya*) or to some insufficiency of the means employed (*sahakārivaiguṇya*) or the presence of powerful obstacles (*pratibandha*)[2]. *Smṛti*s composed by individuals cannot claim such a privilege since they are neither eternal nor intrinsically valid.

In order to dispel the lingering doubt in the mind that the perceivable benefits, promised in the *Śruti*s may not be realizable and the performer and the performance are being simply blamed for the inability of the *Śruti*s to yield the promised benefits, the next *sūtra* says:

॥ ॐ दृश्यते तु ॐ ॥ **(2-1-5)**

तुशब्दोऽधिकारिविशेषद्योतकः । इतरेषामित्यत्र **(BS. 2-1-2)** प्रसक्तं उपलब्धियोग्यं श्रुत्युक्तफलम् अधिकारिणां दृश्यते ।

The word '*tu*' in the *sūtra* implies the special cases of the deserving ones. **The perceivable benefit referred to in BS. 2-1-2, promised in the *Śruti*s and acquired by the eligible ones, is seen.** (This *sūtra* is read after the next one, by Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and others).

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1 परेणापि फलव्यभिचारेणाप्रामाण्ये वेदस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्ग इत्यापादानमात्रस्य क्रियमाणत्वात्। (TP.2-1-4).

2 BNK. I. p. 336.

3 अभिमान्यधिकरणम् ।

Madhvācārya treats the following *sūtra* and the next one as forming a separate *Adhikaraṇa.* As said earlier, a text is invalid if the statements therein fail to convey a cogent sense or they convey a false sense. In the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s doubt about the validity of *Śruti*s on account of miscarriages of promised results has been cleared. In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* is considering another objection to the validity of *Śruti*s on account of certain statements therein, which appear irrational and impossible. For example, there are sentences[1] such as 'the earth spoke', 'the waters spoke', 'those waters saw', 'that fire saw', etc. And these are not figurative sentences either. People cannot swallow such statements where inanimate things are said to be doing activities expected of sentient beings. Cogency of such statements and thereby the validity of *Śruti*s is suspected. The *Sūtrakāra* refutes such a contention in the following *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ॐ ॥

(2-1-6)

तुरेव । विशिष्यते इति विशेषः शक्तिः । अनुगतिः व्याप्तिः । व्याप्तत्वसदेहत्वयो। अङ्गीकारे अपि अन्तर्धानशक्त्या अदर्शनोपपत्तेः इति भावः । मृदब्रवीदित्यादिश्रुती अभिमानिनः चेतनस्य एव व्यपदेशः न तु जडस्य तस्य अनुगत। अभिमन्यमानवस्तुषु सदेहव्याप्तत्वात् विशेषात् अन्तर्धानसामर्थ्यविशेषात् च ।

'*Tu*' is in the sense of 'only'. '*Viśeṣa*' implies the special power that particularizes or distinguishes a presiding deity. '*Anugati* ' here means pervasion or permeation. **In statements like 'the earth spoke' in *Śruti*, the sentient presiding deity (of the respective inanimate thing,) only is referred to (by the terms 'earth' etc.) but not the inanimate thing, because**

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1 मृदब्रवीत् । (S.B. 6-2-3) ॥आपोऽब्रुवन् । (S.B. 6-1-3) ॥ ता आप ऐक्षन्त । (Chānd. Up. 6-2-4) ॥ तत्तेज ऐक्षत । (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3).

the deity with its own form pervades those inanimate objects under its control, and has the special capacity to remain invisible.

The concept of presiding deities for elements like earth, is open to some doubts. Do the deities have form or not? If they do not have form, how can they perform intelligent activities without the organs of activity? Do the deities exist in a part of the respective elements or pervade them? If the deity exists in a part of the element and the remaining part can be without the deity, then the part where the deity exists, can also remain without the deity. If the deities have forms of their own, then why are they not visible?

The *sūtra* answers all these questions in the two terms '*anugateḥ*' and '*viśeṣāt* '. It says that the deities have form and they pervade the respective elements and that they have special capacity to pervade the respective things with their forms and yet remain invisible.

While discussing the *sūtra*, '*tadadhīnātvādarthavat* (BS. 1-4-3)' earlier, it is seen that a word can be applied to a thing / person if, either the thing possesses the properties denoted by that word or the person has the overall control over the functioning of said properties. Thus, for example, the word '*mṛd* ' (clay) can be used to denote clay because it has clayness (*mṛttva*) or to the presiding deity of earth since that deity controls the clayness in clay. Therefore, Madhvācārya holds in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, another work on *Brahmasūtras*, that "the terms like *mṛt*, *āpaḥ* etc. in these contexts are to be understood as having been applied to the *Abhimānidevatā*s directly and primarily (*abhidhāvṛtti*) and not by secondary significance (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*)"[1]. Hence, the statements like '*mṛdabravīt*' are not irrational and the validity of *Śruti* need not be doubted on this point.

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1 HNK. I. p. 340.

Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and others have considered the same *Śruti* statements and drawn the same meaning from the *sūtra*, but as an argument of *Pūrvapakṣin*, in support of his view that the world is different in nature from *Brahman*. The interpretation is shown earlier as unconvincing.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* still feels that[1] instead of inventing an incredible concept of presiding deities and then imagining a special power of remaining invisible ascribed to them, it is better to accept the invalidity of *Śruti*s, as it is simple. That concept cannot be authenticated by *Śruti*s, since their authoritativeness itself is in dispute. To dispel such an apprehension, the next *sūtra* says:

॥ ॐ दृश्यते च ॐ ॥ **(2-1-7)**

तासाम् अभिमानिदेवतानां सामर्थ्यं महद्भिः दृश्यते च।

The power of those presiding deities are perceptible to the great sages[2]. The *Sūtrakāra* avers that the concept of *Abhimānidevatā*s is not just an imagination for the sake of argument but a fact corroborated by the experience of the great sages.

4 असदधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ॐ ॥ **(2-1-8)**

The term *asat* in the *sūtra* is the antonym of *sat*. *Sat* is the present participle of the root *as*, to be, to exist, formed by suffixing '*at*' (*śatṛ*)[3] to *as*. Thus, *sat* means being, existing or existent, and *asat* means not existing or non-existent. Although the words *sat* and *asat* are present-participles qualifying some noun, in Vedic literature, they are sometimes understood as abstract nouns meaning existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*)

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1 ननु अत्र अप्रामाणिकदेवताकल्पनात् तासां च विशिष्टसामर्थ्यकल्पनात् वरं वेदाप्रामाण्यग्रहणमेव लाघवात्। न च वेदेन तत्सिद्धिः तत्प्रामाण्ये विवादात्। (TP. 2-1-7).

2 M. BSB. 2-1-7.

3 लटः शतृशानचावप्रथमासमानाधिकरणे। (Pāṇini 3-2-124).

respectively[1]. Thus, with reference to the creation of a thing, the term *asat* denotes both the antecedent negation (*prāgabhāva*) and the non-existent (*abhāvapratiyogī*)[2].

This *sūtra* has been interpreted differently by different commentators in keeping with their own doctrines and the *sūtra* is laconic enough to permit such varying interpretations.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the *sūtra* says: "if it be said that the effect is non-existent before its origination, it is not so, because it is a mere negation (without any object to be negated)". His *Pūrvapakṣin* argues[3] that if the intelligent *Brahman* is the cause of the unintelligent world, then there arises a contingency that the effect (i.e. world) was non-existent (*asat*) before its creation. This goes against the doctrine of *Satkāryavāda*, which holds that the effect preexists in its cause. The *sūtra* refutes this contingency since it is a mere negation where there is nothing to be negated. Śaṅkarācārya then advocates his doctrine of *Vivartavāda*. He says[4]; this negation cannot negate the existence of the effect before its origination, because just as the effect exists even now in the form of the cause itself; similarly it is understood to have been existing before its origination. What he is driving at is that whether before the appearance of the world or after it, what really exists is *Brahman* and the world is just a phenomenal appearance superimposed on the ever-existing *Brahman*. Therefore, when there is no creation of the world as such, where is the question of negating its existence prior to its creation?

The objection assumed by Rāmānujācārya is similar to that of Śaṅkarācārya. The objection is that "if *Brahman*, the cause,

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1. यद्यपि शतृ कर्तरि एव तथापि छान्दसो भावसाधनः। (TDK. 2-1-8).
2. अत्र असच्छब्दः प्रागभावपरः अभावप्रतियोगिपरश्च। (TDK. 2-1-8).
3. यदि चेतनं ब्रह्म अचेतनस्य कार्यस्य कारणम् इष्येत असत्तर्हि कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति प्रसज्येत : अनिष्टं च एतत् सत्कार्यवादिनः तु इति चेत् नैष दोषः ; प्रतिषेधमात्रं हि इदम् ; नास्य प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति। (S. BSB. 2-1-7).
4. न हि अयं प्रतिषेधः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्नोति। कथम्? यथैव हीदानीमपि इदं कार्यं कारणात्मना सत् एवं प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि इति गम्यते। (S. BSB. 2-1-7).

is different from the world, the effect, then because the cause and effect are different substances, it would mean that the effect does not exist in the cause and therefore there arises a contingency that the world originates from the prior non-existence (*asat*)''[1]. The *sūtra* says that it is not so. But the second half of the sūtra '*pratiṣedhamātratvāt* ', which is the reason offered for refuting the objection, has been interpreted differently by Rāmānujācārya. He says that[2], in the previous *sūtra* it has only been stated that there is no hard and fast rule that cause and effect should always be of the same characteristics; but it has not been said that the effect is altogether a different substance from its cause[3]. What he holds is that *Brahman* modifies itself to become the world and evenif there is difference between the characteristics of *Brahman* and those of the world, there is identity of substance between the two as it is in the case of gold and gold-ornaments[4].

According to Madhvācārya, the exposition of this *sūtra* is as follows:

असत् जगत्कारणम् इति चेत् न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् असतः स्वरूपतः एव प्रतिषेधबुद्धिविषयत्वात् शशविषाणवत्।

If it be said that the antecedent non-existence of the world (*jagatprāgabhāva*) is the cause of the world, it is not so, because the term 'non-existence (*asat*)' is a pure negation having a referent in the mind only like that of a rabbit's horn, (but having no positive entity to refer to).

In the first *Adhyāya* of these *Brahmasūtras*, the enquiry into the nature and attributes of *Brahman* starts with the definition of *Brahman* as the source of creation etc. (BS. 1-1-2). Thus, the

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1 यदि कार्यभूताज्जगतः कारणभूतं ब्रह्म विलक्षणं तर्हि कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यान्तरत्वेन कारणे कार्यं न विद्यते, इति असतः एव जगतः उत्पत्तिः प्रसज्यते इति चेत् नैतदेवम्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-7)

2 कार्यकारणयोः सालक्षण्यनियमप्रतिषेधमात्रमेव हि पूर्वसूत्रे अभिहितम् , न तु कारणात् कार्यस्य द्रव्यान्तरत्वम्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-7).

3 BNK. I. p. 348.

4 सति वैलक्षण्ये कुण्डलहिरण्ययोरिव द्रव्यैक्यम् अस्ति एव। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-7).

discussion is based on the hypothesis that *Brahman* is the cause of the world. Here, the *Pūrvapakṣin* questions the very basis of this hypothesis. He quotes *Śruti* itself, which says that[1] "non-existence alone was there in the beginning, one only without a second; from that non-existence originates existence". *Ṛgveda* also corroborates the same view[2]. Therefore, he contends that non-existence can be the cause of the world and the hypothesis that *Brahman* is the cause of the world is doubtful. The *sūtra* refutes this contention saying that the non-existence (*asat*) cannot be the cause of the world since it is a pure negation having no corporeal positive entity as its referent. But the *Śruti* statements are valid conclusions and cannot be refuted. *Brahmasūtras* are also irrefutable valid conclusions based on *Śruti* only. This apparent contradiction between the *Śruti* and the *sūtra* will vanish if we understand what both mean by the term 'cause'.

'Cause' (*kāraṇa*) of an effect is a broad general term having various meanings. *Bhagavadgītā* enumerates five varieties, namely the location, the agent, the instruments, various efforts and the supernatural element[3]. *Naiyāyikas* define[4] the cause as 'that which invariably precedes the effect'. For example, for making an earthen jar (effect), the potter, the clay, the wheel, the stick etc. are invariably required and they are all considered as the cause for the proposed effect (jar). The potter is called as the efficient cause (*kartā*), the clay as the material cause (*upādānakāraṇaṁ*) and the wheel, the stick etc. are known as the instruments (*karaṇaṁ*). All these various causes have an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) with the effect. In addition, the antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) of the jar also has an invariable concomitance with the effect (jar). In simple words, it means that if the jar exists

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1 असदेव इदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सज्जायते। (Chānd. Up. 6-2-1).

2 असतः सदजायत। (RV. 10-72-2).

3 पञ्चैतानि महाबाहो कारणानि निबोध मे। सांख्ये कृतान्ते प्रोक्तानि सिद्धये सर्वकर्मणाम्॥ अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्ता करणं च पृथग्विधम्।विविधाश्च पृथक्चेष्टा दैवं चैवात्र पञ्चमम्॥ (BG. 18-13,14).

4 कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम्। (Tarka. 38).

already then there is no question of making it. So the non-existence of the jar is also a necessity for making the jar. In fact, the effect is defined[1] as the counter-entity (*pratiyogin*) of antecedent negation (*prāgabhāva*). Therefore, the antecedent negation can also claim to be one of the causes of the jar (effect).

Thus, from the *Śruti* statement '*asataḥ sadajāyata*' if one claims that *asat* is the cause of the world, he can do so only to the extent of saying that the antecedent non-existence of the world has an invariable concomitance with the creation of the world. In other words, it means that the world has a beginning and is not eternal. On the other hand, *Brahmasūtra*s hold *Brahman* as the cause of the world in the sense of efficient cause (*kartā*) and hence it does not conflict with the *Śruti* statement '*asataḥ sadajāyata*'.

Madhvācārya's interpretation of the *sūtra* as '*asat (jagatkāraṇaṁ) iti cet na pratiṣedhamātratvāt*' with just one imported word, is simple, straight forward and shows a direct connection between the assertion (*pratijñā*) and the reason (*hetu*)[2]

If the *Pūrvapakṣin* still insists that the non-existent things like rabbit's horn may not be found capable of producing anything, but the antecedent non-existence of the world (*viśvaprāgabhāva*) could be of a different type and therefore may be held capable of originating the world on the backing of the *Śruti*, then the next *sūtra* addresses that doubt.

॥ ॐ अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ॐ ॥ (2-1-9)

अपीतौ प्रलये तद्वत्प्रसङ्गात् अभावमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गात् अभावकर्तृत्वमतम् असमञ्जसम् ।

Attribution of creativity to non-existence is unreasonable because in that case there would be the undesirable contingency

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1 कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि । (Tarka, 39).

2 BNK. I. p. 351.

of everything reducing to complete non-existence at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*). The general axiom is that on destruction, an effect merges into its cause. Therefore, if one holds that non-existence is the cause of the world, then at the time of dissolution, everything in the world should reduce to non-existence. Then nothing would remain, not even *Brahman*, *Jivas*, Time etc. The *sūtra* holds this consequence as improper. The term '*apītau*', i.e. at the time of dissolution, indicates that the concept of *pralaya* presupposes the existence of Time[1].

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this entire *sūtra* as an objection raised by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* thus: Because at the time of the dissolution, *Brahman* will be of the same nature as the world, i.e. when the effect becomes one with the cause, *Brahman* will be polluted by the impurities of the effect, the doctrine of causality of *Brahman* is inadequate[2]. Rāmānujācārya also interprets on similar lines. This interpretation is far from convincing, because[3] there is no possibility of *Brahman* becoming polluted by the imperfections of the effects at the time of dissolution since the distinctive properties of the effects are completely destroyed when the effects are destroyed[4].

If the *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that it is not undesirable if nothing remains at the time of dissolution, the next *sūtra* clarifies.

॥ ॐ न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ॐ ॥ **(2-1-10)**

र्थ। अत्र दृष्टान्तपदेन तत्रावधारितव्याप्तिमूलकम् अनुमानम् उच्यते। सूत्रे अपीतौ तद्वत्त्वम् इत्यनुवर्तते।[5] अपीतौ प्रलये तद्वत्त्वम् सर्वासत्त्वम् इष्टम् इति न युज्यते तदा पदार्थसत्त्वसाधने दृष्टान्तभावात् अनुमानसत्त्वात्।

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1. अपीतौ इत्यनेन प्रलये भावमात्रासत्त्वे कालोऽपि न स्यात् इति सूचयति। (BNK. I. p. 344).
2. SRK. p. 339.
3. प्रलये ब्रह्मणः कार्यधर्मापत्तौ किं कार्यनाशो हेतुः किं वा कार्यकारणयोरभेदः। नाद्यः। कार्यनाशे तद्धर्माणां सुतरां नष्टत्वेन ब्रह्मणः तदनापत्तेः। (TC. III. p. 21).
4. BNK. I. p. 352.
5. VML. 2-1-10.

'*Tu*' is used as an emphatic particle. Here, the term '*dṛṣṭānta*' (example) is used in the sense of the inference drawn on the basis of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) ascertained from the example. The words '*apītau*' and '*tadvattvaṁ*' are continued. Thus, the *sūtra* says that **"it is not proper to expect that nothing positive survives at the time of dissolution because there are examples to infer the existence of positive things at that time".** The creation of the world under dispute, depends on existing entities, because it is a creation like that of an earthen jar. The dissolution is expected to leave a residue since it is a destruction like that of an earthen pot[1].

In keeping with his interpretation of the previous *sūtra*, Śaṅkarācārya holds this *sūtra* as telling that "it is not unreasonable to take *Brahman* as the cause of the world, since there are examples to show that the effects do not pollute the causes when they (effects) merge into their causes". Pots made of clay do not transfer their characteristics to clay into which they may be reduced. Gold ornaments do not transfer their features to the gold into which they are melted. However, such examples, showing difference of characteristics between cause and effect, like scorpions produced from cowdung, quoted in an earlier *sūtra* (*dṛśyate tu*) imply that the characteristics of the effect, scorpion, are not to be found in the cause, cowdung. Thus, this interpretation renders the *sūtra* as a repetition of a point already dealt with[2]. Rāmānujācārya's interpretation also is on similar lines, that the imperfections of the world do not affect *Brahman* and that one substance can exist in the two states, cause and effect, having different qualities in the two states.

It is undesirable to expect that nothing remains at the time of dissolution because there is no proof also to that effect. The next *sūtra* elucidates the point.

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1 विमतोत्पत्तिर्भावाधीना उत्पत्तित्वात् घटोत्पत्तिवत्। विमतो विनाशः सशेषो विनाशत्वात् घटविनाशवत् ॥ (TDK. 2-1-10).

2 षष्ठेऽपि विलक्षणयोरपि कार्यकारणभावे दृष्टान्तं कथयता 'दृश्यते'त्वित्यनेनैव कार्यवृश्चिकधर्माणां कारणे गोमये नापत्तावपि दृष्टान्तस्य उक्तत्वेन तेन पौनरुक्त्यम्। (TC. III. p. 21).

॥ ॐ स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॐ ॥ **(2-1-11)**

प्रलये सर्वासत्त्वम् इष्टम् इति न युज्यते स्वपक्षे सर्वासत्त्वपक्षे दृष्टान्ताभाव-रूपदोषात् च ।

It is not proper to expect that nothing positive survives at the time of dissolution, also because that contention has the shortcoming of having no examples to infer the same.

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have taken a different view of this *sūtra*. According to them, the defects in the *Vedānta* view regarding creation, alleged by the *Sāṅkhya*, are found in their view also.

If one contends that it is not proper to reason out the survival of some positive existence and denying the reasonability of non-existence at the time of dissolution, both on the strength of inference, the next *sūtra* addresses that point.

॥ ॐ तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथाऽनुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः ॐ ॥
(2-1-12)

तर्कस्य अनुमानस्य अप्रतिष्ठानात् अव्यवस्थितत्वेन अप्रमाणत्वात् अन्यथा पूर्वसूत्रद्वयोक्तप्रमेयाद्वैपरीत्येन असतः कारणत्वादिरूपेणापि अनुमेयम् अनुमातुं शक्यम् इति चेत् न, एवमपि एवं सति तर्कस्य अप्रामाण्याङ्गीकारे मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्गः ।[1]

If it be said that it is possible to infer otherwise, i.e. contrary to what is concluded in the previous two *sūtra*s, as antecedent negation is the cause of creation, because reasoning (on the strength of which it was refuted) can be unsettled and hence unreliable, it is not so. In that case, i.e. if the unreliability of reasoning is accepted (universally), there will arise a contingency of negation of liberation.

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1 VKM. 2-1-12.

This *sūtra* in fact refers to an important general principle understood and accepted by all commentators and other *Vedāntin*s, regarding the validity and reliability of reasoning as an instrument of knowledge. In case of a reasoning, sometimes there could be a counter reasoning. Therefore, mere reasoning is not dependable. But one cannot contend that every inference has a counter-inference. Hence every reasoning need not be condemned. Reasoning is one of the three means of knowledge, accepted by *Vedānta*, namely perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and traditional scriptures (*āgama*). Śaṅkarācārya quotes Manu[1] who says that "one who is desirous of understanding *dharma* should know well perception, inference and *āgama*". If so, there should be some criterion to decide which reasoning is reliable and which is not. Such an agreed criterion is that[2] a reasoning be accepted totally, only if it is supported by sound evidence of *pratyakṣa* or *Āgama*.

Even though all commentators have accepted this rule at the back of this *sūtra*, they have taken this *sūtra* in different light, in keeping with their interpretations of the previous *sūtras*. Śaṅkarācārya takes this as one *sūtra* and treats it as an additional support to his conclusion in a previous *sūtra* (*dṛśyate tu*). He interprets it as follows: And hence, in matters, which can be understood only through *Śruti*, one should not rely only on reasoning, because reasonings unsupported by *Śruti* and resting only on individual guesswork are unreliable. If one holds that rejecting defective reasoning, faultless reasoning can be accepted, (we say that) even this way reasoning cannot be absolved of its unreliability. Therefore, with the help of *Śruti*, it is established that the sentient *Brahman* is both the efficient and material cause of the world[3]. In effect, Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted the *sūtra* in

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1 प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम्। त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता॥ (S. BSB.2-1-11).

2 अतो यावत्प्रमाणसिद्धं तावदेव अङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। (M. BSB. 2-1-12).

3 इतश्च न आगमगम्ये अर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम् यस्मात् निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्र निवन्धनाः तर्काः अप्रतिष्ठिताः भवन्ति।------ सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यः तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यः -----इति चेत् एवमपि अविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः। अतः आगमवशेन आगमानुसारितर्कवशेन च चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्च इति स्थितम्। (S. BSB. 2-1-11).

two parts. In the first part, he brings in a predicate to suit the probans '*tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt*'. Based on this, the *Pūrvapakṣin* comes up with an alternative, in the second half, which the *sūtra* refutes saying that he (the *Pūrvapakṣin*) cannot get away with that. Rāmānujācārya has assumed two separate *sūtras*. The first one, '*tarkāpratiṣṭhānādapi*' is interpreted as follows[1]. On account of logical reasoning not having a firm basis also, the doctrine of *Brahman* being the cause (of the world), being based upon the *Śruti*, is alone to be resorted to, not the doctrine about the *Pradhāna* being the cause. The remaining portion has been interpreted as another *sūtra* in the following way[2]. If it be argued (that the matter) should be inferred otherwise, (the answer is) even then there would be the undesirable contingency viz. absence of freedom (from the same blemish).

Compared to these complex interpretations, that of Madhvācārya is cogent and in keeping with the flow of thoughts from the preceding *sūtras*. Here, the *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that in the preceding two *sūtras*, the survival of something positive and denial of non-existence alone at the time of dissolution have been established on the strength of reasoning, but they cannot be accepted because reasoning is not reliable and a counter-inference is also possible. The *Siddhāntin* assumes that the *Pūrvapakṣin* also believes that the purpose of studying *Vedānta* is to achieve final emancipation (*mokṣa*). Therefore, he contends that if reasoning is to be universally rejected as unreliable and the controversial things are to be decided on the evidence of *āgama* (traditional scriptures) alone, then there will arise the undesirable contingency of negation of emancipation[3]. In effect, the *sūtra* holds that[4] inferences would be inconclusive only in the absence of supporting evidences of perception or *āgama*, but not universally.

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1 Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-1-11.

2 Śrībhāṣya- RDK 2-1-12.

3 विप्रतिपन्ने च अर्थे स्वस्यापि केवलागमेन अनध्यवसायेन स्वमते मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्गात्। (TDK. 2-1-12).

4 BNK. I. p. 346.

Even after accepting that the antecedent negation (*prāgabhāva*) is not the cause of the world since it is a pure negation, (as established in this *Adhikaraṇa*), there still remains a doubt that *Jīva*, who is not a pure negation, could be the cause of creation or the world could have come up automatically without any cause just like the collapsing of river banks. The next *sūtra* clears such doubts.

॥ ॐ एतेन शिष्टा अपरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः ॐ ॥

(2-1-13)

शिष्टाः प्राङ्निरस्ताद् अभावकर्तृत्वाद् अवशिष्टाः अपरिग्रहाः वेदपरिग्रहशून्याः तद्विरुद्धाश्च जीवप्रधानशून्यकालस्वभावादिवादाः अपि एतेन सत्कारणत्वे दृष्टान्तभावेन जीवादिकारणत्वे दृष्टान्ताभावेन च व्याख्याताः निरस्ताः।

The remaining theories, other than the causality of antecedent non-existence just refuted, which are not countenanced by and are opposed to Vedas, like the causality of individual soul (*Jīva*), insentient matter (*Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti*), void (*śūnya*), time (*kāla*), nature (*svabhāva*) etc. are also explained i.e. stand refuted by this argument of availability of evidence to infer the causality of an existent positive entity and non-availability of evidence to infer the causality of *Jīva* etc. The word '*śiṣṭa*' in the *sūtra* is understood as 'the remaining'.

There are some doctrines, which advocate that *Jīvas* etc. are the cause of creation and they are not all pure negations. These theories have some support from *Śruti* too. Madhvācārya quotes a number of *Śruti* statements, which apparently support these views. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* makes[1] a mention of many such views which hold the time, nature, destiny, chance (accident), the five elements, insentient matter (*Prakṛti*) and soul (*Puruṣa*) as the cause of creation and later refutes their claim. The *sūtra*

1 कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्याः। (Śveta. Up. 1-2).

refutes all such views by extending the argument made in the earlier *sūtra* (2-1-11) that there are no examples to infer such views. The *Siddhāntin* holds that all such words like *Jīva*, *kāla*, *svabhāva* etc. used in *Śruti* statements referred to above, primarily convey *Brahman* only, based on the teaching of *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. This has been made amply clear in the first *Adhyāya*.

This *sūtra* appears to have a sense of concluding some topic and yet Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* as a separate *adhikaraṇa*. They read the words '*śiṣṭāḥ aparigrahāḥ*' in the above *sūtra*, as a compound '*śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ*'. Śaṅkarācārya takes the word '*śiṣṭa*' in the *sūtra* to mean 'the wise, educated, eminent, competent etc.' He holds[1] that *pradhāna-kāraṇavāda* (the theory of the *Sāṅkhya*) is nearest to *Vedānta* philosophy, is endowed with powerful logic and has been accepted to some extent by some competent *Vedāntins*. He[2] interprets the *sūtra* as follows: "By this refutation of *pradhānakāraṇavāda* (the theory of the *Sāṅkhya*), the (other) theories such as the atomic theory of causation (of the *Vaiśeṣika*s) which have not been accepted in any aspect by the competent authorities like Manu and Vyāsa, also stand refuted[3].

The interpretation of Rāmānujācārya is also on similar line, that "by this the remaining (systems) not accepted (by the Vedas) also have been explained away".

But, this line of interpretation is not considered as convincing for the following reasons: *Vedānta* holds *Brahman*, the Supreme Being, as the Author of the world. The *Sāṅkhya* doctrine believes neither in the existence of *Brahman* nor in *Brahman*'s authorship of the world. The other Vedic doctrines like *Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyāya* etc.

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1 वैदिकस्य दर्शनस्य प्रत्यासन्नत्वात् गुरुतरतर्कबलोपेतत्वात् वेदानुसारिभिश्च कैश्चिच्छिष्टैः केनचिदंशेन परिगृहीतत्वात् प्रधानकारणवादं तावत् व्यपाश्रित्य ------, (S. BSB. 2-1-12).

2 एतेन प्रकृतेन प्रधानकारणवादनिराकरणकारणेन शिष्टैः मनुव्यासप्रभृतिभिः केनचिदंशेनापरिगृहीता ये अण्वादिकारणवादाः ते अपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याताः निराकृताः। (S. BSB. 2-1-12).

3 BNK. I. p. 354.

at least believe in the existence of *Brahman*. Then, how can a competent authority like Vyāsa, who composed *Brahmasūtra*s forming a recognized manual of *Vedānta* and who initiated an enquiry into *Brahman* through these *Brahmasūtra*s defining *Brahman* as the creator etc. of the world, be expected to consider the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine as nearer to *Vedānta* than the other Vedic doctrines?[1]. Moreover, the closing *sūtra* of the first *Adhyāya*, '*etena sarve vyākhyātāḥ vyākhyātāḥ*' has been interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya in a similar way. Therefore, Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra* 2-1-13 renders it a repetition[2].

5 भोक्त्रापत्त्यधिकरणम् ।

This *Adhikaraṇa* comprises only one *sūtra*, shown below, and it has been interpreted by each commentator in his own way.

॥ ॐ भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत् ॐ ॥ **(2-1-14)**

The word *bhoktṛ* in the *sūtra* means the enjoyer i.e. the transmigrating individual soul (*Jīvātman*). The term *āpatti* can be taken in two senses, one as obtaining, getting, attainment, and the other as a calamity, an undesirable occurrence (*aniṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ*). The term *avibhāga* signifies no distinction, non-difference, identity.

Śaṅkarācārya takes the meaning of the word *āpatti* as an undesirable consequence and interprets the *sūtra* as follows: If someone objects that it is not proper to accept *Brahman*'s material causality of the world (as established in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*) because in that case there will result an undesirable contingency of non-difference between the enjoying self and the inanimate objects of enjoyment, he may be replied that the distinction can exist as is seen in ordinary experience[3]. The objection assumed

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1 निरीशसांख्यवादादपि सेश्वरवैशेषिकादिवादानाम् एव ईश्वरवादिभिः शिष्टैः परिगृहीतत्वात् ईशकारणत्ववादिवैदिकदर्शनप्रत्यासन्नत्वाच्च । (TC. III. p. 22).

2 'एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता' इत्यत्रापि अस्यैवार्थस्य उक्तत्वेन पुनरुक्तेः । (TC. III. p. 22).

3 भोक्तृभोग्यविभागस्य अभावप्रसङ्गात् अयुक्तम् इदं ब्रह्मकारणतावधारणम् इति चेत् कश्चित् चोदयेत् तं प्रति ब्रूयात् स्यात् लोकवत् इति । (S. BSB. 2-1-13)

here is that if *Brahman* is taken as the efficient and material cause of the world and if the world were non-different from *Brahman*, then the distinction between the enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment would be nullified. According to Śaṅkarācārya the *sūtra* refutes this contention and says that the distinction may exist as seen in mundane experience. Śaṅkarācārya gives the illustration of the waves, foam and bubbles which are not different from sea-water and yet exist in a state of mutual difference for some time.

This interpretation is far from convincing for the following reasons[1]: Firstly, the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s argument that there will be no distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed, since both are the effects of a common material cause *Brahman*, is not sustainable. Since we see difference between bracelets and crowns made from a nugget of gold, there can be a distinction between the effects of *Brahman*. The *Siddhānta* is also not tenable. In *Vivartavāda*, the examples of foam and waves do not hold good. The foam and waves are made of different particles of sea-water, but the partless *Brahman* is said to be the material cause of the world[2].

V. S. Ghate criticizes the interpretation of Śaṅkarācārya. He says: "the question of the difference or non-difference between *bhoktṛ* and *bhogya* seems to be rather out of place.... Also the illustration of the wave and ripple and the sea does not quite fit with the *bhoktṛ*, the *bhogya* and the *Brahman*; for the relation between *bhoktṛ* and *bhogya* cannot bear comparison with that between a wave and a ripple or that between a bracelet and an ear-ring. And how is it conceivable that one who held the doctrine of absolute monism should devote a separate *Adhikaraṇa* to the establishing of the difference between *bhoktṛ* and *bhogya*?"(VSG. p.72).

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1 एकमहासुवर्णपिण्डकार्याणां कटकमुकुटाद्यवस्थानां भेदस्यैव दर्शनेन ब्रह्मकार्याणामप्याकाशवाय्वादीनां भेदसंभवात् । तस्मान्न पूर्वपक्षोदयः। सिद्धान्तोप्ययुक्तः। विवर्तवादे फेनतरङ्गादिदृष्टान्तोक्त्ययुक्तेः। फेनतरङ्गादीनां भिन्नानेकजलावयवोपादानकत्वेनैकोपादानकत्वाभावाच्च । (TC. III. p. 27).

2 BNK. I. p. 362.

Rāmānujācārya also criticizes[1] the above interpretation by Śaṅkarācārya. Raising the doubt about non-difference between the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the *sūtra* is interpreted as asserting the difference with the help of the examples of the ocean, foam and waves. It is not proper, because such an objection and refutation are inconsistent for those who admit the creation by *Brahman* possessed of the limiting adjunct *avidyā* with its power implied within (i.e. *Vivartavāda*). *Brahman* covered by the limiting adjunct *avidyā* being the enjoyer and the limiting adjunct being the enjoyed, the contingency of the two different from each other, attaining to mutual natures is, indeed, not possible.

According to Rāmānujācārya the *sūtra* tells that, "if it be said that from *Brahman* becoming an enjoyer since he is embodied, there will be no distinction between *Brahman* and *Jīva*, (we say, such distinction) may exist as is experienced commonly in the world"[2]. Rāmānujācārya takes the word *āpattiḥ* to mean getting the status. His contention is that, being subject to pleasure and pain does not depend merely on possessing a body, but it depends on good and evil deeds (*karman*) performed by the embodied being. Not being connected with *karma*, *Brahman* does not experience pleasure and pain. For the worldly experience (*lokavat*), Rāmānujācārya quotes the example of a king and his subjects Though both are embodied, yet the experience of reward or punishment for complying with or transgressing the king's orders respectively, is for the subjects, but not for the king.

This interpretation also is not quite convincing because while explaining an earlier *sūtra* (1-2-8)'*sambhogaprāptiriti cenna vaiśeṣyāt*', for a similar objection, Rāmānujācārya has given the

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1 भोक्तृभोग्यविभागाभावमाशङ्क्य समुद्रफेनतरङ्गदृष्टान्तेन विभागप्रतिपादनपरं सूत्रं व्याख्यातम्। तदयुक्तम्। अन्तर्भावितशक्त्यविद्योपाधिकाद्ब्रह्मणः सृष्टिमभ्युपगच्छताम् एवमाक्षेपपरिहारयोरसङ्गतत्वात्। --------- अविद्योपाध्युपहितस्य भोक्तृत्वात् उपाधेश्च भोग्यत्वात् विलक्षणयोस्तयोः परस्परभावापत्तिर्हि न संभवति। (Śrībhāṣya - RDK 2-1-14).

2 ब्रह्मणः सशरीरत्वे तस्य भोक्तृत्वापत्तेः जीवब्रह्मणोः विभागो न संभवति इति चेत् स्यात् लोकवत्। (Śrībhāṣya - SV 2-1-14).

same reply[1]. The reply given is that it is not the mere dwelling in a body that is the cause of experiencing pleasure and pain but the subjection to *Karman*, good and evil[2]. That is not possible for the Supreme Being, who is free from evil. If the same explanation is accepted here also, it would amount to repetition.

Moreover, in both the expositions referred to above, there are a number of new words brought in the *sūtra* (*adhyāhāra*)[3].

Madhvācārya has taken an altogether different view. He takes the word *āpattiḥ* in the sense of attainment. The exposition of the *sutra*, in his view, is as follows.

भोक्तुः जीवस्य आपत्तेः मोक्षे ब्रह्मत्वप्राप्तेः एकीभवन्तीति श्रुत्युक्तत्त्वेन तयोरविभागः भेदाभाव इति चेत् न, स्यात् लोकवत्। यथा लोके स्थानैक्याभिप्रायेण उदके उदकस्य एकीभावव्यवहारः तथा।[4] न इति शेषः।

If it be said that there is no distinction between *Jīva* and *Brahman*, because the transmigrating soul (*bhoktṛ*) attains Brahmanhood (*Brahmatva*), in the released state (*mokṣa*), as the *Śruti* talks of their becoming one, (the *Sūtrakāra* says) it is not so; it is the oneness of co-existence as seen in ordinary experience when water is mixed with water. The word '*na*' is supplied to complete the construction.

The topic under discussion here is the one raised by the two *mantras*[5] in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. They say that, "the fifteen parts (*Prāṇa*, *Śraddhā*, *Ākāśa* etc.)and the presiding deities (that make the body of a *Jīva*) enter their corresponding elements and deities,

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1 अस्याः शङ्कायाः संभोगप्राप्तिरित्यत्रैव निरस्तत्वाच्च। (TC. III. p. 28).

2 न हि शरीरान्तर्वर्तित्वमेव सुखदुःखोपभोगे हेतुः अपि तु पुण्यपापरूपकर्मपरवशत्वम्। तत्तु अपहतपाप्मनः परमात्मनो न संभवति। (Śrībhāṣya - RDK 1-2-8).

3 BNK. I. p. 364

4 VKM. 2-1-14.

5 गताः कलाः पञ्चदश प्रतिष्ठा देवाश्च सर्वे प्रतिदेवतासु। कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति॥ यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय। तथा विद्वान् नामरूपाद् विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम्॥ (Mund. UP. 3-2-7,8).

the *Jīva* and his deeds all become one with the Highest Imperishable *Brahman*. As the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean losing their names and forms, so the wise man free from his names and forms goes unto the Divine Supreme Being".

These *mantras* apparently indicate that the *Jīva* in the released state, attains Brahmanhood. The *Pūrvapakṣin* here argues, according to Madhvācārya, that in that case, even during the transmigrating state, the *Jīva* should be non-different from *Brahman*, because two things of different characteristics will never become one[1]. And there is no dearth of people who advocate that *Jīva* is *Brahman* only but not anything else, even while transmigrating. Therefore, the *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that since the transmigrating soul is known to be not the author of the world, *Brahman*, which is identical with it cannot also be the author of the world[2].

This *sūtra*, as interpreted by Madhvācārya, refutes such a contention. Just as in worldly experience when water is mixed with another water and is said to have become one with the other, there still exists an internal difference between the two, and the same thing should be understood here also[3] when the *Śruti* talks of oneness (*ekībhāva*) between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. This is oneness of co-existence (*sthānaikya*) as seen in the cases of cows returning to their shed and the birds coming back to their nests[4]. In order to make this point clear and to explore the mind of Bādarāyaṇavyāsa as to what could be at the back of his mind while composing this *sūtra*, Madhvācārya quotes two verses[5]

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1 मुक्तौ ऐक्ये संसारे अपि ऐक्यस्य आवश्यकत्वात्। न हि भिन्नम् अभिन्नतां याति इति युक्तम्। (TP. 2-1-14).

2 BNK. I. p 356.

3 यथा लोके उदके उदकान्तरस्य एकीभावव्यवहारे अपि अन्तर्भेदो अस्ति एव एवं स्याद् अत्रापि। (M. BSB. 2-1-14).

4 BNK. I. p. 358.

5 उदकं तूदके सिक्तं मिश्रमेव यथा भवेत्। न चैतदेव भवति यतो वृद्धिः प्रदृश्यते॥
एवमेव हि जीवोऽपि तादात्म्यं परमात्मना। प्राप्तोऽपि नासौ भवति स्वातन्त्र्यादिविशेषणात्॥
इति स्कान्दे। (M. BSB.2-1-14).

from *Skandapurāṇa*, The verses tell that, 'when water is poured into water, the two do not become one, but form a mixture, because an increase in volume is seen; similarly the *Jīva*, even when it attains oneness with *Brahman*, it does not become *Brahman* and does not get *Brahman*'s special characteristics like independence'.

Thus, with minimum importation (*adhyāhāra*) of words and with the logical and contextual propriety, Madhvācārya's interpretation sounds quite convincing.

6 आरम्भणाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ॐ ॥ (2-1-15)

This *Adhikaraṇa* also has been interpreted by different commentators differently.

According to Śaṅkarācārya this *sūtra* tells that[1], "the effect, the world, is in reality non-different from the cause, *Brahman*; this is to be understood; how? from the words like *ārambhaṇa* (beginning) and others".

The topic under discussion here assumed by Śaṅkarācārya is a *mantra* from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* which tells that, "my dear, just as through a single clod of clay, all that is made of clay would become known, for all modification is but a name arising from speech while the truth is that it is just clay[2]." Śaṅkarācārya says that[3], these modifications or effects are only names and they exist through speech only while in reality there exists no such thing as modification.

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1 कार्यम् आकाशादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत्, कारणं परं ब्रह्म, तस्मात् कारणात् परमार्थतः अनन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेण भावः कार्यस्य अवगम्यते। कुतः? आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः। (S.BSB. 2-1-14).

2 यथा सोम्य एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातश्स्यात् वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिका इत्येव सत्यम्। (Chānd. Up. 6-1-4).

3 वाचा एव केवलम् अस्ति।------ न तु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिद् अस्ति। (S. BSB. 2-1-14).

This position of *Vivartavāda* has already been explained by Śaṅkarācārya earlier in *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (BS 1-4-24), with the same example. Its discussion here again will amount to repetition[1]. Moreover, it appears odd that the *Sūtrakāra* establishes difference between the enjoyer and the enjoyed, according to Śaṅkarācārya, in the just concluded *Adhikaraṇa* and immediately he shifts his stand here to non-difference between the world and Brahman[2]. Here, from the word '*ārambhaṇa*' in the *sūtra* we have to perceive the word '*vācārambhaṇa*' used in a *Chāndogya mantra* and from that word we have to understand the purport of that *mantra* and use it as a *probans* in this *sūtra*. It looks like a two-stage secondary signification (*lakṣitalakṣaṇa*), a far-fetched conclusion. Compared to this, a *Śruti mantra* having the word *ārambhaṇa* used in it, if any, would have a better claim for consideration here.

Further, the example of clay and its products does not convincingly drive home the doctrine of *Vivartavāda*. The main plank of *Vivartavāda* is that the world is a phenomenal appearance superimposed on *Brahman*, just as a snake is seen in place of a rope. But the pots are not superimposed on clay since they do not vanish even after knowing that they are made of clay[3]. Further, the understanding of the *Chāndogya mantra* in the manner that by knowing a single clod of clay, all that is made of clay would become known, is also not rational[4]. For example, a metallurgist knowing all about steel cannot be expected to know about the various complicated machinery made of steel. Hence, Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of this *Adhikaraṇa Sūtra* cannot be said to be convincing.

In his lengthy commentary on this *sūtra*, Rāmānujācārya criticizes the concept of *avidyā* (ignorance) and *māyā* (illusion)

1 प्रकृत्यधिकरणादृश्यत्वाधिकरणाभ्यामस्य पुनरुक्तिश्च। (TC. III p. 33).

2 पूर्वत्र भेदोक्तेः अत्र तु अभेदोक्तेः विरोधः। (TC. III p. 33).

3 न च घटादेर्मृदादावारोपितत्वात्तद्दृष्टान्तो युक्त इति वाच्यम्। मृत्तत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि घटाद्यनिवृत्तेः। (TC. III. p. 32)

4 एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानायोगाच्च । मृत्पिण्डादिदृष्टान्तानुपपत्तेश्च। (TC. III. p. 31)

advocated by Śaṅkarācārya. He also interprets the *sūtra* on the same lines as followed by Śaṅkarācārya with the same example of *Chāndogya mantra* (6-1-4). But his interpretation of that *Chāndogya mantra* is quite laborious, complicated and different from that of Śaṅkarācārya. The *sūtra* says, according to Rāmānujācārya that[1], "the non-difference of the world from that *Brahman* is known from texts beginning with the word *ārambhaṇa*". He assumes the *Vaiśeṣika* (atomist) view[2] as the *Pūrvapakṣa*, which contends that it is not possible for the effect to be non-different from the cause, because various differences (like time, shape, number, utility, idea conveyed, nomenclature, etc.) are perceived. This *sūtra* is supposed to refute this contention. This conclusion is based on the purport of the *Chāndogya mantra* (6-1-4), which is suggested by the word *ārambhaṇa* in the *sūtra*. Rāmānujācārya treats the term *ārambhaṇaṁ* in the *mantra* as a separate word and not as the second member of the compound word *vācārambhaṇaṁ* as done by Śaṅkarācārya. Further, the term *ārambhaṇa* is treated as a variant of *ālambhana* and is taken to mean 'being touched'[3]. The gist of Rāmānujācārya's interpretation of the *Chāndogya mantra* is that all modifications of clay in the form of particular configurations such as a pot and their names are *touched by speech*, for bringing about appropriate transactions (such as fetching water) and that, therefore, it is only the substance 'clay' that receives the new configuration and the new name of 'pot' for the sake of purposeful activity[4]. Therefore the world, which is the effect of *Brahman*, for the sake of purposeful activity, is non-different from it.

Even this farfetched explanation taking many liberties with the wording of the *Śruti*, can not be said to be convincing, and

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1 Śrībhāṣya - sv 2-1-15

2 अत्र काणादाः प्राहुः। न च कारणात् कार्यस्य अनन्यत्वं संभवति। विलक्षणबुद्धिबोध्यत्वात्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-15).

3 आरभ्यते आलभ्यते स्पृश्यते इति आरम्भणम् 'कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्' (पा॥ सू॥ ३-३-११३) इति कर्मणि ल्युट्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-15).

4 BNK. I. p. 378

it is doubtful, if on the analogy of clay and its configurations we can regard the world of matter as a *physical configuration of Brahman*[1].

Madhvācārya has taken a fresh look at the *sūtra* and come out of the groove of connecting this *sūtra* with the *Chāndogya mantra*, on the strength of the word *ārambhaṇa* in the *sūtra*. The scope of *śastra* is not limited to the *Upaniṣads* only, but extends to the four Vedas, the epics and the *Purāṇas* even according to Śaṅkarācārya. Therefore Madhvācārya takes as the *Viṣayavākya* of this *sūtra*, a *mantra* from *Ṛgveda*, which says[2], "what could have been the base, the means, what was it and how was it, with which the Creator of the world created this earth and heaven and the One who can see with all his limbs covered this earth and heaven (during dissolution)?'' The word *ārambhaṇa* is to be interpreted to mean the material or the means (with which any thing is made) and the word is to be understood to represent the whole class of things like the place to stand (*adhiṣṭhāna*) etc. instrumental in creation, by implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*)[3].

The *Pūrvapakṣin* contends here that the creation of an earthen pot depends on the accessories like clay etc. which, are independent of the potter and without them the creation is not possible; similarly the creatorship of *Brahman* should also be dependent on independent accessories and therefore *Brahman* can not be accepted as the One Independent Cause of creation and Author of all[4].

The *sūtra* refutes such a contention. The exposition of the *sūtra* would be as follows :

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1 BNK. I. p. 378.

2 किं स्विदासीदधिष्ठानमारम्भणं कतमत्स्वित्कथाऽऽसीत्। यतो भूमिं जनयन् विश्वकर्मा विद्यामौर्णोन्महिना विश्वचक्षाः। (RV. 10-81-2).

3 आरभ्यते येन तदारम्भणमुपादानम्। आरम्भणपदेनाधिष्ठानादिसाधनजातं लक्षणीयम्। (TDK.2-1-15).

4 घटसृष्टौ मृदादीनि खलु स्वतन्त्रसाधनानि। तानि विना सृष्ट्यनुपपत्तेः। अतो ब्रह्मस्वतन्त्रसाधनसापेक्षमेव सृष्ट्यादिकर्तृ इति न तस्य जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वेन सर्वगुणपूर्णत्वसिद्धिः। (TP. 2-1-15).

अवरस्य इति अग्रे अभिधानात् स्वतन्त्रसाधनस्य इति शेषः। स्वतन्त्रसाधनस्य तदनन्यत्वं ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं, कुतः? आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः, "किं स्विदासीद-धिष्ठानमारम्भणं कतमत्स्वित्कथासीत्" इति स्वतन्त्राधिष्ठानाद्याक्षेपकशब्दात्, अपरतन्त्रत्वात् स्वतन्त्रत्वात् साधनसत्ताप्रदत्वात् इति आदिपदोक्तव्यतिरेकिहेतुभ्यः च।

The reference to the existence of what is 'inferior' in a succeeding *sūtra* (BS. 2-1-17) of this *Adhikaraṇa*, suggests the term 'superior' or the independent (*svatantra*) as its counter-correlate for supplying the ellipsis in the opening *sūtra*[1]. **An Independent accessory is non-different from *Brahman*, i.e. *Brahman* is the One and Only Independent Cause of creation on account of the challenging questions (*ākṣepa*) in the *viṣayavākya* implying the non-existence of any independent accessory like a place to stand (*adhiṣṭhānaṁ*) or other means (*ārambhaṇaṁ*) etc., and also on account of *Brahman*'s non-dependence on anything, absolute independence and authority over the existence of other accessories implied by the word '*ādi*' in the *sūtra* through negative reasoning (*vyatirekihetubhyaḥ*).**

In the *viṣayavākya* considered above, where only questions are asked to which a positive reply is neither possible nor expected, the purport is a negative reply[2]. For example, the purport of a question like 'who can avoid death?' is that 'no one can avoid death'.

If the *Pūrvapakṣin* insists that there could be some accessory independent of *Brahman*, the next *sūtra* answers the same.

॥ ॐ भावे चोपलब्धेः ॐ ॥ **(2-1-16)**

अन्यस्वतन्त्रसाधनस्य भावे सत्त्वे उपलब्धेः प्रसङ्गः प्रमाणैः उपलभ्यते। न उपलभ्यते। अतश्च नास्ति।

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1 BNK. p. 368.

2 आक्षेपस्य विपर्यये पर्यवसानात्। (TP. 2-1-15).

If there existed some accessory or means independently of *Brahman*, it should have been known through authoritative evidence (like *Śruti*). But there is no such evidence available and hence it does not exist.

If the *Pūrvapakṣin* quotes an evidence[1] from *Śruti* and on that basis insists that there existed accessories like the waters, the earth, etc. other than *Brahman*, the next *sūtra* clarifies the doubt. The *Śruti* text tells that "The *Puruṣa* has been produced with waters, earth, faculties etc.".

|| ॐ सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य ॐ || **(2-1-17)**

अवरस्य तदधीनस्य साधनस्य सत्त्वात् एव 'अद्भ्यः सम्भूतः' इत्यादि वचनं न स्वतन्त्रस्य सत्त्वात्।

There are *Śruti* statements like '*adbhyaḥ sambhūtaḥ*' (referred to by the *Pūrvapakṣin*), which mention the accessories like the waters etc. because such accessories do exist, but only as subservient to *Brahman* and not independent of It.

In support of this contention, Madhvācārya quotes an appropriate *Śruti mantra*, which says that "time was, the soul was, the Lord was; whatever there was, was enveloped by Him, was under his power. Therefore, it is said that the Supreme alone was. As His, they may even be treated as non-existent in their own right"[2].

If one contends that it is not proper to first accept the existence of means other than *Brahman* before creation and then to say that they were subservient to *Brahman*, the next *sūtra* clarifies the doubt.

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1 अद्भ्यः सम्भूतः पृथिव्यै रसाच्च । (T. Ā. 3-13-1). (M. BSB. 2-1-17).

2 "काल आसीत् पुरुष आसीत् परम आसीत् तद् यद् आसीत् तदावृतम् आसीत् तदधीनम् आसीत् अथ हि एक एव परम आसीत् यस्य एतद् आसीत् न हि एतद् आसीत्" इति काषायणश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-1-17) BNK. I. p. 371.

॥ ॐ असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् ॐ ॥
(2-1-18)

"नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीं नासीद्रजो नो व्योम"[1] इति श्रुतौ साधनस्य असत्त्वव्यपदेशात् न उक्तं युक्तं इति चेत् न। साधनानाम् अव्यक्तत्वपरतन्त्रत्वा-धमत्वविकृतरूपविनाशादिधर्मान्तरापेक्षया असत्त्वस्य व्यपदिष्टत्वात्। न च स्वरूपासत्त्वाभिप्रायेण। कुतः? वाक्यशेषे प्रकृत्यादिसत्त्वश्रवणात्।

Since it is told in *Nāsadīya Sūkta* that nothing but *Brahman* existed before creation, neither *Sat* nor *Asat*, if it be argued that it is not proper to hold the existence of means subservient to *Brahman*, it is not so; because the accessories are said to have been non-existent only in the restricted sense of their having been unmanifested, dependent, inferior, modified and disintegrated in that state, but not in their very essence. Whence? For, in the concluding part of the same *sūkta* (*vākyaśeṣa*) there is a reference to the existence of *Prakṛti* or *Tamas* (*Tama āsīt*) etc. The existence of Time is presupposed in the reference to 'then' (*tadānīm*) in the opening line[2].

If it be argued that it is not proper to accept the use of other accessories by the Supreme Being for creation, when He alone is independent and capable of creating the world without the use of accessories, other than Himself, the next *sūtra* answers the objection.

॥ ॐ युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ॐ ॥ (2-1-19)

स्वेच्छया लीलया स्वाधीनसाधनान्तरोपादानेन सृष्टेः युक्तत्वात् ईशत्वाविरोधित्वात्। लीलयेति कुतः। शब्दान्तराच्च। विवक्षितार्थप्रतिपादक शब्दविशेषात् च। यथा "शक्तोपि भगवान् विष्णुः अकर्तुं कर्तुमन्यथा। स्वभिन्नं कारणाभिन्नं भिन्नं विश्वं करोत्यजः ॥" इति।

Creating the world by the Supreme Being using other accessories under His control, sportingly and at will, is quite

1 *Nāsadīya Sūkta* (RV. 10-129-1).
2 BNK. I. p. 371.

in keeping with His Divine Majesty, and this sense of sport is vouched in specific words, as in the verse which says that "the Supreme Being, though capable of not creating or creating otherwise, creates this varied world, different from Himself and non-different from the accessories used". To evaluate the concept behind the *sūtra* Vādirājatīrtha gives a practical example that[1] compared to a king going alone, a king with his paraphernalia looks more majestic. Rāghavedratīrtha offers another example[2], that a person sporting a staff need not be lame.

The next *sūtra* adduces an analogy to infer the existence of means other than *Brahman*, before creation.

॥ ॐ पटवच्च ॐ ॥ **(2-1-20)**

विमता सृष्टिः कर्तृभिन्नसाधनसाध्या सृष्टित्वात् पटसृष्टिवत्।

The disputed creation is feasible with the help of means other than the creator, since it is a creation like that of a cloth.

On this, if one argues that in that case it can be easily established that the creation could be with the help of independent means other than the Creator, the next *sūtra* hastens to correct the impression[3].

॥ ॐ यथा प्राणादिः ॐ ॥ **(2-1-21)**

यथा प्राणदेहेन्द्रियादिकं 'यः प्राणे तिष्ठन्....प्राणम् अन्तरो यमयति'[4] इत्यादिना प्रेरणार्थम् ईशेन अनुप्रविष्टत्वेन अस्वतन्त्रं तथा इदं साधनजातम् अपि। अन्यथा प्रवेशवैयर्थ्यात्।[5]

Just as the vital air, body and its organs are entered into and impelled by *Brahman*, as told in the *Śruti* 'He who inhabits

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1 एकाकिराजापेक्षया स्वाधीनचतुरङ्गसैन्यसहितस्य राज्ञो महिमदर्शनात्। (GDK. 2-1-19).

2 लीलया दण्डमालम्ब्य गच्छतोऽपङ्गुत्ववत्। (TDK. 2-1-19).

3 BNK. I. p. 372.

4 Bṛha. Up. 3-7-16.

5 VKM 2-1-21., TDK. 2-1-21.

the vital air.... controls the vital air from within', and are therefore not independent, so also these various means of creation, other than the Creator are also not independent. Otherwise *Brahman*'s entering (the body etc.) would be in vain. In support of this view, Madhvācārya quotes a verse[1] from *Kūrma Purāṇa*, which says that "the mighty Supreme Being, having entered into the primary elements of creation (*Prakṛti*) and the individual souls (*Puruṣa*), excited (impelled) them in order to create this world".

7 इतरव्यपदेशाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ॐ ॥

(2-1-22)

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* and the next two as one *Adhikaraṇa*. They assume this entire *sūtra* as an objection by the *Pūrvapakṣin.*

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* as follows. Since *Jīva* (*itara*) and *Brahman* are identical as told by *Śruti* statements like '*tat tvaṁ asi* ' etc., if *Brahman* the creator of the world, subjects the *Jīvas* to the miseries of *Saṁsāra*, then there will be the undesirable contingency of *Brahman* being at fault of exposing Itself to the miseries of the world[2]. So a doubt arises whether the world has been created by an intelligent cause (like *Brahman*)[3].

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on similar lines as follows[4]. If these *Śruti* passages profess the *Jīva* as being *Brahman*

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1 प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव प्रविश्य पुरुषोत्तमः। क्षोभयामास भगवान् सृष्ट्यर्थं जगतो विभुः॥ इति कौर्मे। (M. BSB. 2-1-21).

2 'इतरव्यपदेशात्' इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वं 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादि श्रुतिवचनैः व्यपदेशात्, यत् ब्रह्म जीवान् सृष्ट्यादिना दुःखयेत् स्वात्मानम् एव दुःखयेत् इति हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः। (S. BSB.2-1-21), (TC. III. p. 40).

3 SRK. p. 354.

4 यदि इतरस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावः अमीभिः (श्रुति) वाक्यैः व्यपदिश्यते तदा ब्रह्मणः सार्वज्ञसत्यसङ्कल्पादियुक्तस्य आत्मनः हितरूपजगदकरणम् अहितरूपजगत्करणम् इत्यादयः दोषाः प्रसज्येरन्। अतः इदम् असङ्गतं ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वम्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-21).

then certain blemishes such as not creating a world beneficial to Himself and creating a world non-beneficial to Himself, cling to the omniscient and omnipotent *Brahman*. Therefore, *Brahman*'s causality of the world becomes untenable.

The next sūtra is,

अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्।

The word '*tu*' (but) here is taken as indicative of the refutation of the objection raised in the preceding *sūtra*. This *sūtra* asserts, according to Śaṅkarācārya, that[1], "the omniscient and omnipotent *Brahman* who is something more than and different from the *Jīva*, is held as the creator of the world. No blemishes such as creating a world non-beneficial to Himself, cling to Him. How? This is on account of the difference (between *Jīva* and *Brahman*) borne out by *Śruti* texts". Śaṅkarācārya clarifies his position here that while non-difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman* is the real truth, the difference alluded to in the *sūtra* above is the one which is the outcome of *Avidyā* (illusion)[2].

V. S. Ghate opines that, "this *Adhikaraṇa* leaves not the slightest doubt that according to the *Sūtrakāra*, the *Jīva* and the *Brahman* cannot be absolutely non-different as understood by Śaṅkarācārya; and one can easily see that Śaṅkarācārya was conscious of this, since he comes forth with his usual explanation that the difference, maintained in *sūtra* 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts"[3].

Rāmānujācārya accepts the *sūtra* literally, without any rider on it. He interprets as follows[4]. "Compared to *Jīva*, subject to

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1 यत् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति ब्रह्म शारीरादधिकम् अन्यत् तत् वयं जगतः स्रष्टृ ब्रूमः। न तस्मिन् हिताकरणादयः दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते। कुतः? भेदनिर्देशात्। (S. BSB. 2-1-22).

2 BNK. I. p. 389.

3 VSG. p. 75.

4 आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखयोगार्हात्, प्रत्यगात्मनः अधिकम् अर्थान्तरभूतं ब्रह्म। कुतः? भेदनिर्देशात्। प्रत्यगात्मनः हि भेदेन निर्दिश्यते परं ब्रह्म। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-22).

worldly miseries, *Brahman* is a different entity. How? On account of the *Supreme Brahman* having been shown as different from *Jīva* (in the *Śruti* texts)''. Then he quotes a number of *Śruti* texts in support of the difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman*.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the third *sūtra* of this *Adhikaraṇa*,

अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ।

as follows[1]. Just as stones are of different varieties, some precious, some semi-precious and others worthless, in the same way *Brahman*, though one, is found in the form of *Jīva*, Lord and other varied effects. Therefore, faults such as *Brahman* exposing Himself to the miseries of the world, as imagined by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, do not arise.

Rāmānujācārya has taken the *sūtra* quite differently. According to him, the *sūtra* says that, just as the insentient objects like stones cannot be taken as identical with *Brahman*, the sentient ones, *Jīvas*, who are subject to miseries, also cannot be taken as identical with *Brahman*[2].

These divergent explanations of the *sūtras* shown above, appear far-fetched. The compound *itaravyapadeśāt* in the opening *sūtra*, has been dissolved as '*itarasya śārīrasya Brahmātmatvaṁ vyapadeśāt*' and is taken to mean 'on account of the other's i.e. *Jīva*'s being mentioned as being identical with *Brahman*'. The compound *itaravyapadeśāt*, which clearly means 'on account of being told as other than' is taken in the contrary sense as 'on account of identity being mentioned[3].

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1. यथा अश्मनां केचिन्महार्हाः मणयः अन्ये मध्यमवीर्याः अन्ये प्रहीणाः पाषाणाः इति अनेकविधं वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते एवम् एकस्यापि ब्रह्मणः जीवप्राज्ञपृथक्त्वं कार्यं वैचित्र्यं च उपपद्यते। इत्यतः तदनुपपत्तिः परपरिकल्पितदोषानुपपत्तिः। (S. BSB. 2-1-23).
2. अश्मादीनां अचिद्विशेषाणां ब्रह्मस्वरूपैक्यं यथा न उपपद्यते तथा चेतनस्यापि दुःखयोगार्हस्य ब्रह्मभावानुपपत्तिः। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-23).
3. आद्ये सूत्रे 'इतरव्यपदेशात्' इत्यस्य ऐक्यव्यपदेशात् इत्यर्थः विरुद्धः। (TC. III. p. 40).

(Gurudeva) R. D. Ranade holds that these three *sūtra*s "do not seem to have been accurately interpreted by any commentator"[1]. V. S. Ghate tells the same, but rather diplomatically. He says that "it is difficult to say, which of these interpretations is more natural than others"[2].

Madhvācārya interprets these *sūtra*s in a different way, in keeping with the thought process in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. He treats these three *sūtra*s and the next three as forming one *Adhikaraṇa*. The exposition of the opening *sūtra* (2-1-22) above, according to his views, is as follows:

इतरस्य जीवस्य "जीवाद्भवन्ति भूतानि" इति श्रुतौ कारणत्वेन व्यपदेशात स्वतन्त्रकारणत्वम् इति चेत् तर्हि तस्य हिताकरणाहितकरणयोर्दोषत्वप्रसक्तिः ।[3]

On the strength of a *Śruti* passage, which apparently tells that 'the individual soul (*Jīva*) creates the world', if the individual soul, other than *Brahman* (*itara*), is held as the independent cause of the world, then there will be the undesirable contingency of *Jīva* not doing what is beneficial to him and doing what is detrimental to him. The general understanding or axiom is that an independent creator will create what is good for him and not what is harmful to him. But, what we see in the world is that *Jīva*s cannot always get what they desire and cannot avoid what they dislike. They are found helpless. Therefore, the *sūtra* asserts that helpless creatures like *Jīva*s cannot be credited with the status of independent creator of the world.

Since a person engaged in a huge multifarious activity gets tired and worried, the creator of the world, *Brahman* may also be subject to fatigue and worries and become helpless like *Jīva*s

1 BNK. I. p. 390.
2 VSG. p. 75.
3 VKM. 2-1-22.

and hence may not be the independent cause of the world[1]. Thus, because of similarity between the two (*Jīva* and *Brahman*), if one doubts whether the perceived causality of *Jīva* only could be accepted, the next *sūtra* clarifies the doubt[2].

॥ ॐ अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॐ ॥ **(2-1-23)**

तद् ब्रह्म तु अधिकं अधिकशक्त्यादिमत्त्वेन उत्कृष्टम्। कुतः भेदनिर्देशात् 'श्रोता मन्ता'इत्यादिना सर्वेभ्यः अखिलश्रोतृत्वान्तर्यामित्वादिविशेषस्य निर्देशात्।

But, that *Brahman* having abundant powers, is the supreme. For, the *Śruti* texts, saying that the Supreme Being is all-listener, all-thinker, the conscious person in all etc.[3], place Him in an all-together different class of His own, far superior to *Jīvas*. The purport is that *Brahman* cannot be equated with *Jīvas* and cannot be doubted to be subject to fatigue or worries like ordinary mortals.

If one questions why not consider *Jīva* as the independent creator since *Jīva* also is a sentient being like *Brahman*, the next sutra answers the same.

॥ ॐ अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ॐ ॥ **(2-1-24)**

चेतनत्वे अपि जीवस्य अश्मादिवत् अस्वतन्त्रत्वात् स्वतःकर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिः।

Though *Jīva* is sentient, like insentient objects such as stones etc., *Jīva* is not independent and therefore cannot claim self-creativity.

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1. महत्कार्यव्यापृतस्य कर्तुः श्रमचिन्तादिदोषदर्शनात् जगत्कर्तुरपि श्रमचिन्तादिदोषप्रसक्तेः जीववत् पारतन्त्र्यम् इति। (STK. 2-1-23).
2. एवं च पक्षयोः साम्ये अनुभवसिद्धं जीवकर्तृत्वमेव आश्रयणीयम् इत्याशङ्कां परिहरत्सूत्रमुपन्यस्य व्याचष्टे। (TP. 2-1-23).
3. स योऽतोऽश्रुतोऽगतोऽमतोऽनतोऽदृष्टोऽविज्ञातोऽनादिष्टः श्रोता मन्ता द्रष्टाऽघोष्टा विज्ञाता प्रज्ञाता सर्वेषां भूतानाम् अन्तरपुरुषः। (A.Ā. 3-2-4). He Who is all-pervasive, Who cannot be heard, comprehended or thought of in all His fullness, Who submits to none, Who cannot be seen directly or known indirectly in all His fullness, Who cannot be ordered, Who listens to all, thinks of all, sees all but reports to none, Who knows all and Who is the conscious inner Person in all.

The universal experience of *Jīvas*' inability to do what is favourable to them and their subjection to the states of (birth), death and sleep etc. prove the lack of independence on the part of Jīvas[1].

If one does not agree with this observation and contends that this is against common experience, the next *sūtra* explains it further.

॥ ॐ उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेत् क्षीरवद्धि ॐ ॥ (2-1-25)

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* and the next as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows. The *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that since in the world the potters etc. are seen producing pots, cloth etc. after collecting the accessories like clay, rod etc., then how can your *Brahman* create the world without collecting any other accessories? Therefore, *Brahman* cannot be taken as the cause of the world[2]. The *sūtra* refutes the argument saying that, just as in the world milk and water turn into curd and ice respectively without any external means, so is it here also (with *Brahman*). The next *sūtra*,

देवादिवदपि लोके।

has been interpreted in the following way. If it be said that non-conscious beings like milk may change themselves without extraneous means into curds etc., *Brahman* being intelligent, like the potter, cannot be conceived to create without other external means. The answer is that gods and sages are reported in the *śāstras* to have the ability to produce palaces and chariots by the shear force of their will. So *Brahman* may create the world without any extraneous means[3].

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1 अस्वातन्त्र्यं च हिताक्रियादिना मृतिसुप्त्यादौ सार्वजनीनानुभवेन सिद्धम् इति भावः। (TDK. 2-1-24).

2 इह हि लोके कुलालादयः घटपटादीनां कर्तारः मृद्दण्डचक्रसूत्राद्यनेककारकोपसंहारेण संगृहीतसाधनाः सन्तः तत्तत्कार्यं कुर्वाणा दृश्यन्ते। ब्रह्म च असहायं तवाभिप्रेतं तस्य साधनान्तरानुपसङ्ग्रहे सति कथं स्रष्टृत्वम् उपपद्येत। तस्मान्न ब्रह्म जगत्कारणम् इति चेत् नैष दोषः। यथा हि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमभावेन परिणमते अनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं तथा इहापि भविष्यति। (S. BSB. 2-1-24).

3 SRK. p. 357.

Rāmānujācārya's interpretation of the *sūtra* is also on these lines only.

However, the example of milk turning into curd[1] is not fitting since that process requires external help like a favourable temperature and a fermenting agent. In a succeeding *sūtra* (BS. 2-2-3) Śaṅkarācārya himself holds[2] that the actions of milk and water are due to the influence of a sentient Supreme Being in them. Therefore, the example of milk turning into curd without any external help is not consistent with what he is going to establish later[3]. The illustrations of milk etc., and those of gods and sages producing things at will, have no place in *Vivartavāda*[4]. If the Supreme Being creates the world by will-power just as gods and sages create palaces etc., then the world would not be unreal. Thus, the interpretation of these two *sūtras* shown above, is not found convincing.

Madhvācārya explains the *sūtras* differently. The exposition of the sūtra 2-1-25 is as follows :

जीवे उपसंहारस्य आरब्धकार्यसमापनस्य दर्शनात् अनुभवात् न स्वतन्त्रकतृत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् न। क्षीरवत्। यथा गोषु दृश्यमानं क्षीरं गोभिन्नप्राणकर्त्रधीनं तथा जीवे दृश्यमानमपि कार्यावसानं जीवभिन्नेशाख्यकर्त्रधीनम्।

If it be said that, on account of the ability to complete the task undertaken, perceived in *Jīva*, he cannot be said to lack independent creativity, it is not so. Just as the milk found in the cow, is subject to the vitality or the life-principle in the cow, other than the cow, in the same way the ability to complete the task undertaken, though visible in *Jīva*, is subservient to a Supreme Power called *Brahman*, other than the *Jīva*. The

1. क्षीरादेरपि दधिभावे क्वाथातंचनादिसापेक्षत्वात्। (TC. III. p. 42).
2. पयोम्बुनोः चेतनाधिष्ठितयोः एव प्रवृत्तिः। (S. BSB. 2-2-3).
3. 'पयोम्बुवत्' इत्यत्र क्षीरे अपि ईशः कर्ता इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वेन तद्विरोधाच्च। (TC. III. p. 42).
4. क्षीरादिदृष्टान्तस्य विवर्तानिनुगुणत्वाच्च। यदि च प्रासादादिः देवादिभिः इव जगदीश्वरेण कृतम् तर्हि मिथ्या न स्यात्। (TC. III. p.42).

purport behind the illustration of the milk is that the food eaten by the cow is converted into milk by *Prāṇa*, the vital force i.e. *Brahman*, in the cow. The same sentiment is seen in a verse[1] from *Bhagavdgītā*, which says that, "I (the Supreme Being) abide in the body of living beings and, becoming the gastric fire and associated with the vital airs, digest the four-fold food".

If one argues that the so-called Supreme Being does not exist at all, since He is not perceptible, and therefore, where is the question of *Jīva* being subservient to Him, the next *sūtra* answers the same.

|| ॐ देवादिवदपि लोके ॐ || (2-1-26)

देवादिवत् देवादीनामिव सतोऽपि ईशस्य अनुपलम्भः युक्तः । कुतः ? अपि लोके इति । लोके पिशाचादीनाम् अपि तादृशशक्तिरस्ति किमु ईश्वरस्य ।

Like the deities (described in scriptures as functioning unseen), it is quite proper for the Supreme Being to exist without being perceived. When in the world even the inferior spirits (ghosts) are known to have the power of remaining unseen, what to talk of the Supreme Being?[2]

Uptill now, it has been established that *Jīva* does not have independent creativity, based on the observation of his inability to do what is beneficial to him and avoid doing what is harmful. The next *sūtra* proves the same lack of independent creativity on the part of *Jīva*, on another ground.

|| ॐ कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ॐ ||

(2-1-27)

This is a peculiar *sūtra*. It neither raises an objection (*Pūrvapakṣa*), nor states an established view (*Siddhānta*), nor an

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1 अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा प्राणिनां देहमाश्रितः। प्राणापानसमायुक्तः पचाम्यन्नं चतुर्विधम् ॥ (BG. 15-14).

2 कैमुत्यन्यायः। (An argument a *fortiori*).

additional reason nor illustration in support of the established view. It simply poses a dilemma like that between a devil and the deep sea. In the first *sūtra* of this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* has established by the method of '*reductio ad absurdum*' a view that the individual soul (*Jīva*) cannot be credited with independent creativity. Possibly, here also, the *Sūtrakāra* follows the same method, rather more forcefully, and suggests that if one does not accept the view established in this *Adhikaraṇa*, he would be on the horns of a dilemma.

The exposition of the *sūtra*, according to Madhvācārya, is as follows.

यदि जीवः स्वतन्त्रकर्ता तर्हि सर्वकार्येषु कृत्स्नसामर्थ्यप्रवर्तनप्रसक्तिः या अनुभवविरुद्धा अथवा सामर्थ्यांशप्रवर्तनाङ्गीकारे निरवयवत्वश्रुतिव्याकोपः।

If it be said that *Jīva* possesses independent creativity (*kartṛtva*), then in all works either he should employ his entire creative energy which is contrary to general experience or if it is accepted that he employs a part of his energy, it contradicts the *Śruti* which declares that *Jīva* is partless. Here, the creative energy is not restricted to the physical energy, but stands for his physical and intellectual faculties, i.e. his entire personality. If the first alternative is accepted, then it means that even for bringing a blade of grass *Jīva* has to muster his entire energy, which is against the common experience. If the second alternative is accepted, then it means that the *Jīva*'s personality has parts, which contradicts the *Śruti* statement[1] that holds *Jīva* as partless. Madhvācārya quotes a saying[2], which tells that "whenever an event defies logic then the only recourse is to attribute it to the Divine Will". Based on this, the *sūtra* is taken to conclude that the creativity (*kartṛtva*) of *Jīvas* is subservient to the Supreme

1. 'अथ यः स जीवः स नित्यो निरवयवो ज्ञाताज्ञाता सुखी दुःखी शरीरेन्द्रियस्थः।' इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-1-27).
2. 'यदि युक्त्या विरुद्ध्येत तदीशकृतमेव हि' इति गत्यन्तरोक्तेः। (M. BSB. 2-1-17).

Being and non-acceptance of that leads to the dilemma mentioned therein. Thus, the purport of the *Adhikaraṇa* is not explicitly mentioned in the *sūtra* but is implied in the dialectic and wording of the *sūtra*.

Śaṅkarācārya treats this *sūtra* and the next three, as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. Rāmānujācārya on the other hand, treats this *sūtra* and the next five as a single *Adhikaraṇa*. Of course, there is continuity of ideas and arguments from this *Adhikaraṇa* to the next. The difference between the two *Adhikaraṇa*s is that, here the creativity of individual souls is under the scanner, but in the next, an objection against the causality of *Brahman* is being addressed.

8 शब्दमूलत्वाधिकरणम् ।

Śaṅkarācārya treats the whole of previous *sūtra* i.e. *kṛtsnaprasaktirniravayavatvaśabdakopo vā* as an objection and interprets it as follows. "The objection is raised that if the whole of *Brahman* is transformed into the world, then *Brahman* would cease to exist and there is no point in asking us to see *Brahman* or in saying that *Brahman* is unborn. If, on the other hand, we hold that a part of *Brahman* is transformed, then we assume that *Brahman* is capable of being divided into parts. This would be a direct violation of the texts, which declare that *Brahman* is partless, etc."[1]. The succeeding three *sūtra*s are taken as refuting this objection.

The next *sūtra*, '*Śrutes tu śabdamūlatvāt*', is interpreted as saying 'but (it is not so) on account of Vedic testimony since *Brahman*'s causality has its ground in Scripture'. The word '*tu*' in the *sūtra* indicates the refutation of the objection, as 'it is not so'[2]. "Śaṅkarācārya states the objection again[3]. *Brahman* is either

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1 SRK. p. 358.

2 तुशब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति । (S. BSB. 2-1-27).

3 यदि निरवयवं ब्रह्म स्यात् नैव परिणमेत । कृत्स्नमेव वा परिणमेत । अथ केनचिद्रूपेण [illegible] अवतिष्ठेत इति रूपभेदकल्पनात् सावयवमेव प्रसज्येत । नैष दोषः अविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदाभ्युप[illegible] (S. BSB.2-1-27).

partless or is transformed partially. If it is partless, it is transformed as a whole or not at all. If it is only partially transformed, then it consists of parts. Śaṅkarācārya overcomes the difficulties by his view that *Brahman* ever remains the same in reality. It does not undergo any change, though it is the ground of multiplicity of name and form in the phenomenal world''[1]. The succeeding *sūtra ''ātmani caivaṁ vicitraś ca hi'* i.e. ''for, thus it is even within the Self and wondrous'', tells that, ''So there may exist a manifold creation in *Brahman* without impairing his real nature''[2]. The following *sūtra 'Svapakṣadoṣācca'* i.e. ''and because there is fault in the opponent's own view'', purports that if 'the *Sāṅkhya* theory of *Pradhāna* is considered, does it (*Pradhāna*) change into the world wholly or partially? If the former, there will be no *Pradhāna*; if the latter, the view that it is partless must be given up''[3]. In short, these four *sūtra*s together convey that the Supreme Being has wonderful powers by which He creates the world out of Himself i.e. He gets transformed into the world, without losing His being wholly or in part[4], for it is so stated in scriptures.

But, all this discussion on whether *Brahman* gets itself transformed into the world, either wholly or in part, fits in the doctrine of *Pariṇāmavāda* and has no place in *Vivartavāda* advocated by Śaṅkarācārya. In the standard illustrations of *Vivartavāda* like the snake seen in place of rope or the silver seen in place of a shell, neither the rope modifies into snake nor the shell alters into silver. Moreover, Śaṅkarācārya has already established his *Vivartavāda* as the authentic scriptural view of *Vedānta*, earlier in *Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa* (i.e. *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* comprising *sūtra*s 2-1-15 to 21, according to Śaṅkarācārya) and in *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (BS. 1-4-24 to 28).

1. SRK. p. 359.
2. SRK. p. 360.
3. SRK. p. 360.
4. BNK. I. p. 394.

Therefore, the objector[1] is not expected to forget so quickly and to confuse himself with the transformation of *Brahman* into the world. Further, the import of the *sūtra* '*Śrutestu śabdamūlatvāt*' that *Brahman*'s causality of the world can be known only through *śabdaprāmaṇa* i.e. Vedic testimony and not through perception or inference, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that *Brahman* is the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world[2]. If the *Sūtrakāra* wanted to expound *Vivartavāda*, then instead of giving the example of milk turning into curd, in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, he would have relied on illustrations like dreams, which are more conducive to *Vivartavāda*[3]. Thus, the interpretation of these four *sūtras* by Śaṅkarācārya, is far from convincing.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets these *sūtras* on similar lines[4]. The first *sūtra* poses a dilemma for considering *Brahman* as the material cause of the world. The second *sūtra* refutes this objection and states that *Brahman* is without parts and yet the material cause of the world, since the scriptures declare so. In supersensuous matters scriptures alone are the authority and ordinary standards of reasoning do not apply there. The third one declares that *Brahman* is of a different category altogether from the sentient and insentient world, and has manifold supernatural powers. The fourth *sūtra* turns the accusing finger of the opponent towards himself and states that the opponent's view also is subject to these very objections.

"But the difficulty is that in Rāmānujācārya's philosophy *Brahman*, pure and simple, is never the material cause of the world. It is only *Brahman* qualified by *Acit* in its subtle state (*sūkṣma-acid-viśiṣṭa*) that is the cause. That being so, no

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1 विवर्तस्य प्रकृत्यधिकरणारम्भणाधिकरणेषु उक्तत्वेन परिणामभ्रान्त्ययोगात्। (TC. III. p. 43)

2 BNK. I. p. 395

3 योगे वाऽऽदावेव विवर्तप्रतिकूलं कुचोद्योत्पादकं क्षीरादिदृष्टान्तम् अनुक्त्वा तदनुगुणस्वप्नदृष्टान्त एव वाच्यः। (TC. III. 43)

4 Śribhāṣya- SV. 2-1-26 to 29.

Pūrvapakṣa based on *Brahman* being partless can be raised with reference to this qualified *Brahman*. It has already been established by Rāmānujācārya in the *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (BS. 1-4-24 to 28) that this qualified *Brahman* is the material cause of the world. There is thus no justification whatever to reopen the issue here''[1].

Madhvācārya takes the five *sūtras* starting from the following one, as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. In the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s contention has been that instead of assuming the imperceptible *Brahman* as the cause of the world, it would be reasonable to ascribe that causality to *Jīva*, whose creativity is known. This argument has been refuted there by various reasonings, the last one of them being that the ascription of causality to *Jīva* would be subject to the dilemma that in all works he should either employ his entire creative energy or a part of it, both leading to absurd conclusions. Turning the table on the *Siddhāntin*, the *Pūrvapakṣin* comes up with the argument that in that case the creativity of the Supreme Being may also be subject to the same dilemma. The following *sūtra* refutes the contention.

॥ ॐ श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ॐ ॥ (2-1-28)

पूर्व जीवाद्विशेषे वा। ईश्वरकर्तृत्वे तु न कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यादियुक्तिविरोधः। कुतः। श्रुतेः लोकविरुद्धधर्माणाम् ईशे अविरुद्धत्वश्रवणात्। ननु श्रौतमपि युक्तिविरुद्धं कथम् उपेयम् इति चेत् शब्दमूलत्वात्।[2] न हि शब्दैकसमधिगम्यवस्तुनि युक्तिविरोधः यथा प्रत्यक्षाविषये न प्रत्यक्षविरोधः।

The word *tu* in the *sūtra* can be taken either as an emphatic particle or in the sense 'on the contrary'. (It indicates the contrast between the creativity of *Jīva* discussed in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* and that of the Supreme Being, to be considered here). **On the contrary (i.e. as against the creativity of *Jīvas*), the creativity of the Supreme Being is not subject to the dilemma, whether**

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1. BNK. I. p. 397.
2. शब्दो मूलं प्रमाणं यस्य तत् शब्दमूलम्। तस्य भावः शब्दमूलत्वम्। तस्मात् शब्दमूलत्वात्। (TDK. 2-1-28)

in every work He uses His entire energy or a part of it, because *Śruti* tells that the Supreme Being is capable of possessing attributes, which are considered in ordinary usage as mutually exclusive. If it be said that even if *Śruti* tells, how can we accept that attributes which are considered contradictory in common logic, can exist simultaneously at the same location, the reply is that in matters which can be comprehended only through verbal testimony (*śabdapramāṇa*), inference cannot contradict the same, just as perception cannot contradict unperceivable things. For example, a deaf person cannot judge whether a singer is singing well or not, just by looking at him. Similarly, when *Śruti* tells[1] that *Brahman* is smaller than the small and bigger than the big, one cannot question how a thing can be both small and big, which defies common logic.

This is a complex *sūtra*. It contains two probanses and therefore involves two syllogisms. The proposition for the first syllogism is constructed in keeping with the thought process in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. The proposition for the second syllogism replies a possible objection against the assertion in the first syllogism.

The next *sūtra* provides another reason why inference cannot contradict matters regarding the Supreme Being.

॥ ॐ आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ॐ ॥ **(2-1-29)**

आद्यश्चोऽवधारणे। अन्त्यः समुच्चये। आत्मनि च परमात्मनि एव एवंविधा युक्तिविरोधनिरासकाः विचित्राः अघटितघटिकाः शक्तयः हि। अतश्च न युक्तिविरोधः।

The first *ca* in the *sūtra* is an emphatic particle and the last one is conjunctive. **As is well-known, the Supreme Being alone can have such strange powers which can defy common logic and accomplish things ordinarily considered as impossible. And therefore there is no contradiction.** To justify

1 अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान् आत्मा। (Katha. Up. 1-2-20)

that this is well-known, Madhvācārya quotes a *mantra*[1] from *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* which says that, "the primordial Supreme Being has strange powers and others do not have that kind of powers."

If it be said that in case the Supreme Being can defy the logic in the dilemma posed by the *sūtra* "*Kṛtsnaprasaktir*......", then the *Jīva*, who is also sentient like the Supreme Being, can as well defy that logic, the next *sūtra* answers the contention.

॥ ॐ स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ॐ ॥　**(2-1-30)**

चोऽवधारणे । जीवपक्षे कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यादिदोषादेव युक्तिविरोधः न अविरोधतां नेतव्यः । ईशवत् श्रौतत्वशब्दैकगम्यत्वविचित्रशक्तिमत्त्वानाम् अविरोधता कल्पकानाम् अभावात् ।

Ca is for emphasis. ***Jīva*s (though sentient) should not be credited with the ability to defy ordinary logic, because of drawbacks only such as being subject to the dilemma of employing either the entire creative energy or a part of it in every work etc.; and also because they do not have the attributes ascribed to the Supreme Being, such as being established by *Śruti*s, knowability only through verbal testimony and possession of strange powers etc., which justify the ability to defy ordinary logic.**

If one doubts that these strange powers of the Supreme Being, such as being capable of accomplishing the impossible and defying common logic, may not be true in all matters and at all times, the next *sūtra* removes that doubt.

॥ ॐ सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ॐ ॥　**(2-1-31)**

चशब्दः समुच्चये । देवता इति श्रुतिबलात् लभ्यते । तथा च आत्माख्यदेवता शक्तिभिः सर्वविषयकसार्वकालिकशक्तिभिः उपेता तद्दर्शनात् 'सर्वैर्युक्ता' इति श्रुतौ तथा उक्तत्वात् ।

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1. विचित्रशक्तिः पुरुषः पुराणो न चान्येषां शक्तयस्तादृशाः स्युः । इति श्वेताश्वतरश्रुतिः । (M.BSB. 2-1-29)

Ca in the *sūtra* is a conjunctive particle. The word '*devatā*' is taken from the *Viṣayavākya*. **So it is said that the Divinity called *Ātman* posseses that kind of powers which are true in all matters and at all times since it is told so in the *Śruti* text.**

The *Viṣayavākya* referred to here, is a *mantra*[1] from *caturvedaśikhā*, quoted by Madhvācārya which declares that, "that immortal, unchanging, ever happy, eternal, Supreme Divinity called *Ātman* is said to possess all the powers, true in all matters and at all times''.

Since the discussion on strange powers of *Brahman* started with the masculine word '*ātmani* ' (BS. 2-1-29), the term *upetaḥ* should have been found here. But a feminine term *upetā* is used in the *sūtra*, to suggest the reference to the *Śruti* text where a feminine word *devatā* is used[2].

If one doubts how creativity could be ascribed to *Brahman* having no organs of action like hands and feet, the next *sūtra* clears that doubt.

॥ ॐ विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम् ॐ ॥ (2-1-32)

न इति आवर्तते। "अचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम्"[3] इत्यादि श्रुत्या अक्ष्यादिकरण-शून्यत्वात् न ईशस्य कर्तृत्वम् इति चेत् न। "अपाणिपादो जवनो गृहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स श्रुणोत्यकर्णः"[4] इति श्रुतौ उक्तत्वात्।[5]

The word '*na*' is to be repeated. **If it be said that the Supreme Being cannot be ascribed with creativity since "He does not possess organs like eyes, ears, hands, feet etc." as told by the *Śruti*, it is not so because it is declared in the *Śruti* that**

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1 सर्वैर्युक्ता शक्तिभिर्देवता सा परेति यां प्राहुरजस्रशक्तिम्। नित्यानन्दा नित्यरूपाऽजरा च या शाश्वताऽत्मेति च यां वदन्ति॥ इति चतुर्वेदशिखायाम्। (M. BSB. 2-1-31)

2 आत्मनीत्युपक्रमात् उपेतः इति वाच्ये उपेता इत्युक्तिः श्रुतिविशेषसूचनाय। (TDK. 2-1-31)

3 Muṇḍ. Up. 1-1-6.

4 Śveta. Up. 3-19.

5 M. BSB. 2-1-32.

"He can be swift without legs, can hold without hands, see without eyes and hear without ears". The import is that those who have an ordinary physical body, need sense organs to acquire knowledge from outside, need organs of action to work, need some ground to support their bodies etc. But, the Supreme Being having an omniscient, all-powerful, happiness personified, extraordinary and trans-empirical form, needs no such organs or instruments for creation.

Śaṅkarācārya treats this *sūtra* and the preceding one as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. The previous *sūtra*, '*Sarvopetā ca taddarśanāt*' has been interpreted as saying that, "*Brahman* is endowed with all wonderful powers as seen in *Śruti*"[1]. The present *sūtra* is understood as refuting an objection that in the absence of any organs, how can *Brahman* create the world, though having all powers. The *sūtra* avers that *Brahman* can exercise all powers without having any organs and in support of this Śaṅkarācārya quotes the same *mantra* (Śveta. Up. 3-19), seen above in Madhvācārya's interpretation. But he adds[2] that, "*Brahman* is conceived as being endowed with powers when we assume in its nature an element of plurality which is the product of *Avidyā*"[3].

All this explanation is not convincing. All this discussion on these *sūtra*s does not fit in the doctrine of *Vivartavāda*, advocated by Śaṅkarācārya. "Since *Brahman* in *Vivartavāda* is only the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world, the objection to *Brahman*'s being the cause of the world on the ground of its having no body or senses and the reply to such an objection that *Brahman* has adequate *Śakti*s are all misplaced"[4, 5].

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1 सर्वशक्तियुक्ता च परा देवता कुतः तद्दर्शनात् तथा हि दर्शयति श्रुतिः। (S. BSB. 2-1-30).

2 प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवति इत्येतद् अपि अविद्याकल्पित-रूपभेदोपन्यासेन उक्तमेव। (S. BSB. 2-1-31).

3 SRK. p. 361.

4 भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वस्य विकरणत्वेन आक्षेपः शक्तिविशेषेण समाधानं च अयुक्तम्। (TC. III. p. 44).

5 BNK. I. p. 397.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets these two *sūtras* on similar lines. The first *sūtra* says that[1], "The Supreme Deity, unlike other entities, is endowed with all powers. The *Śrutis* present that kind of Supreme Divinity only". The second one is interpreted as follows[2]. "If it be said that (though endowed with all powers), *Bahaman* without instruments cannot start any work, the *sūtra* says that this objection has been answered earlier (BS. 2-1-27,28) that the Supreme Being, who can be known only through scriptures and is different from other entities, is capable of producing various effects even without the necessary accessories".

But, these interpretations do not go well with Rāmānujācārya's doctrine of creation. B.N.K. Sharma says: 'In Rāmānujācārya's philosophy *Brahman*, pure and simple is never the material cause of the world. It is only *Brahman* qualified by *Acit* in its subtle state (*sūkṣma-acid-viśiṣṭa*) that is the cause. --- The *Siddhānta* position that *Brahman* can well be the material cause ---- because of Its being endowed with the highest powers is not very much to the point. If the possessor of the highest powers is *Brahman* in its substantival aspect (*viśeṣya*) unqualified by *Sūkṣma-acit*, it is certainly not the material cause in Rāmānujācārya's theory. The true material cause is not thus identical with the one possessing the highest powers. If it is the qualified *Brahman* that possesses these highest powers, it is doubtful if such a *Brahman* which is virtually unable to prevent itself from becoming exposed to various imperfections in the course of such transformation into the world of objects can properly be said to possess the highest powers'"[3].

9 नप्रयोजनाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ नप्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ॐ ॥ (2-1-33)

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1 सकलेतरवस्तुविसजातीया परा देवता सर्वशक्त्युपेता च। तथैव परां देवतां दर्शयन्ति श्रुतयः। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-30).

2 करणविरहिणः तस्य न कार्यारम्भः संभवति इति चेत् तत्र उत्तरं "शब्दमूलत्वाद्विचित्राश्च हि। (BS.2-1-27, 28)" इत्युक्तम्। शब्दैकप्रमाणकं सकलेतरविलक्षणं तत्तत्करणविरहेणापि तत्तत्कार्यसमर्थम् इत्यर्थः। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-31).

3 BNK. I. p. 397, 398.

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* (BS. 2-1-32 according to them) as an objection and the next one as a reply to it. Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows. The sentient Supreme Being cannot be the creator of this world, because activity on the part of a sentient being presupposes a purpose to attain something; and if a self-serving motive is ascribed to Him, it would contradict the *Śruti* which declares Him to be perpetually fully contented[1]. The next *sūtra* '*Lokavat tu līlākaivalyaṁ*' (BS. 2-1-33) refutes the above contention with the word '*tu*' (but) and tells that just as a king, who has no unfulfilled desires, engages himself in a sporting activity spontaneously without any other motive, "in the same way *Brahman*'s activity also is a spontaneous sporting behaviour without any other motive"[2].

However, all this talk of a motive behind the acts of any sentient being and the spontaneous sporting act of *Brahman* without any other motive etc. is out of tune with the *Advaita* doctrine[3]. According to the said philosophy, the world is a mere illusory appearance on the substratum of *Brahman*, like a snake seen on a rope. One cannot attach any motive to a frightened person seeing a snake in place of a rope nor can that person be said to be indulging in a sportive act. *Brahman* also cannot be charged with a sportive act of deluding either Himself or the other sentient beings into thinking that an illusory world exists.

Possibly being aware of this situation, Śaṅkarācārya adds a rider that[4] 'it should not be lost sight of that the creation told by

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1 न खलु चेतनः परमात्मा इदं जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितुम् अर्हति ।कुतः? प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् प्रवृत्तीनाम् ।यदि इयमपि प्रवृत्तिः चेतनस्य परमात्मनः आत्मप्रयोजनोपयोगिनी परिकल्पेत परितृप्तत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत। (S. BSB. 2-1-32).

2 एवम् ईश्वरस्यापि अनपेक्ष्य किंचित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिः भविष्यति। (S.BSB. 2-1-33).

3 ब्रह्मणः प्रयोजनाभावेन भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वाद्याक्षेपो लीलात्वेन समाधानं च अयुक्तम्। न हि चेतनोऽचेतनो वा फलमुद्दिश्य भ्रमविषयो भवति भ्राम्यति वा। (TC. III. p. 46).\

4 न च इयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात् ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्च इत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम्। (S. BSB. 2-1-33).

the *Śruti* is not in the sense of true spiritual knowledge, but is told with reference to the illusory appearance of the world and its purport is to establish that *Brahman* is the indwelling spirit in all''. But it hardly improves the situation.

Rāmānujācārya holds that all activities have a motive, either to benefit oneself or others. *Brahman* being self-sufficient, has nothing to gain for Itself by the creation; neither can it be for the sake of *Jīvas*, for in that case, *Brahman* would have created a world full of happiness, out of pity for the *Jīvas*, and not this world full of sufferings. Therefore, *Brahman* cannot be the cause of this world. According to Rāmānujācārya, the second *sūtra* (BS. 2-1-33) tells that, even as kings engage themselves in activity like playing with a ball, without any motive but for mere amusement, so also *Brahman* without any purpose to gain, engages Itself in creating this world as a mere pastime[1].

(Gurudeva) R. D. Ranade does not appear to be satisfied with all these theories about creation. In his work, ''Vedānta, the culmination of Indian Thought'', he observes: ''The problem of the creation of the world by God defies explanation and no solution appears to be final''[2]. He also remarks that ''after all none can boast of having given a rational explanation of God's ways''. One need not take such a pessimistic view. Possibly, such a despair springs from our expectation that this explanation about creation should concur with our rational thinking, i.e. it should be within the framework of our common logic. But the *Sūtrakāra* is telling time and again that it is not. He has just told in a previous *sūtra*, *śrutestu śabdamūlatvāt* (BS. 2-1-28) that in matters which can be comprehended only through verbal testimony, inference (i.e. common logic) is of no avail. He has started this enquiry into *Brahman*, stating that the Supreme Being who is the cause of this creation (*janmādyasya yataḥ*), can be known only through

1 Śrībhāṣya - SV 2-1-32, 33.

2 BNK. I. p. 404.

scriptures (*śāstrayonitvāt*). These *Brahmasūtras*, composed by Bādarāyaṇavyāsa, the exponent of *Vedānta* school of philosophy, are universally accepted as forming the manual of *Vedānta*. Therefore, having accepted *Vedānta* as the culmination of Indian Thought, we have no other go but to accept and understand these *sūtras* with the help of an unbiased and objective interpretation, even if it goes against common logic or against the doctrine of one teacher (*ācārya*) or the other.

Madhvācārya treats both these *sūtras* as *Siddhāntasūtras* only. The first *sūtra* is interpreted as follows:

प्रकृतम् ईशस्य कर्तृत्वं न स्वप्रयोजनार्थम्। कुतः? नप्रयोजनवत्त्वात्। तस्य पूर्णानन्दत्वेन प्राप्तप्राप्तव्यत्त्वात् फलानुद्देशेन प्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमादित्यर्थः।[1]

The creativity of the Supreme Being under consideration, is without any purpose to gain anything for Himself, because He has no needs. That is, He has attained all that is to be attained since He is full of bliss, and therefore it is accepted that His propensity to create is without any motive to gain anything. The word *na* in the *sūtra* is repeated in the exposition. In this *Adhikaraṇa* the *Pūrvapakṣin* is presenting another dilemma, whether the Lord has any motive behind creation or not. If it be said that the Lord engages Himself in these activities of creation, sustenance etc. in order to gain something, then it means that the Lord is wanting in something, which contradicts the *Śruti*. If it be said that the Lord has no motive, then where is the question of creating something, because no sentient being acts without any motive to gain something? Hence, the Supreme Being may not be the cause of creation.[2]

The *sūtra* refutes this contention, and implies that even without any purpose action is possible. The *Sūtrakāra* holds the proposition

1 TP 2-1-33.

2 किमसौ प्रयोजनमपेक्ष्य सृष्ट्यादिकं करोति प्रयोजनमनपेक्ष्यैव वा। प्रयोजनापेक्षितत्वे सृष्ट्यादेः पूर्वम् अपूर्णत्वप्रसङ्गः। प्रयोजनानुद्देशेन प्रवृत्तिरेव न दृष्टा। कुतः सर्वकर्तृत्वम्। (TP. 2-1-33).

that 'no sentient being acts without any purpose', as not invariably true. A lecturer when he is absorbed in his subject or a singer in his ecstatic moment may move his head and hands, without any purpose.

If one doubts that when there is no purpose, how can a considerate person like the Supreme Being be expected to act, the next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम् ॐ ॥ (2-1-34)

तुरेव। लोकवत् लोकस्य मत्तादेः नृत्यगानादिका क्रिया यथा तथा ईशस्यापि सृष्टिक्रिया लीलायाः कैवल्यं केवलं प्रयोजनवत्तां विना लीला एव।

The word *tu* is in the sense of 'only'. **Just as the acts of dancing and singing of an overjoyed person etc. in the world, are without any purpose, in the same way, the creation and sustenance of this world by the Supreme Being is only a sporting act, which flows from His pure joy without any specific purpose.**

The word *kaivalyaṁ* added to *līlā* is significant. It suggests that the creation etc. is a sportive act isolated from any purpose behind it. All sportive acts are not without purpose. For example, the games played by professional sportsmen and the dance and music performed by artistes for material gain, and even those performed by the amateurs for the sake of pleasure, do not qualify to be called as *līlākaivalyaṁ*, because they are deliberate acts done with a purpose and involve effort. Therefore, the example of a King taking a stroll in a garden or playing with a ball for pleasure, adduced by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, is not befitting[1]. On the contrary, the moving of hands and feet by a child lying in a cradle after feeding, the nodding or tapping by a person while listening to music, bathroom-singing and the rotating

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1 यदुक्तम् उभाभ्यां प्रयोजनान्तराभावेऽपि महाराजस्य कन्दुकादौ इव लीलार्था ईश्वरस्य प्रवृत्ति इत्येतदधिकरणार्थः इति तन्न। श्रुतिसूत्रविरोधात्। (TC. III. p. 46). "लीलां प्रयोजनं कृत्वा प्रवृत्ति श्रुतिविरोधिनी। इति केवललीलैव निर्णीता प्रभुणा स्वयम्॥" (AV.) (TC. III. p. 46).

of a key-chain by a joyous man wandering aimlessly can be called as *līlākaivalyaṁ*. It is not an act for the sake of pleasure but that, which flows from pleasure. There are two criteria involved. One is that the act requires negligible effort indicated by the word *līlā*. The other is that there should be no motive to gain something from the act, signified by the word *kaivalyaṁ*. Moreover, the act also depends on the in-born propensity of the person, because every one may not rotate the key-chain or sing in the bathroom. Further, the dancing and singing of a drunk person and the help given by a compassionate person to a needy one without any motive to gain something, also qualify to be called as *līlākaivalyaṁ*. Then, in which category can we put the creation, sustenance etc. of the world by the Supreme Being? One cannot say that the Supreme Being engages Himself in futile activities like rotating a key-chain, nor can He be expected to dance in an intoxicated state. Therefore, as we see in the world compassionate people working for the benefit of others only, the creation by the most merciful Lord is for the benefit of other creatures only[1]. There is nothing objectionable in holding so[2]. Madhvācārya quotes appropriate *Śruti* and *Smṛti* in support of this view.

10) वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति ॐ ॥

(2-1-35)

This is an important *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the problem of disparity and cruelty seen in society. Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya treat this *sūtra* and the next two as forming one *Adhikaraṇa*. However, Rāmānujācārya has included this *sūtra* and the remaining three *sūtras* of this *Pāda*, in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* only.

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1 ...नेन कृपालूनां केवलं परप्रयोजनोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तेः दृष्टत्वात् परमकृपालोः ईश्वरस्य परप्रयोजनोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तिः । (VKM. 2-1-34).

2 पूर्णानन्दोऽपि भगवान् लोकानुग्रहाय सृष्ट्यादिक्रीडां करोति इति न किञ्चिद् अयुक्तम् । (TP. 2-1-34).

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that, since there is inequality and pain in the world, *Brahman* is either partial and cruel or *Brahman* is not the cause of the world. The *sūtra* refutes this charge. The charges of partiality and cruelty are not applicable to the Supreme Being, because He has other considerations too. As the rain is common cause of crops of rice and barley and the differences are due to the potentialities of seeds, in the same way the Supreme Being is the common cause of creation while the diversities are due to the individual merits and demerits[1]. *Śruti* supports this view. The next *sūtra*, "*na karmāvibhāgāditi cennānāditvāt*" has been interpreted as follows. If it be contended that since there could be no merit or demerit before the creation, the first creation at least should have been free from inequalities, the answer is that the world is without a beginning. Like seed and sprout, merits, demerits and the inequality are caused as well as causes[2]. The third *sūtra*, '*upapadyate cāpyupalabhyate ca*', confirms the beginninglessness (*anāditva*) of the world, saying that it can be justified also and is observed in scriptures also. If the world had a beginning, it would follow that it came into being without a cause and the released souls could return to *saṁsāra*. Then, there would be no justification for inequalities. As already said, the Lord cannot be the cause of inequalities. *Avidyā* (ignorance, illusion) cannot be the cause as it is of a uniform nature. Without karma (deeds leading to merits and demerits) no one can come into existence. Without coming into existence *karma* cannot be formed. So we must accept that the world is without a beginning[3].

This beginninglessness of the *karma* as an answer to the problem of disparity in the world is as good as telling that *Vedānta*

1 वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न ईश्वरस्य प्रसज्येते। कस्मात् सापेक्षत्वात्। ईश्वरः देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति। देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतानि एव असाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति [illegible] ईश्वरः सापेक्षत्वात् न वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याभ्यां दुष्यति। (S. BSB. 2-1-34).

2 SRK. p. 364.

3 SRK. p. 364.

has no answer for this problem. It amounts to saying that the disparity has to be accepted without questioning.

Can the disparity in the world be explained away so easily as *Brahman* is the common indifferent cause like rain and the difference is due to individual merits and demerits? *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* tells[1] that "the Supreme Being only makes whomsoever He wishes to lead up from this world do good deeds and the one whom He wishes to pull down do bad deeds". Therefore, *Brahman* cannot be absolved of the charge of partiality and cruelty on the plea that *Brahman* is only the common indifferent cause[2].

Moreover, in *Vivartavāda*[3] where *Brahman* is the substratum of the illusory world like the screen in a cinema, *Brahman* cannot be charged with partiality and cruelty for the disparity and pain in the world, just as the screen cannot be blamed for what happens on the screen. Even if *saguṇa Brahman* or *Īśvara* i.e. *Brahman* plus *Māyā*, is considered as the projector of this world, the projector can hardly be blamed for the disparity in the creatures projected[4]. *Bhāmatī* agrees with this[5], and accepts that *Advaita* doctrine cannot explain the disparity in the world[6].

Rāmānujācārya interprets the *sūtra* "*vaiṣamyanairghṛṇye...*" on the same line and asserts that *Brahman* cannot be ascribed with the charge of partiality and cruelty because the disparity in the world is according to the past deeds of individual souls[7].

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1. 'एष ह्येवैनं साधुकर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषत एष उ एव असाधुकर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषत' इति। (Kauś. Up. 3-8).
2. 'एष ह्येव साधुकर्म कारयति' इत्यादि श्रुत्या ईश्वरकारितत्वेन वैषम्याद्यनिस्तारात्। (TC. III. p. 50).
3. भ्रान्तत्वेन वा भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वेन वा वैषम्यादिशङ्कानुदयात्। (TC. III. p. 52).\
4. BNK. I. p. 411.
5. मायाकारस्येवाङ्गसाकल्यवैकल्यभेदेन विचित्रान् प्राणिनः दर्शयतः न वैषम्यदोषः सहसा संहरतः वा न नैर्घृण्यम्। (*Bhāmatī* 2-1-34) (BNK. I. p. 411).
6. अभ्युपेत्य च सृष्टेः तात्त्विकत्वम् इदम् उक्तम्। अनिर्वाच्या तु सृष्टिः इति न प्रस्मर्तव्यम् अत्रापि। (*Bhāmatī* 2-1-34) (BNK. I. p. 411).
7. न प्रसज्येयातां वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये। कुतः सापेक्षत्वात् सृजमानदेवादिक्षेत्रज्ञकर्मसापेक्षत्वात् विषमसृष्टेः। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-34).

Rāmānujācārya reads the next two *sūtra*s together as one *sūtra* and interprets as follows. Though *Brahman* alone existed before creation and nothing else, the individual souls and their past deeds form an eternal stream, which is beginningless. Further, Rāmānujācārya explains that, "even though the individual souls are beginningless, *Śruti* declares that nothing but *Brahman* existed before creation, because the individual souls without names and forms existed before creation in a very subtle form, as *Brahman*'s body, almost non-distinguishable from *Brahman*"[1]. Thus, according to Rāmānujācārya, in addition to *Brahman*, the *Jīva*s along with their *karma* existed without a beginning, in a subtle form and as the body of *Brahman*, before creation. But this does not provide any additional reason for the disparity in the world, other than the beginningless *karma* of *Jīva*s, which is clearly inadequate. As interpreted by Madhvācārya, the exposition of the *sūtra* is as follows.

तत्तत्कर्मानपेक्ष्य निर्निमित्तं प्राणिनां विभागेन सुखदुःखादिदानेन ईशस्य प्राप्ते ये वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये ते न स्तः। सापेक्षत्वात्। कर्मसापेक्षत्वात्। निर्निमित्तत्वाभावात्। तथा हि दर्शयति श्रुतिः।

If it be said that the Supreme Being has made some happy and others miserable, without considering their deeds and without any reason, and therefore He is guilty of partiality and cruelty, then (the *sūtra* asserts that) He cannot be deemed to be guilty of partiality and cruelty because He rewards and punishes persons according to their merits and demerits (earned in the present or past lives) and not without any reason. The *Śruti* tells the same thing.

Madhvācārya quotes an appropriate *Śruti mantra*[2] in support of the above contention, which says that, "the Supreme Being takes a person to the heaven or hell according to his good or bad deeds"

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1 तदनादित्वेऽपि अविभाग उपपद्यते च यतः तत्क्षेत्रज्ञवस्तु परित्यक्तनामरूपं ब्रह्मशरीरतयापि प्रथग्व्यपदेशानर्हम् अतिसूक्ष्मम् अवतिष्ठते। (Śrībhāṣya 2-1-35).

2 पुण्येन पुण्यं लोकं नयति पापेन पापम्। (Praśna Up. 3-7).

In spite of the above explanation, if the objector still holds the Supreme Being guilty of partiality, because even the deeds of the persons are under the control of the Supreme Being only, the next *sūtra* answers the objection.

॥ ॐ न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात् ॐ ॥

(2-1-36)

ईश्वरापेक्ष्यं कर्म नास्ति अविभागात् अस्वतन्त्रत्वात् तस्यापि ईशकृतत्वात्। अतश्च स्वकृतकर्मापेक्षया फलदाने वैषम्यादि अनिस्तारात् इति चेत् न कर्मप्रवाहस्य अनादित्वात्।

Since the *Jīva* is not free to do any deed independently and all his deeds are under the control of the Supreme Being, there is no other deed left with reference to which the Supreme Being can reward or punish the *Jīva*; and therefore if it be said that in case the Lord rewards or punishes the *Jīva* taking into account His own deeds, then He cannot escape from the charge of partiality and cruelty, it is not so; because the chain of *Karma* (merits and demerits acquired through deeds) for each transmigrating *Jīva* goes back indefinitely and has no recognizable beginning i.e. it is beginningless (*anādi*)[1].

What the *sūtra* is telling is as follows. No doubt, it is the Lord Himself Who makes a *Jīva* to do good or bad deeds, but He does so taking into account that *Jīva*'s (*karma*) deeds in previous life. And in previous life the Lord made that *Jīva* to do good or bad deeds taking into account that *Jīva*'s *karma* of still earlier stage. This series of *karma* goes back endlessly, i.e. *karma* is beginningless.

If the *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that in case the Supreme Being rewards or punishes the *Jīvas*, depending on their *karma* (deeds) then He cannot be said to be absolutely independent, the next *sūtra* answers the objection.

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1 VKM. 2-1-36.

॥ ॐ उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ॐ ॥ (2-1-37)

चोऽवधारणे। स्वातन्त्र्यमिति शेषः। कर्मापेक्षणे अपि स्वातन्त्र्यम् उपपद्यते एव (कर्मणां) तस्य स्वाधीनत्वात्। उपलभ्यते हि ईदृशं कर्मसापेक्षत्वकृतं वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च। स्वाधीनकर्मसापेक्षत्वेन प्राप्तं वैषम्यादिनामकं दोषो न इत्यर्थः।

The particle *ca* is for emphasis. The word 'independence' is to be supplied for completing the construction. **Though the Supreme Being depends upon the deeds (*karma*) of individual souls for rewarding or punishing them, it is quite proper to accept His independence i.e. His independence remains unaffected, because those deeds are under His control only. Such disparity and cruelty resulting from a reference to the deeds of *Jīva*s (while rewarding or punishing), do exist (in the world) and they are justified in the *Śruti*. Therefore, this type of disparity and cruelty do not amount to a defect of character in *Brahman*.**

In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Pūrvapakṣin* is on a pretty solid ground. The disparity and cruelty are visible in the world and the Lord being the creator and controller, cannot escape from the blame for them. Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya are on the defensive and are trying to explain that the disparity is due to the merits and demerits of transmigrating individuals and this transmigration is beginningless. The merits, demerits and the inequality are caused as well as causes like seed and sprout. This third *sūtra* has been interpreted as confirming the beginninglessness of the *Jīva*s. Thus, the debate has reached a stalemate and the original objection remains unanswered.

Madhvācārya, on the other hand, after interpreting the first two *sūtra*s in the same way as done by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, takes a belligerent stand while interpreting this *sūtra* in order to come out of the stalemate and to repulse the formidable objection effectively. He boldly accepts that, "(Yes,)

there is disparity in the world and the Supreme Being is hard-hearted; it is stated in the *Śruti*, and it is also stated that this be no longer regarded as a defect or blemish in the character of the Lord"[1]. In support, Madhvācārya quotes[2] a *mantra*, which says that, "He, the Supreme Being, makes *Jīva*s do good or bad deeds and yet He is not at all to be blamed for the disparity in the world, for He, the unborn, is independent, omnipotent and the virtues and vices of the people exist because of Him".

The above *mantra* does not claim to offer any solution to the problem of disparity in the world. It only states the facts about the case, the boundaries of the problem. It is upto the various teachers and preachers to explain the teleology, within these parameters, since these, being authoritative statements (*pramāṇavākya*), are unquestionable.

Madhvācārya holds that[3] along with *Brahman*, an infinitely large multitudes of *Jīva*s having different capabilities and nature exist without a beginning (*anādi*). There is no creation[4] of souls as such in *Vedānta*. The Lord makes these *Jīva*s do good or bad deeds according to their propensity and intrinsic fitness (*yogyatā*) and rewards or punishes according to their deeds without extra favour to anyone. The resulting inequalities in the world can be ascribed only to the basic diversity of natures and capabilities of *Jīva*s. *Bhagavadgītā* (17-3)[5] also tells that "the faith of each man takes the shape given to it by the stuff of

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1. उपपद्यत एव तादृशं वैषम्यादि उपलभ्यत्वात्। न हि प्रमाणोपलभ्यम् अनुपपन्नं भवति। (TPD.2-1-37).
2. स कारयेत्पुण्यमथापि पापं न तावता दोषवानीशितापि। ईशो यतो गुणदोषादिसत्त्वे स्वयं परोऽनादिरादिः प्रजानाम्॥ इति चतुर्वेदशिखायाम्। (M. BSB. 2-1-37).
3. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च। यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया॥ (Bhāg. 2-10-12), (M. BSB.2-1-37).
4. BNK. I. p. 408.
5. सत्त्वानुरूपा सर्वस्य श्रद्धा भवति भारत। (As translated by Aurobindo Ghosh in his 'Message of the Gītā', p. 233, fn.) (BGB. p. 454).

his being". Taking the same example of rice and barley, mentioned earlier, the Lord provides the seeds with not only rain but also the required nourishments and favourable climate and makes them grow but as rice and barley. The Lord does not choose to change rice into barley or *vice versa*, though He is competent to do so. Why should He? Otherwise the world would have reduced to a stark uniformity of only one type of tree, flower, fruit etc. Is it desirable? The beauty of nature lies in its diversity. Thus, the Supreme Being cannot be said to be lacking in equity because of the inequalities in the world resulting from His equality of treatment to all according to their worth.

Śaṅkarācārya seeks to explain the disparity in a different way[1] and others follow suit. He is sure that neither the Lord nor the *Avidyā* can be the cause of disparity and he attributes it to *Avidyā* coupled with the deeds prompted by the *vāsanās* of individual souls. But *vāsanās* are the impressions left over on the mind by the past deeds and thus they are caused as well as causes like seed and sprout. This again leads us to the stalemate of endless regression. Therefore, without accepting the beginningless existence of *Jīvas* having different propensities and capabilities, the Supreme Being cannot be absolved of the blemish for the disparities in the world[2].

11 सर्वधर्मोपपत्त्यधिकरणम्

॥ ॐ सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ (2-1-38)

All the commentators understand this *sūtra*, more or less in the same way. Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya treat this *sūtra* as

1 न चेश्वरो वैषम्यहेतुरित्युक्तम्। नचाविद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणम् एकरूपत्वात्। रागादिक्लेशवासनाक्षिप्तकर्मापेक्षा त्वविद्या वैषम्यकारी स्यात्। (S. BSB. 2-1-36).

2 तस्मादनादियोग्यतानङ्गीकारे वैषम्यादि दुर्वारम्। (TC. III. p. 51).

a separate *Adhikaraṇa* while Rāmānujācārya includes this in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[1]. Whereas the *Brahman* is shown to possess all the qualities like omniscience, omnipotence etc. necessary to be the cause of the world, the doctrine of *Upaniṣads* that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world should no longer be doubted. Rāmānujācārya interprets the *sūtra* in the same way.

Madhvācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows.

सर्वेषां धर्माणां ज्ञानानन्दादिसद्गुणानां दुःखद्वेषादिदोषाभावानां च ब्रह्मणि उपपत्तेः उपपत्तिसिद्धत्वात्। चशब्दात् "गुणाः श्रुताः सुविरुद्धाश्च देवे" इति श्रुतेश्च ब्रह्मणः सर्वगुणपूर्णत्वं निर्दोषत्वं च न अयुक्तम्।

***Brahman* is conceived as the abode of all auspicious attributes like omniscience, bliss etc. and as being devoid of all the blemishes like grief, enmity etc., because it is quite logical i.e. because its logicality has been demonstrated. The term *ca* (in the *sūtra*) indicates that (not only the inference but) the *Śruti* (which tells that) "the *Brahman* possesses the attributes, stated (as well as not stated) in the scriptures and even those appearing quite contradictory---" also supports the view that it is not illogical to hold that *Brahman* has all the auspicious attributes and is devoid of all the defects.**

In the previous *Adhikaraṇas*, some particular cases of arguments against *Brahman*'s causality of the world and other attributes as well as the absence of defects have been considered. In this concluding *sūtra* of the *Pāda*, the *Sūtrakāra* makes a general statement that there is nothing illogical in accepting *Brahman* as having all the auspicious attributes and devoid of any defects.

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1 यस्माद् अस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि कारणे परिगृह्यमाणे प्रदर्शितेन सर्वे कारणधर्मा उपपद्यन्ते तस्माद् अनतिशङ्कनीयम् औपनिषदं दर्शनम् इति। (S. BSB. 2-1-38).

In support of the *Sūtrakāra*'s above contention, Madhvācārya quotes an appropriate *mantra*[1] from *Sauparṇaśruti*, which tells that, "there is no doubt that the Supreme Being possesses all the auspicious attributes that are expressly stated, not so stated, appearing contradictory, conceivable and inconceivable and also that He has no defects stated as well as believed by the ignorant".

This *sūtra* clearly goes against the concept of *Brahman* devoid of all attributes[2].

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1 गुणाः श्रुताः सुविरुद्धाश्च देवे सन्त्यश्रुता अपि नैवात्र शङ्का।
चिन्त्या अचिन्त्याश्च तथैव दोषाः श्रुताश्च नाज्ञैर्हि तथा प्रतीताः॥ (M. BSB. 2-1-38).

2 इदं सूत्रं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुक्तब्रह्मवादिनां प्रतिकूलमिति स्फुटमेव। (TC. III. p. 53).

Chapter IX
Adhyāya II, *Pāda* 2
(द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।)

As already said, the purpose of studying the nature and attributes of *Brahman*, the source of creation etc., through scriptures, is to get rid of the painful and endless transmigration. In the first *Adhyāya* it is shown how the scriptures disclose some of the innumerable facets of *Brahman's* majesty. Along with this system of philosophy, known as *Vedānta* or *Uttaramīmāṁsā*, there are a number of other doctrines developed and preached by various thinkers and philosophers in India. These systems are also as old as the *Upaniṣads* and some philosophers even claim support of the *Upaniṣads* for their teachings. Their aim also is the release from the painful transmigration (*apavarga*). Great names like Kapila, Gautama, Kaṇāda, Patañjali are associated with these schools. They too have some apparent convincing arguments and have good followings. With due respects to these philosophers and their followers, the *Sūtrakāra* chooses to disclose the flaws in these tenets, lest the students of *Vedānta* may be carried away by them and get confused. Some of the general arguments of these doctrines against *Vedānta*, have been refuted in the previous *Pāda*. In this *Pāda*, the *Sūtrakāra* proposes to expose the defects in the tenets of these hostile schools, one by one.

There are two groups of these rival schools[1]. One is known as *Haituka* or rationalist, and the other as *Pāṣaṇḍa* or heretical. The doctrines viz. *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* are known as *Haituka*, while *Bauddha*, *Jaina*, *Pāśupata* etc. are known as *Pāṣaṇḍa*.

These rival schools of philosophy are called as *Samayas* and therefore, this *Pāda* is known as *Samayapāda*.

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1 अक्षपादकणादौ च साङ्ख्ययोगौ च हैतुकाः । बौद्धपाशुपताद्यास्तु पाषण्डा इति कीर्तिताः ॥ (नारदस्मृति) (TP. RR. 2-2).

1 रचनानुपपत्त्यधिकरणम् ।

Sūtras 1-10 of this *Pāda* are treated as one *Adhikaraṇa* refuting the *Sāṅkhya* view, by all commentators except Madhvācārya. The latter regards the ten *sūtras* as forming five *Adhikaraṇas*, refuting different shades of *Sāṅkhya* school as well as *Cārvāka* view.

The *Sāṅkhya* school is possibly as old as *Vedānta* and appears to have been an influential school, as seen from the references to it in *Mahābhārata*[1]. May be because of this, the *Sūtrakāra* takes up the *Sāṅkhya* system first, for refutation.

There are two broad divisions of the *Sāṅkhya* system, namely *Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhya* and *Seśvara-Sāṅkhya*. As the name suggests, the *Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhya* school does not admit a Supreme Being as the creator and controller of the universe. The school recognizes two ultimate entities *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, i.e. nature and spirit. It holds that the insentient ultimate *Prakṛti* known as *Pradhāna* or *Mūlaprakṛti*[2] alone evolves into the world spontaneously. *Puruṣa* is mere sentience, an enjoyer or experient. *Puruṣa* is immutable, eternal, changeless and is neither a cause nor effect of any other thing[3]. It is entirely passive, all activity being restricted to *prakṛti*[4] The *Puruṣas* are conceived as many[5], in fact infinite. Every living being is assumed to have an individual *Puruṣa*, the self or the soul.

On the other hand, the *Seśvara-Sāṅkhya* school led by Patañjali, accepts a Supreme Being in addition to the twenty-five principles viz. the twenty-four principles comprising *Prakṛti* and its evolutes, and the twenty fifth principle *Puruṣa*, conceived by the *Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya*. The Supreme Being called *Īśvara* remains unaffected

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1 OIP, p. 267.

2 तत्र केवला प्रकृतिः प्रधानपदेन वेदनीया मूलप्रकृतिः। (SDS-K. p. 355).

3 अनुभवात्मकः पुरुषः। पुरुषस्तु कूटस्थनित्योऽपरिणामी न कस्यचित्प्रकृतिर्नापि विकृतिः कस्यचिदित्यर्थः। (SDS-K. p. 360).

4 OIP. p. 279.

5 OIP. p. 280.

by the worldly sufferings, actions and their prospects and consequences. He takes a suitable form of His own and impels the living beings to do religious and mundane activities. He in His mercy obliges the living beings suffering in the world[1]. But unlike the Vedantic *Īśvara*, He is external to *Prakṛti* as well as to the individual selves (*Puruṣa*)[2].

According to Madhvācārya, in the present *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* refutes the views of *Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhya* school.

॥ ॐ रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् ॐ ॥ (2-2-1)

आनुमानं[3] साङ्ख्यानुमानकल्पितं प्रधानं न कर्तृ रचनानुपपत्तेः जडस्य रचयितृत्वानुपपत्तेः। चशब्देन प्रमाणाभावं दर्शयति।[4]

The principle called *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛti*) inferentially established by the *Sāṅkhya* cannot be accepted as the creator (of the world); for, an insentient *Prakṛti* cannot rationally be accepted as having self-initiated creativity. The particle *ca* indicates the absence of any evidence for accepting that creativity.

The term *ānumānaṁ* is popularly understood in *Vedānta* to mean *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna* inferred by the *Sāṅkhya*, as explained earlier (BS. 1-3-3). The *Sāṅkhya* believe that this unintelligent *Prakṛti* develops itself into the world without any help from an intelligent entity. This contention is not rational, because nowhere such a thing can be observed. For example, if someone tells another that watches grow like mangoes on trees or are collected like diamonds from mines in Switzerland, nobody would believe, even if the latter has never visited that country; because every sane

1. प्रधानादीनि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि प्राचीनान्येव संमतानि। षड्विंशस्तु परमेश्वरः क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषः स्वेच्छया निर्माणकायमधिष्ठाय लौकिकवैदिकसंप्रदायप्रवर्तकः संसाराङ्गारे तप्यमानानां प्राणभृतानामनुग्राहकश्च। (SDS-K. p. 372).
2. OIP. P. 282.
3. HPD. 2-2-1.
4. M. BSB. 2-2-1.

person knows that there has to be an intelligent person behind the manufacture of watches and that they cannot develop on their own from iron ore.

Having told that creativity cannot be expected in an insentient entity, since it is nowhere observed, the next *sūtra* establishes the same contention on account of creative propensity seen in sentient beings only.

॥ ॐ प्रवृत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ (2-2-2)

आनुमानं प्रधानं न कर्तृ प्रवृत्तेश्च पटादिसृष्टौ चेतनप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् च ।

And (insentient) *Pradhāna* cannot be a creator because the propensity to create things like cloth etc. is observed in sentient beings. An activity presupposes volition and only sentient being can possess will or wish.

If one doubts the validity of such a generalization by offering counter-examples to show activity on the part of insentient substances, the next *sūtra* clears this doubt.

॥ ॐ पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्राऽपि ॐ ॥ (2-2-3)

यथा पयः स्वतो दध्यात्मना परिणमते यथा वा अम्बु स्वतो गच्छति तथा आनुमानं कर्तृ इति चेत् न । तत्रापि पयोम्ब्वादौ अपि ईशाख्यचेतनप्रवृत्तेः दर्शनात् ।

If it be said that, just as milk curdles by itself and water flows of its own accord, the (insentient) *Pradhāna* can be the creator, it is not so. Even in these cases, the activity is caused by the Supreme Being, as we know from *Śrutis*.

Madhvācārya quotes appropriate *Śrutis* in support of the above contention. One *mantra* tells that,[1] "because of Him, milk curdles" and another[2] says that, "O Gargi, some rivers flow eastward from

1 एतेन ह वाव पयो मण्डं भवति । (M. BSB. 2-1-3).

2 एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि प्राच्योऽन्या नद्यः स्यन्दन्ते श्वेतेभ्यः पर्वतेभ्यः प्रतीच्योऽन्या यां यां च दिशमनु । (Bṛha. Up. 3-8-9).

the snowy mountains, others flow westward and they keep their respective courses, under the mighty rule of this immutable *Brahman*''. The modern science knows that milk ferments into curd because of a certain type of beneficent bacteria known as 'lactobacilli', which are sentient microbes.

Conceding the argument that the activity seen in milk and rivers is not self-initiated, since *Śruti* corroborates the position, if the *Pūrvapakṣin* comes up with another instance like a magnet and iron filings, to demonstrate a spontaneous activity on the part of insentient things, the next *sūtra* answers the point and concludes the discussion.

॥ ॐ व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ॐ ॥ (2-2-4)

ईशव्यतिरेकेण कस्यापि कर्मणः अनवस्थानात् च न कोऽपि दृष्टान्तः सिध्यति ।[1]
अतः अनपेक्षत्वात् अप्रस्तुतत्वात् न अचेतनस्य कर्तृत्वम् ।

Since no activity is possible without the participation of the Supreme Being, there can be no instance to substantiate (a spontaneous activity on the part of an insentient thing). Therefore, a self-initiated activity by an insentient (*Pradhāna*) is irrelevant.

Madhvācārya quotes[2] an appropriate *Śruti mantra* in support of this view. The *mantra* says that not the slightest movement or activity can take place, far or near, anywhere in the world except as willed and caused by the Supreme Being.[3]

By and large, there is agreement among the commentators about the purport of these four *sūtras*, that they refute the self-initiated evolution ascribed by the *Sāṅkhya* to the insentient *Prakṛti*. Though their conclusions are the same, the commentators differ in the exposition and explanation of the *sūtras*.

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1 VKM. 2-2-4.

न ऋते त्वत्क्रियते किञ्चनारे महामर्कं मघवन् चित्रमर्च । (RV. 10-112-9).

3 BNK. II. p. 11.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the first *sūtra* tells[1] that an insentient entity (like *Pradhāna*) cannot be inferred to be the cause of the world because an orderly creation is not possible by an insentient thing like a clod or stone. The second *sūtra* says that an insentient entity (like *Pradhāna*) cannot be inferred to be the cause of the world also because an insentient *Pradhāna* cannot even have the tendency towards any particular activity just as it is not seen in clay etc.[2] Possibly to avoid an apparent repetition of ideas in the two *sūtras*, Rāmānujācārya reads both the *sūtras* together as one *sūtra* and interprets on similar lines. The third *sūtra*, *payo'mbuvaccettatrāpi*, refutes the *Sāṅkhya's* claim of spontaneous activity on the part of the insentient *Pradhāna* based on their illustrations of milk and water. The *sūtra* asserts that in those cases too, there is an intelligent principle behind the activity[3]. Śaṅkarācārya has taken the example of milk flowing towards the calves and Rāmānujācārya assumes it to be the curdling of milk. But, while interpreting an earlier *sūtra* (BS. 2-1-25), Śaṅkarācārya has taken the same example of milk curdling as an instance of automatic transformation of an insentient thing, without the help of any external agency. Being aware of this contradiction, he explains here that what is told earlier is as per popular belief and that being asserted here is the view of scriptures. Yet, such conflicting statements confuse the readers. Śaṅkarācārya interprets the fourth *sūtra* as follows[4]. "Since, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, *Pradhāna* is the three *guṇas* in equilibrium and there is no other principle which can make it active or inactive, it is impossible to know why it should sometimes transform itself into the effects of *mahat* etc., and at other times not. *Puruṣa* is indifferent and so cannot cause action or cessation from activity. God, on the

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1 रचना अनुपपत्तेः च हेतोः न अचेतनं जगत्कारणम् अनुमातव्यं भवति। लोष्टपाषाणादिष्वदृष्टत्वात्। (S. BSB. 2-2-1).

2 प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि हेतोः न अचेतनं जगत्कारणम् अनुमातव्यं भवति। विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तिः सापि न अचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य उपपद्यते मृदादिषु अदर्शनात्। (S. BSB. 2-2-2)

3 पयोम्बुनोः चेतनाधिष्ठितयोः एव प्रवृत्तिः। (S. BSB. 2-2-3).

4 SRK. p. 369.

other hand, as a principle of intelligence, can act or not as he chooses''. Rāmānujācārya says[1] that "*Pradhāna* guided by the Lord explains the alternating states of creation and dissolution which are to carry out God's purposes. *Pradhāna* which is not guided by an intelligent principle cannot account for them''. These interpretations require importation (*adhyāhāra*) of a large number of words.

2 अन्यत्राभावाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ॐ ॥ (2-2-5)

अन्यत्राभावात् ईशादन्याधारत्वेन जगतः अभावात्, चशब्दात् प्रकृत्यादिकारण-सत्तादेरपीशायत्तत्वाच्च न तृणादिवत् तृणादीनां पर्जन्य इव न ईश्वरो अनुग्राहकमात्रम् ।

Since no creation can exist with the support or sustenance of anyone except the Supreme Being, and since the very existence of all the means of creation like *Prakṛti* etc. depends on the Supreme Being as understood by the word *ca* (in the *sūtra*), the Supreme Being cannot be held simply as a contributory factor in creation, like the rain, which helps the grass etc. to grow.

A section of the *Sāṅkhya* led by Patañjali, known as *Seśvara-Sāṅkhya*, admits the existence of *Īśvara*, the Supreme Being, but only as an auxiliary factor to help the *Prakṛti* to develop into the world with its own intrinsic potency (*kṣetraśakti*). Their stock example to substantiate the said doctrine is the growth of grass and other vegetation with the help of rain. This demotion of *Īśvara* to a secondary position and assignment of a prominent role in creation to the insentient *Prakṛti*, is not acceptable to *Vedānta*. Therefore, the *Sūtrakāra* refutes here the doctrine of *Seśvara-Sāṅkhya*, taking their stock-example itself. *Vedānta* holds that *Brahman*, the Supreme Being is not merely an external auxiliary

factor, but an immanent factor, which impels and regulates every creative action.

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya interpret this *sūtra* as follows. It cannot be argued that *Pradhāna* changes into the world just as the grass transforms into milk. It is only grass that is eaten by a cow that changes into milk. It means that there is another sentient being, behind the apparently spontaneous activity of grass. So we cannot admit the spontaneous modification of *Pradhāna*[1]. The commentators have taken this *sūtra* as providing another illustration for denying spontaneous modification of *Pradhāna*. But this point has been already established earlier in this *Adhikaraṇa* and also many times in other *Adhikaraṇas*. The *sūtra* appears superfluous, unless the commentators see some new point in it.

3 अभ्युपगमाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-6)**

अर्थशब्दो विषयप्रयोजनपरः । अभ्युपगमेपि सिद्धान्तेपि अर्थाभावात् विषयप्रयोजनयोः अभावात् व्याहतम् एतद् मतम् ।[2] मे माता वन्ध्या इतिवत् स्वव्याहतम् ।

The word *'artha'* (in the *sūtra*) is in the sense of a subject matter as well as an object or purpose. **This dogma too stands refuted on account of its having neither a subject nor an object. It is as self-contradictory as saying "my mother is sterile".**

According to Madhvācārya this *sūtra* refers to the materialistic views of the so-called *Cārvāka* school of philosophy. The *Cārvāka* is said to accept only perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and therefore he does not accept any super-

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1 SRK. p. 369.

2 VKM. 2-2-6.

sensuous things like *Brahman*, *Jīvas*, merit (*puṇya*), demerit (*pāpa*), heaven, hell etc. He assumes that the physical body is a peculiar combination of four gross elements earth, water, fire and air, which gets the property of consciousness, just as a combination of some chemicals becomes liquor and gets the intoxicating property. He assumes that the consciousness disappears with the disintegration of the body after death. He believes neither in life after death nor in transmigration. The purpose of life, according to the so-called *Cārvāka* doctrine, is said to be to maximize enjoyment by hook or by crook.

No one is sure whether such a formal doctrine existed. Some ascribe it to a teacher called Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka is said to be a disciple. But no such work is extant. References to its tenets are available only in their refutation by other schools. The verses quoted could be some stray remarks of some intelligent critics, disgusted with the excessive ritualism in Vedic religion, in order to ridicule the ritualists. The words like *Bṛhaspati* (a heavenly teacher), *Cārvāka* (sweat-tounged), could have been used ironically in a derogatory sense.

The *Cārvāka* dogma, if any, cannot be refuted on the strength of *Śruti* (verbal testimony), because he does not accept verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. Therefore, the *Sūtrakāra* takes a recourse to its internal contradictions. If a dogma is to be treated as a doctrine, then it should have a subject and a purpose for teaching it. The tendency to maximize enjoyment in life is instinctive in all creatures and needs no doctrine to be taught. Even if we accept the non-existence of supersensuous entities like God, merit (*puṇya*) etc. as the subject-matter, and freeing the people from the religious superstitions as its purpose, how is Cārvāka going to accomplish it? Even the non-existence of unperceivable things can be expounded only either through reasoning i.e. inference or by authoritative statements from an *Āgama* i.e. verbal testimony. Cārvāka does not believe in both.

Thus, the dogma is unable to have a proper subject and a purpose, and consequently cannot claim to be a doctrine. Therefore, possibly the *Sūtrakāra* thinks it fit to casually brush aside the so-called Cārvāka doctrine having neither a subject nor a purpose, as self-contradictory.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* as follows[1]. Even if we accept the spontaneous activity of *Pradhāna*, in keeping with your faith, still there remains a blemish that such activity would be wanting in a purpose. Rāmānujācārya interprets that[2], "even admitting that the *Pradhāna* can be established through inference, yet because of the absence of any purpose to be served by it, it (*Pradhāna*) should not be inferred[3].

Śaṅkarācārya treats this *sūtra* as providing an additional reason, i.e. absence of a purpose (*arthābhāva*), for refuting a propensity to act on its own, on the part of *Pradhāna*. If it is so, then the word *arthābhāvāt* alone would have sufficed. That could have given a cogent exposition as *'prakṛteḥ pravṛttyanupapattiḥ arthābhāvāt'*. This makes the words *'abhyupagame api'* in the sūtra redundant[4]. It appears that these commentators see no new point beyond *Pradhāna*. On the other hand, Madhvācārya's interpretation looks ingenious.

4 पुरुषाश्माधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि ॐ ॥ **(2-2-7)**

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows. "Even if it be said that like a lame man devoid of the power of motion but

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1 अथापि नाम भवतः श्रद्धामनुरुध्यमानः स्वाभाविकीमेव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिम् अभ्युपगच्छेम तथापि दोषो अनुषज्यते एव; कुत? अर्थाभावात्। (S. BSB. 2-2-6).

2 अनुमानेन प्रधानसिद्ध्यभ्युपगमेपि प्रधानेन प्रयोजनाभावात् न तद् अनुमातव्यम्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-2-8).

3 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-2-8.

4 अभ्युपगमेऽपीत्येतावतो वैयर्थ्यात्। 'अर्थाभावाच्च' इत्येतावतैव पूर्णत्वात्। (NS. p. 331b) (BNK. II. p. 16).

possessing the power of sight, moves the blind man who is able to move but not to see and move of his own or like a magnet, not moving itself moves the iron (filings), so the soul moves the *Pradhāna*, we say that this doctrine is not free from difficulties[1]." Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on the same lines.

Can we assume that the word *puruṣa* (person) in the *sūtra* hints to the illustration of a pair of a lame person and a blind one and that the word *aśma* (stone) suggests the example of a magnet? No doubt, these are the stock examples used to explain the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine. But, when the self-initiated creativity on the part of insentient *Pradhāna* has been convincingly refuted in the first and the second *sūtras* of this *Pāda* and the same has been substantiated by refuting their examples of milk and water in the third *sūtra*, is it necessary to discuss the other examples used by the *Sāṅkhya* also, in such a concise work?

The next *sūtra aṅgitvānupapatteśca* is interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya as follows. "*Pradhāna* can not be active as the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* abide in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of principal and subordinate[2]. For activity the equipoise should be disturbed. There is no external principle to stir up the guṇas[3]." But, this very argument that[4], "the original disturbance of the three *guṇas* of *Prakṛti* from the condition of equipoise, which is essential for the creative manifestation of the world can not be due to the unintelligent *Pradhāna* itself [5]", has been put forth by

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1 SRK. p. 370.

2 इतश्च न प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिरवकल्पते। यद्धि सत्त्वरजस्तमसाम् अन्योन्यगुणप्रधानभावम् उत्सृज्य साम्येन स्वरूपमात्रेण अवस्थानम् सा प्रधानावस्था। तस्याम् अवस्थायाम् अनपेक्षस्वरूपाणाम् स्वरूपप्रणाशभयात् परस्परं प्रति अङ्गाङ्गिभावानुपपत्तेः। वाह्यस्य च कस्यचिद् क्षोभयितुः अभावात् गुणवैषम्यनिमित्तो महदाद्युत्पादो न स्यात्। (S. BSB. 2-2-8).

3 SRK. p. 371.

4 आस्तां तावदियं रचना; तत्सिद्ध्यर्था या प्रवृत्तिः - साम्यावस्थानात् प्रच्युतिः, सत्त्वरजस्तमसाम् अङ्गाङ्गिभावरूपापत्तिः, विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तिता–सापि न अचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य उपपद्यते। (S. BSB. 2-2-2).

5 BNK. II. p. 27

Śaṅkarācārya while interpreting an earlier *sūtra 'pravṛtteśca'* (B. S. 2-2-2). This renders the present *sūtra* redundant.

Rāmānujācārya interprets the two *sūtras* in the same way and with the same examples and further says, "in the *pralaya* state there is no relation of superiority and subordination among the *guṇas* and so the world can not originate. If it be said that there is a certain inequality even in the state of *pralaya*, then creation would be eternal"[1].

Madhvācārya has given a different interpretation of these *sūtras*. The doctrine of *Nirīśvara-Sānkhya* that the insentient *Pradhāna* alone evolves into the world on its own, has been refuted in the first four *sūtras* of this *Pāda*. According to Madhvācārya, there are two more shades of *Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhya* to be refuted. One holds that the insentient *Prakṛti* evolves into creation in the presence (*sānnidhya*) of *Puruṣa* (*Jīva*) as a catalyst. Here, the *Puruṣa* has a subordinate (*upasarjana*) status, as an assistant or contributor. This view is being refuted in this *Adhikaraṇa*[2]. The other view holds that *Prakṛti* occupies the subordinate position and *Puruṣa* takes the chief role in the evolution of the world[3]. This view is being refuted in the next *Adhikaraṇa*[4].

The exposition of the sūtra (2-2-7) is as follows.

यथा पुरुषस्य चेतनस्य सम्बन्धेन शरीरम् अश्मानयनादिकर्तृ तद्वत् प्रधानं जीवसम्बन्धात् जगत्कर्तृ इति चेत् तथापि न उक्तदोषनिस्तारः।

If it be said that just as the (unintelligent) body performs such acts as fetching a stone, because of its (body's) association with the intelligent self, in the same way the *Prakṛti* also evolves the world, on account of the presence of individual soul (*Jīva*) in the vicinity, even then the short-comings told

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1 SRK. p. 371.

2 पुरुषोपसर्जनप्रकृतिकर्तृत्ववादमपाकरोति। (M. BSB. 2-2-7)

3 BNK. II. p. 22.

4 प्रकृत्युपसर्जनपुरुषकर्तृत्ववादमपाकरोति। (M. BSB. 2-2-9).

earlier can not be overcome. As told earlier (BS. 2-2-4) with the help of *Śruti 'na ṛte.....'* that no activity is possible without the participation of the Supreme Being, even the activity on the part of the body here is subject to the Supreme Being, and therefore the illustration adduced by the *Pūrvapakṣin* can not prove the creation of the world by the *Prakṛti*.

Since the *Sāṅkhya* rely more on logic than on *Śruti*, the *Sūtrakāra* uses reasoning in the next *sūtra* to refute the contention of the *Sāṅkhya* and to reach the same conclusion.

॥ ॐ अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेः ॐ ॥ **(2-2-8)**

जीवस्य गुणत्वे सार्वजनीनस्य शरीरं प्रति अङ्गित्वस्य अनुपपत्तेः न पुरुषाश्मदृष्टान्तो युक्तः ।

If the *Jīva* (*puruṣa*) is considered as subordinate (to body), then the universally experienced primacy of *Jīva* in relation to body becomes untenable and therefore the illustration of man fetching stone is not befitting. It cannot prove activity on the part of body as a primary agent.

5 अन्यथानुमित्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अन्यथाऽनुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् ॐ ॥

(2-2-9)

अन्यथा प्रागुक्तादन्यथा जीवस्य प्राधान्येन प्रकृतेः गुणत्वेन अनुमितौ च अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तिः । कुतः ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् । ज्ञस्य[1] पुरुषस्य शरीरसम्बन्धे शक्त्यभावात् ।

Even if it be inferred in the reverse way, i.e. if the *Jīva* is conceived in the principal role and *Prakṛti* in a subordinate position, the primacy of the *Jīva* (in the evolution of the world) is not tenable on account of the inability on the part of the sentient principle *Puruṣa* to get connected with *Prakṛti* (without the help of the Supreme Being).

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1 जानाति इति ज्ञः जीवः । इगुपधज्ञाप्रीकिरः कः । (Pāṇini 3-1-135).

In *Sāṅkhya* doctrine, *Puruṣa* being mere sentience and entirely passive, has no physical body of his own to become connected with *Prakṛti* and to operate it[1] If it is assumed[2] that the *Puruṣa* undertakes the activity with the assistance of the body, then a question arises whether *Puruṣa* has the capacity to undertake the activity or not. In case, he has the capacity, there is no need of the assistance of the body. If he has no capacity, then the major role ascribed to *Puruṣa* becomes untenable, because mere sentience is incapable of connecting itself to a body. In any case, there is a need for accepting a Supreme Being, *Īśvara*, and it can only be by His active impulsion that *Puruṣa* can energize *Prakṛti* and make it serve as his *Upasarjana* (assistant)[3].

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* as follows[4].

If it be differently inferred that the *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) being unsteady, are capable of entering into 'a relation of mutual, inequality even while they are in a state of equipoise'[5], even then the defects such as the inability of *Pradhāna* to create an orderly world etc., told earlier, still remain on account of the absence of the faculty of understanding (*jñaśaktiviyogāt*) on the part of *Pradhāna*. Rāmānujācārya also interprets on similar lines. But, since these concepts have been discussed in many *sūtras* earlier, there is no new point established in this *sūtra*.

Having refuted the various shades of *Sāṅkhya* doctrine individually, in the previous nine *sūtras*, the next *sūtra* concludes the discussion by refuting all the shades of *Sāṅkhya* in one stroke.

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1 BNK. II. p. 22.

2 शरीरोपसर्जनः पुरुषः प्रवर्तते इति पक्षे किं पुरुषस्य प्रवृत्तिशक्तिः अस्ति न वा। यदि अस्ति तर्हि शरीरवैयर्थ्यम्। यदि न शक्तिः तर्हि पुरुषाङ्गित्वम् अनुपपन्नं स्यात्। शरीरसम्बन्धार्थं केवलस्य पुरुषस्य शक्त्यभावात्। (TP. 2-2-9).

3 BNK. II. p. 22.

4 साम्यावस्थायामपि वैषम्योपगमयोग्या एव गुणाः अवतिष्ठन्ते इति। एवम् (अन्यथा अनुमितौ) अपि प्रधानस्य ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात् रचनानुपपत्त्यादयः पूर्वोक्ताः दोषाः तदवस्था एव। (S. BSB. 2-2-9).

5 SRK. p. 371.

|| ॐ विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम् ॐ || **(2-2-10)**

सर्वश्रुतिस्मृतियुक्तिविरुद्धत्वात् च अनीश्वरमतम् असमञ्जसम्।[1]

The (*Sāṅkhya*) doctrine, which does not accept the primacy and supremacy of the Lord (*Īśvara*) is improper and absurd because it is contrary to *Śruti*, *Smṛti* and logic.

Śaṅkarācārya holds that this *sūtra* rejects the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine as improper on account of a number of discrepancies in it[2], regarding the number of sense-organs, the manner of evolution of certain principles and such other details. "Such discrepancies are also to be found in the Vedantic sources. The *Sāṅkhya* also could explain them in the same way as the Vedantin would explain such discrepancies. They do not, therefore, call for a censure"[3].

Rāmājujācārya also holds the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine as unreasonable on account of its internal contradictions. But he points out a number of their philosophical inconsistencies. Then he says[4], "therefore, on account of such contradictions, the doctrine of the *Sāṅkhya* is absurd". Incidentally Rāmānujācārya criticizes *Advaita Vedānta* also. He remarks - "As to those also, who speak of *Brahman* which is immutable, eternal, attributeless, self-illumining and pure consciousness, as the resort of unreal bondage and salvation, being the witness of *Avidyā* - in their case also there is nothing but absurdity, on account of the impossibility of (*Brahman*) being the witness of *Avidyā*, superimposition etc. by the reasoning mentioned before. There is, however, this further speciality (about this *Advaita* view) - the followers of the *Sāṅkhya* admit many *puruṣas* to account for birth,

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1 M. BSB. 2-2-10.

2 परस्परविरुद्धस्य अयं सांख्यानाम् अभ्युपगमः - क्वचित् सप्तेन्द्रियाणि अनुक्रामन्ति क्वचिदेकादशः....., (S. BSB. 2-2-10).

3 BNK II. p. 29.

4 अतः एवमादेः विप्रतिषेधात् सांख्यानां दर्शनम् असमञ्जसम्। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK- 2-2-9).

death etc., but they (the *Advaitins*) do not want even that- and so, the absurdity is all the greater''[1].

6 वैशेषिकाधिकरणम्।

All the commentators except Śaṅkarācārya, treat *sūtras* 11-17 of this *Pāda*, as refuting the views of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* schools of Indian philosophy. Śaṅkarācārya holds *sūtra* 11 as forming a separate *Adhikaraṇa* and the remaining six as directed against the *Vaiśeṣika*.

The *Vaiśeṣika* system is a rational system of philosophy based on an analytical approach like that of modern scientists. In this system, everything in the world whatsoever, perceived or conceived, is termed as a *padārtha*. *Pada* means a word and *artha* means a thing or entity. Therefore *padārtha* means a thing, which can be referred to by a word. The system holds that everything knowable is namable. The *Vaiśeṣika* classify all the *padārthas* in the world into seven categories. The first three namely substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and action (*karman*) are tangible. The next three viz. generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and intimate union (*samavāya*) are relational and are conceivable. The seventh category is negation (*abhāva*), which is also conceivable.

The category of substance has been sub-divided into nine things, which include corporeal things viz. earth, water, fire and air, and non-corporeal things viz. ether, time, space, self (soul) and *manas* (an instrument of cognition). Under the category of quality, twenty-four qualities of substances like colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), odour (*gandha*) etc. have been enumerated. Action is of five kinds, namely tossing upwards, dropping downwards, contraction, expansion and motion in general. The generality is

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1 येऽपि कूटस्थनित्यनिर्विशेषस्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्माविद्यासाक्षित्वेनापारमार्थिकबन्धमोक्षभागिति वदन्ति तेषामप्युक्तनीत्याविद्यासाक्षित्वाध्यासाद्यसंभवादसामञ्जस्यमेव। इयांस्तु विशेषः --- सांख्या जननमरणप्रतिनियमादिसिद्ध्यर्थं पुरुषबहुत्वमिच्छन्ति ते तु तदपि नेच्छन्तीति सुतरामसामञ्जस्यम। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-2-9).

the common attribute amongst a class of substances, qualities and actions. Particularity is the characteristic property of eternal substances, which distinguishes them from the rest. *Samavāya* is the intimate and inseparable union between two things, so that they cannot be separated without destroying at least one of them. *Samavāya* is supposed to exist between only five pairs of things viz. (1) the product and its parts (*avayavāvayavinau*), (2) the quality and the qualified (*guṇaguṇinau*), (3) the motion and the moving (*kriyākriyāvantau*), (4) the individual and the common characteristic (*jātivyaktī*), and (5) the particularity and the eternal substances in which it inheres (*viśeṣanityadravye*)[1]. *Abhāva* is the non-existence of a thing.

The *Nyāya* system accepts all these categories of *padārtha* and puts them under one head called *'prameya'*, i.e. that which can be known or is known or worth knowing. The *Naiyāyikas* have evolved a rigorous logical system of understanding things, under sixteen heads or topics namely *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge), *prameya* (the knowable), *saṁśaya* (doubt), *prayojana* (aim) etc. Therefore, it is said that "the *Vaiśeṣika* views the world from the ontological point while the *Nyāya* does so from the epistemological"[2].

The *Vaiśeṣika* concept of cause and effect is as follows : The *Sāṅkhya* and the *Vedānta* schools recognize two kinds of causes behind an effect, namely the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and the instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). But in this *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine, there are three kinds of causes[3] viz. (1) intimate (*samavāyi*), (2) non-intimate (*asamavāyi*) and (3) instrumental (*nimitta*). The instrumental cause is common to all three schools mentioned here. But, the material cause of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Vedānta*, appears to have been named as *samavāyi* cause, in this

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1 Tarka - MRB. p. 96.

2 OIP. p. 245.

3 कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । (Tarka - 40).

doctrine. The *samavāyi* cause i.e. the intimate cause[1] is "that, in inseparable union with which, the effect is produced"[2]. In simple words, this is the material cause. The *asamavāyi* cause i.e. the non-intimate cause[3] is defined as the "one, which is inseparably united in the same object either with the effect or with the (intimate) cause"[4]. This term *asamavāyikāraṇa* is rather misleading. Literally it means that which is not *samavāyikāraṇa* (material cause). Therefore, it connotes the instrumental cause itself. But here, the concept is different. The *asamavāyikāraṇa* is seen as a link between the material cause and the product. The *samavāyikāraṇa* is always some substance and the *asamavāyikāraṇa* is an action (*karman*) done on, or a quality of that material. For example, the bricks are the material cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of a wall. But the arrangement of bricks in the necessary formation is the *asamavāyikāraṇa* of the wall. Further, the colour of the bricks is the *asamavāyikāraṇa* of the colour of the wall. This hair-splitting of the material cause has not been accepted by the *Vedāntins* and the modern science. The next *sūtra* is going to refute this concept and to tell that there is no such thing as an *asamavāyikāraṇa*.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* postulate that every visible substance is composed of parts, and every object having parts is divisible. Therefore, a visible thing can be divided and subdivided repeatedly. This division cannot go on endlessly as otherwise there is a possibility of ending up in *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). They assume a stop at a stage when one gets minute particles called atoms (*paramāṇu*). These ultimate particles are all assumed to be indivisible and of equal magnitude. An atom is assumed to be globular, but having neither an interior nor an exterior. The atoms exhibit all the properties of their respective substances. The *Vaiśeṣika* hold that all the four corporeal

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1 यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम्। (Tarka - 40).

2 (Tarka - MRB. p. 206).

3 कार्येण कारणेन वा सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम्। (Tarka - 40).

4 Tarka - MRB. p. 206.

substances, earth etc., are eternal in the form of atoms and perishable in other forms.

The *Vaiśeṣika* accept the existence of a Supreme Being and assign Him a prominent role in creation. They argue that "every effect must have an agent; the universe is an effect and therefore it must have an agent"[1]. This agent is called *Paramātman*, the Supreme Being. They hold Him to be omnipresent and eternal and classify Him under the category of souls. He is ascribed with universal and perfect knowledge and will to create, protect and destroy the universe and to create it again.

The origination of objects and creation of the world, according to the *Vaiśeṣika* is as follows : They hold that after a dissolution (*pralaya*) when everything gets annihilated, and before the next creation, what continue to exist are the four corporeal substances earth etc. in their atomic form, the souls, time and space as well as the non-eternal principles like merit and demerit, the potencies of *karman* pertaining to the souls[2]. When the Supreme Being desires to create the world, the merits and demerits imbedded in the individual souls are activised and the free atoms coming into contact with the souls, get attracted to one another[3]. This motion of atoms impelled by *Paramātman's* will, produces conjunction of atoms to form dyads, triads, quaternaries and so on. Two atoms of a substance, say earth, come together and form a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*). It is still infinitesimal and supersensuous. Three such dyads produce a triad (*tryaṇuka*) comprising six atoms, which is the minimum visible entity comparable to a mote[4] in a sunbeam. Four dyads produce a quaternary (*caturaṇuka*) comprising eight atoms. There is another view that four triads produce a quaternary comprising twenty-four atoms. These quaternaries produce parts

1 क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वात्। यद्यत्कार्यं तत्कर्तृजन्यं यथा घटः। (Tarka - YVA. p.138).

2 BNK. II. p. 30.

3 BNK. II. p. 31

4 जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं यत्सूक्ष्मं दृश्यते रजः।तस्य षष्ठतमो भागः परमाणुः स उच्यते॥ (Tarka- YVA. p.123).

and then masses of earth, water, fire and air. When the Supreme Being desires to dissolve the world, the union of parts, quaternaries, triads and dyads is dissolved and finally the atoms forming dyads are dissociated.

In this doctrine, the quality of dimension (size, *parimāṇa*) is of four kinds. They are minuteness (*aṇutva*), longitude (*dīrghatva*) magnitude (*mahattva*)[1], and shortness (*hrasvatva*). An atom by definition is infinitesimal (*atisūkṣma*), and immeasurable. Hence, its minuteness (*aṇutva*) is assigned a dimension technically called as *pārimāṇḍalya*. A dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) is still infinitesimal, and yet it has length but no breadth. It has minuteness and shortness. The triad and quaternary and their further compounds have all the three dimensions and therefore have magnitude and longitude. All are comparative terms.

॥ ॐ महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ॐ ॥

(2-2-11)

यथा महत्त्वात्[2] दीर्घत्वात् च परिमाणात् चतुरणुकादिकार्यगतं परिमाणं जायते तथा ह्रस्वत्वात् पारिमाण्डल्यात् च परिमाणात् तत्तत्कार्ये परिमाणम् उत्पद्येत । वा शब्दात् अन्यथा एतयोः अपि न स्यात् विशेषकारणाभावात् ।[3]

Just as from the dimension, magnitude and longitude (of the triads), corresponding dimensions are generated in the products quaternary etc., similarly from the dimensions, the shortness (of dyads) and the minuteness (*pārimāṇḍalya* of

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1 The term *mahat* used here should not be confused with that mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya* theory of evolution- *Prakṛti-Mahat-Ahaṅkāra-Manas* etc., where the term signifies the total (macro) intelligence (*buddhi*). Here it simply signifies the physical attribute of magnitude, bigness.

2 पञ्चम्यन्ताद् वतिः। प्रतियोगिनः तथा निर्देशात्। 'तत्र तस्येव' (Pāṇini 5-1-116) इत्यस्य प्रायिकत्वात्। भावप्रधानोयम्। (TDK. 2-2-11). The suffix *vat* is taken as having been added to the terms *mahat* and *dīrgha* in their abstract sense and in the ablative sense, on account of the ablative case-ending of the other corresponding terms in the *sūtra*. The *vyākaraṇa sūtra 'tatra tasyeva'* represents the usual practice of suffixing *vat* in the genitive and locative senses, but here it is a special case

3 M. BSB. 2-2-11.

atoms), the corresponding dimensions should be generated in their respective products. The term *vā* in the *sūtra* suggests that otherwise there is no other reason why these magnitude and longitude of triads should produce the corresponding dimensions in the products, quaternary etc.

According to Madhvācārya, the *Sūtrakāra* is making a counter-argument here and thereby he is pointing towards the illogicality of the dogmas of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school. The *Vaiśeṣika* admit the axiom that the qualities inherent in causal substances generate similar corresponding qualities in their products, as white cloth is seen being produced from white yarn and nothing contrary to that is observed[1]. Accordingly they hold that the magnitude and longitude of quaternary and other higher products are caused by the similar qualities in their constituent triads. However, they make an exception of the atoms, dyads and triads. In their doctrine, the magnitude and longitude of a triad are not caused by the corresponding qualities in the constituent dyads (since the dyads do not have those qualities), but they are caused by the number i.e. manyness (*bahutva*) of the constituent atoms. Similarly, the shortness (*hrasvatva*) of a dyad is caused by the duality (*dvitva*) of its constituent atoms and not by the shortness of atoms, which quality the atoms do not have. In their terminology, the *Vaiśeṣika* explain the above statements as follows. The *mahattva* and *dīrghatva* of triads are the *asamavāyikāraṇa* (non-material cause) of the *mahattva* and *dīrghatva* of the quaternary and other higher products. On the other hand, the *dvitva* (duality) of atoms is the *asamavāyikāraṇa* of *hrasvatva* of the dyad, and the *bahutva* (manyness) of the dyads constituting the triad is the *asamavāyikāraṇa* of *mahattva* and *dīrghatva* of that triad.

The present *sūtra* questions this double standard and inconsistency in the *Vaiśeṣika* theory. It avers that if the dimensions

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1 तत्रायं वैशेषिकाणाम् अभ्युपगमः - कारणद्रव्यसमवायिनो गुणाः कार्यद्रव्ये समानजातीयं गुणान्तरम् आरभन्ते। शुक्लेभ्यः तन्तुभ्यः शुक्लस्य पटस्य प्रसवदर्शनात् । तद्विपर्ययादर्शनात् च। (S.BSB.2-2-10).

of triads produce similar dimensions in their products, quaternary and other higher products, then by the same principle, the dimensions of atoms should produce similar dimensions in dyads and the dimensions of dyads should produce similar dimensions in triads. This is not seen to be the case in *Vaiśeṣika* theory of creation. Moreover, the number and dimension belong to two different classes of quality. So it does not stand to reason that a quality belonging to one class generates a quality falling in another class. For example, if one argues that colour can generate smell or smell can produce length, it could be the limit of inconsistency. Therefore, the whole concept of *asamavāyikāraṇa* is held illogical[1].

Rāmānujācārya takes the word *vā* in the *sūtra* in the sense of 'and'[2]. On the strength of this, he repeats (*anuvṛtti*), the word *asamañjasam* from the previous *sūtra* and establishes that the atomic theory of the *Vaiśeṣika* is also absurd. "Rāmānujācārya and Nimbārkācārya hold that this *sūtra* refutes the theory of atoms constituting the universal cause. If the atoms consist of parts, there will result an infinite regress, if they are without parts, they cannot account for the production of other evolutes. The atomic view is untenable"[3].

Śaṅkarācārya treats this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa* and interprets it on different lines. He assumes the *Vaiśeṣika* as the *Pūrvapakṣin* who argues[4] that if the sentient *Brahman* is fancied to be the cause of the world, then sentiency should be present (everywhere) in the effect i.e. the world. But it is not seen. Therefore, the sentient *Brahman* cannot be the cause of the world. The *sūtra* answers the objection. "According to the *Vaiśeṣika*, from spherical atoms binary compounds are produced which are minute and short and ternary compounds which are big and long

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1 अतः असमवायिकारणं नाम न किञ्चिदस्ति इति सिद्धम्। (TP. 2-2-11).

2 वाशब्दश्चार्थे। (Śrībhāṣya 2-2-10).

3 SRK. p. 373.

4 चेतनस्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वे अभ्युपगम्यमाने, कार्ये अपि जगति चैतन्यं समवेयात्; तददर्शनात्तु न चेतनं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं भवितुमर्हति। (S. BSB. 2-2-10).

but not anything spherical; again from binary compounds which are minute and short, ternary compounds, etc. are produced which are big and long and not minute and short. So a non-intelligent world may spring from intelligent *Brahman*''[1].

This interpretation renders the *sūtra* 'odd one out' in the company of other *sūtras* of this *Pāda*, which refute one or the other of the several doctrines opposed to *Vedānta*. Moreover, this controversy about the difference of nature between the cause and effect has been already discussed threadbare by Śaṅkarācārya in '*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-1-4 to 11), in the previous *Pāda* only. The same discussion here again would be a repetition.

Having refuted the concept of *asamavāyikāraṇa* in this *sūtra* the *Sūtrakāra* proceeds to refute the *Vaiśeṣika* concept of instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) in the next sūtra.

॥ ॐ उभयथाऽपि न कर्मातस्तदभावः ॐ ॥ (2-2-12)

उभयथा अपि न कर्म अतः तदभावः ।

The *sūtra* literally means that "in case of both the alternatives, activity is not possible, and therefore it cannot happen". The *Sūtrakāra* talks in terms of pronouns only. It is left to the commentators to guess the nouns for which these pronouns stand. Naturally, different commentators have guessed differently and interpreted *sūtra* according to their convenience. It is more difficult for Śaṅkarācārya to find the referents of these pronouns because according to him, this is the first *sūtra* of the *Adhikaraṇa*. Since this *Adhikaraṇa* is meant to refute the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine, all the commentators agree that this *sūtra* refutes the *Vaiśeṣika* theory of creation. The word '*tad*' in the *sūtra* is taken to refer to the creation.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the present *sūtra* refutes the *Vaiśeṣika* theory of creation and dissolution. Based on the pronoun

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1 SRK. p. 373.

ubhayathā, he puts forth two propositions to counter the *Vaiśeṣika* theory. First he questions how the initial motion in the atoms starts before creation. He argues that motion presupposes an action, and action implies an effort on the part of the soul or an impact of something like wind. But both are not possible since during the state of dissolution neither the soul could have a body to enable it to make an effort nor there could be any evolved product like wind to cause impact. Thus, creation from atoms cannot be proved. Śaṅkarācārya considers another alternative. If *adṛṣṭa* i.e. the accumulation of merits and demerits is taken as the cause of initial motion of atoms, then, he questions, where does it reside, in the soul or in the atoms? Moreover, *adṛṣṭa* being insentient, cannot impel itself or any other entity without the supervision of a sentient principle. And in the state of dissolution, even the soul is yet to get sentiency and hence remains insentient[1]. Thus, in both the cases (*ubhayathā api*), there is no instrumental cause for any action on the part of atoms either for their conjunction or disjunction[2]. Therefore, in the absence of conjunction and disjunction of atoms, there can be neither creation nor dissolution. Hence, the *Vaiśeṣika* theory of creation cannot be established.

Similarly, Rāmānujācārya also asks the same question that if the atoms are set in motion by the *adṛṣṭa*, where in does the *adṛṣṭa* reside? Does it inhere in the atoms or the souls? He then concludes that in either case (*ubhayathā api*) the creation cannot be explained.

All this discussion appears far-fetched and superfluous. When the *Vaiśeṣika* hold that the initial motion of atoms is impelled by the will of the Supreme Being, there is no point in asking whether it is the effort on the part of souls or an impact of something that sets the atoms in motion. Similarly, when the *Vaiśeṣika* profess that the *adṛṣṭa* is imbedded in the individual soul and is activised

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1 आत्मनः च अनुत्पन्नचैतन्यस्य तस्याम् अवस्थायाम् अचेतनत्वात्। (S. BSB. 2-2-12).

2 इत्यतो निमित्ताभावात् न स्यात् अणूनां संयोगोत्पत्यर्थं विभागोत्पत्यर्थं वा कर्म। (S. BSB. 2-2-12).

by the ever-sentient *Paramātman*, there is no need to ask where does the *adṛṣṭa* reside and who impels it.

Possibly because in the immediately preceding *sūtra* the concept of *asamavāyikāraṇa* is refuted, Madhvācārya holds that in the present *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* refutes the *Vaiśeṣika* concept of the remaining *Nimittakāraṇa*. The exposition of the *sūtra*, according to Madhvācārya is as follows:

उभयथा अपि ईश्वरेच्छायाः नित्यानित्यत्वरूपप्रकारद्वये अपि न कर्म परमाणुषु क्रिया न सम्भवति। अतः तदभावः द्व्यणुकादिकार्याभावः।[1]

In both the cases, that is whether the will of the Supreme Being is taken as eternal or fleeting, there is no possibility of any action on the part of atoms and therefore there is no possibility of creating dyads and so on.

The *Vaiśeṣika* accept that the instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) for the motion induced in the atoms, is the will of the Supreme Being. Now, this will can be either eternal or occasional. If the *Paramātman*'s will is taken as eternal, then it means that during the state of dissolution there is no movement induced in the atoms in spite of the presence of that will. Therefore, it becomes fallacious to hold the *Paramātman*'s will as the cause of activity in atoms[2]. On the other hand, if the *Paramātman*'s will is assumed to be occasional, then we have to find a cause for that will and another cause for that cause and so on; thus we will end up in an infinite regression. Therefore, one may have to conclude that it is not proper to hold the will of the Supreme Being as the cause of activity in the atoms and the cause of subsequent creation[3].

One may wonder that when the *Sūtrakāra* himself has defined the Supreme Being as the One from whom the creation etc. of

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1 VKM. 2-2-12.

2 नित्यत्वे लये तस्यां सत्यामणुषु कर्मानुत्पादेन व्यभिचाराद्धेतुत्वं नास्ति। (TDK. 2-2-12).

3 अनित्यत्वे अनवस्थाद्यापातेन उत्पादकाभावात् ईशेच्छायाः हेतुत्वं न युक्तम्। (TDK. 2-2-12)

the world proceed (BS. 1-1-2), why does he refute the *Vaiśeṣika* concept that creation commences by the will of the Supreme Being. He refutes the *Vaiśeṣika* concept of *Paramātman* because it differs from that in *Vedānta*. The *Vaiśeṣika* establish the existence of *Paramātman* through inference and not through revelation (*Śruti*) as in the *Vedānta*. While doing so, they make certain assumptions such as (i) every effect must have a cause, (ii) every product must have an intelligent producer, (iii) this world is a product and (iv) its producer must be an extraordinary being[1]. Because of such assumptions, they run into controversies. Moreover, they ascribe the *Paramātman* with only eight special qualities (out of twenty-four qualities conceived in their doctrine), namely, number, dimension, severality, conjunction, disjunction, intellect, desire and effort[2]. They are not unanimous on whether their *Paramātman* has pleasure or He is simply devoid of pain. Thus, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* present a very limited concept of *Paramātman*.

This is opposed by the *Vedānta*. Based on *Śruti*, the *Vedānta* holds that the Supreme Being is endowed with all the powers and therefore all things can happen[3]. In spite of the presence of the *Paramātman*'s will (to create) during the state of dissolution, there could be no activity etc. because of *Paramātman*'s inscrutable power of accomplishing the unaccomplishable (*acintyaśakti*)[4]. The term *acintyaśakti* conveys a special ability to induce and manifest a power, similar to that of a snake-charmer who can make a cobra to expand its hood, without which the serpent cannot expand it in spite of its perpetual desire to do so[5]. Thus, the *Paramātman*'s will, as conceived by the *Vedānta*, is not just a physical power to induce motion in atoms like the magnetic

1 Tarka.- YVA. p. 138.

2 Tarka.- YVA. p. 142.

3 वैदिकेश्वरस्य तु वेदेनैव सर्वशक्तित्वोक्तेः सर्वम् उपपद्यते। (M. BSB. 2-2-12).

4 सत्यामपि ईश्वरेच्छायां कार्यानुत्पादादेः सर्वेश्वराचिन्त्यशक्तितः एव उपपत्तेः।(TP. 2-2-12).

5 अचिन्त्यशक्तिपदेन नित्याया एव इच्छायाः सत एव सर्पस्य फणीकरणगारुडशक्तिवत् शक्तीकरणव्यक्तीकरणादिसामर्थ्यविशेषः उच्यते। (GDK. 2-2-12).

power, which induces motion in iron filings. Therefore, the *Sūtrakāra* refutes the *Vaiśeṣika* concept of *Paramātman*'s will as the instrumental cause of movement in atoms and the resultant creation.

The next *sūtra* refutes the cardinal concepts *samavāya* and *samavāyikāraṇa* in *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* doctrine.

॥ ॐ समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ॐ ॥
(2-2-13)

कार्यकारणादीनां समवायसम्बन्धाङ्गीकारात् तस्य च भिन्नत्वसाम्यात् समवायान्तरापेक्षायाम् अनवस्थितेः न च तत्प्रमाणम्।[1]

Since a *samavāya* relation has been accepted (by the *Vaiśeṣika*,) between the cause and the effect etc. (as they are considered different from each other), and since this *samavāya* relation itself is different from the cause and effect, it requires another *samavāya* relation (to connect it to the cause and effect) and so on; it leads to infinite regress and it has no justification.

All the commentators are unanimous in refuting the *Vaiśeṣika* concepts of *samavāya*, *samavāyikāraṇa* and their theory of creation. The inseparable and intimate union between two things like cause and effect, whole and part, a quality and the qualified etc. is called as *samavāya* relation in *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine. In this relation, there is always a *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* as in the case of a clay-jar, for example. The clay and the jar are two distinct things and the clay particularizes the jar and tells that it is a jar made of clay and not of silver. Similarly, in the case of a blue-lotus, blueness is distinct from lotus and it particularizes the lotus. The *Vaiśeṣika* accept a *samavāya* relation between clay and jar, blueness and lotus etc. By the same logic[2], *samavāya* particularizes the pairs,

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1 M. BSB. 2-2-13.

2 भिन्नयोः अवयवावयवित्वादिविशेषणविशेष्यभावोपपत्तये समवायोऽङ्गीकार्य एव अतः तदभ्युपगमे को दोष इति चेन्न। तथा सति समवायस्यापि समवायिभ्यां भिन्नत्वसाम्यान्मृद्घटसमवाय इत्यादि विशेषणविशेष्यभावोपपत्तये समवायान्तरापेक्षापातात्। (TP. 2-2-13).

clay and jar, blueness and lotus etc. and tells that they are inseparably connected pairs. Therefore, this *samavāya* also requires another *samavāya* relation to connect it to the pair it particularizes. Similarly, this second *samavāya* requires a third one and so on *ad infinitum*. There is no justification for such endless regression. If it be said that there is no need for such regression since the *samavāya* itself is capable of expressing the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* between the pairs, the whole and the part etc., it cannot be accepted; because in that case the material like clay and the quality like blueness etc. can also be held as capable of describing their relation with their relata. One may argue that unlike the clay, which is a material or the blueness, which is a quality, *samavāya* itself is a relation and therefore has the capacity to express the relation. But in the case of *saṁyoga* (conjunction), which is also a relation, though not inseparable, the *Vaiśeṣika* hold that it is a quality and it relates to the things it conjoins by *samavāya* relation. Thus, the concepts of *samavāya* and *samavāyikāraṇa* are inconsistent and superfluous and hence the *Sūtrakāra* rejects them.

Having rejected the three types of causes, *samavāyikāraṇa*, *asamavāyikāraṇa* and *nimittakāraṇa*, conceived by the *Vaiśeṣika* and having refuted their theory of creation, the *Sūtrakāra* refutes their theory of dissolution (*pralaya*) in the next sūtra.

|| ॐ नित्यमेव च भावात् ॐ || (2-2-14)

ईशेच्छापरमाण्वादिकारणस्य नित्यं भावात् नित्यमेव च कार्यं स्यात् न तु कदाचित् प्रलयः ।

Since the will of the Supreme Being (which is the instrumental cause) and the atoms (which are the material cause) and other causes are (considered by the *Vaiśeṣika* as) eternal, there will be the contingency of creation all the time and no dissolution at any time.

Śaṅkarācārya considers four alternatives. "The atoms may be essentially active or non-active or both or neither. If active, there will be no dissolution. If non-active, there would be no creation.

Their being both is impossible because of mutual contradiction. If they were neither, their activity or non-activity would depend on an operative cause. Such causes as *adṛṣṭa* being in proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result. If they are not operative causes, permanent non-activity will result. So the atomist view is untenable''[1]. But there is no hint in the sūtra for a discussion on the alternatives, as there is in '*Ubhayathā ca.....* (BS. 2-2-12, 16 or 23)'[2].

Rāmānujācārya says that if the *samavāya* relation is eternal, that to which the relation belongs is also eternal and so the world is eternal[3]. This is absurd[4].

So far, the *Vaiśeṣika* theory of creation is discussed, accepting their assumption that the atoms are eternal, and shown to be untenable. Now, the *Sūtrakāra* is going to show in the next *sūtra* that the atoms cannot be assumed to be eternal.

॥ ॐ रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-15)**

किञ्च पार्थिवादिपरमाणूनां रूपरसादिमत्त्वात् प्रकृतनित्यत्वविपर्ययः अनित्यत्वं भवति। यद् रूपादिमत् तद् अनित्यम् इति घटादौ दर्शनात्।

Moreover, since the atoms of earth etc. are having physical characteristics like colour, taste etc. they become impermanent, contrary to being eternal. Whatever has colour etc. that is impermanent as seen in a clay-jar etc.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*.

One may argue that the atoms may be eternal in spite of having colour etc., or they may be impermanent, but what is the harm in their being so? The next *sūtra* answers.

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1 SRK. p. 375.

2 सूत्रे उभयथा च इत्यादौ इव विकल्पसूचकाभावात्। (TC. III. p. 65).

3 SRK. p. 375.

4 समवायस्य संबन्धत्वात् संबन्धनित्यत्वे संबन्धिनः जगतः च नित्यमेव भावात् असमञ्जसम्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-2-13).

॥ ॐ उभयथा च दोषात् ॐ ॥ (2-2-16)

परमाणूनां नित्यत्वे घटादेः अपि तथात्वापत्तिः अनित्यत्वे कारणाभावेन परमाण्वनुत्पत्तिः इति उभयथा च पक्षद्वये अपि दोषसत्त्वात्।[1]

In case the atoms are assumed to be eternal (despite their having colour etc.) then things like clay-jar also will have to be accepted as permanent; and if the atoms are assumed to be impermanent (i.e. created) then in the absence of any concept of a cause for creation of atoms (in *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine), there will be no production of atoms. Thus, in both the cases, the doctrine would be defective.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* differently as follows. Out of four characteristics namely smell, taste, colour and touch, the earth has all the four and it is gross, water has three and it is fine, fire has two and it is finer and air has one and it is the finest. In *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine, the atoms have all the properties of their respective elements. If some atoms possess more qualities, then their size must be bigger and therefore they will cease to be atoms. If the atoms are assumed to possess same number of qualities, then they cannot be representative of the properties of their respective elements. Therefore, the atomic theory (of the *Vaiśeṣika*) is untenable.

In the above discussion, Śaṅkarācārya assumes that size varies directly with the number of qualities, which is hypothetical and not always true[2]. Moreover, it has been observed under BS. 2-2-11 earlier that a quality belonging to one class cannot generate a quality falling in another class. Therefore, qualities like colour, taste, smell, touch and their number cannot be expected to generate or modify another quality namely dimension (*parimāṇa*) in this case. Therefore, the interpretation is farfetched and unconvincing.

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1 VKM. 2-2-16.

2 गुणाधिक्येपि परिमाणाधिक्यादृष्टेः। (TC. III. p. 66).

According to Rāmānujācārya, if atoms are said to have colour etc. then they would cease to be eternal, and if the atoms are assumed to possess no colour etc. then one cannot account for the colour etc. of the effects, namely earth etc. Thus, the doctrine is defective in both the cases and hence it is absurd.

The next *sūtra* offers another reason for rejecting the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine.

॥ ॐ अपरिग्रहाच्च अत्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॐ ॥ (2-2-17)

परमाण्वारम्भवादस्य श्रुत्याद्यपरिग्रहीतत्वात् तद्विरुद्धत्वात् च अत्यन्तम् अनपेक्षा अनादरणं युक्तम् ।

The *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine that the world is created from the atoms is worth disregarding entirely because it is not approved by *Śruti* etc. and it contradicts them.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*.

7 समुदायाधिकरणम् ।

In this *Adhikaraṇa* and the next two, the *Sūtrakāra* discusses the tenets of another great world religion known as Buddhism, vis-a-vis his Vedic concepts of *Brahman* and the creation. This religion originated from Indian thought in sixth century B.C. It was founded by the great thinker *Siddhārtha Gautama*, who later came to be known as Buddha, which means the 'awakened one'. Every religion has two facets, one theoretical and the other practical. Buddha is said to have kept himself to the practical side of religion and taught his disciples the "knowledge of the truth which had brought him illumination and freedom" and how to lead a life in order to get rid of the suffering that afflicted mankind[1]. He did not write anything. It is later, about three hundred years after him, Buddha's followers compiled the teachings ascribed

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1 OIP. p. 134

to Buddha and put them in writing in Pāli, a dialect of Magadha (i.e. now Bihar). These compilations show the influence of thoughts that existed even before Buddha and those that appeared after him, as well as of the *Upaniṣads*[1]. This system of philosophy is known as *Theravāda*, i.e. the doctrine of the elders.

This doctrine holds that the world is full of suffering and the aim of man is to escape from it. It accepts only two means of getting knowledge (*pramāṇas*) namely perception and reasoning. It recognizes the distinction between the self and the material environment, but the concept of self is different. The doctrine does not accept the existence of a permanent Supreme Being or enduring individual souls. According to the doctrine, the 'self' is conceived as a combination of five factors,[2] which are called as *skandhas*, *rūpa*, *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṁjñā* and *saṁskāra*. The *Rupa-skandha* stands for the physical world of objects and the rest represent the psychical elements in the self. '*Vijñāna* is bare sensation (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). *Vedanā* is feeling of pleasure or pain. *Saṁjñā* is conceptual knowledge (*savikalpakajñāna*) and *saṁskāra* stands for impressions carried forward by the mind i.e. mental dispositions[3]. Thus, the 'self' is merely a continuity of momentary thoughts and nothing beyond that. Just as the word 'chariot' stands for an assemblage of certain parts and no individual part can claim to be the chariot, the word 'self' stands for the aggregate (*saṅghātu*) of the five factors.

According to the doctrine, the self and the material world are each a flux, a succession (*santāna*) of similar things or happenings. Whatever is perceived in the world is but momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and the continuity observed is similar to that of a river or a flame[4].

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1 OIP. p. 135

2 OIP. p. 139.

3 BNK II p. 50.

4 OIP. p. 141.

The doctrine holds that neither Being nor non-Being is the truth, but only becoming. There is incessant change but at the same time there is nothing that changes. Since there is incessant production, but no new things are brought into being, the world becomes the world-process[1].

The doctrine also holds that[2] whatever that happens, depends on certain conditions present, not necessarily on account of an agent behind them, and the happening can be stopped or changed by sundering the causes sustaining the effect. Thus, Buddha realized the causes behind the sufferings in the world and taught his disciples how to get rid of the sufferings by removing the causes behind them, through an eight-fold path of self-discipline. Though Buddhism does not accept the permanency of individual souls, it accepts the transmigration of the 'self' and the '*Karma*' theory of carrying forward the merits and demerits of individuals from one life to another[3].

According to this doctrine, the mundane cycle of birth, suffering, death and rebirth is sustained by a chain of a dozen links (*nidāna*), which are connected together in a cause and effect relationship. The links are identified as ignorance (*avidyā*), action (*saṁskāra*), consciousness (*vijñāna*), name and form (*nāma-rūpa*), the six fields, viz. the five senses and mind together with their objects (*ṣaḍāyatana*), contact between the senses and the objects (*sparśa*), sensation (*vedanā*), desire (*tṛṣṇā*), clinging to existence (*upādāna*), being (*bhava*), rebirth (*jāti*) and pain or literally old age and death (*jarā-maraṇa*)[4]. This endless cycle of worldly life is known as *Bhava-cakra* i.e. the wheel of existence.

With the spread of Buddhism in India and outside, divergent views appeared among its followers, and several schools emerged.

1 OIP. p. 142.
2 OIP. p. 143.
3 OIP. p. 145.
4 OIP. p. 149.

Four of these schools are considered as important, and they are known as (1) *Vaibhāṣika*, (2) *Sautrāntika*, (3) *Mādhyamika* and (4) *Yogācāra* or *Vijñānavādins*. The views of the first two are realistic and therefore they are also called as *Sarvāstivādins*. The views of the other two schools are idealistic. They call their way to salvation as *Mahāyāna*, the great way, and dub that of the first two as *Hīnayāna*, the inferior way[1].

In this *Adhikaraṇa* the views of *Vaibhāṣika* and *Sautrāntika* schools are considered. They hold that the world is momentary but real. They postulate the physical world as arising out of four kinds of atoms, earth, water, fire and air. In the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* we have seen that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* schools had postulated the existence of four kinds of atoms, earth etc. even during dissolution (*pralaya*), and that the world came into existence due to the combinations of these atoms into dyads, triads etc impelled by the will of the Supreme Being. But here, these realistic Buddhist schools assume that the world is mere aggregation of momentary atoms, which come into existence for a moment and vanish giving rise to another set of atoms of the same category. These groups of fleeting atoms only are known as objects like cow, pot etc. and apart from these groups there is no such thing as a constituted whole entity[2]. There is not much of a difference between the two schools. The *Vaibhāṣika* hold that objects are directly perceived; and the *Sautrāntika* hold that they are known indirectly since according to the doctrine of momentariness, objects cannot be present at the time they are perceived[3]. The coming *sūtra* rejects these views.

॥ ॐ समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः ॐ ॥

(2-2-18)

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1 OIP. p. 196.

2 अणुसमुदाया एव गोघटादिबोधबोध्या न तु तदतिरिक्तो अवयवी नाम अस्ति।
(NS. 2-2-18) (BNK.II p. 51)

3 OIP. p. 201.

All the commentators agree that this *sūtra* is directed against the Buddhist concept of the world as containing mere aggregations of isolated fleeting atoms. But their interpretations are different.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets as follows[1]. These two types of aggregates postulated by the (Buddhist) opponents, the physical one caused by the atoms and the other of experience caused by the five psychical factors (*skandhas*), do not get established, i.e. their formation cannot be proved; why?; because these atoms and psychical factors are insentient. The mental activity also presupposes the existence of the aggregates i.e. the physical bodies and their contact with the psychical factors. Moreover the Buddhists do not accept the existence of any other enduring sentient being like an enjoying soul or the governing Lord, who could be said to have brought about the activity i.e. the aggregation of the physical world and the psychical factors. If this propensity is accepted as independent of any other agency, then it will never cease.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets on similar lines as follows[2]. Both of these two types of aggregates, one of elements earth etc. caused by the atoms, and the other of body-mind complexes caused by the elements earth etc. cannot occur, on account of the momentariness of atoms and the elements, postulated (by the Buddhists). Since everything is momentary, the perceiver himself is no more and the perceived is also no more. Similarly the

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1 योऽयमुभयहेतुक उभयप्रकारः समुदायः परेषामभिप्रेतः अणुहेतुकश्च भूतभौतिकसंहतिरूपः स्कन्धहेतुकश्च पञ्चस्कन्धीरूपः तस्मिन् उभयहेतुकेऽपि समुदाये अभिप्रेयमाणे तदप्राप्तिः स्यात् समुदायाप्राप्तिः। समुदायभावानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः। कुतः। समुदायिनाम् अचेतनत्वात्। चित्ताभिज्वलनस्य च समुदायसिद्ध्यधीनत्वात्। अन्यस्य च कस्यचित् चेतनस्य भोक्तुः प्रशासितुर्वा स्थिरस्य संहन्तुः अनभ्युपगमात् निरपेक्षप्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे च प्रवृत्त्यनुपरमप्रसङ्गात्। (S. BSB 2-2-18).

2 योऽयमणुहेतुकः पृथिव्यादिभूतात्मकः समुदायो यश्च पृथिव्यादिहेतुकः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयरूपः समुदायः तस्मिन् उभयहेतुके अपि समुदाये तत्प्राप्तिः न उपपद्यते। जगदात्मकसमुदायोत्पत्तिः नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थः। परमाणूनां पृथिव्यादिभूतानां च क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। ---स्प्रष्टा हि नष्टः स्पृष्टश्च नष्टः। तथा वेदिता विदितश्च नष्टः। कथं च अन्येन स्पृष्टम् अन्यो वेदयते। ---अहमर्थ एव आत्मा। स च ज्ञाता एव। (Srībhāṣya 2-2-17).

knower and the known are also no more. How can any one know what is perceived by another? The entity 'I' alone is the *Ātman* and that alone is the knower.

Though these are valid arguments against the Buddhist tenets, the wording of the *sūtra* does not indicate all these thoughts. At best, the assertion (*pratijñā*) that the aggregation (*samudāya*) cannot be justified, can be read in the *sūtra*. The probans (*hetu*) offered by both the commentators, viz. the lack of sentiency on the part of atoms and the momentariness of the atoms etc. appear extraneous to the *sūtra*. If the *sūtra* were to convey this much only as interpreted above, then the *Sūtrakāra could have said 'ubhayahetu- samudāyāprāptiḥ'*, and therefore the full significance of the words used in the *sūtra* does not reflect in the above interpretations[1].

Madhvācārya has tried to derive some reason for the assertion made in the *sutra*, from the words in the *sūtra* itself. Though the word *ubhaya* means a thing made of two parts[2], here it is understood in the sense of a thing made of two or more parts i.e. more than one (*aneka*) parts, by way of secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*)[3], because an aggregate or group can be conceived of with two or more parts only. The word *api* indicates the rejection of the contingency of a group having only one member[4]. The *sūtra* points out the illogicality in the Buddhist postulate that the things

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1 तथात्वे --- उभयहेतुसमुदायाप्राप्तिः इत्येवसूत्रणीयत्वेन समुदाये उभयहेतुके इति सप्तम्योः अपि शब्दस्य तदप्राप्तिरित्यत्र तच्छब्दस्य च व्यर्थत्वात्। (TC III p. 70).

2 (i) संख्याया अवयवे तयप्। (Pāṇini 5-2-42).
The affix *tayap* comes after a numeral in the sense of "that whereof the parts are so many".
(ii) द्वित्रिभ्यां तयस्यायज्वा। (Pāṇini 5-2-43).
The affix ayach is optionally the substitute of *tayap*, after the words *dvi* and *tri*
(iii) उभादुदात्तो नित्यम्। (Pāṇini 5-2-44).
After the word *ubha*, *ayac* is always the substitute for *tayap*, having the acute (*udātta*) accent on its first syllable.

3 उभयेत्यनेकोपलक्षणम्। (TDK 2-2-18).

4 अपिः एकहेतुकत्वपक्षनिरासमूचकः। (TDK 2-2-18).

like cow, pot and clock etc. perceived in the world are only aggregates or groups of fleeting atoms and that there is no such thing as a constituted whole entity (*avayavī*) as a result of combination of atoms. Obviously, it is absurd to think of a group having only one atom. The *sūtra* avers that even if there are more than one atoms it is not possible to have an aggregate unless the atoms combine i.e. form that aggregate.

उभयहेतुके अनेकपरमाणुहेतुके समुदाये अङ्गीकृते सति अपि तदप्राप्तिः तस्य समुदायस्य अप्राप्तिः अनुपपत्तिः । अणूनां मेलने सति समुदायः तस्मिन् (समुदाये) सति मेलनम् इति अन्योन्याश्रयात् ।

Even if we accept an aggregate as having more than one i.e. many atoms, still the existence of an aggregate cannot be established. There can be an aggregate only if the atoms combine and if there is an aggregate then there is combination of atoms. Thus, there is interdependence. In other words, an aggregate presupposes the combination of atoms into a constituted whole entity. For example, on a beach one can see dolls of sand if they are made and they would vanish in the next high tide. But if one insists that he sees the dolls in the expanse of sand, without anybody making them, then they would not vanish in high tide. It means that there is no scope for dissolution (*pralaya*) which is accepted by the Buddhists. The interdependence (*anyonyāśraya*) between an aggregate and aggregation of atoms, (i.e. between the cause and the effect), is not expressly mentioned in the *sūtra*, but it follows from the tenor of other words used in the *sūtra* with reference to the logical disputations, common in those days. In order to show that a certain postulate is not tenable, the usual method is to demonstrate that the postulate under consideration leads to such logical fallacies like 'mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*)', 'unending series (*anavasthā*), absurdity etc.

If the Buddhist opponent further tries to account for creation and dissolution, with his postulate that the world consists of only aggregates of momentary atoms, the next *sutra* answers the same.

|| ॐ इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् ॐ ||
(2-2-19)

Śaṅkarācārya takes the word *itaretara* as mutual and *pratyayatva* as causality. He assumes a Buddhist contention *(pūrvapakṣa)* that even though there is no enduring sentient principle postulated as the enjoyer or governor, the cycle of worldly life[1], *Bhava-cakra*, is possible because of the cause and effect relationship between the factors, ignorance *(avidyā)* etc. in that *Bhava-cakra*. The *sūtra* refutes such a contention saying that[2], that causality accounts for the origination of the different members in the chain, but there is no cause for their groupings as material aggregates and psychical factors.

Śaṅkarācārya has argued in the previous *sūtra* that in the absence of an enduring sentient being, aggregation of the physical world and the psychical factors could not be possible. In view of this, there is little scope for such a contention by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that[3] the cycle of worldly life continues incessantly like a rotating water wheel on account of the cause and effect relationship between the members of the chain, *avidyā*, *saṁskāra*, *jarā*, *maraṇa*, *śoka* etc. Rāmānujācārya reads the *sūtra* a little differently and interprets it on similar lines.

इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादुपपन्नमिति चेन्न संघातभावानिमित्तत्वात्।

If it be said that the occurrence of the aggregates etc. can take place on account of the mutual causality of the members of the series, *avidyā*, *saṁskāra* etc., it is not so because *avidyā* etc. cannot be the cause of aggregation (of the momentary

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1 यद्यपि भोक्ता प्रशासिता वा कश्चित् चेतनः संहन्ता स्थिरो न अभ्युपगम्यते तथापि अविद्यादीनाम् इतरेतरकारणत्वात् उपपद्यते लोकयात्रा। (S. BSB. 2-2-19).

2 इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वेऽपि अविद्यादीनां पूर्वं पूर्वम् उत्तरोत्तरस्य उत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तं भवद्भवेन्न तु संघातोत्पत्तेः किञ्चिन्निमित्तं सम्भवति। (S. BSB. 2-2-19).

3 न हि संहन्तुः चेतनस्य अभावात् संघातो न युक्त इत्युक्ते अविद्यासंस्कारजरामरणशोकादीनाम् अन्योन्यं हेतुहेतुमद्भावेन पूर्वापरीभूततया घटीयन्त्रवदनिशमावर्तमानत्वरूपम् इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वं शङ्कार्हम्। (TC. III p.70).

atoms)[1]. Though *avidyā* produces the notion of permanency in impermanent things, yet *avidyā* etc. cannot get the status of being the cause of aggregating other momentary objects. Otherwise, the illusory knowledge of silver in shell could produce real silver[2].

Having said (in the preceding *sutra*) that no aggregation of atoms or of psychical factors (*skandhas*) is possible on account of universal momentariness of things, how again one can raise a doubt whether the mutual causality of the members of the *Bhava-cakra, avidyā* etc. could be the cause of aggregates?[3]

Madhvācārya takes an all-together different line of interpretation. As expressed in the saying "beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder", the *Vaibhāṣika* hold that the perception of the world as 'this is a pot', 'this is a cow', 'this is another cow' and so on, involves a subjective element in it. The element includes thoughts (*kalpanā*) like generality (*jāti*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), name (*nāma*) and substance (*dravya*)[4]. Thus, perception includes much more than what is actually presented to the senses. In addition to the things perceived, perception depends on the mindset of the perceiver and his proximity to the things perceived. This interrelated or coordinated comprehension of things is what is conveyed by the word *itaretarapratyaya* in the sutra, according to Madhvācārya. It is also described[5] as *parasparāpekṣābuddhi*.

The argument in the preceding *sūtra* is that if it is accepted that the isolated momentary atoms sprawled in space only present themselves as various aggregates without combining into

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1 अविद्यादीनाम् इतरेतरहेतुत्वेन उपपन्नं संघातभावादिकम् इति चेत् --- न संघातभावानिमित्तत्वात्। --- न खलु अस्थिरादिषु स्थिरत्वादिबुद्ध्यात्मिका अविद्या तन्निमित्ता रागद्वेषादयो वा अर्थान्तरस्य क्षणिकस्य संहतिहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते। शुक्तिकारजतादिबुद्धिर्हि न शुक्त्याद्यर्थसंहतिहेतुर्भवति। (Śrībhāṣya 2-2-18).

2 (Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-2-18).

3 क्षणिकत्वादणूनां संघात एव नोपपद्यते इत्युक्ते पुनः कथमन्योन्यहेतुहेतुमद्भावरूपेतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वं शङ्कार्हम्। (TCP. p. 915, BNK II. p. 66).

4 OIP. p. 215.

5 इतरसहितम् इतरत् इतरेतरत् तस्य प्रत्ययः तद्विषयापेक्षाबुद्धिः इतरेतरप्रत्ययः। (BNK. II p. 53).

formulations, it leads to the contingency of the aggregates remaining permanently, denying any scope for dissolution. But the Buddhist contender can argue that even if the isolated momentary atoms are always present and are capable of projecting various aggregates, the creation appears as long as this *itaretarapratyaya* exists and the absence of the same accounts for the dissolution.

According to Madhvācārya this *sūtra* refutes such a contention, as follows.

समुदायस्य सर्वदा सत्त्वेऽपि तत्प्रतीतेः इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वात् परस्परापेक्षा बुद्ध्यधीनत्वात् तदभावे तत्प्रतीत्यभावेन लयोत्पत्तिः इति चेन्न उत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् विरलाणूनां मिलिताणुरूपसमुदायोत्पत्तिमात्रे निमित्तत्वात् तदपेक्षाबुद्धौ निमित्तत्त्वाभावात्।

If it be said that even though the aggregate (of isolated fleeting atoms) is always present, its cognition is subject to the co-coordinated perception and in the absence of the same there would be no cognition and that accounts for dissolution, it can not be so, because the scattered momentary atoms can (at best) be capable of presenting an aggregate but cannot bring about the coordinated perception by activating the mindset.

The next *sūtra* shows that, in fact, scattered isolated atoms cannot produce aggregates at all.

॥ ॐ उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-20)**

There is no assertion in the *sūtra*. It consists of only a probans So, Śaṅkarācārya[1] rightly takes this sutra as an additional probans for the assertion assumed by him in the preceding sutra, on the strength of '*ca*' in this one, and interprets it as follows. Buddhists postulate that when the subsequent momentary thing originates,

1 क्षणभङ्गवादिनोऽयमभ्युपगम उत्तरस्मिन्क्षण उत्पद्यमाने पूर्वः क्षणो निरुध्यते इति। न चैवमभ्युपगच्छता पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोः हेतुफलभावः शक्यते सम्पादयितुम्। निरुध्यमानस्य निरुद्धस्य वा पूर्वक्षणस्य अभावग्रस्तत्वात् उत्तरक्षणहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः। (S. BSB. 2-2-20).

the preceding one ceases to be. With this postulate, the cause and effect relation between preceding and succeeding momentary things cannot be established. For, the vanishing or vanished preceding momentary thing cannot be the cause of the succeeding momentary thing because it (the preceding one) has attained a state of non-existence (*abhāva*). And therefore, the Buddhist assumption in the previous *sūtra* that the cycle of worldly life is possible because of the cause and effect relationship between the links, ignorance, action etc. does not stand.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* in a similar way, as follows[1]. And for this reason, the origination of the world is not possible, according to the doctrine of momentariness. Since the preceding moment is destroyed at the time of the origination of the succeeding moment, it cannot be the cause of the succeeding moment. (The word moment is to be taken as a momentary thing).

Though there is nothing untenable in the above arguments, the doubt is whether these are intended by the *Sūtrakartā* here. In this Buddhist doctrine of momentariness which is dubbed as *kṣaṇikavāda* or *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*, the *Vaibhāṣika* hold that the physical world consists of an infinite number of fleeting atoms, each one being unique and therefore called as *svalakṣaṇa*. Each *svalakṣaṇa* is produced by the preceding one in its series and gives rise in its turn to the succeeding one in the same series[2]. Thus, a cause and effect relation between the preceding and succeeding atoms is accepted. This basic postulate of the *Vaibhāṣika* that[3] "as soon as the succeeding momentary atom is produced, the preceding one ceases to be" stands heavily criticized by the *Vedāntins*. The *Sūtrakāra* also does criticize this postulate, but in the next *sūtra*. Here, he simply quotes that postulate as a

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1 इतश्च क्षणिकत्वपक्षे जगदुत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यते । उत्तरक्षणोत्पत्तिवेलायां पूर्वक्षणस्य विनष्टत्वात् तस्य उत्तरक्षणं प्रति हेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः । (Śrībhāṣya-RDK. 2-2-19).

2 OIP. p. 215.

3 उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधः ।

probans. It indicates that he proposes here to confirm the refutation of the Buddhist assumption of the world as consisting of aggregates of fleeting atoms, done in the previous sūtra, on the strength of their own basic postulate. The point to be noted in this basic postulate is that each momentary atom is capable of producing only another atom similar (*sadṛśa*) to itself[1].

Since the *sūtra* contains only a probans, Madhvācārya takes it as an additional reasoning to substantiate the point that isolated and scattered atoms cannot produce aggregates (*samudāya*) of atoms, established in the previous *sūtra*. The exposition of the *sūtra* would be as follows.

उत्तरोत्पादे उत्तरस्य स्वसदृशकार्यस्य उत्पादे एव पूर्वनिरोधात् पूर्वस्य कारणस्य निरोधात् नाशात् कारणस्य स्वसदृशकार्यजनने एव सामर्थ्यम्। तस्मात् तत्कार्यमुत्पाद्य पश्चात् तत्कारणस्य मिलिताणुरूपसमुदायस्य असदृशकार्यस्य जननम् अयुक्तम्।

Since the cause, the preceding atom in its series, ceases to exist as soon as it produces the succeeding atom in the same series, similar to itself, the cause is competent to produce only a like effect. Therefore, when a cause has done its work of producing a like effect (and ceased to exist), it is improper to expect it again to produce a dissimilar work like forming an aggregate of atoms.

The next *sūtra* demonstrates that this postulate that a cause ceases to exist as soon as it produces an effect every moment, is also not sustainable.

॥ ॐ असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ॐ ॥

(2-2-21)

असति, पूर्वस्मिन् कारणे असति, कार्योत्पत्तिः इत्युक्ते, तत् तस्य कार्यम् इति प्रतिज्ञायाः उपरोधः हानिः। अतिप्रसङ्गादिति भावः। अन्यथा, सति पूर्वस्मिन्

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1 क्षणिकवादे कारणस्य सदृशकार्यजनने एव सामर्थ्यात्। (TDK. 2-2-20).

कारणे, उत्तरोत्पादे यौगपद्यं कारणस्य द्विक्षणत्वप्रसङ्गः च। क्षणिकस्य च द्विक्षणावस्थाने तदुत्तरत्र विनाशकारणाभावात् पुनः तस्मात् कार्योत्पत्तयः स्युः तेभ्यः च तथा इति सर्वकार्याणां यौगपद्यं स्यात्।[1]

If it be said that when the cause is absent, an effect can originate, then the statement that "it is the effect of that cause" stands contradicted. If an effect can happen without a cause, then there will be an undesirable contingency of anything originating everywhere. Otherwise i.e., if it is assumed that the effect originates when the cause is also present, then the cause and effect would simultaneously exist. It also means that the cause exists for two moments. If a momentary cause can exist for two moments, there is no reason why it should perish in subsequent moments. It may produce further effects and those may produce similar effects and all these effects may exist simultaneously.

In such a case, one may expect a potter's shed to be filled with a large number of pots in a few moments without any effort on the part of the potter.

All the commentators agree on the interpretation of this *sūtra*. The interpretations by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya are on these lines only. But these arguments are used by them in the previous *sūtra* also. Therefore, the same here appear as repetitions.

The next *sūtra* refutes the very concept of destruction of a thing after existing for just a moment, postulated in Buddhist philosophy.

॥ ॐ प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् ॐ ॥

(2-2-22)

Here *Saṅkhyā* means intellect and *pratisaṅkhyā* is taken as intentional or deliberate. *Nirodha* is used in the sense of destruction.

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1 TP. 2-2-21.

Thus, *pratisaṅkhyāirodha* signifies deliberate or voluntary destruction as when a clay-pot is broken by a stick, which is perceivable. On the other hand, *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* signifies involuntary destruction or natural decay, which goes on unnoticed automatically, which is imperceptible or subtle. The sūtra declares:

वस्तूनां प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्य अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्य च अप्राप्तिः अविच्छेदात्।

Whatever exists in the world cannot get destroyed, either deliberately by some agency or through the natural process of decay, on account of continuity or non-interruption. The *sūtra* states what is known as the 'Law of indestructibility' in modern science. It avers that whatever exists in the world cannot get destroyed but continues to exist in one state or the other, solid, liquid or gaseous. Absolute destruction is impossible. All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. But they apply it to different contexts of Buddhist philosophy.

According to Śaṅkarācārya the Buddhists hold that everything that forms an object of knowledge is produced and momentary, except three things, namely. *pratisaṅkhyānirodha*, *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* and *ākāśa*. The three are held to be non substantial and negative in character (*abhāva- mātra*). *Akāśa* will be discussed later. Buddhists postulate that the world is but a number of series (*Santāna*) of momentary things. This *sūtra* avers that both voluntary and involuntary destructions of things in the world are not possible. Destruction must refer to either the series (*Santāna*) of momentary things as a whole or to the things themselves. The destruction of the series is not possible because its members are connected together as cause and effect in an unbroken manner. Destruction of the things without leaving any residue (i.e *niranvaya*) is also not possible because there always remains some residue by which the original thing can be recognized. The residue may be perceptible or could be inferred. Therefore, both the types of destruction conceived by the Buddhists are groundless[1]

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1 SRK. p. 380.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* in a similar way as follows. The two types of destruction, which the Buddhists talk of as *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* and *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* are not possible on account of the impossibility of an absolute destruction of the existent. The origination and destruction of an existing thing are not possible as they can only mean a change of state and name. But the ingredient of a thing in any state is the same one and is constant. This has been propounded by us[1] while reasoning out the fact that the effect is not different from the cause, while explaining the term '*tadananyatvaṁ*' (in BS. 2-1-15).

As said earlier, the world, according to Buddhists, is but a number of series or successions (*Santāna*) of momentary things, where each thing exists for a moment and perishes after producing another one similar to itself. With reference to this postulate, Madhvācārya understands the term *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* as the deliberate and perceptible destruction of the succession of momentary things and designates it as *sasantānavināśa*. On the other hand, he takes the term *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* as the automatic and imperceptible destruction of things without leaving any residue, that goes on within the succession, as assumed by the Buddhists, and designates it as *nissantānavināśa*. The *sūtra* asserts that both are not possible[2].

The probans (*hetu*) for the above assertion is '*avicchedāt*'. Buddhists accept that when a cause is present it must produce an effect[3]. Madhvācārya understands the word '*avicchedāt*' as "on account of the continuity of production of effect when cause is present".

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1 (यो) प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधशब्दाभ्यामभिधीयते तौ न संभवतः 'अविच्छेदात्' सतो निरन्वयविच्छेदासंभवात्।असंभवश्च सत उत्पत्तिविनाशौ नामावस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव। अवस्थायोगि तु द्रव्यमेकमेव स्थिरमिति कारणादनन्यत्वं कार्यस्य उपपादयद्भिः अस्माभिः 'तदनन्यत्वम् (BS. 2-1-15)' इत्यत्र प्रतिपादितम्। (Śrībhāṣya-RDK. 2-2-21).

2 सन्तानमन्तरेण यः प्रतिक्षणं विनाशः यश्च सन्तानेन सह क्षणिकमते तयोरनुपपत्तिः। (TP.2-2-22)

3 कारणे सति कार्यं भवति एव इति नियमाभ्युपगमात्। (TP. 2-2-22).

Thus, the exposition of the *sūtra* would be as follows :

प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्य ससन्तानविनाशस्य तथा अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्य प्रतिक्षण-निस्सन्तानविनाशस्य च अप्राप्तिः अनुपपत्तिः अविच्छेदात् कारणे सति कार्यजननाविच्छेदात्। कारणे सति कार्यं भवति एव इति नियमे पूर्वाविनाशे एव अपरोत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारात् अन्यस्य च विनाशकारणस्य अनिरूपणात्।[1]

The deliberate and perceptible destruction of the succession of momentary things, and the automatic and imperceptible destruction of momentary things without leaving any residue, going on within the succession, are both not possible on account of the inevitable continuity of production of effect when cause is present. On account of the obligation on the part of the cause to produce an effect when the cause is present, it has to be accepted that when the succeeding momentary thing is produced, the preceding one is not destroyed and therefore there is no reason why the preceding one should get destroyed.

For example, in the case of deliberate destruction of a clay-jar, an existing jar only can be destroyed. Therefore, since that jar exists it must produce another jar as its effect. Similarly this new jar must produce another one and so on. Then, where is the scope for interrupting this series?[2]

The next *sūtra* discusses another hypothesis in Buddhist philosophy.

॥ ॐ उभयथा च दोषात् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-23)**

The *sūtra* mentions only a probans and the assertion is left wide open. Śaṅkarācārya takes a very general assertion that the Buddhist doctrine is not reasonable. He raises two alternatives about the destruction of *avidyā* etc. "If the destruction of *avidyā* etc. results from perfect knowledge and the adoption of the ethical

1 TPD. 2-2-22.

2 सतो हि घटस्यात्यन्तिको नाशः। अतोऽसौ सत्त्वात् कार्यमुत्पादयेदेव। तत्कार्यं च एवमिति कथं सन्तानोच्छेदावसरः। (TP. 2-2-22).

path, we must give up the view that destruction takes place without any cause. If *avidyā* etc., are destroyed of their own accord, what is the use of the ethical path and the knowledge that everything is momentary, painful and void?"[1] Since it becomes defective both ways, the Buddhist doctrine is unreasonable.

At present, the *Sūtrakāra* is discussing the views of Buddhists about ontology. Therefore, Śaṅkarācārya's reference here to the destruction of *avidyā* etc. which is a part of Buddhist doctrine about origin and removal of suffering in the world, appears out of context, in the absence of any specific assertion in the *sutra*. Moreover, in his commentary Śaṅkarācārya takes the destruction of *avidyā* etc. as falling within the purview of deliberate destruction (*pratisaṅkhyānirodhāntaḥpātī*) according to Buddhist hypothesis. Then, where is the scope for the alternative of involuntary destruction of *avidyā* etc.?

Rāmānujācārya carries forward the discussion of the two types of destruction of things, from the previous *sūtra*, as follows. Origination of a thing from void and passing away of an existent thing into void are not possible. If something originates from void, it would be of the nature of void only. But neither the Buddhists hold the world to be of the nature of nothingness, nor is it seen so. If an existent thing becomes void on destruction, then the world would be destroyed after just one moment and become void. The subsequent world that originates from the void would also be of the nature of void. Therefore, as both the views are defective, the origination and destruction (of the world) cannot be as told by the Buddhists[2]. The word '*ubhayathā*' in the *sūtra* indicates two clear antithetical positions. Such an antithesis is not visible in the above interpretation[3].

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1 योऽयमविद्यादिनिरोधः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधान्तःपाती परपरिकल्पितः स सम्यक् ज्ञानाद्वा सपरिकरात् स्यात् स्वयमेव वा। पूर्वस्मिन् विकल्पे निर्हेतुकविनाशाभ्युपगमहानिप्रसङ्गः। उत्तरस्मिन् तु मार्गोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः। एवम् उभयथापि दोषप्रसङ्गात् असमञ्जसमिदं दर्शनम्। (S. BSB. 2-2-23) (SRK p.381).

2 Śrībhāṣya 2-2-22.

3 BNK. II. p. 68.

Madhvācārya takes a different line. In Buddhist view[1], there is no Being at all, and the only reality is Becoming. Reality consists in causal efficiency or the capacity to effect something. This capacity to produce something is assumed to manifest not bit by bit but at once and fully. This causal efficiency is designated as *'arthakriyākāritva'*. Since a thing Is only when it Acts, it must be momentary. If in the first moment itself the cause does not cease to exist after producing a like effect, there will be the undesirable contingency of an endless production of effects[2].

Thus, the conclusion that everything real must be momentary, i.e. everything must face destruction after a momentary existence, is based on presumption (*arthāpatti*).

Since the present *sūtra* contains only a probans and the conjunctive particle *'ca'*, it is logical to take it as providing an additional reason in support of the assertion established in the preceding *sūtra*. In the last *sutra*, the two types of destruction held by the Buddhists are refuted in view of their own rule that when a cause is present it must produce an effect. The present *sūtra* declares, according to Madhvācārya, that whether this rule is true or false, in both the cases (*ubhayathā*) the Buddhist postulate of destruction of things after momentary existence is defective.

कारणे सति कार्यं भवति एव इति नियमे समानकालीनत्वेन कार्यकारणभावानुपपत्तिः अनियमे असत्त्वापत्तिः इति उभयपक्षे अपि दोषात्[3] सतां भावानां प्रतिक्षणं स्वसदृशकार्यमुत्पाद्य विनाशः अनुपपन्नः ।

In case the rule that when a cause is present then the effect is necessarily present is true, the sense of cause and effect cannot be established since both are simultaneously present (like the horns of an animal). In the absence of that rule, a cause may not have any effect and in that case it faces the

1 OIP. p. 211, 212.

2 BNK II p. 59.

3 VKM. 2.2.23.

undesirable contingency of losing its reality (due to lack of causal efficiency) (*arthakriyākāritva*). Since both the alternatives are defective, the destruction of existing things every moment after producing a like effect, is improper.

Thus, the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) argued by the Buddhists on the basis of presumptive reasoning (*arthāpatti*), is refuted by this *sūtra*. Another argument put forth by them in support of momentariness, based on inference (*anumāna*), is being refuted in the next *sūtra*.

The Buddhist syllogism is that "whatever exists that is momentary as for example the flame of a lamp etc"[1]. The example of a flame is chosen because it flickers and its size varies from moment to moment. So it can be taken as a succession of momentary flames. The *Sūtrakāra* refutes this argument by putting forth a counter-syllogism in the next sutra, according to Madhvācārya.

॥ ॐ आकाशे चाविशेषात् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-24)**

दीप इव आकाशे च अविशेषात् परिमाणविशेषाभावात् यत् सत् तत् अक्षणिकं यथा आकाशः ।

In the same way as the flame provides an illustration of continuous variations, *Ākāśa* (sky) is an example where there are no internal modifications and therefore it can be inferred that whatever exists is not momentary (but stable) like *Ākāśa*.

Perhaps the *Sūtrakāra* deliberately chooses the example of *Ākāśa*, because the Buddhists hold that *Ākāśa* and the two types of destruction (discussed in BS. 2-2-22) are eternal and unproduced[2]. But the Buddhists also hold *Ākāśa* to be mere absence of occupying bodies[3] and a non-entity (*abhāva*).

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1 यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा दीपादि । (TP. 2-2-24).

2 आकाशो द्वौ विनाशौ च नित्यं त्रयमसंस्कृतम् इति बौद्धोक्तिः । (BVB. 2-2-24).

3 आवरणाभावमात्रमाकाशम् । (S. BSB. 2-2-22).

Madhvācārya argues in his *Anuvyākhyāna* that the concept of *abhāva* is always with reference to a counter-correlative (*pratiyogin*) as for example *ghaṭābhāva*, but *Ākāśa*[1] can be understood without reference to any such correlative. One cannot argue that *Ākāśa* is that where everything is absent. On the contrary, wherever any object is present *Ākāśa* also exists and provides room for the object. So *Ākāśa* is an entity (*bhāvarūpa*).

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* itself as refuting the Buddhist concept of *Ākāśa* as a non-entity. Out of three things namely *pratisaṅkhyānirodha*, *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* and *Ākāśa*, held by Buddhists as non-substantial and negative in character, their concept about the first two are already refuted earlier and the same about *Ākāśa* is being refuted now. The *sūtra* avers that "In the case of *ākāśa* also, there being no difference, it can not be treated as a non-entity"[2]. *Ākāśa* is the substratum of sound. The Buddhists hold that *ākāśa* is the support of air and is eternal. So it must be an entity. That which is non-substantial can be neither eternal nor non-eternal[3].

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sutra* on similar lines and holds that the *Sūtrakāra* is refuting here, in passing (*prasaṅgena*), the Buddhist concept that *Ākāśa* is unsubstantial.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the term '*aviśeṣa*' in the *sūtra* as non difference between the untenability of the Buddhist concept of two-fold destruction, and that of *Ākāśa* as having a non-substantial and negative character. Rāmānujācārya understands the same term as non-difference between the substantial and positive character of *Ākāśa*, and that of other elements Earth etc. Madhvācārya holds that the term stands for the stability i.e. lack of internal modifications in *Ākāśa*. Thus, it is a guesswork done by the

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1 BNK II. p. 60.

2 SRK. p. 381.

3 शब्दगुणानुनेयत्वं वक्तव्यम्। ----- वायुराकाशसंनिश्रयः--- नित्यम्। न हि अवस्तुनः नि[illegible] अनित्यत्वं वा संभवति। (S. BSB. 2-2-24).

commentators regarding what could be at the back of *Sūtrkāra's* mind. Considering the flow of thoughts in this *Adhikaraṇa*, Madhvācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra* as refuting the main postulate of Buddhists that the world is momentary, appears more meaningful and imaginative.

The refutation of the concept of momentariness of the world continues in the next *sūtra*, with the evidence of our common experience of recollection (*anusmṛti*).

॥ ॐ अनुस्मृतेश्च ॐ ॥ (2-2-25)

तदेव इदम् इति अनुस्मृतेः प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् च 'यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा दीपादि' इति अनुमानात् क्षणिकत्वं न सिद्धम्।

The (Buddhist postulate of) universal momentariness is not established by inference, with syllogisms like 'whatever exists that is momentary as for example the flame of a lamp etc.', on account also of (our common) experience of recognition as 'this is verily that (cow or pot etc.)'.

For the experience of recognition, the perceiver and the thing perceived have to exist at both the moments, the moment of cognition and that of recognition. Hence they cannot be momentary. Even in the case of unstable things like a stream of water or a flame which are known to be successions of momentary things and which are usually quoted by the Buddhists as examples of momentariness, at least the perceiver must be stable to vouch for the existence of that series of fleeting things.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this sūtra, that the things in the world are not momentary but stable.

८ असदधिकरणम्।

The coming *sūtra* and the next three are treated by Madhvācārya as one *Adhikaraṇa*, discussing the tenets of *Mādhyamika* School among the Buddhists. The school believes

in no reality whatsoever and is therefore described as *Śūnyavāda*[1]. The *Vedāntins* hold that according to the *Mādyamika* School, the '*Śūnya*' (void) is the only truth[2]. Trivikram Pandita summarizes the tenets of this school as follows. The *Mādhyamika* hold that this *śūnya*, which is described as eternal, devoid of all attributes, one without a second, self-luminous, free from limitations and beyond thought and speech, is the cause of this world i.e. appears as this world. Since it is covered due to delusion, this world of pluralities experienced, has only a provisional reality (*saṁvṛti-satya*), but it does not really exist. The worldly experience is a mistake (*vikalpa*). It exists for the purpose of worldly transactions only and lasts as long as our vision is deluded. When the nature of this *Śūnya* is realized, this empirical world vanishes completely like a dream only[3]. This is considered as the state of emancipation, which can be achieved by adhering to the prescribed eight-fold path of self-discipline.

The following four *sūtras* are going to refute these views.

|| ॐ नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ॐ || (2-2-26)

असतः शून्यस्य जगत्कारणत्वं न युक्तम् अदृष्टत्वात् असत्कारणत्वस्य लोके अदृष्टत्वात्।[4]

It is not proper to accept blank or void as the cause of the world, because causation from a non-existent thing is nowhere seen in the world.

Since no such thing is observed anywhere, no evidence can be furnished either of perception or of inference.

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1 OIP. p. 220.

2 OIP. p. 221.

3 नित्यं निर्विशेषम् अद्वितीयं स्वयम्प्रकाशम् अपास्तगुणदोषं वाङ्मनसागोचरं शून्यं जगत्कारणं माध्यमिका मन्यन्ते। तत्संवृत्याः प्रत्ययमात्रविनिवेशिन्या विलासरूपोऽयं भेदप्रपञ्चो न तत्त्वतो विद्यते। तद्दृष्टिरपि विकल्परूपा यावत्संवृति संव्यवहारमात्रनिर्वहणी निवर्तते। स्वप्नवदेव शून्यात्मप्रतिबोधे समूलं समुपशाम्यति इत्येतन्मतम्। (TPD. 2-2-26).

4 VKM. 2-2-26.

Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra* is also on the same line as follows. 'Entity does not arise from non-existence since it is not observed'[1]. He quotes an example[2]. If things can arise from non-existence, then sprouts etc. may spring from rabbit's horns etc. But somehow he relates this *sūtra* and the next, to the discussion of the tenets of *Vaibhāṣika* and *Sautrāntika* schools in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. But they are realists. Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtras* on similar lines and connects them to the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. The discussions appear rather far-fetched.

In order to confirm the assertion in this *sutra*, the *Sūtrakāra* offers another proof based on the well-known method called *reductio ad absurdum*, in the next *sūtra*:

॥ ॐ उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ॐ ॥ (2-2-27)

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[3]. If existence should spring from non-existence, even lazy and inactive people would reap benefits without putting forth effort. This is not proper. True; idle people getting the benefits without putting in any effort, is undesirable, improper and rare. But it can not be said to be impossible or absurd[4]. Thus, the interpretation does not appear befitting.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on the same lines.

Udāsīna means[5] 'indifferent' 'unconcerned' 'passive' and 'taking no part in the creation of material universe'. The last meaning refers to imaginary things like rabbit's horn, sky-flower etc. Madhvācārya takes this sense of the word and interprets the *sūtra* differently as follows.

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1 SRK. p. 382.

2 अभावस्य कारणत्वाभ्युपगमे शशविषाणादिभ्योऽपि अङ्कुरादयो जायेरन्। (S. BSB. 2-2-26).

3 यदि च अभावात् भावोत्पत्तिः अभ्युपगम्येत एवं सति उदासीनानाम् अनीहमानानाम् अपि जनानामभिमतसिद्धिः स्यात्। न च एतद् युज्यते। (S. BSB 2-2-27).

4 BNK II. p. 70.

5 SED. p. 105.

एवम् असतः कारणत्वे सति उदासीनानां हेयोपादेयधीविषयत्वादुदासीनानां खपुष्पादीनामपि सकाशात् सौरभ्यादिकार्यसिद्धिः स्यात्।

In this way i.e. if void or non-being were to be accepted as causally efficient, then one may expect even the fictitious things taking no part in the creation of the material universe, which are not objects worthy of pursuit or avoidance, to fructify, and fragrance etc. may come from sky-flower etc.

Thus, acceptance of the causality of non-existent things yields impossible and absurd results and hence it fails to be true.

The world may not be a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of void (*śūnya*). Even then the *Mādhyamikas* can argue that the world can be a *Vivarta* - an illusory appearance - of void, just like the appearance of silver in a shell. The next *sutra* refutes such an argument.

॥ ॐ नाभावो उपलब्धेः ॐ ॥ **(2-2-28)**

जगत् न अभावः, शून्यव्यतिरेकेण तत्त्वं नास्ति इति न, उपलब्धेः सदिति उपलभ्यमानत्वात्।

The world is not non-existence or nullity i.e. it is not that except void (*śūnya*) nothing is true, because the world is perceivable as existing.

Our perception of the world as real cannot be brushed aside as illusion like the perception of silver in a shell, because, the erroneous perception of silver in a shell is later sublated after seeing the shell, but no such sublation happens in case of our perception of the world. If we are to believe that the world is an illusion while seeing it in reality, then it should be reasonable to conclude that it is a rope while seeing a snake, without even verifying it. In could be a real snake as well.

As already said, Śaṅkarācārya has included the preceding two *sūtras* in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, discussing the tenets of

Vaibhāṣika and *Sautrāntika* schools. He prefers to include the present *sutra* and the next, in the coming *Adhikaraṇa*, which is going to discuss the tenets of *Yogācāra* School or *Vijñānavadins*. Possibly he holds that the *Sūtrakāra* makes no reference to the *Mādhyamika* school, though an important section among *Buddhists*, as seen from his following remark[1]. "And now, *Śūnyavāda* is contradicted by the entire available evidence and therefore no attention is given (by the *Sūtrakāra*) to refute that view." But the same thing is true about other schools of Buddhism as well. It seems that Śaṅkarācārya has diplomatically abstained from criticizing the *Mādhyamika* School advocated by the popular Buddhistic thinkers like Nāgārjuna. It is interesting to note that in the summary of *Mādhyamika* tenets mentioned at the beginning of this *Adhikaraṇa*, if the words *śūnya*, *saṁvṛttisatya* and *vikalpa* are substituted by the words *Brahman*, *Vyāvahārika-satya* and *Avidyā* (or *Māyā*) respectively, it sounds almost like the doctrine of *Vivartavāda*. According to V. S. Ghate, Vallabhācārya observes that both the doctrines are equally unreasonable.[2]

Śaṅkarācārya presents a lengthy discussion first and shows the views of *Vijñānvādins* that 'the world of external things is not real'[3] and that 'ideas are the only reality'. The present *sūtra* is said to refute this position and it is interpreted by him as follows. 'The non-existence (of external objects) can not be maintained on account of perception'[4]. This interpretation is not at variance with that of Madhvācārya, but it 'repudiates the interpretation of the *māyā* doctrine (put forth by Śaṅkarācārya only) which holds that all objects are illusory or non-existent'[5].

Rāmānujācārya interprets the *sūtra* in the same way.

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1 शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणाय नादरः क्रियते । (S.BSB-VA. 2-2-31).
2 VSG. p. 78.
3 SRK. p. 384.
4 SRK. p. 383.
5 SRK. p. 385.

Now, a doubt may arise that a dream also appears real while dreaming, but the objects covered by the dream experience are not real; similarly though our perception reveals the world to be real, it could be unreal. The next *sūtra* answers this doubt.

॥ ॐ वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-29)**

न च स्वप्नादिवत् जगदभावः असत् वैधर्म्यात् स्वप्न एव अयं न जाग्रत् इति बाधविषयत्ववैलक्षण्यात्।

And the world is not non-existence or nullity like the dream-objects, because the dream is of a different nature (when compared with waking state experience) as the dream-objects get sublated when the dreamer wakes up and knows that it is a dream only and not a waking state experience.

By and large, all the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. The *Sūtrakāra* points out here that the dream experience and the waking state experience are not comparable but of a different nature, though both are experiences. To drive home this point Śaṅkarācārya offers a befitting example[1]. He says that though fire and water have the common property of being primary element (*sādharmya*), fire perceived as hot, cannot be expected to be cool on the analogy of water. Thus, the existence of the empirical world can not be denied on the analogy of dream experience or the illusion of snake on a piece of rope etc. The *Mādhyamika* cannot argue that as the dream experience gets sublated after waking up, our perceptions of the reality of the world can be invalidated in course of time, when the nature of *Śūnya* i.e *Śūnyatā* is realized. For, the same argument can rebound on him like a boomrang. The *Vedāntin* can say that even the realization of *Śūnyatā* may one day get sublated by a knowledge that it is just a perversion of logic and a philosophical confusion[2].

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1 न हि अग्निः उष्णोऽनुभूयमानः उदकसाधर्म्यात् शीतो भविष्यति। (S. BSB 2-2-29).

2 BNK. II. p. 74, 75.

9 अनुपलब्ध्यधिकरणम् ।

In this *Adhikaraṇa* the validity of the tenets of *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism, is discussed.

Modern philosophers use the term 'knowledge' to denote only true cognition. But as per the *Yogācāra* school, any cognition-true or false- is the truth. Hence, 'knowledge' and such other terms are replaced here below by 'cognition' and such other terms.

"According to the *Yogācāra*, cognition (*vijñāna*) is the sole truth and its whole content is false. Among the factors 'cognizer' 'cognized' and ' cognition ', the last one is here taken to be true. There is neither subject nor object but only a succession of ideas. The specific form, which cognition at any particular instant assumes is determined in this view, not by an outside object presented to it, but by past experience. That is, the stimulus always comes from within, never from without. It is in no way dependent upon objects existing outside, but is to be traced to an impression (*vāsanā*) left behind by past experience, which in its turn goes back to another impression, that to another experience and so on indefinitely in a beginningless series. At no particular stage in the series, it must be noted, is the experience due to an external factor. In other words, the ideas signify nothing but themselves. Since the *Yogācāra* believes in the reality of nothing but these ideas (*vijñāna*), he is also designated as *vijñānavādin*"[1].

It is seen in the previous *Samudāyādhikaraṇa* that *vijñāna* means bare sensation or consciousness (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) i.e. the 'cognizer'. *Rūpaskandha* stands for the world of objects and *Vedanā* for the feelings, both constituting the 'cognizable'. *Saṁjñā* represents the conceptual 'cognition' i.e. idea or thought (*savikalpakajñāna*). But here, *Vijñāna* itself is taken as 'cognition'

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1 OIP. p. 205.

i.e. idea or thought, because *Vijñānavādins* hold that among the triad, cognizer, cognizable and cognition, cognition alone is true.

The next two *sūtras* refute these postulates.

॥ ॐ न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ॐ ॥ **(2-2-30)**

Śaṅkarācārya takes the word *bhāva* in the sense of existence and interprets the *sūtra* as follows : *Vijñāna-vāda* attempts to account for the variety of ideas by the variety of mental impressions (*vāsanās*) without any reference to external objects. The *sūtra* is said to refute this contention arguing that "the existence of impressions is not possible on account of non-perception". Without the perception of external objects the existence of mental impressions is impossible[1].

Rāmānujācārya also takes the term *bhāva* as existence and interprets the *sūtra* as under : The existence of mere cognition devoid of objects is not possible, because it is not experienced anywhere[2].

Both these arguments are correct. But there is no word in the *sutra* to indicate the sense of *Vāsanā*. Further if *bhāva* is taken to mean 'existence', then there is no extra word to indicate the sense of cognition. When the subject in the syllogism is itself imported (*adhyāhṛta*), the interpretations appear far-fetched.

The term *bhāva* also means[3] idea, thought etc. i.e. cognition. Madhvācārya takes this sense of the word and interprets the *sūtra*.

न भावो जगत्, ज्ञानमेव जगदाकारेण परिणमते इति न, अनुपलब्धेः अननुभवात् प्रमाणाभावात्।

Cognition alone cannot project itself in the form of the world, because there is no experience to that effect, i.e. there is no evidence.

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1 SRK. p. 386.

2 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-2-29.

3 SED. p. 403.

Here also, the predicate of the syllogism, *'jagat'* is imported. But in the case of refutation of the views of *Vijñānavāda* about ontology, the subject and the probans suggest the missing predicate. We have already seen earlier a similar importation of the predicate *'jagatkāraṇatvaṁ'* while interpreting the *sūtra 'nāsatodṛṣṭatvāt'* (BS. 2-2-26). Instead of using the word *jñānaṁ*, the *Sūtrakāra* has used the word *bhāva*, to suggest[1] that cognition having a positive existence (*bhavati iti bhāvaḥ i.e. sat*) is free from the fault of a non-being (*asat*) claiming to be cause of the world. It hints at the assumption that *Vijñānavāda* is an improvement on *Śūnyavāda*, where the cause as such is pure non-being (*asat*)[2]. The purport of the *sūtra* is that cognition itself cannot be taken as the world of objects because the difference between cognition and the cognizable is an observed conclusion. This observation 'cannot be treated as a misapprehension, as there is no sublating cognition to the contrary'[3]. Nor can it be proved to be untrue by any valid logical arguments.

The next *sūtra* provides another reason to show why knowledge cannot be the cause of the world.

॥ ॐ क्षणिकत्वाच्च ॐ ॥　　　(2-2-31)

न भावो जगत् भावस्य क्षणिकत्वात् च आशुतरविनाशित्वात् च ।

Cognition cannot be taken as the world of objects because thoughts are fleeting i.e. they perish within a vary short time. But the world of objects is stable and real as proved earlier (BS. 2-2-25,28).

The purport of the *sūtra* is that the objects of cognition are enduring, but their awareness or thoughts are short-lived and therefore the two cannot be the same[4].

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1 ज्ञानमिति वाच्ये भाव इत्युक्तिः 'न असतः' इत्युक्तदोषो न इति दर्शयितुम्। (TDK. 2-2-30).

2 BNK II. p. 76.

3 BNK II. p. 77.

4 ज्ञानज्ञेययोर्भेदस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्वात् इति भावः। (TDK. 2-2-30).

According to Śaṅkarācārya this *sūtra* refutes the position of the *Vijñānavādin* that ego-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) can be the abode of *Vāsanās*, as the former is itself momentary. This position is applicable to other schools of Buddhism like *Vaibhāṣika* and *Sautrāntika* and not exclusively to *Vijnanavada*[1]. The interpretation appears far-fetched, like the preceding one, since there is no term in the *sūtra* to suggest a discussion of *ālayavijñāna*. Rāmānujācārya does not mention this *sūtra*.

The next *sūtra* concludes the discussion of the tenets of different schools of Buddhism, and refutes all of them in one stroke.

॥ ॐ सर्वथाऽनुपपत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ **(2-2-32)**

सर्वथा प्रत्यर्थं क्षणिकत्वकल्पने शून्याद्वैतकल्पने विज्ञानाद्वैतकल्पने वा न एते वेदद्वेषपक्षाः ग्राह्याः अनुपपत्तेः प्रमाणाभावात् तद्विरुद्धत्वात् च ।

In every alternative view, whether it is momentariness of worldly objects or non-difference between void and the world or non-difference between cognition and the world, these factions hostile to Vedas are not acceptable because they have no evidence and they are incompatible with available evidence.

Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation is also on the same lines as follows. The different doctrines of the reality of external objects, or of ideas and general nothingness contradict one another. The Buddhist doctrine cannot be accepted[2].

Rāmānujācārya takes this *sutra* as refuting nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) and interprets it as under. "And as nihilism is illogical in every way, it can not be accepted"[3]. The *Sūtrakāra's* general remark in this *sūtra*, applies to all shades of Buddhism and not to nihilism alone.

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1 BNK II. p. 81.

2 SRK. p. 387.

3 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-2-30.

10 नैकस्मिन्नधिकरणम् ।

In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* discusses the validity of the tenets of another great religion of Indian origin, known as Jainism. It is older than Buddhism and has a good following in Western and Southern parts of India. Like Buddhism, Jainism does not believe in a Supreme Being and does not accept the authority of Vedas. But it accepts the existence of an infinite number of *Jīvas*, the conscious beings like the *Jīvātman* or *Puruṣa* of Vedic schools, and *Ajīva*, the inanimate things, which include matter as well as time and space. Thus, Jainism is a theological mean between Vedic schools and Buddhism[1].

The Jains hold that an infinite number of *Jīvas* exist, which are all alike and eternal. They are all believed to be intrinsically having all knowledge, power, peace and perfection. The empirical difference between the *Jīvas* is held to be due to obscuration of these glorious innate characteristics by their *karmas*. The *Jīvas* are held to be capable of expanding and contracting and thus becoming exactly equal to the size of the body they occupy in the world. *Jīvas* are considered as the experients (*bhoktā*) and the agents (*kartā*)[2].

The inanimate category (*ajīva*) comprises time, space and matter (*pudgala*). According to Jainism, the world is full of an infinite number of atoms, all of the same kind, and they give rise to the elements, earth, water, fire and air and an infinite variety of things[3]. Jains hold that matter (*pudgala*) is indefinite and indeterminate and therefore with respect to matter absolute affirmation and absolute negation are both erroneous[4]. They also believe that reality is so complex in its structure that its precise

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1 OIP. p. 155,156.

2 OIP. p. 157, 158.

3 OIP. p. 162.

4 OIP. p. 163,164.

nature baffles all attempts to describe it directly and once for all. Therefore they make it known through a series of partially true statements without committing themselves to any one among them exclusively. Accordingly, the Jains enunciate the nature of reality in seven steps, known as *saptabhaṅgī* i.e. the sevenfold formula. The seven steps are :

1. May be, is (*syāt asti*).

2. May be, is not (*syāt nāsti*).

3. May be, is and is not (*syāt asti nāsti*).

4. May be, is inexpressible (*syāt avaktavyaḥ*).

5. May be, is and is inexpressible (*syāt asti ca avaktavyaḥ ca*).

6. May be, is not and is inexpressible (*syāt nāsti ca avaktavyaḥ ca*).

7. May be, is, is not and is inexpressible (*syāt asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyaḥ ca*).

This is known as the *syādvāda* i.e. 'the doctrine of *may be*' of Jainism.

The next four sūtras refute these postulates.

॥ ॐ नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् ॐ ॥ (2-2-33)

सत्त्वम् , असत्त्वं, सदसत्त्वं, सदसद्विलक्षणत्वं, सत्त्वे सति सद्विलक्षणत्त्वम्, असत्त्वे सति असद्विलक्षणत्वं, सदसदात्मकत्वे सति सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम् इति अनियतसप्तप्रकारा एकस्मिन् वस्तुनि न युक्ताः असम्भवात् अप्रामाणिकत्वेन असम्भावितत्वात् ।

It is not proper to expect seven kinds of indefinite (and contradictory) attributes like may be it is, may be it is not, may be it is and is not, may be it is inexpressible, may be it is and is inexpressible, may be it is not and is inexpressible, may be it is and is not and is inexpressible in one and the same thing because it is impossible as there is no evidence to that effect.

All the commentators concur with this purport of the *sūtra*.

But S. Radhakrishnan remarks : "The *Jaina* doctrine of *anekānta-vāda* describes the complexity of objects. The different qualities possessed by an object are not contradictory to one another"[1].

The next sūtra considers the Jaina theory that the Jīva pervades the entire body it occupies.

॥ ॐ एवं चात्माऽकात्स्न्र्यम् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-34)**

एवं च जीवस्य शरीरपरिमितत्वाङ्गीकारे अण्वादिशरीरस्थस्य हस्त्यादिशरीरे अकात्स्न्र्यं स्यात्।[2]

If the (*Jaina*) theory that a *Jīva* is of the same size as that of the body it occupies is accepted, then a *Jīva* in a minute creature (like an ant) cannot occupy the whole body of a large animal like an elephant (when that *Jīva* passes into that large body in the course of its transmigration).

Conversely, when the *Jīva* occupying a large body has to pass on to a small creature, then its size would be far in excess of the body size of that small creature[3].

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*.

The Jains may defend their theory by arguing that the *Jīva* is capable of expanding or contracting to suit the body it has to occupy. The next *sūtra* refutes such a contention.

॥ ॐ न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॐ ॥

(2-2-35)

पर्यायात् क्रमात् तत्तद्देहपरिमाणत्वाङ्गीकारात् अपि न च अविरोधः। कुतः? विकारादिभ्यः विकारित्वापत्तेः ततश्च अनित्यत्वानिर्मोक्षत्वशास्त्रवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गेभ्यः।

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1 SRK. p. 388.

2 M BSB. 2.2.34.

3 BNK. p. 85.

Even if it be accepted that a *Jīva* assumes the dimension of the respective body, which it enters (in each birth), that too is not compatible; whence? because in that case *Jīva* becomes subject to modifications and because of its further concomitant adverse consequences like impermanence and inability to attain liberation on the part of *Jīva* and the futility of philosophy.

There is unanimity among the commentators on the interpretation of this *sūtra*.

This discussion about the dimension of *Jīva* as postulated by Jainism continues further in the next *sūtra* from a different angle. If a *Jīva* assumes the dimension of the respective body, which it enters during its earthly pilgrimage, then what is its dimension in the state of liberation? One cannot argue that a *Jīva* has no dimension at all in the liberated state, because there cannot be a substance or entity without any dimension[1]. And in Jainism, *Jīva* is described as a spiritual substance[2]. Then, since a *Jīva* cannot have a dimension without a body according to the Jaina theory, the existence of a body for a *Jīva* even in its liberated state, has to be accepted[3]. Then a question arises whether this body is eternal or perishable. It cannot be taken as perishable because in that case the liberated state would be similar to the mundane state[4].

The next *sūtra* points out the fallacy even in accepting this body as eternal.

॥ ॐ अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषात् ॐ ॥

(2-2-36)

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1 न हि परिमाणशून्यं द्रव्यमस्ति। (TP. 2.2.36).

2 OIP. p. 172.

3 देहाभावे स्वतो जीवे जैनैः परिमाणानङ्गीकारेण तदर्थं देहस्यापि आवश्यकत्वात्। (GDK. 2-2-36) मोक्षेपि शरीरमुररीकरणीयं प्रसज्येत। (TP. 2-2-36).

4 तच्छरीरमनित्यं नित्यं वा। नाद्यः संसारसमानधर्मतापातात्। (TP. 2-2-36)

अन्त्यस्य मुक्तिगतात्मपरिमाणस्य अवस्थितेः तदवच्छेदकतया नित्यदेहावश्यम्भावेन उभयस्य नित्यत्वात् मुक्तौ आत्मतद्देहयोः नित्यत्वात् अद्यतनदेहानामपि नित्यत्वं स्यात् अविशेषात् देहत्वाविशेषात्।

Since a liberated *Jīvātman* has a dimension and since that *Jīvātman* has to have a permanent body in order to have a dimension, on account of the permanency of both the liberated *Jīvātman* and his body, there would be the adverse consequence of the present (worldly) bodies also getting permanency because there is no characteristic difference between the mundane body and the body in the liberated state, both being bodies only.

If the worldly bodies become eternal one may never attain liberation, because liberation is impossible without the destruction of physical embodiment, which has been the source of misery[1].

Thus, we reach a stalemate that the body of a *Jīva* in the liberated state, can be taken neither as perishable nor as eternal. Since one arrives at such absurd conclusion, the Jaina postulate that the *Jīva* is of the size of the body it occupies has to be taken as untenable.

Other commentators also arrive at the same conclusion that the Jaina postulate about the size of *Jīva* is not tenable, but with some variations in their interpretations.

11 पत्युरधिकरणम्।

In this *Adhikaraṇa* the *Sūtrakāra* refutes the tenets of *pāśupata* i.e. *Śaiva* school of Indian thought. The followers of this tradition believe that *Paśupati* i.e. *Śiva* (*Rudra*) is the author of the world. They claim that their traditional writings (*āgamas*) are in accordance with the Vedic views only. The language and style

1 एवं च दुःखहेतुसांसारिकदेहध्वंसासम्भवेन मोक्ष एव न स्यात्। (GDK. 2-2-36). (BNK. II. p.85).

of their doctrine gives a semblance of a Vedic school. But, the Sūtrakāra holds that their tenets are not exactly in conformity with the Vedic views and hence refutes them. In this tradition *Paśu*[1] means a *Jīva* and *Paśupati* connotes the lord of all *Jīvas* i.e. the Supreme Being. This designation of *Paśupati* is ascribed to the third god of Hindu Trinity who is known by various names like *Śiva* (auspicious), *Rudra* (terrific), *Mahādeva* (the great deity), *Maheśvara* (the great lord) etc.

There are four shades of this tradition. One sect of *Nakulīśapāśupatas* holds[2] that the cause of creation and destruction of the entire world is *Paśupati*. Another sect of *Śaivas* believes[3] that *Paśupati* becomes the cause of the world in conformity with the *karma* (merits and demerits of *Jīvas*), and the existence of *Paśupati* is known by inference[4]. His body is said to be made up of five powers represented by five particular Vedic hymns. According to *Śaivas*, the existence of a Supreme Being (*Paśupati*) who has full knowledge of the enjoyment or suffering in conformity with the respective *karmas* (of *Jīvas*), the means of accomplishing them, and the material etc. required for them, has been established by inference[5]. Thus, the *Śaivas* hold that *Paśupati* is only an efficient cause like a potter.

On the other hand, another sect of *Pāśupatas* known as *Pratyabhijña Sampradāya*, believes that *Maheśvara* (*Paśupati*) is both the efficient cause and the material cause of the world. They argue as follows[6]. Since the insentient things or sentient beings

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1 अनणुः क्षेत्रज्ञादिपदवेदनीयो जीवात्मा पशुः। (SDS. p. 203) A *Jīva* who is not of an atomic dimension and who is known by the terms like soul, is understood as '*paśu*'

2 समस्तसृष्टिसंहारानुग्रहकारि कारणम्। (SDS. p. 188).

3 कर्मादिसापेक्षः परमेश्वरः कारणम् अनुमानवशात् परमेश्वरसिद्धिः। (SDS. p. 195,197).

4 अनुमानवशात्परमेश्वरप्रसिद्धिरुपपद्यते। (SDS. p. 197).

5 तत्तत्कर्माशयवशाद् भोगतत्साधनतदुपादानादिविशेषज्ञः कर्तानुमानादिसिद्ध इति सिद्धम्। (SDS. p.198).

6 यतो जडस्य न कारणता न वा अनीश्वरस्य चेतनस्यापि तस्मात् तेन तेन जगद्[illegible] स्थित्यादिभावविकारतत्तद्भेदक्रियासहस्ररूपेण स्थातुमिच्छोः स्वतन्त्रस्य भगवतो महेश्वरस्य [illegible] उत्तरोत्तरमुच्छूनस्वभावा क्रिया विश्वकर्तृत्वं वा उच्यते। (SDS. p. 222).

who are not the Lord (i.e. *Jīvas*) can not be the cause of the world, the will of that *Bhagavān Maheśvara*, who desires to remain in the form of thousands of different activities effecting (six)[1] modifications viz. creation, existence etc. of various things in the world, appears as the ever increasing activity and that is known as creation. This sect also believes in the identity between *Jīvas* and *Maheśvara*. According to one of their *āgamas*[2], this all-knower (*Maheśvara*) having been blinded by illusion (*māyā*) and getting entangled in the bonds of *karma*, becomes an individual soul (*Jīva*). When such a soul is reminded of his (original) Lordship through learning, the permanent spirit is said to be liberated.

The fourth sect known as *Raseśvara sampradāya* also believes in the identity of *Jīva* and *Maheśvara*. Yet it holds that one can achieve the well-known liberation while living (*Jīvanmukti*) if his body gets stabilized. And it is promised that the way to get the stabilization of the body is to obtain the essence i.e. a constituent fluid of the body (*rasa*) known by the term *Pārada* (the one that takes beyond the life)[3].

Thus, some sects of *Pāśupatas* hold that *Maheśvara* is only the efficient cause of the world. But some other sects consider Him as both the efficient and the material cause and also believe in the identity between *Jīva* and *Maheśvara*. However, all the sects unanimously believe in *Paśupati*'s authorship of the world.

॥ ॐ पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात् ॐ ॥ (2-2-37)

According to Śaṅkarācārya 'the view that God is merely the efficient and not the material cause of the world is here considered'[4].

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1 The six modifications are: जायते। अस्ति। वर्धते। विपरिणमते। अपक्षीयते। विनश्यति।

2 एष प्रमाता मायान्धः संसारी कर्मबन्धनः। विद्यादिज्ञापितैश्वर्यश्चिद्घनो मुक्त उच्यते॥ (SDS. p. 225).

3 अपरे माहेश्वराः परमेश्वरतादात्म्यवादिनोऽपि पिण्डस्थैर्ये सर्वाभिमता जीवन्मुक्तिः सेत्स्यतीत्यास्थाय पिण्ड- स्थैर्योपायं पारदादिपदवेदनीयं रसमेव सङ्गिरन्ते। रसस्य पारदत्वं संसारपरपारप्रापणहेतुत्वेन। (SDS.p. 229).

4 इदानीं केवलाधिष्ठात्रीश्वरकारणवादः प्रतिषिध्यते। (S.BSB. 2-2-37), (SRK. p. 390).

He observes[1] that 'the *Māheśvaras* hold that *Paśupati, Śiva*, is the efficient cause. There are other systems which hold that God is only the efficient cause of the world'. Then he discusses the demerits of such a view of the Pāśupata as well as that of the *Śāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*.

The interpretation appears farfetched and wide off the mark. The observation that *Māheśvaras* in general hold *Paśupati* as only the efficient cause of the world is not acceptable since only a section of them do so. There is no term in the *sūtra* to indicate that the *Sūtrakāra* is referring to the philosophical differences between various sects of *Pāśupatas*. The question whether an entity is the efficient or material cause or both of the world, arises only after its causality is established. Further, as interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya, the *Sūtrakāra* has already established that *Brahman* is both the efficient and the material cause of the world, in *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (BS. 1-4-23) and *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-1-15). Therefore, the same topic is not expected here again. Moreover, the views of the *Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* are already discussed earlier in detail and they are not expected to be referred to again.

Rāmānujācārya restricts the discussion to the views of *Pāśupatas* only. According to him[2], the *Pāśupatas'* view about *Paśupati* should not be respected on account of absurdity. Their concepts of philosophy, worship and other practices are inconsistent with the Vedas. The Vedas indeed speak of the Supreme Being Nārāyaṇa alone as the efficient and material cause of the world

Madhvācārya simply quotes a number of mantras from *Ṛgveda* and *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad* which clearly tell that Rudra or *Īśāna*

1 माहेश्वरास्तु ------- पशुपतिरीश्वरो निमित्तकारणमिति वर्णयन्ति। तथा वैशेषिकादयोऽपि केचित् ---- निमित्तकारणमीश्वर इति वर्णयन्ति। (S.BSB. 2-2-37), (SRK. p. 390).

2 पत्युः पशुपतेः मतं नादरणीयम्। कुतः असामञ्जस्यात्। --- वेदविरुद्धं चेदं तत्त्वपरिकल्पनम् उपासनम् आचारश्च। वेदाः खलु परं ब्रह्म नारायणमेव जगन्निमित्तम् उपादानं च वदन्ति। Śrībhāṣya 2-2-35.

is not the creator of the world and *Nārāyaṇa* alone is the creator, and then states[1] that *Paśupati's* authorship of the world is not tenable on account of his dependent status.

The *sūtra* contains only two terms, *'patyuḥ'* and *'asāmañjasyāt'*. The latter in the ablative case is the probans. The word *'patyuḥ'* is to be repeated in the remaining four *sūtras* of this *Adhikaraṇa*. It shows that this *Adhikaraṇa* is telling something about *Pati* i.e. *Paśupati*. Since we have seen till this *Adhikaraṇa* that the *Sūtrakāra* is refuting in this *Pāda* the ontology of various other philosophical systems in India, one can easily guess the missing predicate of this opening *sūtra* of the *Adhikaraṇa* as refutation of the causality of the world, i.e. *na jagatkāraṇatvaṁ*. Therefore the exposition of the *sūtra* would be as follows.

पत्युः पशुपतेः न जगत्कारणत्वं युक्तं पत्युः असामञ्जस्यात् पारतन्त्र्यजनिमृत्यादि दोषित्वात् ।

***Paśupati*'s causality of the world is not tenable on account of his impropriety due to defects like dependence, birth and death etc.**

The defects shown above are taken as established on the strength of scriptures (*Śruti*)[2]. The term *patyuḥ* is repeated (*āvṛtti*)[3].

The next *sūtra* gives another reason for not ascribing the causality of the world to *Paśupati*.

॥ ॐ सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ **(2-2-38)**

पत्युः न जगत्कारणत्वं पत्युः अशरीरत्वात् जगता कार्यकर्तृभावरूप-सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेश्च ।

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1 ----- इत्यादि श्रुतेः पारतन्त्र्येण असमञ्जसत्वात् न पशुपतिरीश्वरो जगत्कर्ता । (M. BSB. 2-2-37).

2 तच्च श्रुत्यादिसिद्धमिति भावः । (TDK. 2-2-37).

3 पत्युरित्युभयत्रान्वेति । (TDK. 2-2-37).

And *Paśupati* cannot be the author of the world because he cannot have a creator-creation relation with the world on account of having no body.

On this *sūtra*, Śaṅkarācārya discusses the relation between *Pradhāna*, *Puruṣa* and *Īśvara*. Rāmānujācārya does not read this *sūtra*.

The next *sūtra* offers a further reason for not attributing the authorship of the world to *Paśupati*.

॥ ॐ अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ॐ ॥ (2-2-39)

पत्युः न जगत्कारणत्वं भूतानां प्रलीनत्वेन सृष्ट्यादिकाले भूताभावात् पृथिव्याद्यधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ।

And *Paśupati* cannot be attributed with the authorship of the world on account of non-availability of a support or substratum to him, of any element like the Earth etc. as they are extinct before creation.

The interpretation of Śaṅkarācārya is more or less on these lines only as follows: "And on account of the impossibility of a support (or substratum) (the Lord cannot be the maker)"[1].

Rāmānujācārya takes the term *adhiṣṭhāna* in the sense of an authority or controlling power and then argues how this power cannot be ascribed to *Paśupati* on account of his being without a body etc.[2].

The next *sūtra* refutes a probable counter-argument by the *Pāśupatas* against the position taken in the two *sūtras* above.

॥ ॐ करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः ॐ ॥ (2-2-40)

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1 SRK. p. 391.

2 Śrībhāṣya - RDK. 2-2-36.

करणवत् देहवत् अस्मदादिशरीरवत् इदं कारकजातं साक्षात् प्रयत्नादिधिष्ठेयतया पत्युः शरीररूपमधिष्ठानरूपं चेति न सम्बन्धानुपपत्त्यादीति चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः सुखदुःखानुभवरूपभोगोत्पत्तिमरणाख्यदोषेभ्यः ।

If it be said that[1], just as our body is the medium of our effort, this entire causal complement of the world, being the medium for *Paśupati*'s creative effort, is in fact in the position of a body and support to Him, and therefore, it cannot be argued that *Paśupati* has no body and no support etc., it is not so, because if He has a body He would have the defects like subjection to the experience of pleasure and pain, birth and death etc.

The next *sūtra* argues that whether one assumes a body for *Paśupati* or not, in both the alternatives, there are defects, on account of which *Paśupati* cannot be attributed with the authorship of the world.

॥ ॐ अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा ॐ ॥ (2-2-41)

पत्युः देहवत्वे अन्तवत्वं परिच्छिन्नत्वम् अथवा अशरीरत्वे सर्वज्ञता न स्यात् अशरीरिणः ज्ञानस्यैव अभावात् ।[2]

In case *Paśupati* is assumed to be having a body, then He is subject to limitation, or on the other hand if He is assumed to be having no body He may not be all-knowing, because one without a body cannot have knowledge.

Thus, in either case, on account of such defects, *Paśupati* cannot be accepted as the author of the world.

However, this dilemma does not apply to Brahman, the Supreme Being. The *Sūtrakāra* has explained in *Śabdamūlatvādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-1-28to32) that the Supreme Being has an omniscient, all powerful, happiness personified,

1 करणमिति देह उच्यते। जीवस्य तत्तत्कार्यजनने तस्य सहकारित्वात्। (TDK. 2-2-40).

2 VKM. 2-2-41

extraordinary, trans-empirical and eternal form and He / It needs no physical body, organs or instruments for creation. *Pāśupatas* also can make similar claim for *Paśupati*. But, the difference is that the *Pāśupatas'* claims are based on āgamas, which are utterances of trustworthy and knowledgeable persons, which cannot be taken as absolutely free from imperfections. These points have been established in the *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa* and the *Na Vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-1-1 to 5). On the other hand, the position of *Brahman* is based on the authority of *Śrutis,* which are *apauruṣeyapramāṇa*[1].

12 उत्पत्त्यधिकरणम् ।

This *Adhikaraṇa* appears to be a controversial one. The *sūtras*, being extremely laconic, enable the commentators to take divergent views. The first *sūtra* is as follows :

उत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् । **(2-2-42)**

The *sūtra* literally means 'on account of the impossibility of origination'[2].

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* in the following way. "The Bhāgavata view (as expressed in the *Pañcarātra āgama*) admits that God is both the efficient and material cause. It holds that Vāsudeva is the highest reality and is of the nature of pure knowledge. He assumes four forms, *Vāsudeva*, *Saṅkarṣaṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*. These answer to the Highest Self, the individual soul, the mind and the self-sense (ego). *Vāsudeva* is the ultimate causal essence and the three others are the effects. Śaṅkarācārya does not object to the theory that *Vāsudeva* is the Highest Self, higher than the undeveloped, and the self of all, that he appears in manifold forms and that by devotion and meditation we reach the Highest Being. Only Śaṅkarācārya objects to the

1 BNK. II. p. 94.

2 SRK. p. 393.

doctrine of origination of *Saṅkarṣaṇa* from *Vāsudeva*. If such were the case, the individual soul would be non-permanent and there is no possibility of release''[1].

The second *sūtra* (2-2-43) is interpreted as objecting to the concept of *Pradyumna* i.e. mind, originating from *Saṅkarṣaṇa*, the *Jīva* and further *Aniruddha*, the ego, arising from *Pradyumna*. The third *sūtra*, (2-2-44) tells, according to Śaṅkarācārya, that even if it is taken that all the four are forms of *Vāsudeva* only, having the same knowledge and powers, still the objection holds. If all are equal, then there is no need to have more than one forms and it contradicts the *Bhāgavatas'* own doctrine that *Vāsudeva* is alone the Supreme Being. While interpreting the last *sūtra*, (2-2-45) Śaṅkarācārya concludes[2] that the doctrine of *Pañcarātra* is found inconsistent since it criticizes Vedas and has several contradictions.

Rāmānujācārya interprets the first two *sūtras* of this *Adhikaraṇa* in the same way as that followed by Śaṅkarācārya. But he treats them as *Pūrvapakṣa*, and interprets the remaining two *sūtras* as refuting the contention of the *Pūrvapakṣa*. According to him, the third *sūtra* tells that[3] ''there is no ground to declare that this system (advocated by *Pañcarātra*) is unauthoritative. *Saṅkarṣaṇa* and others are called *Jīva* etc. because they are the presiding deities over the *Jīvas*, the mind and the ego, and hence the nomenclatures are appropriate''. The last *sūtra* is interpreted to arrive at the following conclusion[4]. ''Śāṇḍilya's statement (in *Pañcarātra*, which is taken by Śaṅkarācārya as disparaging to Vedas) is not meant to say that the *Pañcarātra* system is opposed to the Vedas, but is meant to praise the system, which gives in a clear and succinct manner the teachings of Vedas, and which

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1 SRK. p. 393.

2 वेदविप्रतिषेधश्च भवति--- वेदनिन्दादर्शनात्। तस्मात् असङ्गता एषा कल्पना इति सिद्धम्। (S.BSB.2-2-45).

3 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-2-41.

4 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-2-42.

can be easily grasped by even the dull-witted. Moreover, Vyāsa in the *Mahābhārata* praises this system and says that it is consistent with the Vedas and beneficial to man. So the same Vyāsa could not have maintained in the *Brahmasūtras* the non-authoritativeness of this system''.

Thus, in this *Adhikaraṇa* Śaṅkarācārya objects to the doctrine of origination of *Jīva* from *Vāsudeva*, the Supreme Being, mentioned in *Pañcarātra*, and arrives at the conclusion that the *Bhāgavata* system propagated by *Pañcarātra āgama* contradicts Vedas. Rāmānujācārya takes a diametrically opposite view and concludes that the *Pañcarātra* system is supportive of Vedas.

The objection of Śaṅkarācārya to the concept of *Saṅkarṣaṇa*, a *Jīva*, originating from *Vāsudeva*, the Supreme Being, may be true. But, the point is whether such a minor discrepancy, if at all it is there, is chosen by the *Sūtrakāra* to refute here in this *Adhikaraṇa*. There is no word in the sūtra to that effect.

In this *Pāda*, the *Sūtrakāra* refutes the tenets of various religious schools of Indian origin, which are hostile to Vedānta But *Pañcarātra* is not considered as an *āgama* hostile to *Vedānta*. On the contrary, it is held as an *Āgama* supportive of *Vedānta* in *Śrutis*[1], *Purāṇas*[2] and *Mahābhārata*[3]. In fact it is taken as a part of *Śāstra*[4], which reveals *Brahman*. Even an *advaita* scholar from Maharashtra, Amalānanda refers to *Pañcarātra* in his

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1 ''उपास्य एकः परतः परो यो वेदैश्च सर्वैः सह चेतिहासैः सपञ्चरात्रैः सपुराणैश्च देवः सर्वगुणैर[illegible] तत्र प्रतीतैः ॥'' इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतिः ।''वेदैश्च पञ्चरात्रैश्च ध्येयो नारायणः परः। पञ्चरात्रं च वेद[illegible] विद्यैकैव विधीयत'' इति नारायणश्रुतिः।
''सर्वान् वेदान् सेतिहासान् सपुराणान् सयुक्तिकान्।
सपञ्चरात्रान् विज्ञाय विष्णुर्ज्ञेयो न चान्यथा ॥'' इति ब्रह्मतर्के। (TPD. 1-1-1).

2 वेदेन पञ्चरात्रेण भक्त्या यज्ञेन चैव हि। दृश्योऽहं नान्यथा दृश्यो वर्षकोटिशतैरपि ॥
(Varāha Purāṇa TC. III. p. 79).

3 पञ्चरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्ता नारायणः स्वयम्। ज्ञानेष्वेतेषु राजेन्द्र सर्वेष्वेतद्विशिष्यते ॥
पञ्चरात्रविदो मुख्या यथाक्रमपरा नृप। एकान्तभावोपगता वासुदेवं विशन्ति हि ॥
(Mbh. Mokṣadharmaparva BNK. II. p. 108).

4 ''ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वश्च भारतं पञ्चरात्रकम्। मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥'' इति स्कान्दे।
(M. BSB. 1-1-3).

Kalpataru, a gloss on *Bhāmatī*, and observes as follows. "They are the works of Nārāyaṇa himself. His omniscience is established by the Vedas themselves. He is not like Kapila or Patañjali- a mere individual self (but God Himself)"[1]. In his opinion, the *Pañcarātra* is a deliberate composition and *Śruti* is naturally breathed out, and therefore the creation of a *Jīva* stated there (in *Pañcarātra*) is assumed to be in a secondary or figurative sense (and not as a mistake)[2]. Such apparent mutually conflicting statements may exist and do exist in scriptures. The *Sūtrakāra* has reserved the next *Pāda* entirely for this topic of reconcilation of contradictory statements in scriptures. So a discussion on how *Saṅkaraṣaṇa* can originate from *Vāsudeva* etc. as stated in *Pañcarātra*, is not expected here. So, the interpretation of this *Adhikaraṇa* by Śaṅkarācarya and Rāmānujācārya appear to be farfetched and out of context.

Madhvācārya holds that after refuting the doctrine of *Pāśupata* school in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, it is natural to expect the refutation of the tenets of another religious school in India, namely the *Śākta* system, which is comparable with the *Pāśupata* system. His guess appears to be befitting to the context. Some later commentators like Nimbārkācārya accept this view[3].

"The *Śākta* recognize *Śakti*, conceived as a female principle, as the sole creator of the Universe. The school is also known as *Vāmamārga* after its worship of the female principle with Tantric rites. The *Śākta Āgamas* are more commonly known as *'Tantras'*. Three shades of *Śākta* thought have been referred to by Madhvācārya in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, the *Mahāvāma*, *Madhyavāma* and *Aṇuvāma*. Jayatīrtha informs us that these also go by the names of *Śākta*, *Śāmbhava* and *Āṇava* schools.

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1 BNK. II. p. 108.

2 बुद्धिपूर्वकृतिः पञ्चरात्रं निश्वसितं श्रुतिः। तेन जीवजनिस्तत्र सिद्धा गौणी नियम्यते॥
(TC. III. p. 82) (BNK. II. p. 109).

3 SRK. p. 394.

Śakti is all-in-all in the *Mahāvāma* school. She needs no partnership with *Śiva* to be the creator of the Universe. The other two schools make room for her alliance with *Śiva* to a greator or less extent in the act of creation. There is thus propriety in considering this school after the *Pāśupata*''[1].

The first *sūtra* is taken as refuting the doctrine of *Mahāvāma* cult among *Śāktas*.

॥ ॐ उत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-42)**

न शक्तिर्जगत्कारणम् उत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् पुरुषाननुगृहीतस्त्रीमात्रात् अपत्योत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् ।

***Śakti* (the female principle) cannot be the cause of the world, because without the obligation of the male principle, production of progeny is not possible for a female principle alone.**

The next *sūtra* refutes the position of *Madhyavāma* school, which admits *Sadāśiva* as an adjunct (*upasarjanaṁ*) to *Śakti* in such creation[2].

॥ ॐ न च कर्तुः करणम् ॐ ॥ **(2-2-43)**

कर्तुः अनुग्राहकस्य शिवस्य करणं ज्ञानादिसाधनं नास्ति ।

The obliging *Śiva* does not have the wherewithal like the (necessary) knowledge etc.

Since *Sadāśiva* is conceived to be without a body and sense organs, he could not have the required knowledge to help *Śakti* If Śakti is assumed to have the power to provide a body to *Śiva*, then she may as well create the whole world by herself without waiting for *Śiva*'s help[3].

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1 BNK. II. p. 104.
2 BNK. II. p. 105.
3 BNK. II. p. 105.

The next *sūtra* refutes the dogma of *Aṇuvāma* school which holds that *Śiva* endowed with the necessary body, sense organs, supreme knowledge and all powers only assists *Śakti* in the act of creation.

॥ ॐ विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ॐ ॥

(2-2-44)

कर्तुः अनुग्राहकस्य शिवस्य विज्ञानादिभावे अङ्गीकृते सति तस्य प्रकृतशैवमतस्य अप्रतिषेधः स्यात् अनुमतिः स्यात्।

In case it is accepted that the obliging *Śiva* has all the necessary requirements like knowledge etc., then it would be as though accepting the *Pāśupata* doctrine just discussed (in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*).

The *Sūtrakāra* contends here that if the *śākta* is ready to confer so much power on *Śiva*, he could as well join the *Pāśupata* school instead of claiming to be a follower of the *Śākta* cult.

Having refuted the three shades of *Śākta* doctrine individually, the *Sūtrakāra* concludes the discussion by rejecting the dogmas of all these schools, on account of the common defect of being in conflict with *Śrutis* and *Smṛtis*, in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ विप्रतिषेधाच्च ॐ ॥ **(2-2-45)**

सकलश्रुत्यादिविरुद्धत्वात् च असमञ्जसं शाक्तेयमतम्।[1]

The *Śākta* doctrine is improper also because it is against the teaching of *Śrutis* and *Smṛtis*.

☆ ☆ ☆

Chapter X
Adhyāya II, *Pāda* 3
(द्वितीयाध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः।)

Having refuted the tenets of various schools of Indian thought, which are hostile to the *Vedānta*, the *Sūtrakāra* now proceeds to remove the apparent internal conflicts and contradictions in Vedic statements themselves in respect of the Vedic view of ontology. Moreover, after seeing the *Sūtrakāra* rejecting the ontological concepts of hostile schools, the student would naturally be eager to know what exactly the *Sūtrakāra* holds about the Vedic concepts of origination of matter and souls in the world. Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa, the great master of Indian philosophy has achieved both these targets in one and the same attempt[1].

It is worth noting that there is a difference between a creation by a human being and that by the Supreme Being. For example, when a potter creates a pot, the pot is other than the potter. But when *Brahman* creates something, animate or inanimate, He remains in them as the controlling power[2]. Therefore, when the *Sūtrakāra* discusses about the origination of inanimate objects like Earth, water, fire, air and ether, he refers to the origination of both the element and its controlling deity (*abhimānidevatā*) through whom the Supreme Being regulates the functioning of that element. The same *sūtra*s cover the discussion about the genesis of the elements and their controlling deities as well[3].

As per the maxim of the needle and the frying-pan (*sūcīkatāhanyāya*)[4], the *Sūtrakāra* first takes up the comparatively easier topics about the genesis of the basic elements and defers the problems relating to *Jīva*s to the later *Adhikaraṇa*s.

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1 सर्ववेदान्तर्गतसृष्टिश्रुत्यर्थनिर्मलत्वाय परः प्रपञ्च आरभ्यते। (S. BSB. 2-3-1).

2 तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्। (Tait. Up. 2-6).

3 भूतविचारपरसूत्राण्येवाधिदैवविचारपराणीति भावः। (BVD. 2-3-1).

4 When there are two objects to be attended to, the wise practice is to take up the easier one first.

1 वियदधिकरणम् ।

Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya take the first seven *sūtras* of this *Pāda* as forming this *Adhikaraṇa*. However, Rāmānujācārya includes the next two *sūtras* also in this *Adhikaraṇa*. He reads *sūtras* 3 and 4 together as one *sūtra* and splits the sixth *sūtra* into two, treating the word *śabdebhyaḥ* as a separate *sūtra*.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the first *sūtra*,

न वियदश्रुतेः । **(2-3-1)**

contends, after importing the word *utpadyate* or adopting it (*anuvṛtti*) from the word *utpatti* in an earlier *sūtra* (BS. 2-2-42), that "*Ākāśa* is not created since there is no scriptural statement to that effect"[1]. This *sūtra* is treated as the *Pūrvapakṣa*. It is assumed to be based on a statement in *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, which says[2] that "That (Supreme) Being willed, 'May I become many, May I grow forth'; It created fire". Here, there is no mention of *Ākāśa* in the list of created elements. The next *sūtra*

अस्ति तु । **(2-3-2)**

is taken as answering the above objection. It says that[3] "there is a statement (in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which tells that '*Ākāśa* sprang from that *Brahman*')". Thus, an apparent conflict is envisaged between *Chāndogyopaniṣad* which states fire as the first created element and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, which mentions *Ākāśa* as the first created.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* continues to insist on his objection and argues in the next *sūtra*,

गौण्यसंभवात् । **(2-3-3)**

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1 न खलु आकाशम् उत्पद्यते; कस्मात् ? अश्रुतेः । (S. BSB. 2-3-1).

2 तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत । (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3).

3 श्रुत्यन्तरे तु अस्ति; तैत्तिरीयका हि समामनन्ति 'एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः' इति । (S. BSB.2-3-2).

that[1], that scriptural statement asserting the genesis of *Ākāśa* is to be taken in a secondary sense only, because the creation of *Ākāśa* is impossible. The commentator further explains[2]:- The creation of *Ākāśa* is impossible since it has no parts. *Ākāśa* is all-pervading and so can be inferred to be eternal and without origin. Śaṅkarācārya here refers to the *Vaiśeṣika* view that whatever is originated springs from inherent (*samavāyī*), non-inherent (*asamavāyī*) and operative (*nimitta*) causes. We cannot conceive of such causes for *Ākāśa*. Therefore, as in common usage we speak of space being made or created, in a figurative sense, in the same way the scriptural statement about the creation of *Ākāśa* shall be treated as metaphorical[3].

The *Pūrvapakṣin* further substantiates his assertion that *Ākāśa* is not originated, by an additional probans in the next *sūtra*,

शब्दाच्च । **(2-3-4)**

on account of scriptural text. The commentator then quotes a number of *Śruti* statements to show that *Ākāśa* is omnipresent and eternal like *Brahman*.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* can be asked[4] how the same word *saṁbhūta* repeatedly used with *Agni* etc. is to be taken in the primary sense and in the case of *Ākāśa* in the secondary sense. The next *sūtra* answers the same.

स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत् । **(2-2-5)**

One word '*saṁbhūta*' may be used in its primary sense as well as in secondary sense depending upon the speciality of the

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1 या तु इतरा वियदुत्पत्तिवादिनी श्रुतिः उदाहृता। सा गौणी भवितुमर्हति; कस्मात् ? असंभवात्।

2 SRK. p. 397.

3 तस्माद्यथा लोके 'आकाशं कुरु आकाशो जातः' इत्येवंजातीयको गौणः प्रयोगो भवति। एवम् उत्पत्तिश्रुतिरपि गौणी द्रष्टव्या। (S. BSB. 2-3-3).

4 कथं पुनः एकस्य संभूतशब्दस्य --------- तेजःप्रभृतिषु अनुवर्तमानस्य मुख्यत्वं संभवति आकाशे च गौणत्वम् इति। S. BSB. 2-3-5).

topic concerned, like the word *Brahman*[1]. The commentator quotes an example of *Śruti* where the word *Brahman* is used in different senses. In *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (3-2), the word *Brahman* is used in the primary sense in the case of bliss and in the secondary sense with reference to food etc.

Thus, the *Pūrvapakṣin* reconciles in his own way, apparent conflict between a *Taittirīya* statement and a *Chāndogya* statement and contends that *Ākāśa* is not created. This stand of *Pūrvapakṣin* is going to be refuted in the next two *sūtra*s.

प्रतिज्ञाहानिरव्यतिरेकाच्छब्देभ्यः । (2-3-6)

"The statements (*pratijñā*) in various *Upaniṣad*s, that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known, are not contradicted (*ahāniḥ*) because the entire aggregate of things is non-different (*avyaktirekāt*) from *Brahman*. So *Ākāśa* will also be one of the effects of *Brahman*; otherwise it could not be known when *Brahman* becomes known. There are also texts, which declare that all this is *Brahman* and *Ākāśa* is included in the world. So *Ākāśa* is a created product. The *Chāndogya* text in which *Ākāśa* is not mentioned, is to be interpreted in relation to the *Taittirīya* passage, *Ākāśa* and air are first created and then fire. There is no contradiction between different scriptural passages"[2].

यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत् । (2-3-7)

"The word 'but' (*tu*) refutes the view that *Ākāśa* is not created. The creation of *Ākāśa* is not impossible. Whatever is divided (*yāvad vibhāgaḥ*) is an effect (*vikāraṁ*); whatever is not an effect is not divided as the Self. *Ākāśa* is divided from earth and so on and it is therefore an effect. It cannot be said that the Self also is divided from *Ākāśa* and so on, for the Self is self-

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1 स्यात् च एकस्यापि संभूतशब्दस्य विषयविशेषवशात् गौणो मुख्यश्च प्रयोगः ब्रह्मशब्दवत्। (S.BSB.2-3-5).

2 SRK. p. 398.

established while *Ākāśa* and others are to be established by other means of knowledge. An adventitious thing may be refuted but not that which is the essential nature of him who refutes. The Self is therefore not an effect. Śaṅkarācārya points out that *Brahman* existed before *Ākāśa* was produced. Besides, *Ākāśa* is non-eternal because it is the substratum of non-eternal quality like sound. Statements regarding the eternity of *Ākāśa* are to be taken in a relative sense. *Ākāśa* is an effect of *Brahman*. Whatever is an effect has an origin. *Ākāśa* has *Brahman* for its material cause''[1].

Out of seven *sūtra*s here, the commentator has treated four *sūtra*s as the *Pūrvapakṣa* and three *sūtras* as *Siddhānta*. As already observed earlier in *Na Vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-1-4 & 5), this is not in tune with the practice of the *Sūtrakāra*. Wherever a statement is to be taken as *Pūrvapakṣa*, it is followed by the words '*iti cet* ' or '*cet* ' and in the absense of the same it is not proper to divide the *sūtras* as *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhānta*[2].

After so much of wrangling with the *Pūrvapakṣin*, the conclusion arrived at in the seventh *sūtra* is, that 'the creation of *Ākāśa* is not impossible'. But, instead of adapting the word *utpatti* in the first *sūtra* from a previous one, '*utpattyasambhavāt* ' (BS. 2-2-42), and making the first *sūtra* as *Pūrvapakṣa*, if we adapt the word *utpattyasambhavaḥ* itself, we can arrive at the same conclusion in the first *sūtra* only.

The topic for discussion in this *Adhikaraṇa* is whether *Ākāśa* is created or is co-eternal with *Brahman*. The *Taittirīya* statement clearly holds *Ākāśa* as created. The commentator has to select another *Śruti* statement, which denies this tenet and states that *Ākāśa* is eternal. Then he has to reconcile the two conflicting statements. Śaṅkarācārya has chosen the statement '*tattejo'sṛjata*' from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6-2-3) as the conflicting statement.

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1 SRK. p. 399.

2 चेदित्यादिपूर्वपक्षचिह्नस्य---अभावेऽपि न सूत्राणि छित्वा पूर्वपक्षत्वादिवर्णनं युक्तम्। (TC. III. p. 91).

But that statement is only silent about the genesis of *Ākāśa*. It does not say that *Ākāśa* is eternal. Its silence cannot be construed as its denial of the *Taittirīya* statement[1]. There is no conflict between the two *Śruti* statements.

Further, about the issue of priority of creation pointed out by Śaṅkarācārya, it is observed that "the conflict of texts about *Ākāśa* with which this *Adhikaraṇa* is concerned is simply over the question whether *Ākāśa* is produced at all or whether it is an absolutely un-originated (*anādi*) *tattva* and that it has nothing to do with the other question whether *Ākāśa* or *Tejas* was the first in creation"[2].

While trying to establish the *Siddhānta* view that *Ākāśa* is created and not eternal, for the word *pratijñā* in the sixth *sūtra*, the commentator refers to some assertions in *Upaniṣad*s which tell that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known (*ekavijñānena sarvavijñānaṁ*) and concludes that the entire aggregate of things (in the world) is non-different from *Brahman* and hence *Ākāśa* will also be one of the effects of *Brahman*[3]. This is the cardinal principle of *Vivartavāda*, advocated by Śaṅkarācārya, according to which the world is non-different from *Brahman* and it is phenomenal appearance superimposed on *Nirguṇa Brahman*, just as a snake is seen in place of a rope. Likewise, if the genesis of *Ākāśa* means its superimposition on *Brahman*, then it contradicts the *Śruti* and the related *sūtras*[4]. In the statements '*Ātmana Ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*' etc. and in the related *sūtra*s, *Ākāśa* and others are not told as superimposed. Moreover, if *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu*, *Agni* etc. are all superimposed, then the question of priority or order of creation, discussed by the commentator, becomes a non-issue.

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1 छान्दोग्ये हि आकाशस्योत्पत्त्यनुक्तिमात्रम्। न तु अनादित्वोक्तिः। न च अनुक्तिः तैत्तिरीयस्थोत्पत्त्युक्त्या विरुद्धा। (TC. III. p. 90).

2 BNK. II. p. 137.

3 तद् यदि आकाशं न ब्रह्मकार्यं स्यात् न ब्रह्मणि विज्ञाते आकाशं विज्ञायेत। (S. BSB. 2-3-6).

4 कार्यत्वम् आरोपितत्वं चेत् श्रुतिसूत्रविरोधः। न हि 'आत्मन आकाशः संभूत' इत्यादि विषयवाक्येषु तदनुसारिसूत्रेषु च आकाशादेः आरोप उच्यते। (TC. III. p. 91).

In order to prove that *Ākāśa* is a created thing or an effect (*kāryam*), Śaṅkarācārya puts forth a theory in the seventh *sūtra* that whatever is divided or separate from others is an effect. *Ākāśa* is divided from earth etc. and therefore it is an effect. Besides, *Ākāśa* is non-eternal because it is the substratum of non-eternal quality like sound. He says that *Brahman* is an exception to this rule as He is self-established while *Ākāśa* and others are not. But, according to the *Sūtrakāra*, *Brahman* is to be known through *śāstra* (*śāstrayonitvāt*. BS. 1-1-3). Further, according to *Vivartavāda*, *Brahman* is the substratum of innumerable non-eternal things in the world. Therefore, with this interpretation, there is a danger of *Brahman* also becoming "liable to genesis, as *Brahman* too is distinguished from the world of unrealities (*neti neti*)"[1].

Thus, the interpretation of these *sūtras* by Śaṅkarācārya, appears to be far-fetched and far from convincing.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets these *sūtras* almost on the same lines. But, he has correctly observed that the (*Chāndogya*) passage apprehending fire as the first produced element, cannot be considered as competent to refute the origination of *Ākāśa* perceived in another *Śruti*, merely on account of the former's silence about creation of *Ākāśa* [2]. So there is no conflict as such between the two scriptural statements sought to be reconciled by Śaṅkarācārya. Yet, Rāmānujācārya pursues the same controversy and explains the *sūtras* following in Śaṅkarācārya's foot-steps. Only in the seventh sūtra unlike Śaṅkarācārya, he takes *Vibhāga* in the sense of origination and interprets the *sūtra* as follows. Where *Ākāśa* is spoken of as an effect of *Brahman*, its origination from *Brahman* is also declared thereby[3].

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1 BNK. II. p. 140.

2 वियदुत्पत्त्यवचनमात्रेण तेजसः प्रतीयमानं प्राथम्यं श्रुत्यन्तरप्रतिपन्नां वियदुत्पत्तिं न निवारयितुमलम्। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-6).

3 Śrībhāṣya- SV 2-3-7.

It is true that the genesis of *Ākāśa* presents a difficult problem to philosophers as well as to scientists. George Thibaut observes in his translation of Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on *Vedāntasūtras* that, "The *Vedāntins* do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly fine matter filling all space which, however attenuated, is yet one of the material elements and as such belongs to the same category as air, fire, water and earth"[1]. This remark does not apply to Madhvācārya. He does take into account that the word *Ākāśa* means the empty space which provides room for bodies to exist (*avyākṛtākāśa*) and it also means the element ether pervading the whole universe (*bhūtākāśa*), which is recognized by the *Vaiśeṣikas* as "one of the nine *dravyas* (substances) and the substratum of the quality 'sound'"[2].

Further, Madhvācārya propounds, "for the first time in Indian Philosophy"[3], his concept of two types of creation. One is the conventional creation of a thing, which did not exist earlier, like the production of a clay-pot, which is described by *Naiyāyikas* as *prāgabhāvapratiyogitvaṁ*. Madhvācārya terms it as *Abhūtvābhavanaṁ*. The other is when an existing thing or person is empowered to possess some new characteristic and the thing or person of that characteristic is said to be created or born. For example, when a strip of iron is magnetized or when a person is appointed as an umpire, a magnet or an umpire can be said to be created respectively. This type of creation presupposes a superior power whose will dominates in it. Therefore, this type of creation is referred to as *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*.

Madhvācārya interprets the following *sūtras* in the light of these concepts.

॥ ॐ न वियदश्रुतेः ॐ ॥ **(2-3-1)**

न वियत् अनुत्पत्तिमत् तथा अश्रुतेः ।[4]

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1 BNK. II. p. 126.

2 SED. p. 74.

3 BNK. II. p. 127.

4 M. BSB. 2-3-1.

Ākāśa is not without genesis, for there is no _Śruti_ text to that effect.

The predicate *anutpattimat* is adapted by *anuvṛtti*, from the overall sense of '*utpattyasambhava*' mentioned in BS. 2-2-42[1]. Here, the word *viyat* conveys the empty space, ether and their controlling deities as well[2]. Thus, viyat has four referents.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* is assumed to be contending that *Ākāśa* is not created. The concept of its creation is against common experience, logic and scriptural statements. The *sūtra* refutes this contention. It says that *Ākāśa* cannot be said to be un-created because there is no clear scriptural statement declaring that *Ākāśa* is not created.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* further argues[3]. If there is no evidence to prove that a pot exists, no further proof is required to say that it does not exist. Similarly, no proof is needed regarding non-creation of *Ākāśa*, when there is no proof for its creation. The next *sūtra* answers:

॥ ॐ अस्ति तु ॐ ॥ **(2-3-2)**

अस्ति एव वियदुत्पत्तिश्रुतिः आत्मन आकाशः संभूतः इत्यादिकः ।

Precisely, there exists _Śruti_ about the genesis of _Ākāśa_, like '_Ākāśa_ sprang from _Brahman_ (_Ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ_)'[4] etc.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* further contests. The *Śruti* quoted above contradicts another *Śruti*, which tells that 'this *Ākāśa* is eternal (*anādirvā ayamākāśaḥ*)' and the latter also disproves the

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1 अत्र उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् इति सूत्रप्रकृतानुत्पत्तिबोधकानुत्पत्तिमत् इति पदमनुवर्त्य न वियदिति प्रतिज्ञाभागं व्याचष्टे । (*Bhāṣyadīpikā* of Jagannātha Tīrtha 2-3-1). (BNK. II. p. 126).

2 अत्र श्रुतौ सूत्रे च वियत्पदेन भूताकाशौ तदभिमानिनौ चेति चतुष्टयमुच्यते । (TDK. 2-3-1).

3 न हि घटे प्रमाणाभावे पुनस्तदभावे प्रमाणापेक्षा स्यात् । (TP. 2-3-2).

4 Tait. Up. 2-1.

Sūtrakāra's contention in the preceding *sūtra* that there is no clear statement declaring *Ākāśa* as un-originated.

The next *sūtra* addresses these objections.

॥ ॐ गौण्यसम्भवात् ॐ ॥ (2-3-3)

अनादित्वश्रुतिः गौणी गौणानादिपरा अन्यथा उत्पत्तिश्रुतिबाहुल्यासम्भवात्।[1]

The *Śruti* text, which describes *Ākāśa* as beginningless (*anādi*), does so in a secondary figurative sense as otherwise it would be impossible to have significance for so many texts, which speak of the origination of *Ākāśa* from *Brahman*.

Out of four referents of the term *Ākāśa* mentioned earlier, ether (*bhūtākāśa*) has to be originated in the sense of *abhūtvābhavanaṁ* [2], since it has a form or appearance. So, the *Śruti* describing Ākāśa as beginningless, is utterly inapplicable to ether[3]. Since that *Śruti* is not universally applicable to all the four referents of *Ākāśa*, in the case of ether it can be taken in a figurative sense either by '*Chatrinyāya*'[4] or due to ether's unfathomable antiquity. Or, that *Śruti* can be taken as applicable to the remaining three referents of *Ākāśa* only, leaving out ether. If the empty space and the two controlling deities are thus taken as beginningless, then the *utpatti-śruti* cannot be said to be applicable to them. It is not so. The *utpatti-śruti* is applicable to all the four[5]. In the case of ether, the genesis is in the sense of *abhūtvābhavanaṁ*, and its presiding deity has a genesis through

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1 VKM. 2-3-3.

2 तत्र भूतं स्वरूपत एव उत्पत्तिमत् रूपित्वात्। (TP. 2-3-2).

3 अनादिर्वा इति श्रुतिः भूते सर्वथा अयुक्ता इति असर्वविषयत्वात् भूते छत्रिवल्लाक्षणिकी वा चिरन्तनत्वमात्रेण गौणी वा भूतेतरत्रितयाकाशपरा वा नेया इति भावः। (TDK. 2-3-3).

4 In a group of people, even-though some persons only are carrying umbrellas, the whole group is sometimes described as 'people with umbrellas'. This is known as *Chatrinyāya*.

5 भूतस्य स्वरूपतः तदभिमानिनो देहतः अवकाशतदभिमानिनोः पराधीनविशेषावाप्तित उत्पत्तिसम्भवेन चतुष्टयविषयत्वात् बहुत्वात् च उत्पत्तिश्रुतिर्युक्ता। (TDK. 2-3-3).

his becoming embodied. In the case of empty space and its presiding deity. the genesis is through *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* from *Brahman*. The concept of empowering the empty space to hold things is creating corporeal things and enabling space to hold them[1]. For example, a person can function as an umpire provided that there are two competing teams brought before him. Thus, according to Madhvācārya, the text, which refers to *Ākāśa* as beginningless does not contradict the text declaring the origination of *Ākāśa* from *Brahman* [2]. The *sūtra* indicates that the *utpatti-śruti* covering all the four referents of *Ākāśa* is to be taken as primary and the *anāditvaśruti* which covers only three, is to be treated as secondary (*gauṇī*).

The above conclusion is arrived at on the evidence of inference. The next *sūtra* offers another evidence based on *śabda* (*Śruti*) for the same conclusion.

॥ ॐ शब्दाच्च ॐ ॥ **(2-3-4)**

अनादित्वश्रुतिः गौणी शब्दाच्च भाल्लवेयश्रुतेश्च। अस्यां श्रुतौ 'अथ एतानि उत्पत्तिमन्ति च अनुत्पत्तिमन्ति च प्राणः श्रद्धा आकाश इति भागशो हि उत्पद्यन्ते' इति भूतादिचतुर्भिः भागैः आकाशपदार्थस्य उत्पत्त्युक्तेः अवकाशादिस्वरूपकतिपयभागेन अनुत्पत्त्युक्तेः इति भावः।

The *anāditva-śruti* is secondary, also because of what is stated in *Bhāllaveya-śruti* [3]. In this *Śruti*, *Prāṇa*, *Śraddhā* and *Ākāśa* are taken as created as well as un-created and they are indeed created in parts. Therefore, the import is that the *Śruti* tells genesis of the four referents of *Ākāśa*, ether etc. and non-creation of some of those parts like empty space.

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1 अवकाशो पराधीनो विशेषो मूर्तपदार्थसंवन्धः। (VVM. 2-3-3).

2 न उत्पत्तिश्रुतेः अनादित्वश्रुतिविरोधः। (TP. 2-3-3).

3 अथ ह वाव नित्यानि पुरुषः प्रकृतिरात्मा काल इति। अथ यान्यनित्यानि प्राणः श्रद्धा भूतानि भौतिकानीति। यानि ह वा उत्पत्तिमन्ति तान्यनित्यानि। यानि ह वा अनुत्पत्तिमन्ति तानि नित्यानि। न ह्येतानि कदाचनोत्पद्यन्ते न लीयन्ते पुरुषः प्रकृतिरात्मा काल इति। अथैतान्युत्पत्तिमन्ति चानुत्पत्तिमन्ति च प्राणः श्रद्धाऽऽकाश इति भागशो ह्युत्पद्यन्त इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतेः। (M. BSB. 2-3-4).

Hence, the *utpatti-śruti*, applicable to all the four referents of *Ākāśa*, is to be taken as primary and the *anāditva-śruti*, which is partially applicable to them is to be understood as secondary.

The next *sūtra* gives an example to show how the same word can be used in a primary sense in one context and in a secondary sense in another.

॥ ॐ स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत् ॐ ॥ (2-3-5)

यथा ब्रह्मशब्दस्य परब्रह्मणि मुख्यत्वेऽपि विरिञ्चादिषु गौणत्वं तद्वत् एकस्य एव अनुत्पत्तिवाचिशब्दस्य परमात्मनि मुख्यत्वेऽपि आकाशे अमुख्यत्वं स्यादेव ।

Just as the term *Brahman* though primarily denoting the Supreme *Brahman* is also figuratively applied to the four-faced *Brahmā*, similarly the same expression 'having no genesis' though primarily true of the Supreme Being, can certainly be applied to *Ākāśa* in a figurative sense.

The word '*ca*' in the *sūtra* is in the sense of '*eva*', and it is taken twice (*āvṛtti*), once in the sense of 'same' and next time as an emphatic particle.

It is well-known that the secondary significance of a word is taken only when its primary meaning fails to give a coherent sense. But, here, what is the harm if *Ākāśa* is held primarily as not originated? The next *sūtra* clarifies the doubt.

॥ ॐ प्रतिज्ञाहानिरव्यतिरेकात् शब्देभ्यः ॐ ॥ (2-3-6)

आकाशेऽपि अनुत्पत्तिवाचिशब्दस्य मुख्यत्वे स इदं सर्वमसृजत इति प्रतिज्ञायाः हानिः स्यात् । कुतः । अव्यतिरेकात् आकाशस्य सर्वमध्यपतितत्वात् । शब्देभ्यः अनेकश्रुतिवचनेभ्यः आकाशस्य सादित्वं स्पष्टम् ।

If the expression 'not originated' appearing in a text is understood in its primary sense with reference to *Ākāśa* also, then the promissory statement in *Śruti* that "He created all

this (finite reality)''[1] would be contradicted because *Ākāśa* is not excluded (*avyatirekāt*) from (but included within) the ambit of the phrase ''all this'. It is evident from many *Śruti* statements that *Ākāśa* has a beginning.

Madhvācārya quotes a number of *Śruti* statements, which declare that *Brahman* alone existed before this creation. By using the word *śabdebhyaḥ* in plural, the *Sūtrakāra* suggests in this *sūtra* that on account of contradiction by so many scriptural texts, it is proper to take one rare statement telling non-origination of *Ākāśa* in a figurative sense[2].

Having established here that *Ākāśa* has origination and therefore the text describing it as un-originated is to be understood in a figurative sense, on the evidence of *Śruti*, the *Sūtrakāra* arrives at the same conclusion on the basis of inference also, in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत् ॐ ॥ (2-3-7)

Until now, we have seen *sūtras* in the form of syllogism. This appears to be a peculiar *sūtra*. It states only an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) like 'wherever there is smoke there is fire'[3]. In addition the *sūtra* provides an illustration '*lokavat*' meaning 'as in the world'. The word '*vikāra*', which ordinarily means modification, is taken in the sense of that which undergoes modification (*karmaṇi ghañ*)[4]. The phrase *yāvadvikāraṁ* is an adverbial compound[5], signifying 'whatever is subject to modification'. The word '*vibhāga*' or '*vibhakta*' is interpreted by Madhvācārya, in the sense of that which is subject to limitation

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1 Tait. Up. 2-6.

2 वहुवचनेन वहुश्रुतिविरोधादेकस्यानुत्पत्तिशव्दस्यामुख्यत्वं न्याय्यम् इति सूचयति। (TDK 2-3-6).

3 यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र अग्निः ।

4 अकर्तरि च कारके संज्ञायाम् (घञ्) . (Pāṇini 3-3-19), कर्तृवर्जिते कारकसंज्ञायां विषये धातोर्घञ् प्रत्ययो भवति। अतः कर्मणि (घञ्) । (TDK. 2-3-7).

5 यावदवधारणे (अव्ययीभावः)। (Pāṇini 2-1-8).

of capacity[1]. The root '*bhañja*' not only means 'to divide' but also 'to defeat'[2]. Thus, the *vyāpti* expressed by the *sūtra* is that whatever is subject to modification, has limited capacity. The converse is also true. Whatever has limited capacity, is subject to modification[3].

In order to prove inferentially the conclusion of the preceding *sūtra* that *Ākāśa* is originated, the necessary syllogism suggested by the sūtra on the basis of the above *vyāpti*, is as follows.

यावद्विकारं यः विक्रियमाणः सः विभागः विभक्तः अल्पशक्तिमान्। विपर्ययेण यः विभक्तः सः विक्रियमाणः कृतकम्[4] इति व्याप्तिः। अतश्च वियत् विकारी उत्पत्तिमत् विभक्तत्वात् लोकवत् घटादिवत्।

Whatever is subject to modification has limited capacity. Conversely whatever has limited capacity is subject to modification or creation. Therefore, *Ākāśa* is created also on account of its limited power, like the ordinary wordly things pot etc.

This interpretation also looks round about and far-fetched. But, that is *Brahmasūtra*. At places, such laboured interpretations appear inevitable.

2 मातरिश्वाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः ॐ ॥ **(2-3-8)**

एतेन प्रागुक्तहेतुजातेन मातरिश्वानुत्पत्त्यादिपरशब्दो व्याख्यातः गौणमुख्यत्वेन व्याख्यातः।

By this i.e. by the sum and substance of the arguments put forth in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the scriptural passages

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1 विभागो ह्यल्पशक्तित्वं न तदस्ति जनार्दने। इति बृहत्संहितायाम्। (M. BSB. 2-3-7), विभागपदेन कर्मार्थघञन्तेनाल्पशक्तिमानुच्यते। (TDK. 2-3-7).

2 भञ्जो आमर्दने (धातुपाठ) ॥

3 यावद्विकारं विक्रियमाण एवार्थो विभागो विभक्तः , अल्पशक्तिमानित्यर्थः। यो विभक्तः स विक्रियमाण इति व्याप्तिरुक्ता भवति। यावदनित्यं कृतकमितिवत्। (TDK. 2-3-7).

4 यावदनित्यं कृतकम् इतिवत्। (TDK. 2-3-7).

expressing non-origination and origination of *Vāyu* (air) stand explained as being in a figurative sense and primary sense respectively.

Śaṅkarācārya considers the same controversy between the *Chāngodya* statement[1] which does not mention air (*vāyu*) as originated and the *Taittirīya* statement[2] which declares *Vāyu* as produced from *Ākāśa*. The *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that *Vāyu* is not originated since it does not figure in the list of originated elements in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6-2) and further *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1-5-22) refers to air as the deity, which never sets[3]; therefore the *Taittirīya* text should be taken in a secondary sense. The *sūtra* decides, according to Śaṅkarācārya, that air is a product because in that case only, the scriptural text would not be contradicted and also because of the axiom 'whatever is an effect, is divided'[4]. The denial of an end (setting) for the presiding deity of air, *Vāyu*, is with reference to the lower-knowledge (*aparavidyā*) where the greatness of the deity is told for the purpose of worship (*upāsanā*), and that denial is only in a relative sense compared to *Agni*, *Sūrya* etc.

The arguments put forth for establishing the genesis of air here, are the same as those made by Śaṅkarācārya in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, for the genesis of *Ākāśa*. Therefore, the observations made for holding those arguments as un-convincing, hold good here also. Since Śaṅkarācārya treats these two *Adhikaraṇa*s as establishing the genesis of *Ākāśa* and *Vāyu* as pure elements (*bhūtas*), on the basis of same arguments, this *sūtra* could have been included in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* only. Rāmānujācārya does exactly the same. He treats this *sūtra* as part of the preceding

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1 तत्तेजोऽसृजत । (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3).

2 आत्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः । आकाशाद्वायुः । (Tait. Up. 2-1).

3 सैषानस्तमिता देवता यद्वायुः । (Bṛha. Up. 1-5-22).

4 प्रतिज्ञानुपरोधाद्यावद्विकारं च विभागाभ्युपगमादुत्पद्यते वायुरिति सिद्धान्तः । (S. BSB. 2-3-8)

Adhikaraṇa and interprets it as follows. "By this very argument, is explained the origination of *Mātariśvan*, the wind"[1].

Śaṅkarācārya justifies the discussion about the genesis of *Vāyu* in a separate *Adhikaraṇa*, saying that the special glorification of *Vāyu* alone as 'not setting' may lead the dull-witted to presume that *Vāyu* could be without genesis. But the point is that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* refers to the presiding deity (*abhimānidevatā*) of air as 'not setting', and not the elemental air, while Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya discuss the genesis of elemental *Ākāśa* and *Vāyu* in these *sūtras*[2]. Further, Śaṅkarācārya's explanation that the glorification of *Vāyu-devatā* as immortal is for the purpose of worship (*upāsanā*) does not sound convincing because the other *devatā*s mentioned in the same passage, *Agni* and *Sūrya*, who are more popular and who are worshipped more frequently and regularly, are not similarly glorified.

According to Madhvācārya, the justification for discussing this *sūtra* in a separate *Adhikaraṇa* is due to the special position held by the presiding deity of air, *Mukhya-prāṇa*, among the several deities. The parables in several *Upaniṣad*s about the incontestable suzerainty of *Prāṇa* over the other *Indriyābhimāni-devatā*s are well-known[3]. Actually, there is no controversy about the genesis of the elemental air. But, as already said in the introductory remarks to this *Pāda*, the discussion of the genesis of elements (*bhūta*s) necessarily involves a discussion of the genesis of their presiding deities as well.

Madhvācārya quotes a number of texts, which show the special status of *Mukhya-prāṇa*. One such text says[4]. "Now indeed follows

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1 अनेनैव हेतुना मातरिश्वनो वायोरप्युत्पत्तिर्व्याख्याता। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK 2-3-8).

2 सैषानस्तमिता देवता यद्वायुः इति वायोर्विशिष्यानस्तमितत्वोक्तिरधिका। तथापि सा देवताविषया। त्वन्मते त्विदं भूतविषयम्। (TC. III. p. 93).

3 BNK. II. p. 141.

4 अथ ह नित्याश्चानित्याश्च। तेजोऽवन्नाकाश इति तान्यनित्यानि। वायुर्वाव नित्यो वायुना हि सर्वाणि भूतानि नेनीयन्ते। (M. BSB. 2-3-8) (BNK. II. p. 142).

the explanation of the eternals and the non-eternals (among the finite reals). Fire, water, earth and ether, these are the non-eternals. *Vāyu* is indeed the eternal; for by *Vāyu* are all the beings properly guided''. Therefore, the description of *Mukhya-prāṇa* in the scriptures as eternal, cannot be easily brushed aside as a figurative statement as was done in the case of *Ākāśa*, because the *Śruti* places *Mukhya-prāṇa* on a different pedestal as compared with the presiding deities of other elements.

But, the *sūtra* avers that the eternality of *Vāyu* i.e. *Mukhya-prāṇa* is in a figurative sense. Madhvācārya explains the position. According to him all *Jīvas*, whether of ordinary creatures or of exalted deities, are beginningless (*svarūpānādi*). *Mukhya-prāṇa* is also one of them. Embodying of the *Jīvas* is creation in the sense of *abhūtvābhavanaṁ* and their getting any exalted position is also a creation in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*. ''The special aspect of *Viśeṣanityatva* and *atiśayacetanatva* affirmed of *Vāyu* in the *anādittvaśrutis* is to be understood, says Madhvācārya, in the sense that in addition to his etermality of being (*svarūpānāditva*) which he shares in common with other *Nityapadārthas* like *Avyākṛtākāśa*, the other *Jīvas* etc. *Mukhya-prāṇa* has the unique distinction of retaining undiminished and intact, even in the state of *Mahāpralaya*, the special power of his genious called *Prātibhajñāna* which is competent to visualize, even in the absense of a physical body (in *Mahāpralaya*), the past and the future like the present''[1].

In order to remove the cobweb of confusion in the minds of students, about what is eternal in the world and what is not, Madhvācārya refers to a passage from *Kūrma-purāṇa* which clarifies the position and shows where *Vāyu* stands. It says, ''This world consists of four classes of things, the indestructible, the

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1 एवं प्रलयकालेऽपि प्रतिभातपरावरः। मुख्यवायुर्नित्यसमः शरीरोत्पत्तिकारणात्। परतन्त्रविशेषेण जनिमानेव शब्दितः॥ (AV. 2-3-8) (BNK. II. p.145)॥ शरीराभावेऽपि प्रातिभेनैव ज्ञानेन विषयीकृतातीतानागतो यतः तस्मात् नित्यसम इति शब्दितः। 'शरीरोत्पत्तिकारणात्' 'पराधीनविशेषेण' इति हेतुहेतुमद्भावः। (NS) (BNK. II. p. 145).

highly indestructible, the destructible and the highly destructible. The highly destructible are the products of Earth and other elements. The destructibles are the elements themselves. The indestructible is declared to be *Vāyu*. The absolutely indestructible are only the *puruṣa* (*Jīva*s), Prakṛti and Time. This four-fold (world) is marshalled and supported through eternity by the Supreme Being who is Himself absolutely eternal, highest of the high, who is the redeemer (of *Jīva*s) exalted far above (the *Jīva*s), who is nothing but unlimited bliss and the most brilliant Lord''[1].

3 असम्भवाधिकरणम्।

Having seen in the last two *Adhikaraṇa*s that even the things like empty space and *Jīva*s considered as eternal, have some sort of genesis in the world, one may doubt that the Supreme Being also may be subject to some kind of origination. The following *sūtra* clears such doubts, if any.

॥ ॐ असम्भवस्तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः ॐ ॥ (2-3-9)

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra* that *Brahman* has no origination. But they explain the *sūtra* differently.

Śaṅkarācārya explains the contention of the *sūtra* as follows[2]: *Brahman* whose essence is existence, cannot be suspected to have been originated from anything else, as it does not stand to reason. *Brahman* is indeed mere 'being'. It cannot spring from mere 'being', because without some superiority in the cause over the effect, there can be no cause and effect relation between them. Nor can *Brahman* be said to have sprung from some 'particular

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1 नित्यः परमनित्यश्च तथाऽनित्यः परस्तथा। चतुर्धैतज्जगत्सर्वं परानित्यं तु पार्थिवम्॥ अनित्यानि तु भूतानि नित्यो वायुरुदाहृतः। परस्तु नित्यः पुरुषः प्रकृतिः काल एव च॥ एवं चतुष्टयं विष्णुः स्वयं नित्यः परात्परः। प्रतिव्यूह्यव्यूह्य चासावर्तीत्य च जनार्दनः। धारयत्यखिलं देवो नित्यानन्दैकलक्षणः॥ इति कौर्मे। (M. BSB. 2-3-8).

2 न खलु ब्रह्मणः सदात्मकस्य कुतश्चिदन्यतः संभव उत्पत्तिः आशङ्कितव्या ; कस्मात्? अनुपपत्तेः। सन्मात्रं हि ब्रह्म न तस्य सन्मात्रादेवोत्पत्तिः संभवति। असत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकारभावानुपपत्तेः। नापि सद्विशेषात् दृष्टविपर्ययात्। सामान्याद्विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते न तु विशेषेभ्यः सामान्यम्। नाप्यसतः निरात्मकत्वात्। न च विकारेभ्यो विकारान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनाद् ब्रह्मणोऽपि विकारत्वं भवितुमर्हति मूलप्रकृत्यनभ्युपगमेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। (S. BSB. 2-3-9).

form of being', as it is against experience. Particulars are seen to be originating from a general form, but not vice versa. Nor can *Brahman* spring from 'non-being (*asat*)', because non-being is without any character. Now since it is seen (in the world) that one effect springs from another effect, it should not be concluded that *Brahman* also may be an effect of some other thing, because if an original cause is not accepted, it may lead to an infinite regression. *Kalpataru* explains this point[1]. "It is the illusory appearance of something which constitutes an effect. The superimposition is impossible without conceding a real substratum. The existence of *Brahman* as such a substratum is therefore an essential requisite".

The above claim that *Brahman* is mere 'being in general' is not acceptable[2] because in that case the Supreme Being cannot co-exist in conformity with practical (*vyāvahārika*) particular forms of being, and the Supreme Being cannot be said to possess both the aspects of general and particular being. The explanation by *Kalpataru* that an effect always means an illusory appearance is not convincing because it is not in tune with what the *Sūtrakāra* is discussing in this *Pāda*. In the last two *Adhikaraṇas* where he establishes the genesis of *Ākāśa* and *Vāyu*, nowhere has he used any word, which conveys or suggests the notion of an illusory appearance of or a superimposition of *Ākāśa* over *Brahman* or *Vāyu* over *Ākāśa*.

Rāmānujācārya takes a different view that this *sūtra* is not meant to discuss whether *Brahman* is un-originated or not, but is mentioned as an exception to establish a general rule. According to him, the *sūtra* declares that[3], "*Brahman* alone is un-originated.

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1 विवर्तता हि कार्यता।तत्र ब्रह्म कार्यमिति वदन् प्रष्टव्यः किं ब्रह्म स्वयं सत्यमसत्ये कुत्र चित् अध्यस्तम् उत सत्यान्तरे? किं वा विना एव अधिष्ठानेन स्वयमारोपितम्? (Kalpataru 2-3-9) (BNK. II. p. 155).

2 यच्चोक्तं सत्सामान्यं ब्रह्मेति तन्न। परमार्थसतो ब्रह्मणो व्यावहारिकसदाद्यनुगत्ययोगात् परमार्थसति च सामान्यविशेषभावाभावात्। (TC. III. p. 95). (BNK. II. p. 156).

3 असंभवः अनुत्पत्तिः सतो ब्रह्मणः एव। तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कस्यचिदनुत्पत्तिर्न संभवति। ---- तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य ----- अनुत्पत्तिः न उपपद्यते। (Śrībhāṣya - RDK. 2-3-9).

Non-origination of anything except that is not possible. Non-origination does not stand to reason in the case of all except that (*Brahman*)''.

This *Pāda* is intended to reconcile the conflicting statements in scriptures. But, instead of using this *sūtra* to resolve the contradiction about the eternality of *Brahman*, Rāmānujācārya takes the *sūtra* lightly as an exception. If his interpretation of this *sūtra* were correct, then the *Sūtrakāra* should have stopped discussing the genesis of any other thing, here only. But the *Sūtrakāra* continues to discuss the genesis of fire, water, earth and so on. Vyāsatirtha remarks that ''superfluous topic has been discussed and what should have been discussed has been omitted''[1]. Therefore Rāmānujācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra*, though literally correct, is not found satisfactory and convincing.

According to Madhvācārya the doubt about the origination of the Supreme Being arises from the *Śruti* statements like, ''*Asadvā idamagra āsīt tato vai sadajāyata* (Non-Being indeed was there before this world; from it indeed sprang Being i.e. *Brahman*)''[2] and ''*Asataḥ sadajāyata* (from Non-Being sprang Being)''[3]. From such statements if one contends that even the Supreme Being is subject to genesis, the *sūtra* says that it is not so and asserts that *Brahman* has no origination.

अतः ब्रह्मणः असम्भव एव अनुत्पत्तिरेव अनुपपत्तेः असतः सकाशात् सज्जन्मनः अनुपपत्तेः क्वापि अदर्शनात् ।

***Brahman* is absolutely un-originated because genesis of an existent entity from non-existence does not stand to reason, as such a thing is nowhere seen.**

The word '*tu*' (but) in the *sūtra* tells that the arguments advanced in the preceding two *Adhikaraṇa*s are not applicable

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1 अवक्तव्योक्तेरवश्यवक्तव्यानुक्तेः । (TC. III. p. 95).

2 Tait. Up. 2-7.

3 RV. 10-72-2.

here[1]. It is contended there that though empty space (*avyākṛtākāśa*) and *Mukhya-prāṇa* are eternal in essence, *Śruti* describes them as originated in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*. That cannot be said of *Brahman* because *Brahman* is not conceived as subservient to any superior authority and He does not owe His powers to any one[2].

It is not enough to infer that *Brahman* is absolutely unoriginated, in order to ward off the contradiction from a *Śruti* text, because the *Vedāntins* hold that a *Śruti* statement cannot be disproved by the evidence of inference. Therefore, it is incumbent to show that the import of such apparently conflicting texts does not really contradict the eternality of *Brahman*. Madhvācārya quotes the evidence of *Paiṅgiśruti* to show how it views the text '*Asataḥ sadajāyata*'. That *Śruti* declares that[3] "in the text 'In the beginning (of creation) of the deities, from *asat* sprang *sat* ', *asat* indeed means *Brahman*, *sat* is *Prāṇa*, which *Prāṇa* they call the great, the enduring, the powerful, the strong". Madhvācārya quotes a verse from *Bhāgavata* which supports this view that *sat* conveys *Prāṇa*. The verse says: 'O brilliant omniscient unborn Lord, you put in your seed in *Śakti* (Lakṣmī), who is (also) unborn and the source of all qualities and activities; from her we, *sat* (*Prāṇa*) and others have issued; tell us how we should fulfil the purpose for which you have made us"[4].

Thus, Madhvācārya shows how the purport of texts which apparently conflict the eternality of *Brahman*, does not really do so when the texts are properly interpreted with reference to context. His interpretation of the *sūtra* looks more appropriate to the theme of removing apparent internal conflicts in Vedic statements, proposed in this *Pāda*.

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1 तु शब्देन उक्तव्यवस्थाम् अपाकरोति। (M. BSB. 2-3-9).

2 न च सतः पराधीनविशेषवत्त्वम् स्वातन्त्र्यात्। (NV. 2-3-*adhi*. 3) (BNK. II. p. 152).

3 'देवानां पूर्वे युगेऽसतः सदजायतेति ब्रह्म वा असत् सद्वाव प्राणः प्राणोवाव महान् सह ओजो बलमित्याचक्षत' इति पैङ्गिश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-3-9).

4 'त्वं देव शक्त्यां गुणकर्मयोनौ रेतस्त्वजायां कविरादधेऽजः। ततो वयं सत्प्रमुखा यदर्थे बभूविमाऽऽत्मन् करवाम किं ते॥' इति भागवते। (3-6-28) (M. BSB. 2-3-9).

4 तेजोऽधिकरणम्।

Having discussed the genesis of *Ākāśa* and *Vāyu* in the first two *Adhikaraṇas* of this *Pāda* and having cleared an incidental doubt about the eternality of *Brahman* itself, in the third one, the *Sūtrakāra* reverts to discuss the genesis of the third element, fire (*Agni*), and its presiding deity in this *Adhikaraṇa*. The conflict here is between the text[1], '*Agni* originated from *Vāyu*' and another statement[2], 'That (*Brahman*) created Tejas (*Agni*)'. The doubt is whether *Agni* originated from Vāyu or from *Brahman*. The following *sūtra* clarifies.

॥ ॐ तेजोऽतस्तथा ह्याह ॐ ॥ (2-3-10)

According to Śaṅkarācārya the *sūtra* takes the view that[3], "*Agni* originates from *Vāyu* as told in the *Śruti* '*Vāyoragniḥ*' because the ablative case affix used for the word *Vāyu*, clearly conveys so". Regarding the conflicting *Śruti* '*Tattejo'sṛjata*' he explains that[4] after the creation of *Ākāśa* and *Vāyu*, *Agni* can be thought of as originated from *Brahman*, which has assumed the form of *Vāyu*, (and not from the pure immutable Brahman). Thus there is no contradiction by the latter *Śruti*.

But this interpretation goes against the spirit of the introductory *sūtra* '*janmādyasyayataḥ* (BS. 1-1-2)' which defines *Brahman* as that from which originates everything in the world, animate or inanimate. Further, Śaṅkarācārya explains in a just by-gone *sūtra* (BS. 2-2-6) that if the text 'by the knowledge of one thing everything is known' is to hold good, the entire aggregate of things in the world has to be the effect of *Brahman*. This

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1 वायोरग्निः (Tait. Up. 2-1).

2 तत्तेजोऽसृजत। (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3).

3 वायोरग्निरित्यपादानपञ्चमी एवैषेति गम्यते। तस्मादेषा श्रुतिः वायुयोनित्वंतेजसोऽवगमयति। (S. BSB. 2-3-10).

4 आकाशं वायुं च सृष्ट्वा वायुभावापन्ने ब्रह्म तेजोऽसृजत इति कल्प्यते। (S. BSB. 2-3-10).

is not possible if *Agni* etc. are taken as the effects of *Brahman*, which has assumed the form of *Vāyu* etc[1].

Moreover, according to *Vivartavāda*, an effect is an illusory appearance on a substratum and it vanishes on knowing the substratum. So *Agni* etc. should vanish on knowing *Vāyu* etc., just as the silver seen in place of a shell[2]. But we never see *Agni* vanishing on knowing *Vāyu*.

In the above interpretation, the *Taittirīya* statement is taken in the primary sense and the *Chāndogya* statement is explained away in a secondary sense, thereby compromising the primacy of *Brahman* in creation. Hence, it is not convincing.

Rāmānujācārya takes an opposite view. He also interprets this *sutra* as telling that fire originates from air, and the next *sūtras* as telling, "water is produced from fire" and "Earth is produced from water". But he treats all these *sutras* as *Pūrvapakṣa* and a following *sūtra* '*Tadabhidhyānādeva tu talliṅgāt saḥ*' as refuting the *Pūrvapakṣa*. That *sūtra* is interpreted as establishing the fact that *Brahman*, as embodied in the immediately preceding substance is the direct cause of all effects like *Agni*, water, earth etc. It has been observed time and again earlier that treating one *sūtra* as *Pūrvapakṣa* and another as *Siddhānta*, without any indicative words like '*iti cet* ' or '*cet* ', is not in tune with the practice of the *Sūtrakāra*. The *siddhānta* that *Brahman* is the true cause of the evolution of *Agni* etc. through the intermediary causes as mere vehicles, can be arrived at directly from this *sutra* by properly interpreting the term *ataḥ* in the *sūtra*. That is what is done by Madhvācārya. According to him the *sūtra* is to be understood as follows.

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1 किञ्च, तेज आदेर्वाय्वादिभावापन्नविशिष्टभिन्नब्रह्मकार्यत्वे एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं न स्यात्। (TC. III p. 97) (BNK II p. 167).

2 विवर्तमते शुक्तितत्त्वज्ञानेन रूप्यस्येव वाय्वादितत्त्वज्ञानेन तेजादेर्निवृत्तिश्च स्यात्। (TC. III p. 97)

अतः तु ब्रह्मणः एव तेजः तथा तेजोऽपि उत्पत्तिमत् हि यस्मात् 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' इति श्रुतिः आह ।

From *Brahman* only, fire also originates, as the scriptural text '*tattejo'sṛjata* (Chānd. Up 6-2-3)' says.

Here, the words '*tu*', '*Brahmanaḥ* (*sataḥ*)', and '*utpattimat* ' are continued (*anuvṛtti*) from preceding *sūtra*s, and the term '*tathā* ' is understood in the sense of 'also'. The purport of the *sūtra* is that *Brahman* is the primary cause of all creation and that is not refuted by texts[1] like '*Vāyoragniḥ*', since they only tell *Brahman* as the source of all genesis through the vehicle of the mediate causes.

5 अबधिकरणम् ।

The conflict being resolved in this *Adhikaraṇa* is between the *Taittirīya* text[2], 'waters originated from *Agni* ' and another *Muṇḍaka text* [3], which holds waters as produced directly from *Brahman*. The following *sutra* resolves the conflict in the same way as the preceding *sutra* decides the origination of *Agni*.

॥ ॐ आपः ॐ ॥ **(2-3-11)**

अतः तु ब्रह्मणः एव आपः तथा आपोऽपि उत्पत्तिमत्यः हि यस्मात् 'एतस्माज्जायते[4]---- आपः' इति श्रुतिः आह ।

From *Brahman* only, water also is produced, as the (*Muṇḍaka*) text '*etasmājjāyate āpaḥ* ' says.

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1 न च वायोरग्निरित्यादिश्रुतिविरोधः । तत्र वायुद्वारा तेजसो ब्रह्मजातत्वोक्तेः । (TP. 2-3-10)

2 अग्नेरापः । (Tait. Up. 2-1)

3 एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च । खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी ॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3). From this (Supreme Being) are produced the Chief of breaths, mind, all organs of senses, *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu*, *Tejas*, Waters and the Earth which supports all.

4 In classical Sanskrit '*āpaḥ*' is used in plural only, but in Veda in singular and plural (SED. p. 30).

The extra words in the exposition are taken from the preceding *sūtra* by *anuvṛtti*. Here again the purport of the *sūtra* is that water originates primarily from *Brahman* through the vehicle of *Agni*, and therefore the *Śruti* '*Agnerāpaḥ* ' does not refute the primacy of *Brahman* in the creation of water.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, this *sūtra* tells that water springs from *Agni* as per *Śruti*. Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* as telling that water also springs from fire, but he treats it as *Pūrvapakṣa*, as done with the preceding *sūtra*. The observations made against both these views in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* hold good here also.

In his explanation of this *sutra*, Madhvācārya suggests by using the word '*ādi* ' (etc.), that the arguments made here could be used to establish the genesis of other finite realities like *Pṛthivī*, *Oṣadhi*, *Anna* etc., by implication of the analogous (*upalakṣaṇa*)[1]. The word 'Āpaḥ' in the sutra is indicative of others[2].

One can argue that the genesis of water also could have been understood likewise by implication. Madhvācārya justifies the necessity of this *sūtra* in order to remove an additional doubt of the opponent that water originates from fire only because of the popular observation of sweat, etc. following heat[3].

6 पृथिव्यधिकरणम् ।

After going through the discussions about the genesis of *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu*, *Agni* and *Ap*, the student would naturally expect the next discussion to come could be about the origination of *Pṛthivī*, the Earth. S. Radhkrishnan avers that "there is a *sūtra* which is not mentioned by Śaṅkarācārya, Bhāskara and Baladeva. 'The Earth originates from water' *Pṛthivī*"[4]. Madhvācārya also does

1 ब्रह्मणः एव अबादिसृष्टिः। (M. BSB.2-3-11).

2 अत्र न्यायप्राप्तभूतवायुपृथिव्योषध्यादीनां ब्रह्मजातत्वज्ञापनार्थमादिपदं भाष्ये। सूत्रेऽप्पदमन्योपलक्षणम्। (TP. 2-3-11).

3 घर्मात्स्वेदादिदृष्टेः पुनः प्रतिषेधः। (M. BSB.2-3-11).

4 SRK. p. 401.

not read this *sūtra*. But he has indicated in his interpretation of the preceding *sutra* that the genesis of Earth from *Brahman* could be understood by *upalakṣaṇa*. Rāmānujācārya reads this *sūtra*, '*Pṛthivī*', and interprets it as mentioning the opponent view that the Earth originates from the waters.

Even after accepting the fact that the Supreme Being directly originates everything in finite reality through some vehicles, there still remain some contradictions in scriptural texts about these vehicles themselves and their sequence etc. For example, one text tells that "They, the waters mused, 'may we become many, may we produce many', they produced *Anna*"[1]. Another text says that "from waters, the Earth originated. From the Earth, sprang plants. From the plants, the food (*Annaṁ*) was created"[2].

The doubt here is whether the Earth originates from water, or the food. The next *sutra* reconciles the conflict.

|| ॐ पृथिव्यधिकाररूपशब्दान्तरादिभ्यः ॐ || (2-3-12)

अन्नं पृथिवी न प्रसिद्धान्नम्। कुतः। अधिकारात् 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत'[3] इत्यादिभूतप्रकरणात्। 'यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्य'[4] इति कृष्णरूपात्। 'पृथिवी वा अन्नम्'[5] इति शब्दान्तरात्। आदिपदात् वेदो न अप्रमाणम् अपौरुषेयत्वात् इत्यादियुक्तेश्च इत्यर्थः।

The word *Annaṁ* (here in *Chānogya Śruti*) refers to Earth and not to the popularly understood food. The reasons for this preference are: (i) The context of the topic (*adhikāra*) is of the evolution of the basic elements as expressed by the text '*tattejo'sṛjata*', just preceding it. (ii) Further (in the same chapter of that *Upaniṣad*), *Annaṁ* is said to be black in colour, which agrees with the appearance (*rūpa*) of Earth. (iii)

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1 ता आप ऐक्षन्त बह्व्यः स्याम प्रजायेमहीति ता अन्नमसृजन्त। (Chand. Up. 6-2-4).

2 अद्भ्यः पृथिवी। पृथिव्या ओषधयः। ओषधीभ्योऽन्नम्। (Tait. Up. 2-1).

3 That (*Brahman*) created *Tejas* (fire). (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3).

4 That which is black belongs to *Anna*. (Chānd. Up. 6-4-1).

5 The Earth also is denoted by *annaṁ* . (Tait. Up. 3-9).

Moreover, there are scriptural texts (*śabdāntara*) like '*Pṛthivī vā annaṁ* ' etc. which confirm that '*annaṁ* ' can denote the Earth. The term '*ādi* ' (etc.) in the *sūtra* suggests the existence of arguments in addition to the above three, like the irrefutability of Vedas on account of their divine superhuman nature.

All the commentators agree on the interpretation of this *sūtra*.

7 तदभिध्यानाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात् सः ॐ ॥

(2-3-13)

This *sūtra* is viewed by different commentators differently. The word *abhidhyāna* means (i) desire or (ii) deep thinking.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the doubt here is whether the insentient elements themselves bring forth their effects without any help from *Brahman*. The *sūtra* resolves that[1] He, the Supreme Being only abiding in the form of these elements and reflecting on the respective effects produces these effects; whence? on account of His that characteristic (of being the controlling principle in these elements).

Rāmānujācārya stresses[2] on the word *tu* (but) in the *sūtra*. So he assumes the previous *sūtra*s No. 10,11 and 12 split into two, as *Pūrvapakṣa* and this *sūtra* as the *Siddhānta*. The word 'but' refutes the view expressed in the previous *sūtras*. This *sūtra* avers that the Supreme Being, as embodied in the immediately preceding substance, is the direct cause of all effects like *Mahat* etc. Whence? From the indicatory mark, viz. reflection on the part of these substances.

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1 स एव परमेश्वरः तेन तेन आत्मना अवतिष्ठमानः अभिध्यायन् तं तं विकारं सृजतीति: कुतः? तल्लिङ्गात्। (S. BSB. 2-3-13).

2 तुशब्दात्पक्षो व्यावृत्तः। महदादिकार्याणामपि तत्तदनन्तरवस्तुशरीरकः स एव पुरुषोत्तम कारणम्। कुतः? तदभिध्यानरूपात् तल्लिङ्गात्। (Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-3-14).

Madhvācārya takes an all-together different view. He thinks that the discussion about the genesis of the basic elements is over and a fresh topic about their dissolution starts here. The exposition of the *sūtra* is as follows.

सः परमात्मा तु संहर्ता, कुतः? तदभिध्यानादेव तल्लिङ्गात् 'तस्याभिध्यानात्--विश्वमाया निवृत्तिः'[1] इति श्रुतौ यस्य परमात्मनः अनादिबन्धलयस्य तदभिध्याननिमित्तत्वलिङ्गं प्रतीयते तस्यैव सादिजगत्संहर्तृत्वलिङ्गात्।

He, the Supreme Being, indeed is the destroyer (of the world) because He only has the characteristic of being the destroyer of the created world, which understanding naturally follows from His indicatory mark that His desire is the cause of dissolution of beginningless bondage, as disclosed by the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* text (1-10).

In this explanation, the two terms with ablative endings in the *sūtra*, are not taken as providing two reasons for the same assertion. But one provides the reason for the other. Thus, there is a two-stage successive (*Pāramparika*) reasoning. *Paramātman*'s causality of destruction of the created world is inferred from His causality of the dissolution of the beginningless trans-migratory bondage, by '*a fortiori*' arguments (*kaimutyanyāya*). The idea is that when *Paramātman*'s desire can be the cause of the dissolution of the beginningless bondage of *saṁsāra* itself, then what to talk of the capability of His desire in destroying the created world[2].

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya interpret this *sūtra* in the context of preceding *sūtras*. But, the doubt assumed by Śaṅkarācārya is not acceptable even to his own followers who have written glosses on his commentary. Amalānanda remarks in his *Kalpataru* that this doubt renders the *sūtra* redundant since

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1 Śveta. Up. 1-10.

2 अनादिबन्धसंहर्तृत्वात् स विष्णुः सादिजगत्संहर्ता अनुमीयते इति पञ्चम्योर्वैय्याधिकरण्यमुपेत्य परम्परया हेतुत्वोक्तिः। (TDK. 2-3-13). *Vaiyādhikaraṇam* means the state of being in different case relations or positions.

it has been considered earlier. He modifies the doubt by shifting it from the insentient elements to their presiding deities[1]. But in the preceding *sūtras*, Śaṅkarācārya has all along considered the elements only and therefore this shift in *Pūrvapakṣa*, amounts to a shift in the position taken by Śaṅkarācārya[2]. Hence, it is difficult to accept this interpretation as convincing. Rāmānujācārya's interpretation also is, more or less, on the same lines. Moreover, the difficulties in considering the previous *sūtras* themselves as *Pūrvapakṣa*, are already mentioned earlier.

Madhvācārya thinks that this *Adhikaraṇa* decides the authority of *Brahman* in dissolution of the world, because the next *Adhikaraṇa* talks about the details of dissolution, like the sequence. He finds the necessity of this *Adhikaraṇa* in order to dispel a possible doubt due to some apparently conflicting *Śruti* statements like the one from *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* (16-2)[3] which holds a functional deity (Rudra) as the author of destruction while *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (3-1)[4] avers that *Brahman* is the final repository of all created things. The difficulty in accepting Madhvācārya's interpretation is that there is no term in the *sūtra*, which suggests that the *sūtra* talks about dissolution. But, even in the first *sūtra* of this *Pāda*, '*na viyadaśruteḥ* (BS. 2-3-1)', there is no word to suggest that the *sūtra* initiates a discussion on the creation. As it is a guesswork there, depending on the context, here too it is so. Madhvācārya's guess appears convincing.

8 विपर्ययाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ॐ ॥

(2-3-14)

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1 न तावदिह भूतानां ब्रह्मानधिष्ठितानां स्रष्टृत्वाभावश्चिन्त्यते। ईक्षत्याद्यधिकरणैर्गतत्वात्। नापि ब्रह्मण एव तत्तद्भूतात्मनावास्थितस्योत्तरोत्तरकार्योपादानत्वम्। 'तेजोऽत' इत्यत्र तन्निर्णयात्। अतोऽधिकरणानारम्भ इत्याशङ्कामपनयन् संगतिमाह।(*Kalpataru* 2-3-13) (BNK. II. p. 171)

2 BNK. II. p. 172.

3 प्राणानां ग्रंथिरसि रुद्रो मा विशान्तकस्तेनान्नेनाप्यायस्व। (Mahā. N. Up. 16-2).

4 यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद्ब्रह्मेति। (Tai. Up. 3-1).

Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya hold that this *sūtra* decides the sequence of retraction of created elements during dissolution. But Rāmānujācārya thinks that the discussion about creation still continues and that this *sūtra* tells about the order of creation. He points out to an apparent conflict between *Taittīriya Upaniṣad* and *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* regarding sequence of creation. The first one tells[1] that *Ākāśa* sprang from *Brahman*, Air originated from *Ākāśa*, Fire from Air and so on. But the *Muṇḍaka śruti* says[2] that from It (*Brahman*) is born the vital breath, mind, all the sense-organs, *Ākāśa*, air, fire, water, earth. This sequence is quite the reverse (*viparyaya*) of what the preceding text says. According to Rāmānujācārya[3] this *sūtra* declares that the sequence of creation stated in the reverse order is tenable only on the acceptance of the position that each of these effects is from *Brahman* itself, embodied in the immediately preceding causal substance. In view of the laconic composition of the *sūtra*, this interpretation by Rāmānujācārya cannot be said as incorrect. However, it appears, as observed by V. S. Ghate[4], "far less natural than the one given by Śaṅkarācārya."

The *Śruti* '*yatprayantyabhisaṁviśanti* (Tait. Up. 3-1, quoted under the previous *sūtra*) tells that all created things finally enter and dissolve into *Brahman*. But it does not talk of the order of retraction of the things. So, the doubt here, according to Śaṅkarācārya, is whether the retraction of the created things takes place in the same order as they are created or there is no definite order at all. The *sūtra* avers that the order in which the created things are retracted into *Brahman* is the reverse of that in which they are created, and it is logical. Śaṅkarācārya provides some practical examples. One who climbs up a stair has to climb down

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1 एतस्मादात्मन आकाशस्संभूतः। आकाशाद्वायुः। वायोरग्निः। अग्नेरापः।अद्भ्यः पृथिवी। (Tait. Up. 2-1).

2 एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च। खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी॥ (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3).

3 स च क्रमः तत्तद्रूपाद् ब्रह्मणः तत्तत्कार्योत्पत्तेरेव उपपद्यते। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-15).

4 VSG. p. 83.

in the reverse order only. A clay-pot, when destroyed, goes back to its cause, the clay. However, Śaṅkarācārya has not pointed out any conflict between two *Śruti* texts, which would have justified the inclusion of this *sūtra* in this *Pāda*.

Madhvācārya interprets the *sūtra* on these lines only. He quotes some apparently conflicting texts. One text[1] says that "from the same Lord indeed this world is produced successively and is retracted successively." From this text, it appears that origination and retraction of the world takes place in the same order. Another text[2] tells that "from the imperishable Supreme Being only, all this originates sequentially and into the same Supreme Being everything is retracted in the reverse order." This *Śruti* clearly tells that dissolution occurs in the reverse order.

The *sūtra* reconciles this contradiction as follows.

क्रमः तु, 'क्रमादुत्पद्यते क्रमाद्विलीयते' इति श्रुत्युक्तलयक्रमः तु ,अतः प्रकृतात् सृष्टिक्रमात् विपर्ययेण भवति। कुतः? अतः, अस्यामेव श्रुतौ 'क्रमाद्युत्क्रमाच्च' इति व्युत्क्रमाल्लयशब्दात्। तर्हि लोकविरोधः इत्यतः उक्तं पूर्वोत्पन्नानां सामर्थ्याधिक्यात् विपर्यय उपपद्यते च इति।

The order of the dissolution mentioned in the *Śruti* text that '(the world) is produced in order and is retracted in order', is the reverse of the order of evolution because in this very *Śruti* it is further clarified that dissolution is in the reverse of the order of evolution[3]. If this is so, one may feel that it is against common experience. Therefore it is explained that those produced earlier are comparatively more powerful and hence the dissolution in the reverse order is quite proper also.

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1 'अत एव हीदं परात्क्रमादुत्पद्यते क्रमाद्विलीयते नासावुदेति नास्तमेति' इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतौ क्रमाल्लयः प्रतीयते। (M. BSB. 2-3-14).

2 'अक्षरात्परमादेव सर्वमुत्पद्यते क्रमात्। व्युत्क्रमाद्विलयश्चैव तस्मिन्नेव परात्मनि॥' इति चतुर्वेदशिखायां व्युत्क्रमाल्लयः प्रतीयते। (M. BSB. 2-3-14).

3 'कर्ता प्राणादिकस्यास्य हन्ता भूम्यादिकस्य च। यः क्रमाद्युत्क्रमाच्चैव स हरिः पर उच्यते॥' इत्यत एव भाल्लवेयश्रुतिवचनात्। (M. BSB. 2-3-14).

It is to be noted that the *Śruti* text that 'the world is evolved in order and dissolved in order' is not contradicted later by the same *Śruti*, because the 'reverse order' is also an order[1].

9 अन्तराधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तल्लिङ्गादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ॐ ॥
(2-3-15)

This *sūtra* is interpreted differently by different commentators. The word *antarā* in the *sūtra* means (1) between, or (2) except, and is used as a preposition with nouns in the accusative case.

Śaṅkarācārya takes the word *antarā* in the sense of 'between'. He refers to a conflict between the oft-quoted *Taititiīya* text (2-1), which describes the order of origination as *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. and the *Muṇḍaka* text (2-1-3) (quoted earlier under BS. 2-3-14), which mentions the genesis of mind and sense-organs between *Brahman* and the elements. Thus, there is a variation from the previously stated sequence of origination and retraction. The *sūtra* refutes this contention on account of non-difference (*aviśeṣāt*) between the instruments like the intellect, mind etc. and the elements[2]. Śankarācārya quotes a *Chāndogya* text to show that non-difference. He further argues that[3] the *Muṇḍaka* text provides just a list of created things like elements and sense organs, and not the order of their creation.

Thus, Śaṅkarācārya reverts to the topic of creation of things and the order of their creation. If the *Sūtrakāra* had this topic in his mind, he could have positioned this *sūtra* along with others

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1 विपरीतक्रमस्यापि क्रमत्वादिति भावः। (TDK. 2-3-14).

2 आथर्वणे (मुण्डके) उत्पत्तिप्रकरणे भूतानामात्मनश्च अन्तराले (विज्ञानमनसी इत्यादि) करणानि अनुक्रम्यन्ते। तस्मात् पूर्वोक्तोत्पत्तिप्रलयक्रमभङ्गो भूतानामिति चेत्, न अविशेषात्। (S. BSB. 2-3-15).

3 आथर्वणे तु समाम्नायक्रममात्रं करणानां भूतानां च। न तत्र उत्पत्तिक्रम उच्यते। (S. BSB. 2-3-15).

dealing with creation. Moreover, the *Muṇḍaka* text under reference, mentions *Prāṇa*, *Manas* and *Indriyas* in between *Brahman* and *Ākāśa*, but this *sūtra* refers only to *Manas* and *Vijñāna*. The omission of *Prāṇa* in the *sūtra*, creates a doubt whether the *Sūtrakāra* intended to discuss this topic here. Therefore, this interpretation does not appear convincing.

Rāmānujācārya continues the discussion of creation. So he cannot be said to have reverted to the topic of creation. He holds that[1] the word *vijñāna* in the *sūtra*, which means knowledge, stands for the instruments of knowledge i.e. sense-organs. In the previous *sūtra* (BS. 2-3-14), Rāmānujācārya refers to the *Muṇḍaka* text (2-1-3) and avers that each one of the entities listed therein, originates directly from *Brahman*, embodied in the immediately preceding causal substance. But, the *Pūrvapakṣin* insists that this *Muṇḍaka* text gives the order of creation only because[2] the elements *Akāśa* etc. mentioned therein are in the order of creation, corroborated by other *Śruti*. The *sūtra* refutes this argument as follows. "On account of the indicative mark of being mentioned with them (*Ākāśa* etc.) if it be said that *Vijñāna* and *Manas* also are apprehended as being produced in order, in between the elements and the *Prāṇa*, (we say) it is not so, on account of non-distinction, i.e. because the relation of the form of direct origination of *Vijñāna*, and *Manas* and *Ākāśa* etc., mentioned in the passage, 'from this, is produced', is common to all entities from *Prāṇa* to the Earth, the same should be thought of and not the order"[3].

In spite of importation (*adhyāhāra*) of so many words, this interpretation does not appear to offer a clinching answer to the objection. It is almost a repetition of what is said in the interpretation

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1 विज्ञानसाधनत्वात् इन्द्रियाणि विज्ञानमित्युच्यन्ते। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-16).

2 खादिषु तावत् श्रुत्यन्तरसिद्धः कमः अत्रापि प्रतीयते। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-16).

3 तैः सहपाठलिङ्गात् भूतप्राणयोरन्तराले विज्ञानमनसी अपि क्रमेण उत्पद्येते --- इति चेत् तन्न अविशेषात्। विज्ञानमनसोः खादीनां च एतस्माज्जायते इत्यनेन साक्षात्संभवरूपसंबन्धस्याभिधेयस्य सर्वेषां प्राणादिपृथिव्यन्तानामविशिष्टत्वात्स एव विधेयो न क्रमः। (Śrībhāṣya - RDK 2-3-16).

of the previous *sūtra*. Rāmānujācārya also has not given any explanation regarding the omission of *Prāṇa* in the *sūtra*. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the *Sūtrakāra* intended to discuss this topic.

Madhvācārya understands the word *antarā* in the *sūtra*, in the sense of 'except', and he does not leave the track of the topic from the previous *sūtra*. According to him, this and the next *sūtra* consider whether there are any exceptions to the general rule of dissolution in the reverse order of that of creation.

He quotes a text[1], which tells that "from *Prāṇa*, originates *Manas* and from *Manas*, originates *Vijñāna*". Another text[2] indicates the order of dissolution as it says, "the wise shall contemplate that speech merges into mind and mind retracts into *Vijñāna*". *Vijñāna* originates from *Manas* and therefore as per the general rule of dissolution it should retract into *Manas*. But here in the latter text, *Manas* is said to be retracting into *Vijñāna*. Thus, a doubt arises whether *Vijñāna* and *Manas* are exceptions to the general rule. The *sūtra* rejects such a contention, as follows.

विज्ञानमनसी अन्तरा क्रमेण प्रागुक्तक्रमेण अन्येषां तत्त्वानां लयः तल्लिङ्गात् श्रुत्युक्तात् उत्पत्तिक्रमलयाख्यलिङ्गात् इति चेन्न अविशेषात् तद्विशेषप्रमाणाभावात् ।

If it be said that the law of dissolution in the reverse order, established before, is applicable to all other principles except *Vijñāna* and *Manas* on account of their characteristic of retracting in the same order as in creation, as told in *Śruti*, it is not so because there is no special evidence to that effect.

No doubt, this interpretation with a minimum of importation appears natural and lucid. But, when the *Pūrvapakṣin* can point out *Śruti* texts which declare the evolution and dissolution of

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1 प्राणान्मनो मनसश्च विज्ञानम् । (M. BSB. 2-3-15). The source of this *Śruti* is not known. However, the Tait. Up. Gives the same order of genesis as follows. (i) एतस्मात् प्राणमयात् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः । (2-3) (ii) एतस्मात् मनोमयात् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः । (2-4).

2 यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसि प्राज्ञः तद्यच्छेज्ज्ञान आत्मनि । (Kaṭha. Up. 1-3-13).

Vijñāna and *Manas* in the same order as that in creation, a naive argument that there is no special evidence to that effect does not appear to be clinching reply.

The *Sūtrakāra* seems to be aware of this. Therefore, he clarifies in the next *sūtra* where the misconception of the *Pūrvapakṣin* lies. This is a complicated *sūtra* and calls for a cool attention.

॥ ॐ चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्वात् ॐ ॥
(2-3-16)

The word *Manas* (in the preceding *sūtra*) indeed stands for the principle of mind (at universal level) as well as for the individual internal instrument (*antaḥkaraṇa*) of cognition. Similarly, the term *Vijñāna* denotes the principle of intellect as well as the common knowledge acquired by the individuals[1].

The word *cara* in the *sūtra* stands for the fickle sense-organ, mind, and its state of cognition called knowledge. The term *acara* indicates the steady principles of mind and intellect (at the universal level)[2]. The *sūtra* clarifies:

तद्व्यपदेशः 'मनसश्च विज्ञानमि'ति मनोविज्ञानशब्दरूपो व्यपदेशः तु चराचरव्यपाश्रयः स्यात् इन्द्रियतद्वृत्तितत्त्वविषयः सम्भावितः। तथापि सः व्यपदेशः तु भाक्तः[3] अन्तःकरणावबोधरूपभागविषयः एव। न तद्विषयकत्वे अनुपपत्तिः। कुतः? तद्भावभावित्वात् चराचरेषु तस्य मनसः भावेन आलोचनेन अवबोधस्य भावित्वात् उत्पन्नत्वात्।[4]

It is possible that, in the statement '*Vijñāna* originates from *Manas*', the words *Manas* and *Vijñāna* can convey respectively (i) the sense organ, mind, and its principle, and

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1 मनःशब्दो हि तत्त्वे अन्तःकरणे च वर्तते तथा विज्ञानशब्दोऽपि तत्त्वे अवबोधे च। (TP. 2-3-16).

2 चर इति चञ्चलत्वात् मनोरूपमिन्द्रियं तद्वृत्तिरूपावज्ञानं च उच्यते। अचर इति अचञ्चलत्वात् मनस्तत्त्वं विज्ञानतत्त्वं च। (TDK. 2-3-16).

3 भक्त means divided or parted, from the root भज् to divide. The term भाक्त is formed by suffixing अण् as per sūtra 'तस्येदम्' (Pāṇini 4-3-120). Thus, भाक्त means partial.

4 VKM 2-3-16.

(ii) the mind's state of cognition called knowledge and the principle of intellect. Yet, those terms in that statement refer only to their partial senses, the individual sense organ and its state of cognition respectively. It is not illogical to accept those senses because the knowledge of moving and non-moving objects in the world originates from the reflective action of the mind.

Therefore, this characteristic of *Vijñāna* in the sense of ordinary knowledge, originating from *Manas* as a sense organ, is not a special evidence to render the universal principles of *Vijñāna* and *Manas* as exceptions to the general rule of dissolution in the reverse order.

In order to show that the sequence of evolution of *Manas* and *Vijñāna* as the universal principles, is quite different, Madhvācārya quotes a verse from *Skanda Purāṇa* which gives the order as follows:

Brahman→ *Avyakta*→ *Mahat*→ *Vijñāna*→ *Manas*→ *Ākāśa*→ *Vāyu* etc. Dissolution would be in the reverse order.

Such an argument based on recognizing different referents of the terms mind and intellect, could be more effective in reconciling the conflict between the *Taittirīya* Text (2-1) and *Muṇḍaka* text (2-1-3) under the previous *sūtra*, than those offered by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya.

The interpretations of this *sūtra* by Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya are quite different. Rāmānujācārya considers this *sūtra* as the last one of *Tejodhikaraṇa* and interprets it in two ways. In the first, he takes the word *bhākta* in the sense of partial. The *sūtra* tells that[1] the reference to moving and non-moving things by various words is only in a partial sense, because all

1 निखिलजङ्गमस्थावरव्यपाश्रयः तत्तच्छब्दव्यपदेशो भाक्तः वाच्यैकदेशो भज्यते इत्यर्थः। समस्तवस्तु-प्रकारिणो ब्रह्मणः प्रकारभूतवस्तुग्राहिप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविषयत्वात् -----, (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-17).

objects are modes of *Brahman* and all words denote *Brahman*, but that *Brahman*, is not comprehensible by perception etc. Alternatively, he takes the word *bhākta* in the sense of secondary and reads the word *abhākta* i.e. primary in the *sūtra*, Then the *sūtra* means that[1] the words denoting moving and non-moving entities denote *Brahman* in their primary sense because "the denotative nature of all words points out to the nature of *Brahman*"[2]. With these interpretations, the *sūtra* appears out of context in a discussion on the genesis of elements. Moreover, there is no conflict here between two texts, to justify the inclusion of this *sūtra* in this *Pāda*. Thus, the interpretation appears far-fetched and unconvincing. The very fact that the commentator offers two interpretations of the *sūtra*, shows that he is unsure as to what exactly the *Sūtrakāra* intends to tell in this *sūtra*.

Śaṅkarācārya assumes that the discussion about the evolution and dissolution of elements is over with the preceding *sūtra*, and that with this *sūtra* onwards upto the end of this *Pāda*, the discussion would be about the problems connected with individual souls, *Jīvas*. He takes the word *bhākta* in the secondary sense. According to him, the *sūtra* declares as follows. The usage of the words, birth and death, with respect to a *Jīva*, is in a figurative sense only. The words, birth and death, primarily refer to the moving and non-moving bodies, and are used in regard to *Jīva* abiding in them in a secondary sense, because these words, birth and death, come into use when the body emerges and disappears, and not otherwise[3].

The pronoun *tad* in the compound '*tadvyapadeśaḥ*' in the *sūtra*, should refer to some noun appearing in the preceding *sūtra*.

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1 चराचरवाचिशब्दः ब्रह्मणि अभाक्तः मुख्यः। कुतः? ब्रह्मभावभावित्वात् सर्वशब्दानां वाचकभावस्य। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-17).

2 Śrībhāṣya - RDK 2-3-17.

3 भाक्तः तु एष जीवस्य जन्ममरणव्यपदेशः। चराचरव्यपाश्रयः स्थावरजङ्गमशरीरविषयौ जन्ममरणशब्दौ। अतः तद्विषयौ जन्ममरणशब्दौ मुख्यौ सन्तौ तत्स्थे जीवात्मनि उपचर्यते तद्भावभावित्वात्। शरीरप्रादुर्भावतिरोभावयोः हि सतोः जन्ममरणशब्दौ भवतः न असतोः (S.BSB. 2-3-16).

But in this interpretation, *tad* refers to the birth and death of *Jīva*, which does not appear anywhere in the preceding *sūtras* of this *Pāda*. Thus, the interpretation appears arbitrary[1] and hence unconvincing.

10 आत्माधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ नात्माऽश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः ॐ ॥ (2-3-17)

The commentators differ in their interpretations of this *sūtra*.

Śaṅkarācārya holds that this *sūtra* discusses about the genesis of the individual soul, *Jīvātman* i.e. *Jīva*. The doubt here is whether *Ātman* in the sense of *Jīva*, is originated from *Brahman*, like *Ākāśa* etc. or it is un- originated like *Brahman*[2]. He points out to a conflict of texts in this respect. One text[3] tells that like the sparks from fire, *Jīvas* originate from *Brahman*. Another text[4] tells that that immortal Supreme Being enters the creation and He only gets the status of *Jīva*; the text does not tell the creation of *Jīva* as such. The *sūtra* resolves this conflict as follows[5]. *Ātman* i.e. *Jīva* is not created, because in the context of creation of elements in *Śruti*, there is no mention of the genesis of this *Jīva*. And it is understood from *Śruti* texts that *Jīva* is eternal only. This is what is declared by the *sūtra*. Śaṅkarācārya draws further additional conclusions[6]. Similarly, it is also understood from *Śruti*

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1 BNK. II. p. 191.

2 किं जीवाख्यः आत्मा व्योमादिवत् ब्रह्मणः उत्पद्यते आहोस्वित् ब्रह्मवदेव न उत्पद्यते।

3 यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकाद् विस्फुलिङ्गाः सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः। तथाक्षरात् विविधाः भावाः प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापियन्ति। As from the flaming fire issue forth thousands of sparks of the same form, so from the Immortal proceed diverse *Jīvas* and they find their way back into it. (Muṇḍa. Up. 2-1-1).

4 इदं सर्वमसृजत यदिदं किञ्च। तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत। He created all this whatever exists. Having created, He entered it (Tait. Up. 2-6).

5 न आत्मा जीव उत्पद्यत इति ; कस्मात्? अश्रुतेः। न हि अस्य उत्पत्तिप्रकरणे श्रवणमस्ति भूयःसु प्रदेशेषु। नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः। नित्यत्वं हि अस्य श्रुतिभ्यो अवगम्यते। (S. BSB. 2-3-17).

6 तथा अजत्वम् अविकारित्वम् अविकृतस्यैव ब्रह्मणो जीवात्मनावस्थानं ब्रह्मात्मना च इति। (S. BSB.2-3-17).

texts that *Jīvātman* is beginningless, immutable, and that the immutable *Brahman* only gets the status of *Jīva* and that *Jīva* is in essence *Brahman* only. He then quotes a number of texts in support of his corollary conclusions.

The word *Ātman*[1] no doubt stands for both *Paramātman* and *Jīvātman*, but it primarily denotes *Brahman*. We have seen earlier in '*dyubhvādhikaraṇa* (BS. 1-3-1)' that the word *Ātman* is to be preferably taken in the sense of *Brahman*. Hnece, in this *sūtra* also the word *Ātman* is *Brahman*. In that case, the *sūtra* would mean that *Brahman* has no genesis, which has already been proved earlier in *Asambhavādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-3-9).

Further, if *Ātman* is taken in the sense of *Jīva*, then the *sūtra* would mean that *Jīva* has no genesis. But this beginninglessness of *Jīva*, *saṁsāra*, *karma* etc. has already been argued in BS. 2-1-35. Thus, whether one takes the word *Ātman* in the *sūtra* as *Brahman* or *Jīva*, the above interpretation renders the *sūtra* itself redundant. Moreover, the additional conclusions that the immutable *Brahman* only gets the status of *Jīva* and that *Jīva* is in essence *Brahman* only are, as the commentator says, understood from *Śruti* texts. Hence, it is a matter extraneous to the *sūtra*. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the *Taittirīya* text '*tad sṛṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśata*' can be construed as declaring that the Supreme Being only gets the status of *Jīva* in sentient things, because He enters everything created by Him, both sentient and insentient (*yadidaṁ kiñca*). With this interpretation, the *sūtra* does not offer any new scope to arrive at the doctrine that '*Jīva* is in essence *Brahman* only'.

Thus, the above interpretation of the *sūtra* is found farfetched and unconvincing.

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1 आत्मशब्दश्च परमात्मपरिग्रहे सम्यगवकल्पते न अर्थान्तरपरिग्रहे । (S. BSB. 1-3-1). The use of the word *Ātman*, self, denotes *Brahman* and not unintelligent matter or the individual soul. (SRK. p. 286).

Rāmānujācārya reads the word *aśruteḥ* in the *sūtra* as *Śruteḥ*, and interprets the *sūtra* on the same lines as follows: The individual self is not (produced), (for it is so) mentioned in the scriptures, also (on account of its) being eternal, (for so it is known) from them (the *Śruti* texts)[1]. Then he also draws extra conclusions according to his views[2] that *Brahman* has for its body the sentient and insentient beings both in the causal and effected states, etc. This interpretation is also found unconvincing for the same reason, stated above.

Like Śaṅkarācārya, Madhvācārya also reads the word *aśruteḥ* in the *sūtra*, but takes the word *Ātman* in the sense of *Brahman*. Having established that all elements in the world evolve from *Brahman* and are subject to retraction into *Brahman* in a reverse order, and that *Brahman* itself has no genesis, Madhvācārya holds that the *Sūtrakāra* now considers a possible doubt whether *Brahman* also is subject to extinction (*laya*). According to him, the discussion on dissolution still continues. He quotes a text[3], which says that "He having caused all this to dissolve in darkness, finally remains hidden in that darkness, having dissolved the darkness He issues forth". Such a description of *Brahman* during dissolution (*pralaya*) that 'He remains hidden in darkness' may be understood by linguists that this may be a euphemistic way of telling that *Brahman* also gets disintegrated into extinction. The *sūtra* rules out such an extinction for *Brahman*.

आत्मा परमात्मा न लीयते कुतः अश्रुतेः ब्रह्मलयस्य अश्रवणात् ताभ्यः 'तुच्छेनाभ्वपिहितं यदासीत्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः तस्य नित्यत्वात् च ।[4]

The Supreme Being does not become extinct, because there is no such evidence of *Brahman*'s extinction in the scriptures, and also because Its eternality is (positively)

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1 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-3-18.

2 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-3-18.

3 स इदं सर्वम् विलाप्य अन्तस्तमसि निलीनः तद् विलाप्य व्युत्तिष्ठते। (M. BSB. 2-3-17).

4 VKM. 2-3-17.

understood from many scriptural texts like *Nāsadīyasūkta* which tells that 'the all-pervading one (*ābhu*) lay concealed by the inferior (*tuccha*) principle of *Prakṛti*.

According to Madhvācārya, the text that tells that He lies hidden in darkness does not mean that the Supreme Being melts away into extinction, but only means that during dissolution (*pralaya*) He remains concealed and wrapped up in primeval darkness which is an aspect of *Prakṛti* and is invisible to others[1]. *Nāsadīyasūkta* corroborates this aspect[2].

As an example of *Śruti* texts, which positively describe *Brahman* as eternal, Madhvācārya quotes a *mantra* from *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, which says that[3] "He is the eternal of eternals".

11 ज्ञाधिकरणम् ।

The *Sūtrakāra* now turns towards the more difficult questions about the sentient beings i.e. *Jīva*s and discusses them till the end of this *Pāda*.

॥ ॐ ज्ञोऽत एव ॐ ॥ **(2-3-18)**

Śaṅkarācārya sees a doubt as follows. The *Vaiśeṣika*s believe that the individual soul, *Jīva*, in essence has no intelligence, but it acquires intelligence later through sense organs, while the *Sāṅkhya*s hold that the soul is basically of the nature of eternal intelligence[4]. So the doubt is whether *Jīva*'s intelligence is adventitious or natural. The *sūtra* clarifies the doubt.

(The soul is) intelligence (*jñaḥ*), for this very reason (*ata eva*)[5].

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1 BNK. II. p. 188.

2 तुच्छयेनाभ्वापिहितं यदासीत् । (RV. 10-129-3).

3 नित्यो नित्यानाम् । (Kaṭha. Up. 2-2-13).

4 स किं काणभुजानामिवागन्तुकचैतन्यः स्वतोऽचेतनः आहोस्वित् सांख्यानामिव नित्यचैतन्यस्वरूप एव । (S. BSB. 2-3-18).

5 SRK. p. 405.

Śaṅkarācārya explains[1]: This *Ātman* (*Jīva*) is of the nature of eternal intelligence for this very reason, i.e. because *jīva* is unoriginated, i.e. because the unmodified Supreme *Brahman* only appears as *Jīva* on account of *Brahman*'s contact with limiting adjuncts; the Supreme *Brahman* only is said to be of the nature of intelligence, in scriptures.

In this syllogism, the subject (*kartā*) '*Jīva*' is repeated from the previous *sūtra*. The predicate '*jñaḥ*' is interpreted in the sense of the nature of intelligence. The probans '*ata eva*' is construed as 'because *Jīva* is unoriginated' from the decision in the preceding *sūtra* according to the commentator. But his further conclusion based on this unoriginated status of *Jīva*, that the unmodified Supreme *Brahman* only appears as *Jīva* on account of *Brahman*'s contact with limiting adjuncts, looks hypothetical. And without this hypothesis, the mere fact of being unoriginated cannot prove *Jīva*'s nature of intelligence[2].

In the above argument, it is taken for granted as a proven fact that because *Jīva* is unoriginated, *Brahman* only owing to contact with limiting adjuncts appears as *Jīva*. This doctrine is neither proved in any of the earlier *sūtras* nor any reference to it is made. The previous *sūtra* is interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya as saying that *Jīva* is un-originated. Even that is found unconvincing. Therefore, all this argument cannot be sustained by the words '*ata eva*' in the *sūtra*[3].

Further, the word '*jñaḥ*' grammatically means[4] 'the knower' but not 'the knowledge', as assumed in the interpretation. Moreover, the validity or else of the tenets of various schools

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1 ज्ञः नित्यचैतन्योऽयमात्मा अत एव यस्मादेव नोत्पद्यते परमेव ब्रह्म अविकृतमुपाधिसंपर्काज्जीवभावेनावतिष्ठते ; परस्य हि ब्रह्मणश्चैतन्यस्वरूपत्वमाम्नातम् ।(S. BSB. 2-3-18).

2 अनुत्पत्तिमात्रेण ज्ञत्वासिद्धेश्च । (TC. III. p. 108).

3 ज्ञानरूपब्रह्माभेदस्य च अप्रकृतत्वेन सौत्रेण अतःशब्देन अनुक्तेः । (TC. III. p. 108).

4 इगुपधज्ञाप्रीकिरः कः । (Pāṇini 3-1-135). After a verb ending in a consonant but preceded by इ, उ or ऋ (long or short), and after the verbs ज्ञा, प्री and कृ, comes the affix क (अ). ज्ञा+क = ज्ञः (knower)

other than *Vedānta* are considered in the second *Pāda* of this *Adhyāya*. In this *Pāda*, the apparent conflicts of texts within *Vedānta* are discussed[1]. Therefore, a *Pūrvapakṣa* based on the difference between the tenets of *Vaiśeṣika* and *Sāṅkhya* schools does not fit in here[2]. Thus, the interpretation of the *sūtra* is not convincing.

Rāmānujācārya takes the word *jñaḥ* as the 'knower' instead of 'knowledge' and interprets the *sūtra* as follows. "The *Ātman* is the knower himself, having the nature of the knower alone, not merely consciousness; not again having a non-sentient nature. Whence? For this very reason, that is to say, from the *Śruti* itself"[3]. Rāmānujācārya takes the same controversy between *Vaiśeṣika* view and *Sāṅkhya* view, and the discussion does not become suitable for this *Pāda*.

So far in this *Pāda*, till the preceding *sūtra*, we see that the *Ādhibhautika* entities like the elements air, fire etc. and the *Ādhidaivika* entities like the presiding deities of those elements, are all subject to genesis and dissolution. In order to explain the genesis of eternal things like space, time etc. Madhvācārya propounds a concept of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*. In the case of other things, which are created *de novo*, the genesis is termed as *Abhūtvābhavanaṁ*. In all these cases of origination and dissolution, the author is held to be the Supreme Being, *Paramātman*, and He Himself is shown to be not subject to either genesis or extinction. The present *sūtra* being the first one of a new series, which discusses *Ādhyātmika* topics i.e. topics concerning the sentient individual souls, *Jīvas*, Madhvācārya expects it to start with the genesis of *Jīvas*, and with this background he understands the words '*ata eva*' in the *sūtra* as 'from this *Paramātman* only' who

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1 सर्ववेदान्तर्गतसृष्टिश्रुत्यर्थनिर्मलत्वाय परः प्रपञ्चः आरभ्यते। (S. BSB. 2-3-1).

2 युक्त्यविरोधकीर्तनस्य पादासंगतेः। (TC. III. p. 108).

3 ज्ञ एव अयमात्मा ज्ञातृस्वरूप एव न ज्ञानमात्रम् नापि जडस्वरूपः। कुतः ? अत एव। श्रुतेरेव इत्यर्थः। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-3-19).

is the author of the genesis and dissolution of all others. He quotes two apparently conflicting texts. One describes *Brahman* as the eternal of the eternals and thereby recognizes *Jīvas* as eternal[1]. Another[2] tells that all these conscious beings issue forth (from It). Thus there is a doubt whether the *Jīvas* are eternal or produced. The *sūtra* clarifies:

जानाति इति ज्ञः जीवः अतः परमात्मनः एव उत्पद्यते कुतः अत एव श्रुतेरेव ।

The knower (in a body) i.e. the individual soul, *Jīva* originates from the Supreme Being only; whence? on account of *Śruti* to that effect.

Madhvācārya quotes a *Śruti*, which says[3]: "All these intelligent beings (*Jīvas*) as indestructible entities enter into the Supreme Light of *Brahman* and as indestructible entities are born from It. They never have dissolution".

If one doubts whether it is proper to hold eternal entities as born also, the next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ युक्तेश्च ॐ ॥ **(2-3-19)**

जीवः परमात्मनः उत्पद्यते नित्यस्य जीवस्य अपि जनेः युक्तत्वात् च पराधीनदेहरूपविशेषाप्तिलक्षणोत्पत्तेः उपपन्नत्वात् ।

***Jīva* originates from the Supreme Being, and it is quite proper to consider the eternal *Jīva* also as born in the sense of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* as it acquires a body subject to the will and pleasure of the Supreme Being.**

The apparently contradictory statements in the *Kāṣāyaṇaśruti* quoted in the preceding discussion, is explained here as follows. *Jīva* is intrinsically eternal and whenever it acquires new adjuncts

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1 नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् । (Kaṭha. Up. 2-2-13).

2 सर्व एते चिदात्मनो व्युच्चरन्ति । (M. BSB. 2-3-18).

3 'ते वा एते चिदात्मनोऽविनष्टाः परं ज्योतिर्निर्विशन्त्यविनष्टा एवोत्पद्यन्ते न विनश्यन्ति कदाचन' इति काषायणश्रुतिः । (M. BSB. 2-3-18).

of body etc. (*upādhi*), it is originated in the sense of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*. In support of this concept, Madhvācārya quotes a text, which says[1]: "From the eternal *Brahman* the eternal beings of intelligence are born. It is with reference to the condition of their bodily existence that birth or genesis is predicated of them".

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya have not read this *sūtra*.

12 उत्क्रान्त्यधिकरणम्।

Having discussed the genesis of *Jīva*, the *Sūtrakāra* now considers the size of *Jīva*, i.e. whether it is atomic or medium sized or all pervasive. Śaṅkarācārya holds that the next fourteen *sūtras* consider this topic. Rāmānujācārya includes all theses *sūtras* in the previous *Jñādhikaraṇa*. Madhvācārya divides the *sūtras* into five groups, depending upon the topics discussed.

॥ ॐ उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ॐ ॥ (2-3-20)

Śaṅkarācārya quotes *Śruti* texts to show that *Jīva* passes out of the body (*utkrānti*) at the time of death, it goes to another world (*gati*) and then returns to this world (*āgati*). From these texts it is understood that *Jīva* has to be of a limited size, since a thing of infinite size cannot tend to move. If it is of limited size it can only be of the atomic size since its possibility of being of the same size as the body has already been refuted earlier while examining the Jaina doctrines[2].

Rāmānujācārya interprets the *sūtra* on the same lines.

Madhvācārya refers to a conflict between two texts. One text tells that "these conscious souls are indeed all-pervasive,

1 उत्पद्यन्ते चिदात्मानो नित्या नित्यात् परात्मनः। उपाध्यपेक्षया तेषामुत्पत्तिरपि गीयते। इति ॥ व्योमसंहितायाम्। (M. BSB. 2-3-19) (BNK. II. p. 197).

2 आसामुत्क्रान्त्यिगत्यागतीनां श्रवणात् परिच्छिन्नः तावत् जीव इति प्राप्नोति। न हि विभोः चलनम् अवकल्पते इति। सति परिच्छेदे शरीरपरिमाणत्वस्यार्हतपरीक्षायां निरस्तत्वात् अणुरात्मेतिगम्यते। (S. BSB. 2-3-20).

devoid of qualities *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, agents of all actions, perfect and infinite''[1] and thereby expresses the all-pervasiveness of *Jīvas*. Another says that ''atomic indeed is this soul, whom these merit and demerit bind''[2] and conveys the atomic nature of the soul. Thus there is a doubt whether *Jīva* is all-pervasive or atomic. The *sūtra* decides as follows.

जीवः अणुः उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनां हेतूनां सकाशात्। व्याप्तस्य तदयोगात् मध्यमपरिमाणत्वेऽपि अनित्यत्वापत्तेः।

***Jīva* is of atomic size on account of its characteristics of departing (from the body), going (to another world) and returning (declared in scriptures). An all-pervasive thing cannot be thought of as moving. If it is taken as of medium-size i.e. of the size of the body itself, then it will be subject to the undesirable contingency of being perishable.**

If the *Jīva* is taken as of the size of the body, then like the body it has to be made up of parts. As a rule, a medium-sized thing must have parts. And *Jīva* cannot be held to be constituted of parts because in that case it will be subject to impermanency[3].

In order to confirm that *Jīva* has these characteristics of departing from the body, going to another world and returning to this, Madhvācārya quotes[4] a *Śruti*. It says that, ''he (*Jīva*) passes out from this body, goes to another world and from that world he returns to this world, enters the (mother's) womb, he is born and he works''.

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1 'व्याप्ता ह्यात्मानश्चेतना निर्गुणाश्च सर्वात्मनः सर्वरूपा अनन्ता' इति काषायणश्रुतौ व्याप्तत्वं प्रतीयते। (M. BSB. 2-3-20).

2 'अणुर्ह्येष आत्मा यं वा एते सिनीतः। पुण्यं च पापं च' इति गौपवनश्रुतावणुत्वमित्यतो विरोधः। (M. BSB.2-3-20).

3 शरीरपरिमाणत्वे चात्मनः शरीरवत्सांशत्वं स्यात्। मध्यमपरिमाणस्य तन्नियमात्। न चांशारब्धोऽशी स्वीकर्तुं शक्यते। अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। (TP. 2-3-20).

4 'सोऽस्माच्छरीरादुत्क्रम्यामुं लोकमभिगच्छत्यमुष्मादिमं लोकमागच्छति स गर्भीभवति स प्रसूयते स कर्म कुरुत' इति पौष्यायणश्रुतेः। (M. BSB. 2-3-20).

From such texts, if one incidentally gets a doubt whether the *Jīva* does all these activities on its own liking and choice, the next *sūtra* answers the same.

॥ ॐ स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोः ॐ ॥ **(2-3-21)**

जीवस्य उत्क्रान्तिः स्वात्मना च परमात्मना एव उत्तरयोः उत्तरवाक्ययोः सकाशात्।[1]

***Jīva*'s departure from the body etc. take place under the guidance of, and along with, the Supreme Being only, on account of what is stated in the two subsequent sentences (of the same *Pauṣyāyaṇa Śruti*).**

Madhvācārya quotes the two sentences[2] concerned, from that *Pauṣyāyaṇa Śruti*, which state as follows. (1) With the Supreme Lord seated in himself as guide, he (the *Jīva*) enters the womb with Him, he is born with Him, guided by Him he works, he is led to other worlds and lifted up to *mokṣa* by Him. Him they call the Lord of the self. (ii) He, the Supreme Being, enjoys the blissful essence (of the good works of *Jīva*s), and He indeed makes the *Jīva*s live, go up and come down.

Instead of using any other word like *Ātmanā* or *Brahmaṇā* in the *sūtra*, the *Sūtrakāra* uses the word *Svātmanā*, in order to achieve consonance with the wording in the concerned *Śruti*.

Śaṅkarācārya gives another interpretation of this *sūtra*, but in support of the atomicity of *Jīva*, as follows. Just as a person can relinquish his rulership of a village (without moving out of the village), similarly a *Jīva*'s departure (*utkrānti*) from the body after his *karma* is exhausted, may be explained as the *Jīva*'s ceasing to be the ruler of the body, without moving away from

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1 VKM. 2-3-21.

2 (i) स एतेनैव स्वात्मना परेणेमं गर्भमनुप्रविशति परेण जायते परेण कर्म कुरुते परेण नीयते परेणोन्नीयते। तं वा एतमभिवदन्ति स्वात्मेति। (ii) एष ह्यानन्दमादत्ते एष ह्येनं जीवमभिजीवयत्येष उद्गमयत्येष गमयत्येष आगमयति। (M. BSB. 2-3-21).

it. But, the other two activities (*uttare*) of going (to another world) and returning are not possible for a *Jīva* that cannot move. The two activities have to be connected with the *Jīva* itself as the agent. Going and coming are possible only for a *Jīva* of atomic size.[1] With this interpretation, the word *sva* in the *sūtra* appears superfluous, since the word *ātmanā* itself would suffice[2].

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on the same lines.

If the *Pūrvapakṣin* is still not ready to disbelieve in the all-pervasiveness of *Jīva*, since it is very clearly stated in the text '*vyāptā hyātmānascetanā nirguṇāśca* ---' in *Kāṣāyaṇaśruti*, the next *sūtra* offers further explanation.

॥ ॐ नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् ॐ ॥ (2-3-22)

All commentators concur on the interpretation of this *sūtra*. They only refer to different texts in support of their arguments. It is quite natural.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets as follows. "If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, as the scriptures state it to be otherwise (i.e. all-pervading) (we say) not so on account of the other one (the Highest Self) being the subject matter (of those texts)"[3].

Rāmānujācārya interprets on the same lines.

Madhvācārya continues with the same text, referred to earlier, and interprets the *sūtra* as follows.

जीवः न अणुः अतत्श्रुतेः व्याप्ता ह्यात्मानः इति अनणुत्वश्रुतेः इति चेत् न तस्याः श्रुतेः ब्रह्मपरत्वात् कुतः इतराधिकारात् इतरस्य प्रकृतजीवभिन्नस्य ब्रह्मणः अधिकारात् प्रकरणात्। परमात्मनि बहुरूपत्वापेक्षया बहुवचनं युक्तम् ।

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1 उत्क्रान्तिः कदाचिदचलतोऽपि ग्रामस्वाम्यनिवृत्तिवद्देहस्वाम्यनिवृत्त्या कर्मक्षयेणावकल्पेत ; उत्तरे तु गत्यागती नाचलतः संभवतः। स्वात्मना हि तयोः संबन्धो भवति।---- गत्यागती अणुत्वे एव संभवतः। (S. BSB. 2-3-21).

2 सूत्रे आत्मना चोत्तरे इति निर्देशापत्तेश्च। (TC. III. p. 116).

3 SRK. p. 406.

If it be said that *Jīva* is not atomic, as the text '*vyāptā hyātmānaḥ*' states it to be otherwise, it is not so, on account of the reference to *Brahman* in that passage, because that section in the *Śruti* discusses *Brahman*. The use of plural number is proper since it is with reference to various forms of *Brahman* entering into Its creation.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that, though in one *Śruti* text the souls are said to be subject to departure from the body (*utkrānti*) etc. those are the characteristics of the minds, attributed to souls in a figurative sense[1], and therefore the souls cannot be treated as atomic on that basis, when another *Śruti* clearly holds them as all-pervading. The *sūtra* avers that the text '*vyāptā hyātmānaḥ*' appears in a section, which discusses *Brahman* only because it is further said therein that 'He, the *Ātman* creates all this'[2]. The use of plural number in the text '*vyāptā hyātmānaḥ*' does not present any problem, since in the same passage both singular and plural numbers are used as[3] "He is *Ātman* (the Lord) and He is *Ātman*s (i.e. the Supreme Lord in many forms)". In order to show that though *Paramātman* is one, He appears in many forms along with *Jīva*s, and therefore He is spoken of in singular, dual and plural numbers, Madhvācārya quotes an appropriate verse from *Bhaviṣyatpurāṇa*. It tells that "the one Supreme Being, Keśava is spoken of in the Vedas by words in singular, dual and plural number, but that does not signify any difference in the Lord"[4].

If one feels that the text "*vyāptā hyātmānaḥ*' expressed in plural number, is held to be referring to *Brahman* on the basis

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1 उत्क्रान्त्यादिकं तु मनोगतम् आत्मनि उपचर्यत इति भावः। (TP. 2-3-22).

2 अस्याः श्रुतेः परमात्मविषयत्वात्। 'स आत्मेदं सृजति' इत्यत्र परमात्मनः पठितत्वेना-स्यास्तत्प्रकरणत्वात्। (TP. 2-3-22).

3 स आत्मेदं सृजति स द्विधेदं बिभर्ति अन्तर्बहिश्च। स बहुधेदमनुप्रविश्याऽऽत्मनोऽभिनयति। स आत्मा स आत्मानः स ईशः स विष्णुः स परः परोवरीयान्। (M. BSB. 2-3-22).

4 एकशब्दैर्द्विशब्दैश्च बहुशब्दैश्च केशवः। एक एवोच्यते वेदैस्तावता नास्य भिन्नता। इति च भविष्यत्पुराणे। (M. BSB. 2-3-22).

of a weak evidence like context (*prakaraṇa*)[1], the next *sūtra* offers further stronger evidence for that.

॥ ॐ स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां च ॐ ॥ **(2-3-23)**

We have seen earlier in *sūtra* '*dyubhvādhyāyatanaṁ svaśabdāt* (BS. 1-3-1)' that the pronoun *sva* is a synonym of *Ātman*. *Unmānaṁ* means immeasurable. Therefore, the exposition of the *sūtra* would be as shown below.

'व्याप्ता ह्यात्मानः' इति श्रुतेः ब्रह्मपरत्वं (न केवलं प्रकरणबलेन किंतु) वाक्यशेषश्रुतात्मशब्दात् तथा तत्रपठितापरिमितत्वलिङ्गात् च इति द्वाभ्यां हेतुभ्यां च ।[2]

The text '*vyāptā hyāṭmānaḥ*' refers to *Brahman*, (not only because of context but) also on account of the term *Ātman* and the characteristic of being immeasurable (found in the subsequent statement of that scripture).

Madhvācārya quotes that subsequent statement which declares that 'this *Ātman* is indeed beyond human capacity of measuring''[3].

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* as follows. And the individual soul (*Jīva*) is of atomic size also on account of direct (Vedic) statement telling the atomic size of *Jīva*. Similarly, the word *unmāna* also signifies the infinitesimal size of *Jīva*[4]. He quotes a *Śruti* text, which declares *Jīva* as of atomic size and another text, which conveys the *Jīva*'s infinitesimal measure.

The word '*śabda*' is understood here in its secondary sense as scripture. But the figurative meaning is to be taken only when the primary meaning does not give a coherent sense. Further, the

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1 श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यम् अर्थविप्रकर्षात्। (PMS. 3-3-14).

2 TP. 2-3-23.

3 एषो ह्यात्मा अध्युद्गतो मानशक्तेः। (M. BSB. 2-3-23).

4 इतश्च अणुरात्मा यतः साक्षादेव अस्य अणुत्ववाची शब्दः श्रूयते। तथा उन्मानमपि जीवस्य अणिमानं गमयति। (S. BSB. 2-3-22).

word '*unmāna*' is taken as infinitesimal measure. The word mānaṁ means measure. The prefix *ud* signifies over, above, upwards, superior to etc. Therefore, *unmānaṁ* means beyond measure or immeasurable and conveys infinite size. Therefore its interpretation as infinitesimal is farfetched[1]. Moreover, if this *sūtra* is just to provide two more reasons for establishing the atomicity of *Jīva*, the *sūtra* is expected immediately after '*utkrāntigatyāgatīnāṁ*'[2]. Thus, the interpretation is not found convincing. Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* exactly in the same way as shown above.

If the *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that, if the *Jīva* is of atomic size and is confined to some part of a body, then the *Jīva* cannot get the sensations from all parts of the body, the next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ अविरोधश्चन्दनवत् ॐ ॥ (2-3-24)

जीवस्य अणुत्वे अपि अविरोधः देहव्याप्तेः अविरोधः चन्दनवत् यथा एकदेशपतितचन्दनबिन्दुः सकलदेहं आह्लादयति तद्वत्।

Though *Jīva* is atomic in size, there is no inconsistency in his functioning throughout the body, just as a drop of sandal-paste at a spot on the body causes refreshing sensation all over the body.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. Madhvācārya quotes a verse[3] from *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*, which echoes the exact import of this *sūtra*. It says that "this *Jīva*, though only of atomic size, stands pervading the whole body he abides in, just as the drops of sandal-paste (on a part of the body, produce refreshing sensation) extended all over the body". If the *Pūrvapakṣin* feels that the inllustration of drops of sandle-paste is not befitting to *Jīva*, the next *sūtra* clarifies the doubt.

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1 बालाग्रशतभागत्वस्योन्मानशब्दार्थत्वायोगाच्च। (TC. III. p. 116).

2 अणुत्वसाधकत्वे अस्य उत्क्रान्तिसूत्रानन्तर्यापातात्। (TC. III. p. 116).

3 "अणुमात्रोऽप्ययं जीवः स्वदेहं व्याप्य तिष्ठति। यथा व्याप्य शरीराणि हरिचन्दनविप्लुषः" इति ब्रह्माण्डपुराणे। (M. BSB. 2-3-24).

॥ ॐ अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद् हृदि हि ॐ ॥
(2-3-25)

चन्दनबिन्दोः देहे क्वचित्सम्यक् अन्यत्र असम्यक् इति अवस्थानवैशेष्यात् व्याप्तिसंभवेपि जीवस्य तदभावात् देहव्याप्तिः न युक्ता इति चेत् न जीवस्यापि 'हृदि ह्येष आत्मा' इति श्रुत्या हृदि सम्यक् अन्यत्र असम्यक् इति अवस्थितिवैशेष्याभ्युपगमात्।

If it be said that the extension of the effect of sandal-paste drop all over the body is possible since the drop is present in a spot on the body in its intensive form and extends its influence to the other parts of the body in a not-so-intensive form, but no such definite abode is assigned to *Jīva* in a body and therefore, it is not proper to hold Jīva as pervading the body, it is not so, because the text '*hṛdi hyeṣa ātmā*'[1] accepts a definite abode for *Jīva* in his own form in the heart and his functioning throughout the body in a not-so-intensive form.

All commentators agree on the interpretation of this *sūtra*.

If one still doubts how a *Jīva* of atomic size lodged in the heart can function throughout the body, the *Sūtrakāra* adduces another explanation with the help of a practical example, in the next *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ गुणाद्वाऽऽलोकवत् ॐ ॥ **(2-3-26)**

यथा दीपस्य स्वरूपेण दीपिकायाम् एकत्र अवस्थाने अपि आलोकगुणेन आवरकव्याप्तिः तद्वत् जीवस्य अणुस्वरूपेण हृदि स्थितस्यापि चिद्गुणेन देहे व्याप्तिः वा।

Or, just as a flame, though limited to a particular spot in a lamp, pervades the covering area by the property of light (*āloka*), similarly a *Jīva* of atomic size, though confined to a place in the heart, pervades the body by means of the intrinsic property of consciousness (*cidguṇa*).

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1 Praśna Up. 3-6.

All the commentators agree on the interpretation of this *sūtra*.

13 व्यतिरेकाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् तथा च दर्शयति ॐ ॥

(2-3-27)

All the commentators understand the five words in the *sūtra*, in the same sense. But they apply the *sūtra* to different contexts and draw different conclusions. Śaṅkarācārya splits the *sūtra* into two and takes them as parts of the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. The first part, '*vyatireko gandhavat*' is interpreted as follows. "Even as the smell extends beyond the substance which gives it off, so the quality of intelligence extends beyond the soul which is atomic"[1]. And therefore the principle that 'quality (*guṇa*) cannot be separated from its possessor (*guṇin*) as seen in the case of colour etc. is not universally applicable, because the smell, though a quality only, is seen separated from its abode[2]. The second part '*tathā ca darśayati*'[3] tells that, "scripture declares that the atomic soul pervades the whole body on account of the quality of intelligence".

According to Rāmānujācārya the *sūtra* states that "just as smell which is a quality of earth is distinct from earth, so is knowledge different from the knowing subject"[4].

The preceding *sūtra* shows the distinction between substance and its attributes, with the illustration of flame and its light. Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat the present *sūtra* as adducing another illustration to establish that quality (*guṇa*) is distinct from the possessor (*guṇin*) and can extend beyond the

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1 SRK. p. 408.

2 अतश्च अनैकान्तिकमेतत्गुणत्वाद्रूपादिवत् आश्रयविश्लेषानुपपत्तिरिति गुणस्यैव सतो गन्धस्य आश्रयविश्लेपदर्शनात्। (S. BSB. 2-3-26).

3 SRK. p. 408.

4 SRK. p. 408.

possessor. But the two examples are not identical. It is true that light and odour are both qualities and both radiate beyond the substance, which possesses them. But the method of radiation is different. In the case of light, it is an energy generated in the flame and radiating in the form of waves, through ether. The waves can pass through vacuum. The waves are not mass particles (*dravya*) thrown out of the flame. But in the case of odour, the molecular particles are thrown out from the smelling substances, in a gaseous form, and carried away by air. They cannot pass through vacuum. The smelling particles can be collected and stored. On account of this difference between the qualities, light and odour, Madhvācārya thinks that the *Sūtrakāra* conveys something other than what is told in the preceding *sūtra*, and therefore treats this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*.

He refers to a conflict between two texts. One text[1] says: "He (the *Jīva*) is eternal, without parts, endowed with merit and demerit and he goes to and fro between this world and the other; he gets liberated; he is invisible whole, not seven-fold, nor ten-fold, nor hundred-fold". Thus the text predicates indivisibility of *Jīva* and denies his manifoldness. Another text tells that "he (*Jīva*) is fivefold, sevenfold, tenfold; he is hundredfold, thousand-fold, also; he goes (to other worlds); he gets liberated"[2]. Thus, the text asserts the manifoldness of *Jīva*. This contradiction is reconciled by the *sūtra*, as follows.

अणोरपि जीवस्य अंशैः व्यतिरेकः विभागः अस्ति गन्धवत् यथा पुष्पात् गन्धस्य विभागः तद्वत्। तथा च श्रुतिः जीवस्य बहुरूपत्वं दर्शयति।

Though *Jīva* is of atomic size, his parts can separate from him, just as fragrance can part from the flower, and the scripture shows that *Jīva* can be manifold.

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1 स नित्यो निरवयवः पुण्ययुक् पापयुक् च स इमं लोकममुं चावर्तते स विमुच्यते स एकधा न सप्तधा न दशधा न शतधा इति गौपवनश्रुतावेकस्यावहुत्व प्रतीयते। (M. BSB. 2-3-27).

2 स पञ्चधा स सप्तधा स दशधा भवति स शतधा च सहस्रधा स गच्छति स मुच्यते इति पाराशर्यायणश्रुतौ बहुरूपत्वं प्रतीयते। (M. BSB. 2-3-27).

Madhvācārya quotes a text[1], which shows that though *Jīva* is in essence an indivisible whole unit, he can assume many forms at a time. It declares, ''now, being one individual only by nature, (this *Jīva*) splits like fragrance (separating from flower), then becomes one, then becomes many; as the Lord makes him, so he becomes; the Lord is inconceivable, supreme and exalted''. Such mysterious powers of self-partition, living in several bodies at the same time and still remaining as one conscious being etc., are expected of highly placed *Yogins* with the grace of the Lord, and not of ordinary beings. Madhvācārya quotes a *Smṛti* verse[2], which makes this point clear. It says that, ''it is through the Lord's inconceivable power that an individual soul, devoid of parts, makes himself into many forms and sports with them by means of his Yogic powers (achieved through the grace of the Lord). This interpretation sounds like a better option.

14 पृथगुपदेशाधिकरणम्

॥ ॐ पृथगुपदेशात् ॐ ॥ **(2-3-28)**

Śaṅkarācārya treats this *sūtra* and the next four as part of the preceding *Utkrāntyadhikaraṇa*. The interpretation of this *sūtra*, according to him, is as follows[3]. Since *Jīva* and intelligence are taught in scripture separately as agent (*kartṛ*) and instrument (*karaṇa*) respectively, it is understood that this *Jīva* pervades the body with his quality of consciousness only. Therefore, *Jīva* is of atomic size.

Śaṅkarācārya assumes the foregoing ten *sūtras* 19-28 according to his numbering, as presenting the *Pūrvapakṣa* or the *prima facie*

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1 'अथैक एव सन् गन्धवद्व्यतिरिच्यते। अथैकी भवति। अथ बह्वीभवति। तं यथा यथेश्वरः प्रकुरुते तथा तथा भवति सोऽचिन्त्यः परमो गरीयान्' इति शाण्डिल्यश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-3-27).

2 अचिन्त्येशशक्त्यैव ह्येकोऽवयववर्जितः। आत्मानं बहुधा कृत्वा क्रीडते योगसंपदा॥ इति च पाद्मे। (M. BSB. 2-3-27).

3 श्रुतौ आत्मप्रज्ञयोः कर्तृकरणभावेन पृथगुपदेशात् चैतन्यगुणेनैव अस्य शरीरव्यापिता गम्यते। तस्मादणुरात्मेति। (S. BSB. 2-3-28).

view that the *Jīva* is of atomic size, The next four *sūtras* state the *Siddhānta* according to him.

तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्॥ (2-3-29)

This is a controversial *sūtra*. Śaṅkarācārya interprets it as follows[1]. The word *tu* in the *sūtra* refutes the *Pūrvapakṣa* and conveys that it is not proper to hold *Jīva* as atomic in size. The opening pronoun *tad* in the *sūtra* refers to intellect, *buddhi*, and *tadguṇāḥ* means the qualities of *buddhi*. *Tadguṇasāraḥ* is he whose quintessence is the qualities of *buddhi*, i.e. the individual soul or *Jīva*, and *tadguṇasāratvaṁ* signifies the state of *Jīva* or *Jīva*-hood. The compound *tadvyapadeśaḥ* stands for the declaration that the soul's size is atomic etc[2]. So the *sūtra* avers that "the declaration that the soul's size is atomic, is on account of the soul's having for its essence the quality of that (i.e. *buddhi*) as in the case of the *Prājña* (intelligent Lord), i.e. to say just as the Highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness and so on because of the limiting adjuncts of its essence, as in description, 'smaller than a grain of rice or barley' (Chānd. Up. 3-14-2)"[3].

If there be an objection that "when the soul's mundane existence depends on the qualities of his *buddhi*, then the soul and the intellect being different entities, their conjunction is bound to end sometime; then the soul, separated from *buddhi* will either cease to exist altogether or lose its mundane existence, since a soul devoid of intellect is never perceived"[4], the next *sūtra* replies.

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1 तु शब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति। नैतदस्ति- अणुरात्मेति; .... तस्याः बुद्धेः गुणाः तद्गुणाः। तद्गुणाः सारः प्रधानं यस्य आत्मनः संसारित्वे संभवति स तद्गुणसारः; तस्य भावः तद्गुणसारत्वम्। .... एवं उपाधिगुणसारत्वात् जीवस्य अणुत्वादिव्यपदेशः; प्राज्ञवत्। यथा प्राज्ञस्य परमात्मनः सगुणेषूपासनेषु उपाधिगुणसारत्वात् अणीयस्त्वादिव्यपदेशः- 'अणीयान्व्रीहेर्वा यवाद्वा' .... इत्येवंप्रकारः तद्वत्। (S. BSB. 2-3-29).

2 जीवस्य अणुत्वादिव्यपदेशः।

3 BNK. II. p. 229

4 यदि बुद्धिगुणसारत्वात् आत्मनः संसारित्वं कल्प्येत ततो बुद्ध्यात्मनोः भिन्नयोः संयोगावसानम् अवश्यंभावी इत्यतो बुद्धिवियोगे सति आत्मनो विभक्तस्य अनालक्ष्यत्वात् असत्वम् असंसारित्वं वा प्रसज्येत। (S. BSB. 2-3-29).

॥ यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषस्तद्दर्शनात् ॥ (2-3-30)

There is no such contingency, because as long as the soul has mundane existence and as long as the soul's ignorance (*avidyā*) is not destroyed by the realization of knowledge, the conjunction of soul with intellect will not cease. And as long as the soul is connected with the *buddhi* , it has *Jīva*-hood and has mundane existence. In fact, apart from this combination of soul and intellect thought of, there is no such entity as *Jīva* or individual soul[1].

If one doubts how can one believe that as long as the soul has individual trans-migratory existence (*Jīva*-hood) it has connection with *buddhi*, because in the state of deep-sleep and dissolution a connection between soul and intellect cannot be accepted[2], the next *sūtra* answers.

पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् । (2-3-31)

Just as in the world virility etc. are in a potential form during childhood and appear as though they are not existent, but they become manifest during youth, similarly, the conjunction of soul with *buddhi* exists during deep sleep and dissolution in its potential form and it becomes manifest at the time of waking and creation[3].

॥ नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वाऽन्यथा ॥
(2-3-32)

The *sūtra* asserts as follows. The inner instrument which forms the distinguishing characteristic of *Jīvātman*, is talked of

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1 यावदात्मभावित्वाद् बुद्धिसंयोगस्य-यावदयमात्मा संसारी भवति, यावदस्य सम्यग्दर्शनेन संसारित्वं न निवर्तते, तावदस्य बुद्ध्या संयोगो न शाम्यति; यावदेव च अयं बुद्ध्युपाधिसंबन्धः तावदेव अस्य जीवत्वं संसारित्वं च; परमार्थतः तु न जीवो नाम बुद्ध्युपाधिपरिकल्पितस्वरूपव्यतिरेकेण अस्ति। (S. BSB. 2-3-30).

2 ननु सुषुप्तिप्रलययोर्न शक्यते बुद्धिसंबन्ध आत्मनोऽभ्युपगन्तुम्। तत् कथं यावदात्मभावित्वं बुद्धिसंबन्धस्य। (S. BSB. 2-3-30).

3 यथा लोके पुंस्त्वादीनि बीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव बाल्यादिषु अनुपलभ्यमानानि अविद्यमानवदभिप्रेयमाणानि यौवनादिषु आविर्भवन्ति ---- एवम् अयमपि बुद्धिसंबन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तिप्रलययोः पुनः प्रबोधनप्रसवयोः आविर्भवति। (S. BSB. 2-3-31).

by various names (in different modes) as *manas*, *buddhi*, *vijñāna* and *citta*. Existence of such an internal instrument has to be accepted. Otherwise there would be either perpetual perception in the presence of the combination of the soul, the senses and the sense-objects, which are the means of perception, or, if there is no perception in spite of the presence of these causes of perception, then there would be perpetual non-perception. Such a case is not seen. Or one will have to accept some restriction in the way of either the soul or the senses. The soul is immutable. There is no possibility of a sudden change in the senses also, when they have no impediment either in the previous moment or in the subsequent moment. Therefore, an internal organ has to be accepted, whose attentiveness or its absence would result in perception or non-perception. Therefore the assertion '*tadguṇasāratvāt tadvyapadeśaḥ* (BS. 2-3-29)' is proper[1].

The last sentence above shows that the real *Siddhāntasūtra* is '*tadguṇasāratvāt*---- (2-3-29)' and the later three are explanatory and in support of the *Siddhāntasūtra*, which refutes the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is presented in as many as ten *sūtras*. It is observed more than once before that whenever the *Sūtrakāra* presents a *Pūrvapakṣa*, it is as a part of a *sūtra*, and followed by '*cet* ' or '*iti cet* '. He does not indicate anywhere that some are *Pūrvapakṣasūtras* and some are *Siddhāntasūtras*. So, all *Brahmasūtras* are to be taken as *Siddhāntasūtras* only. Even the followers and admirers of Śaṅkarācārya have expressed their surprise at his treatment of ten

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1 तच्चात्मन उपाधिभूतम् अन्तःकरणं मनो बुद्धिर्विज्ञानं चित्तमिति च अनेकधा तत्र तत्राभिलप्यते। ---- अन्यथा----- नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः स्यात्। आत्मेन्द्रियविषयाणामुपलब्धिसाधनानां सन्निधाने सति नित्यमेवोपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत। अथ सत्यपि हेतुसमवधाने फलाभावः ततो नित्यमेवानुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत। न चैवं दृश्यते। अथवा अन्यतरस्यात्मन इन्द्रियस्य वा शक्तिप्रतिबन्धोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। न च आत्मनः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धः संभवति अविक्रियत्वात्। नापि इन्द्रियस्य। न हि तस्य पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोः अप्रतिबद्धशक्तिकस्य सतोऽकस्माच्छक्तिः प्रतिबध्येत। तस्मात् यस्य अवधानानवधानाभ्यामुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी भवतः, तन्मनः। तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेश इति। (S. BSB. 2-3-32).

sūtras in a row as *pūrvapakṣa*, thereby euphemistically expressing their disapproval. Thibaut expresses in his '*Vedāntasūtras*', that he is struck "at the outset by the unusual length to which the mere defence of a *Pūrvapakṣa* is carried"[1] in Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation. V. S. Ghate says that "it is no doubt curious, as Thibaut observes that as many as nine *sūtras* should be devoted to the statement of a mere *prima facie* view to be refuted afterwords"[2]. S. Radhakrishnan observes that "it is not usual to state the *prima facie* view at such length"[3].

In these ten *sūtras* supposed to be constituting *Pūrvapakṣa*, neither the *Sūtrakāra* indicates nor the commentator remarks that the *sūtras* are expressing a *prima facie* view.

After presenting the *Pūrvapakṣa* that the *Jīvātman* is atomic in size, with an elaborate argument, can the *Sūtrakāra* be expected to brush it aside by just a single letter word '*tu*' in the *Siddhāntasūtra*? The word *tu* has different senses, It is sometimes used as a mere expletive also. The word is found used in many *sūtras*. No doubt, it is an adversative particle meaning 'but' or 'on the contrary'. However, it cannot be accepted as a clinching evidence for refuting an elaborately presented *Pūrvapakṣa*.

The *Siddhāntasūtra* (2-3-29) does not categorically refute the *Pūrvapakṣa*. It does not state either that *Jīvātman* is not atomic in size (*aṇu*) or that *Jīvātman* is all-pervading (*vibhu*). It is "left to be gathered by implication from analogy in '*Prājñavat* ' which is open to other interpretations also"[4]. The various points argued in the ten *sūtras* have not been refuted in any of the remaining four *sūtras*.

The pronoun *tad* in *sūtra* 29, is taken as referring to *buddhi* A pronoun normally refers to some noun in the immediately

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1 VST. p. lv.

2 VSG. p. 88.

3 SRK. p. 408.

4 BNK. II. p. 232.

preceding sentence. Here, the word *buddhi* does not appear in any of the ten preceding *sūtras*. Therefore, assuming *tad* to be referring to *buddhi* is not justifiable. In the context of these *sūtras*, *tad* can be taken as referring to *Jīvātman* since he is being discussed now, or to *Brahman* since that is the topic of enquiry in *Brahmasūtras*.

The *Siddhāntasūtra* (29) states, according to Śaṅkarācārya, that *Jīvātman* is said to be atomic on account of its limiting adjunct *buddhi* just as *Paramātman* is spoken of as minute because of the limiting adjuncts. V. S. Ghate observes that "we see no difference whatsoever between *dṛṣṭānta*, the illustration, and *dārṣṭāntika*, the thing illustrated. *Brahman* and *Jīva* being the same, we fail to see how one illustrates the other"[1].

The *utkrānti*, *gati* and *āgati* of *Jīvātman* talked of by the *Sūtrakāra* here in these so called *Pūrvapakṣasūtras*, are a part and parcel of his doctrine because he refers to them again in the next *Adhyāyas*, in *sūtras* 3-1-1, 3-1-8, 3-1-13 and 4-3-1. Therefore, these characteristics of *Jīvātman* "cannot be treated as relevant only for purposes of *Pūrvapakṣa*"[2]. If *Jīvātman* is a mere conjunction of *Ātman* and *buddhi*, according to Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation, and since *Ātman* is all-pervading, for whom these movements, *utkrānti*, *gati* and *āgati* are attributed? Are they for *buddhi*, which is just a quality and is inert (*jaḍa*)?

Thus, the interpretations of these *sūtras* by Śaṅkarācārya, appear far-fetched and the whole argument is not found convincing. V. S. Ghate remarks that, "Śaṅkara's interpretation of *sūtra* 29 strikes us as very far-fetched indeed"[3].

All these *sūtras* which are included by Śaṅkarācārya in *Utkrāntyadhikaraṇa*, are taken by Rāmānujācārya as a part of the preceding *jñādhikaraṇa* only. *Sūtra* 28, '*pṛthagupadeśāt*' has been interpreted by Rāmānujācārya as follows[4]. Knowledge is

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1 VSG. p. 89.

2 BNK. II. p. 230.

3 VSG. p. 88.

4 स्वशब्देनैव विज्ञानं विज्ञातुः प्रथगुपदिश्यते । (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-28).

declared by the scriptures as separate from the soul, the knower. Then he quotes some counter examples from scriptures where knowledge alone is said to be *Ātman*. Thus he raises a *Pūrvapakṣa* that when knowledge is held to be separate from the soul in some texts, then how the soul is said to be mere knowledge in other texts. The next *sūtra* (29), '*tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ prājñavat*' answers the query. The word *tu* (but) refutes the objection. The *sūtra* avers that[1] "the individual soul is said to be mere knowledge, because it has knowledge as its essential quality, just as the omniscient *Brahman* is referred to by the word *Ānanda* (bliss) since bliss is the essential quality of *Brahman*". The next sūtra (30), '*yāvadātmabhāvitvācca na doṣastaddarśanāt*' states that[2] "as long as the individual soul exists, knowledge exists as its essential quality, so there is no fault in designating it as knowledge. It is seen that a cow with broken horns is still called a cow because that word has the capacity to signify the essential quality cowness in it."

If it be said that since knowledge is absent during deep sleep etc, knowledge cannot be a persistent essential quality of soul, the next *sūtra* (31) answers. The *sūtra* '*puṁstvādivattvasya sato'bhivyaktiyogāt*' states that "since this knowledge exists even in deep sleep etc. (potentially) there is possibility of its manifestation in the waking state etc. and so its being a persistent essential attribute (of soul) is appropriate. It is like virility, which exists potentially in a child but manifests in youth; so the man's virility cannot be said occasional. (It is a persistent essential quality of man's body). Therefore, the *Jīvātman* is a knower. And he is atomic in size".[3]

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1 तद्गुणसारत्वात् विज्ञानगुणसारत्वात् आत्मनो विज्ञानमिति व्यपदेशः। यथा प्राज्ञस्य आनन्दः सारभूतो गुण इति प्राज्ञ आनन्दशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते 'आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्।' (Tait. Up. 3-6) इति। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-29).

2 विज्ञानस्य यावदात्मभाविधर्मत्वात् तेन तद्व्यपदेशो न दोषः। तथा च खण्डादयो यावत्स्वरूपभाविगोत्वादि धर्मशब्देन गौरिति व्यपदिश्यमाना दृश्यन्ते स्वरूपनिरूपणधर्मत्वादित्यर्थः। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-30).

3 अस्य ज्ञानस्य सुषुप्त्यादिषु अपि विद्यमानस्य जागर्यादिषु अभिव्यक्तिसंभवात् स्वरूपानुबन्धिधर्मत्वोपपत्तिः। पुंस्त्वादिवत्। यथा पुंस्त्वाद्यसाधारणस्य धातोर्बाल्यावस्थायां सतोऽपि अनभिव्यक्तस्य युवत्वे अभिव्यक्तौ पुंसः तद्वत्ता न कादाचित्की भवति। ---- अतो ज्ञातृत्वमेव जीवात्मनः स्वरूपम्। स च अयमात्मा अणुपरिमाणः। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-31).

The next *sūtra* (32) '*nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgonyataraniyamo vānyathā*' tells how the assumption that *Jīvātman* is all pervading and mere consciousness would lead to adverse contingencies. It says that[1] "Otherwise (i.e. if *Jīvātman* is not taken as the knower and as of atomic size), according to the doctrine that *Jīvātman* is all-pervading and mere consciousness, then it would result in perpetual and simultaneous perception and non-perception, or either as a rule, i.e. there would be always perception alone or non-perception alone".

Unlike Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya does not relegate nine or ten *sūtras* to *Pūrvapakṣa*, and accepts the *Sūtrakāra*'s contention that *Jīvātman* is of atomic size. Though the above interpretations appear straightforward, they are not convincing. The commentator has already interpreted the *sūtra* '*jño'ta eva*' (2-3-18) as establishing the *Jīvātman* as the knower but not mere knowledge. Then there are eight *sūtras* establishing the atomicity of *Jīva*. Now these five *sūtras* as interpreted by Rāmānujācārya, would again revert to the topic of *sūtra* 18, and therefore appear out of context. For establishing the *Jīvātman* as the knower, it is not necessary to wait till he is proved to be atomic. As B. N. K. Sharma puts it, "despite Rāmānujācārya's contention, the self's atomicity does not seem to have any vital bearing on his being essentially a knower"[2]. After comparing the interpretations of these *sūtras*, especially of *sūtra* 29, by five different commentators, V. S. Ghate comes to the conclusion that "an impartial critic, it would appear, will find the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja least satisfactory of all"[3].

Having discussed the genesis and size of *Jīvātman*, it is quite pertinent now, for the *Sūtrakāra* to discuss the standing of *Jīvātman*,

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1 अन्यथा सर्वगतत्वपक्षे तस्य ज्ञानमात्रत्वपक्षे च नित्यम् उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी सहैव प्रसज्येयाताम् अन्यतरनियमो वा उपलब्धिरेव वा नित्यं स्यात् अनुपलब्धिरेव वा। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-32).

2 BNK. II. p. 241.

3 VSG. p. 88.

vis-a-vis the creator *Paramātman* i.e. whether *Jīvātman* is non different from *Brahman* or he is different. This is an ever-hot topic in Indian Philosophy and is being debated inconclusively for thousands of years. In view of its importance and interest to students of Indian philosophy, Madhvācārya thinks it fit to treat the two *sūtras* 28 and 29, as forming a separate *Adhikaraṇa*.

There are some texts like 'That thou art',[1] 'I am *Brahman*'[2], which clearly indicate the identity for *Jīvātman* with *Paramātman*. On the other hand, there are texts like 'The eternal of the eternal ones, the intelligent of the intelligent ones'[3] and 'Two birds bound one to the other as inseparable friends, perch on the same tree'[4] which declare that *Jīvātman* is different from *Paramātman*. Thus. There is a contradiction and the *sūtra* (28), '*prathagupadeśāt*' clears the same, according to Madhvācārya.

ज्ञ इति स्वात्मना इति च वर्तते। ज्ञः जीवः स्वात्मना परमात्मना पृथक् भिन्नः उपदेशात् 'भिन्नोऽचिन्त्यः परमो जीवसङ्घात्' इति श्रुतेः।

The words *jñaḥ* and *svātmanā* are taken by *anuvṛtti*. **The *Jīvātman* is different from *Paramātman* on account of the teaching by *Śruti* that 'the inconceivable Supreme Lord is different from the whole class of *Jīvas*'[5].**

If this is so, then how the texts, which clearly indicate the non-difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman*, are to be understood?

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1 तत्त्वमसि। (Chānd. Up. 3-8-7).

2 अहं ब्रह्मास्मि। (Bṛha. Up. 3-4-10).

3 नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्। (Śvet. Up. 6-13).

4 द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। (Muṇḍ. Up. 3-1-1).

5 भिन्नोऽचिन्त्यः परमो जीवसङ्घात्पूर्णः परो जीवसङ्घो ह्यपूर्णः।यतस्त्वसौ नित्यमुक्तो ह्ययं च बन्धान्मोक्षं तत एवाभिवाञ्छेदिति सोपपत्तिककौशिकश्रुतेर्भिन्न एव जीवः। (M. BSB. 2-3-28). The Supreme Lord is absolutely separate from the whole class of souls; for He is inconceivable, exalted far above the souls, most high, perfect in excellences and He is eternally blessed, while from that Lord this soul has to seek release from bondage" From this *Kauśikaśruti*, embodying a reasoning, it is plain that the soul is separate from the Lord, not one with Him. (M. BSB. 2-3-28)

The next *sūtra* (29) reconciles.

॥ ॐ तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् ॐ ॥(2-3-29)

तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु परमात्मगुणसदृशानन्दादिगुणस्वरूपत्वादेव तद्व्यपदेशः ज्ञस्य पराभेदव्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् प्राज्ञस्य ब्रह्मणः यथा जगद्गुणसदृशगुणस्वरूपत्वात् 'सर्वम् खल्विदं ब्रह्म'[1] इति जगदभेदव्यपदेशः तद्वत्।

The statement of *Jīva*'s non-difference from *Brahman* is (not in the literal sense of identity of essence, *svarūpaikya* but) only on account of *Jīva*'s having for his essence of being such attributes as intelligence and bliss etc. resembling those of *Brahman*, just as in the text 'all this is verily *Brahman*', the omniscient *Brahman* is identified with the world of inert (*jaḍa*) matter, because some properties of the material world such as its reality, causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) are similar to the like ones in *Brahman*[2].

The illustration of identity between two dissimilar entities, sentient *Brahman* and insentient material world in the *sūtra*, suggests a comparison or simile as in '*puruṣaśārdūlaḥ*', in the compound *tadguṇāḥ*. It is termed as *upamāgarbhasamāsa*. With this reconciliation, the validity of identity texts is maintained even after accepting the difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman*.

15 यावदधिकरणम्।

Earlier in *Jñādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-3-18 & 19) it is established that *Jīva* has genesis in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* when *Jīva* gets embodied, but *Jīva* is eternal with reference to his essence of being (*svarūpa*). But one text[3] tells that *Jīva* 'becomes extinct into *Brahman*' and therefore *Jīva* must be impermanent and subject to genesis also. But another text[4] avers that 'he (*Jīva*) is bound

1 Chānd. Up. 3-14.

2 BNK. II. p. 215, 216.

3 ब्रह्मंल्लयमभ्युपैति। (TP. 2-3-30).

4 सोऽनादिना पुण्येन पापेन चानुबद्धः। परेण निर्मुक्त आनन्त्याय कल्प्यते। (M. BSB. 2-3-30).

by beginningless merit and demerit and when liberated by the Supreme Being, he accomplishes everlasting liberation'. With such conflicting texts, a doubt arises whether *Jīva* even in his *svarūpopādhi* i.e. apart from his physical bodily adjuncts, 'what configures him as he is in himself'[1] is subject to origination and dissolution or is eternal. The next *sūtra* clarifies the doubt.

॥ ॐ यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषस्तद्दर्शनात् ॐ ॥

(2-3-30)

ज्ञस्य जीवस्य तत्स्वरूपोपाधेश्च यावदात्मभावित्वात् यावत्परमात्मभावित्वात् न दोषः 'सोऽनादिना पुण्येन पापेन अनुबद्धः' इत्यादिना अनादिपुण्यादिसम्बन्ध-बोधकश्रुत्यप्रामाण्यदोषो न । कुतः ? तद्दर्शनात् स्मरणात् च ।

Since *Jīva* and his essential discriminative attributes (*svarūpopādhi*) exist as long as *Paramātman* exists, the texts, which hold *Jīva* as bound by beginningless merit and demerit cannot be found fault with, on account of *Śruti* and *Smṛti* texts to that effect.

Madhvācārya quotes a text from *Āgniveśyaśruti*, which tells that "The Supreme Being is eternal, the *Jīva* is eternal; fleeting are the latter's physical adjuncts. So, (they say) he originates, he dies and he is liberated"[2]. The commentator also quotes a verse from *Mahābhārata* [3], which says that "*Jīvātmā* is eternal, pleasure and pain are fleeting; *Jīva* is eternal but his body is not eternal". These texts confirm the contention of the *sūtra*.

Thus, it can be understood that the *upādhis* of *Jīva* are of two kinds[4]; one is *svarūpopādhi*, which is intrinsic to him, internal

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1 BNK. II. p. 221.

2 नित्यः परो नित्यो जीवोऽनित्यास्तस्य धातवः । अत उत्पद्यते च म्रियते च विमुच्यते च ॥ इति अग्निवेश्यश्रुतिः । (M. BSB. 2-3-30).

3 आत्मा नित्यः सुखदुःखे त्वनित्ये । जीवो नित्यो धातुरस्य त्वनित्यः ॥ इति च भारते । (M. BSB. 2-3-30).

4 जीवोपाधिर्द्विधा प्रोक्तः स्वरूपं बाह्य एव च । बाह्योपाधिर्लयं याति मुक्तावन्यस्य तु स्थितिः ॥ (TP. 2-3-30).

and indistinguishable from his essence, which is beginningless and exists even after liberation, the other is *bāhyopādhi*, which is extrinsic, physical, through which *Jīva* acts during transmigration and which dissolves at the time of his attaining liberation. The present *sūtra* talks about this *svarūpopādhi* and avers that it exists as long as the Supreme Being exists.

16 पुंस्त्वाधिकरणम् ।

In the earlier sūtra '*tadguṇasāratvāttu*--- (BS. 2-3-29)', it is held that *Jīva* intrinsically has properties like intelligence and bliss, resembling those of *Brahman*. Some texts corroborate this view. One text[1] says that "*Jīva* whose essence is intelligence, stands firm----". Another[2] tells that "he (*Jīva*) is bliss, he is strength, he is vigour, he is taken to that world by the Supreme Being, he is liberated". But, on the other hand, *Paiṅgiśruti*[3] avers that "he becomes blissful when freed from misery, he becomes intelligent when rid of ignorance he becomes strong when taken off weakness, he stays fearless forever". This indicates that *Jīva* by nature, does not have the properties like intelligence and bliss, but becomes endowed with these characteristics in the liberated state. Thus, there is a doubt whether such characteristics as intelligence and bliss are intrinsic to *Jīva* or they are adventitious attributes attained by him in *mokṣa*. The next *sūtra* clears the doubt.

॥ ॐ पुंस्त्वादिवत् त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् ॐ ॥

(2-3-31)

ज्ञस्य जीवस्य सतः तु प्राग्विद्यमानस्य एव अस्य ज्ञानानन्दस्वरूपत्वस्य पुंस्त्वादिवत् बाल्ये सुप्तस्य यौवने व्यज्यमानस्य पुंस्त्वस्त्रीत्वादेः इव अभिव्यक्तियोगात् 'स दुःखाद्विमुक्त आनन्दी भवती'त्यादि व्यपदेशः ।

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1 विज्ञानात्मा सह देवैश्च सर्वैः प्राणा भूतानि सम्प्रतिष्ठन्ति यत्र । (Praśna Up. 4-11) (M. BSB. 2-3-31).

2 'स आनन्दः स बलः स ओजः स परेणामुं लोकं नीयते स विमुच्यत' इति जीवस्य ज्ञानानन्दादिरूपत्वमुच्यते । (M. BSB. 2-3-31).

3 'स दुःखाद्विमुक्त आनन्दी भवति । सोऽज्ञानाद्विमुक्तो ज्ञानी भवति । सोऽबलाद्विमुक्तो बली भवति स नित्यो निरातङ्कोऽवतिष्ठत' इति पैङ्गिश्रुतावनानन्दादिरूपत्वं प्रतीयते । (M. BSB. 2-3-31).

Just as virility in man and child-bearing capacity in woman etc., existing potentially in childhood, become manifest in youth, so also the intrinsic characteristics like intelligence and bliss existing (latent) in *Jīva* only become fully manifested in the state of liberation (*mokṣa*), and in this sense the *Śruti* expresses that '*Jīva* becomes blissful when freed from misery etc.'.

In order to confirm the contention of the *Sūtrakāra*, Madhvācārya quotes an appropriate text[1], which states that, "strength, bliss, vigour, endurance, unclouded intelligence, all essential attributes of *Jīva* become manifest through the grace of the Almighty Supreme Being".

The above *sūtra* avers that the intelligence, bliss etc. are the intrinsic nature of the *Jīva*, but they remain latent during the state of bondage i.e. *saṁsāra* and become fully manifested in *mokṣa*. But certain questions still linger in the mind. When we are conscious of ourselves as 'I am', why are we not able to comprehend the bliss which is said to be a characteristic feature of *Jīva*[2] and for which everyone strives throughout his life? Why should it remain obscured or latent during life time? Moreover, if bliss is the essential feature of *Jīva*, though latent, it should surface one day or the other. Then why should anyone exert himself to attain release from *saṁsāra*?[3] In order to answer all these questions, the *Vedāntin* proposes a hypothesis. According to him, there are reasonable grounds to assume a positive cover for innate bliss in the state of *saṁsāra*, called *avidyā*, other than mere absence of awareness[4].

Thus, *Vedānta* expects a positive spiritual effort on the part of everyone to get rid of this cover, *avidyā*, through the grace of

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1 बलमानन्द ओजश्च सहो ज्ञानमनाकुलम्। स्वरूपाण्येव जीवस्य व्यज्यन्ते परमाद्विभोः। इति गौपवनश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-3-31).

2 जीवस्य अहमिति नित्य अभिव्यक्तत्वेन तत्स्वरूपभूतानां व्यवधानस्यैव अनुपपत्तेः।(TP. 2-3-31).

3 आनन्दादिरूपत्वे च जीवस्य न केनचित् मोक्षाय प्रयतितव्यम्। (TP. 2-3-31).

4 न च आवरणानुपपत्तेः। ज्ञानाभावातिरिक्ततन्निमित्ताविद्याभ्युपगमात्। (TP. 2-3-31).

the Supreme Being. All *Jīvas* are held to be on this highway towards *mokṣa*, at different stages knowingly or unknowingly. They are broadly classified into three categories, one of the exalted or divine ones (*devas*), and the other of evil ones (*asuras*) and the remaining in the middle.

What happens if this hypothesis of *avidyā*, the theory of its gradual removal and manifestation of innate bliss during *mokṣa* is not accepted? The next *sūtra* states the undesirable consequences of such non-acceptance.

॥ ॐ नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वाऽन्यथा ॐ ॥
(2-3-32)

अन्यथा आवरणानङ्गीकारे ज्ञानां मुक्तियोग्यानां तमोयोग्यानां च जीवानाम् अस्य आनन्दादिरूपत्वस्य यथाक्रमं नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योः प्रसङ्गः सतां नित्यमानन्दानुभवः स्यात् असतां नित्यमानन्दाद्यनुपलब्धिः स्यात्। मध्यमजीवानां तु अन्यतरनियमः स्यात् सुखदुःखोभयानुभवः स्यात्।

Otherwise i.e. if the hypothesis of cover for innate bliss etc. and its removal and manifestation of innate bliss in *mokṣa*, is not accepted, there will be the adverse contingency of (i) perpetual experience of their innate bliss for the exalted *Jīvas* fit for *mokṣa*, (ii) perpetual non-experience of bliss (i.e. perpetual misery) for the evil *Jīvas* and (iii) perpetual experience of both bliss and misery (with no prospect of everlasting pure bliss) for the middle category of *Jīvas*.

It should not be misunderstood that on account of bliss etc. being intrinsic to all *Jīvas*, good or evil, when a cover of *avidyā* for bliss etc. is not accepted, then everyone would experience his innate bliss and need not strive for *mokṣa*. The concepts of intelligence and bliss etc. being the essential features of *Jīvas* and the existence of a cover of *avidyā* for them, are all integral parts of the same hypothesis. One presupposes the other. The observed truth is the existence of multitudes of *Jīvas* experiencing different levels of bliss and misery. If a cover of *avidyā* for their innate

characteristics is not accepted, there is nothing to prevent them from experiencing whatever the respective *Jīvas* are constituted of[1]. Thus, whatever happiness and suffering these *Jīvas* are experiencing now, that would be in accordance with the intrinsic characteristics of the respective *Jīvas*, and they would continue to experience the same forever without any prospect of getting rid of them or improving them.

17 कर्तृत्वाधिकरणम्।

While discussing the various aspects of *Jīvas* in this section, the *Sūtrakāra* now takes up another oft-discussed topic in philosophy that whether *Jīva* has any doer-ship or agency (*kartṛtva*) vested in him and is responsible for his actions or whether he is a puppet in the hands of *Paramātman*. It has been established earlier on scriptural authority, in *Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-1-22 to 27), that *Jīva* cannot be credited with independent creativity (*kartṛtva*) and that all creativity is attributable to *Brahman* only. But one text[2] apparently talks in a different tune, as follows. "The wise say that *Jīva* is only that what he desires. What he desires, he resolves. What he resolves he acts. What he acts he reaps the fruits thereof". This signifies some freedom of action (*kartṛtva*) on the part of *Jīva*. The next *sūtra* reconciles this apparent contradiction.

॥ ॐ कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् ॐ ॥ (2-3-33)

Śaṅkarācārya interprets as follows[3]. This *Jīva* is a doer, because it is only then that the scriptural injunctions like 'he shall sacrifice', 'he shall offer', 'he shall give', will be meaningful. Otherwise, these injunctions would become worthless.

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1 आवरणाभावेऽनुभवाभावायोगादिति। (TP. 2-3-32).

2 अथो खल्वाहुः काममय एवायं पुरुष इति। स यथाकामो भवति तत्क्रतुर्भवति। यत्क्रतुर्भवति तत्कर्म कुरुते। यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसम्पद्यते। (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-5) (M. BSB. 2-3-33).

3 कर्ता च अयं जीवः स्यात् : कस्मात् शास्त्रार्थवत्वात्-एवं च 'यजेत' 'जुहुयात्' 'दद्यात्' इत्येवंविधं विधिशास्त्रमर्थवद्भवति। अन्यथा तदनर्थकं स्यात्। (S. BSB. 2-3-33).

However, referring to his interpretation of a previous *sūtra* '*tadguṇasāratvāt*--- (BS. 2-3-29)' Śaṅkarācārya holds that the *Jīva*'s state of being an agent is not natural but is due to his limiting adjunct '*buddhi*'[1]. Since that interpretation of BS. 2-3-29 itself is found far-fetched and in the absence of any such indication in the *sūtra*, this assumption cannot be taken as convincing.

According to Rāmānujācārya, "the opponent holds that the soul is not an agent, but a mere enjoyer, and the *Prakṛti* alone is the agent, for the scriptures so declare. The *sūtra* refutes this and says that the soul is an agent, for only on that basis do the scriptural injunctions like 'he who desires heaven should sacrifice', etc. have a sense. The scriptures prompt a person who desires certain things to perform certain acts, as a result of which he would realize what he desires. An intelligent self alone can have desires and not inert *Prakṛti*, and the scriptural injunctions can influence only a sentient being to action and not inert *Prakṛti*. So the individual self is an agent"[2].

Madhvācārya holds that this *sūtra* simply avers that *Jīva* has doer-ship (*kartṛtva*).

ज्ञः जीवः कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् विधिनिषेधरूपशास्त्रस्य अर्थवत्त्वात्।

***Jīva* is a doer because the scriptures prescribing injunctions and prohibitions are purposeful.**

The contention is that the 'do's' and 'don'ts' enjoined in scriptures are meant for sentient beings like *Jīva*s only, and not for insentient things or for the Supreme Being. If *Jīva*s have no doership, all these scriptural injunctions would become superfluous.

If one argues that *Jīva* does not have doership intrinsically and all doership is attributable to *Brahman* alone, but *Jīva* thinks[3]

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1 SRK. p. 412.

2 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-3-33.

3 अहंकारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते। (BG. 3-27).

that he is the doer because of his mis-apprehension due to egoism, and for such persons the scriptural injunctions would be meaningful, the next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ विहारोपदेशात् ॐ ॥ (2-3-34)

ज्ञः जीवः कर्ता एव न कल्पितकर्तृत्ववान् ''जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ''इति मुक्तौ विहारकर्तृत्वोपदेशात्।

***Jīva* is certainly a doer and not simply assumed to be so, because even in his released state (where all errors of judgement, superimpositions and misconceptions have been transcended once for all)[1] *Jīva*'s sportive activities are told, that he moves about laughing, playing, rejoicing with women, vehicles etc. (Chānd. Up. 8-12-3).**

All commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*. Śaṅkarācārya considers this *sūtra* as another probans to confirm the doership of *Jīva*, and interprets it as follows. ''The texts 'the immortal one goes wherever he likes' (Bṛha. Up. 2-1-18); 'He moves about according to his pleasure within his own body' (Bṛha. Up. 2-1-18) are considered here to be teaching the moving about of the soul''[2].

However, Rāmānujācārya takes this *sūtra* and the next as one by adding a *ca*.

The opponent could further argue that *Jīva* may have doership intrinsically in the released state as there is scriptural evidence for that, but the mundane *Jīva* may not possess intrinsic doership and may be thinking that he is the doer on account of his misapprehension, and scriptural injunctions could still be meaningful for such a person. The next *sūtra* reconciles the contradiction.

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1 BNK. II. p. 245.

2 SRK. p. 412.

|| ॐ उपादानात् ॐ || (2-3-35)

मोक्षाद्युद्देशेन साधनाद्युपादानात् उपादानप्रतीतेः ततश्च फलदर्शनात् ज्ञः संसारेऽपि कर्ता एव न कल्पितकर्तृत्ववान्।[1]

In worldly life also, *Jīva* is certainly a doer and not simply assumed to be so, because it is known that *Jīva*s practise spiritual disciplines (*sādhanās*) for attaining liberation (*mokṣa*) etc. and achieve the same.

The contention is that one cannot get the results for himself, for the acts done by somebody else, by simply assuming that he is the doer. Otherwise, it would be as though one can pass the examination by assuming that he has appeared for it, when actually someone else has appeared.

Śaṅkarācārya also holds this *sūtra* as an additional probans for establishing the doership of *Jīva*, but he interprets it differently, as follows. "Bṛha. Up. (2-1-18) says that the soul in the state of dream takes the organs with it. This shows that the soul is an agent"[2]. However, this interpretation is not found lucid and appealing.

Rāmānujācārya reads the above two *sūtras* 34 and 35 together as

उपादानाद्विहारोपदेशाच्च ।

and interprets on the same lines as follows. "It, taking the organs, moves about as it pleases in its own body (Bṛha Up. 2-1-18). This text, which describes that the soul takes the organs and wanders about in the dream state, clearly shows that it is an agent"[3].

The next *sūtra* offers a direct evidence of *Śruti* in support of the *Jīva*'s doership.

1 TP. 2-3-35.
2 SRK. p. 412.
3 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-3-34.

॥ ॐ व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः ॐ ॥
(2-3-36)

All the three commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*, but they interpret it with reference to different texts.

Śaṅkarācārya refers to a text[1] which states that 'intelligence performs sacrifices, and it also performs all acts'. He avers that *Śruti* refers to *Jīva* as the agent (*kartṛ*) as, for example, in the above quoted text. If it be objected that the word *vijñānaṁ* denotes intelligence or *buddhi* how can it convey the doership of *Jīva*, it is replied that the term connotes *Jīva* only and not intelligence. If it is not the *Jīva* but *buddhi* that is referred to by the word *vijñāna* here, then it would have been in the instrumental case as (*vijñānena*) 'by intelligence'.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* exactly on the same lines with the same example.

Madhvācārya interprets the *sūtra* with reference to another text as an example, as follows.

'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत'[2] इति उपासनादिक्रियायां कर्तृत्वेन व्यपदेशात् च ज्ञः कर्ता न चेत् परमात्मन एव कर्तृत्वापत्त्या आत्मानमिति निर्देशस्य विपर्ययो व्यत्यासः स्यात् आत्मा इति निर्देशः स्यात्।

***Jīva* is an agent also because in texts like 'he shall meditate only on *Ātman* as the refuge of all', *Jīva* is referred to as an agent (subject) in the act of meditation etc.; if it were not so, the *Paramātman* may have to be taken as the agent and in that contingency, in place of *Ātmānaṁ* (in the accusative), the term *Ātmā* (in the nominative) would have been used.**

The contention is as follows. The predication of acts like meditation, presupposes an agent and that too a sentient one. An

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1 विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते। कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च। (Tait. Up. 2-5).

2 Bṛha. Up. 1-4-15.

insentient thing cannot be expected to meditate. There are only two sentient entities in the world, *Jīva* and *Paramātman*. In the above text, *Paramātman* is the object of meditation and therefore the remaining (*pariśeṣa*) sentient entity *Jīva* must be the agent. If *Paramātman* himself were indeed to be the agent, then the term *Ātmā* in the nominative would have been used.

Thus, the *Sūtrakāra* establishes with all the three testimonies, perception, inference and scriptural text, that *Jīva* possesses doership (*kartṛtva*). A natural doubt would arise that if this is so, then how and why is it established earlier in *sūtra*s 2-1-22 to 27, that *Jīva* cannot be credited with creativity and that all creativity is attributable to *Brahman* only? The next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ उपलब्धिवदनियमः ॐ ॥ (2-3-37)

Commentators differ in their understanding of this *sūtra*. Śaṅkarācārya and Madhvācārya view the *sūtra* more or less in the same way. But Rāmānujācārya takes it entirely in a different way.

Rāmānujācārya takes the word *upalabdhi* in the sense of getting results of actions and interprets the *sūtra* as follows. "If the soul were merely an enjoyer and not an agent, and *Prakṛti* alone were the agent, then, as all souls, were equally connected with *Prakṛti*, all actions would result in the enjoyment of all souls or of none. Even if the internal organs be different in different souls, still as all the souls are infinite and all-pervading, they will be equally connected with all internal organs, and so there would be no distribution of results of actions"[1]. Obviously this is far-fetched, unconvincing and not in tune with the flow of ideas from the preceding *sūtra*s.

Śaṅkarācārya understands the word *upalabdhi* as perception or experience, and interprets the *sūtra* as shown below. As the

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1 Śrībhāṣya - SV. 2-3-36.

individual soul (*Jīva*), though free to perceive things around, perceives both the agreeable and disagreeable things, without any certainty (i.e. without any control over them), similarly the *Jīva* carries out works, agreeable and disagreeable, without any certainty (*aniyamena*). In action also, the *Jīva* is not absolutely independent[1], since he depends (for the success in the work undertaken) on the peculiarities of place, time and other causal factors. But the agent does not cease to be an agent because he requires help. For example, a cook is the agent in cooking activities though he needs the help of fuel, water etc.

Madhvācārya also takes the word *upalabdhi* as understanding (*jñāna*) or perception, and interprets the *sūtra* as follows.

यथा उपलब्धौ ज्ञाने अनियमः इच्छानुसारेण प्राप्त्यभावः तथा क्रियायामपि अनियमः ।[2]

As in the case of attainment of knowledge, there is no certainty of getting it as one desires, so also in the case of works undertaken, there is no certainty (of accomplishment).

The argument is that one may wish to see only the beautiful, smell only the fragrant, and hear only the melodious, but there is no certainty (*niyama*) of his succeeding in it. Similarly, a *Jīva*, though intrinsically possessing the doership (*kartṛtva*), is not always in a position to accomplish the task. Thus, *Jīva* is not absolutely independent in successfully carrying out the works undertaken. The case is different with the Supreme Being. "His will is effort, effort is action and action accomplishment, without fatigue"[3]. In this sense only it is said earlier in BS. 2-1-22 to 27, that all creativity is attributable to *Brahman* only and not to *Jīva*.

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1 यथा अयमात्मा उपलब्धिं प्रति स्वतन्त्रोऽपि अनियमेन इष्टमनिष्टं च उपलभते एवम् अनियमेनैव इष्टमनिष्टं च संपादयिष्यति। अपि च अर्थक्रियायामपि न अत्यन्तम् आत्मनः स्वातन्त्र्यमस्ति देशकालनिमित्तविशेषापेक्षत्वात्। न च सहायापेक्षस्य कर्तुः कर्तृत्वं निवर्तते। (S. BSB. 2-3-37).

2 VKM. 2-3-37.

3 BNK. II. p. 247.

Its import is not to deny creativity or doership entirely to *Jīva*. *Jīva* intrinsically has the power of creativity, but to a limited extent.

If one doubts why such limitation in creativity of *Jīva*, the next *sūtra* replies.

|| ॐ शक्तिविपर्ययात् ॐ || **(2-3-38)**

परमात्मशक्त्यपेक्षया ज्ञस्य जीवस्य शक्तेः विपर्ययात् अल्पत्वात् न जीवः स्वतन्त्रः ।

***Jīva* is not fully independent (regarding his creativity) because compared to *Paramātman*'s power or competency that of *Jīva* is trifling[1].**

Śaṅkarācārya treats this *sūtra* as another reason to establish that *Jīvātman* which is other than *vijñāna* i.e. *buddhi*, is the agent. Śaṅkarācārya takes the compound '*śaktiviparyaya*' as indicating a reversal of power between the instrument (*buddhi*) and the agent (*Jīva*). The present *sūtra* is interpreted as follows. "If intellect or *buddhi*, which is an instrument, becomes the agent and ceases to function as an instrument, then we will have to devise something else as an instrument"[2]. Almost the same point is discussed by the commentator in the preceding *sūtra* 36, which renders this *sūtra* superfluous.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* more or less in the same way as follows. "If *buddhi* were to be the agent, there being the impossibility of another agent being the enjoyer, even the power of being the enjoyer would belong to it (*buddhi*) alone. Thus, the *Ātman* would be divested of his power as enjoyer; and because the nature of enjoyer would befall *buddhi* alone, there would be the absence of the means of proof regarding the existence

1 VKM. 2-3-38.

2 SRK. p. 413.

of the *Ātman*. For, it is their (*Sāṅkhya*'s) tenet that '*Puruṣa* exists by virtue of the nature of an enjoyer' (Sā. kā. 17)''[1].

Comparatively, Madhvācārya's interpretation is simple, straight- forward and befitting the flow of ideas. According to him, the next *sūtra* offers another reason for the lack of absolute independence for the *Jīva*.

॥ ॐ समाध्यभावाच्च ॐ ॥ (2-3-39)

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya take the word *samādhi* in the popular sense of deep concentration during meditation. Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[2]. The *samādhi*, which is taught in *Vedānta* texts for the realization of *Ātman* described in the *Upaniṣads*, also will not be possible if *Jīvātman* is not credited with doership (*kartṛtva*). From this also, it is proved that this *Jīvātman* is an agent.

Rāmānujācārya interprets the *sūtra* differently. ''If the internal organ (*buddhi*) were the agent, then *samādhi* would be impossible. For, in *samādhi* the meditating person realizes his difference from *Prakṛti*. This experience would be impossible for the internal organ, inasmuch as it is a product of *Prakṛti*. So we have to accept that the soul is an agent''[3].

Madhvācārya takes the word *samādhi* in the sense of *samādhāna*[4] or *alambuddhi* which conveys composure, satisfaction, peace of mind and absence of want. The exposition of the *sūtra* is as follows.

समाधेः अलम्बुद्धेः जीवे अभावात् च अपूर्णकामत्वात् च तस्य अस्वातन्त्र्यम् ।[5]

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1 Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-3-37.

2 योऽपि अयम् औपनिषदात्मप्रतिपत्तिप्रयोजनः समाधिः उपदिष्टः वेदान्तेषु ------- सोऽपि असति आत्मनः कर्तृत्वे न उपपद्यते। तस्मादपि अस्य कर्तृत्वसिद्धिः। (S. BSB. 2-3-39).

3 Śrībhāṣya- SV 2-3-38.

4 The abstract nouns *samādhi* and *samādhāna* are synonyms, formed from the root सम् +आ+धा. The word *samādhi* is formed as per *sūtra* उपसर्गे घोः किः । (Pāṇini 3-3-92); and the word *samādhāna* is formed according to ल्युट् च । (Pāṇini 3-3-115).

5 VKM 2-3-39.

Since *Jīva* does not have composure, or satisfaction i.e. he remains dissatisfied, he lacks absolute independence.

On account of this lack of independence, *Jīva* though he possesses intrinsic doership, cannot be certain about accomplishing the works undertaken by him. On the contrary *Paramātman* has no desires to be fulfilled. He lacks nothing. He yearns for nothing. Therefore, He is absolutely independent and is always certain about the works He thinks of[1].

The *Sūtrakāra* gives an illustration in the next *sūtra*, to show to what extent the *Jīva* has freedom in his natural attribute of *kartṛtva* and to what extent he depends on other authority and auxiliary things.

॥ ॐ यथा च तक्षोभयथा ॐ ॥ **(2-3-40)**

यथा तक्षा उभयथा कारयितृनियतत्वेन कर्तृत्वेन च उच्यते तथा जीवः अपि ईशनियतः अपि कर्ता उच्यते ।

Just as a carpenter is said to be under the control of his employer and also as an independent worker, similarly a *Jīvātman*, though under the control of *Paramātman*, is said to be an agent (in his own capacity).

The illustration conveys that the carpenter acts as directed by his employer regarding the item to be made, e.g. a chair or a table, the wood to be used, ordinary or superior, the colour of the polish, the size and the design of the item etc. Once these parameters are given to him, the carpenter works independently within the means at his disposal. The accomplishment of the task depends on the carpenter's skill, application and perseverance. The credit or discredit for the work goes to him. Similarly, a *Jīvātman* is free to carry out the jobs on hand within the means at his disposal

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1 समाधानम् अलम्बुद्धिः अस्ति ईश्वरस्य इति तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं जीवस्य च तद्भावात् अस्वातन्त्र्यं प्रतीयते । (TP. 2-3-39).

decided by the circumstances or *Paramātman*, and he has to own up credit or discredit for the work.

Śaṅkarācārya takes this *sūtra* as a new *Adhikaraṇa* and gives a lengthy interpretation as follows. Thus, the agency of *Jīva* is established. The question arises again whether the agency is natural to him or is superimposed due to his limiting adjunct (*buddhi*). The *Sūtrakāra* reconciles with the example of a carpenter[1]. "The soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of actions, *buddhi* etc., and ceases to be so when dissociated from them even as a carpenter works so long as he wields his instruments and rests when he lays them aside. The Self is active in waking and dream states and is blissful when it ceases to be an agent in deep sleep. The Self's true nature is inactive but it becomes active when it is connected with its *upādhis* or adjuncts"[2]. Then Śaṅkarācārya refutes the previous seven *sūtras*, BS. 2-3-33 to 39, one by one, and arrives at the conclusion that the agency of *Jīvātman* is not natural but superimposed on him (due to misconception *avidyā*) on account of his proximity to his limiting adjuncts, buddhi etc.[3].

It appears that Śaṅkarācārya does not agree with the doctrine propagated by the *Sūtrakāra* through these *Brahmasūtras*. The *Sūtrakāra* has strenuously established in the preceding seven *sūtras*, with all the three testimonies, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*, that *Jīvātman* is intrinsically an agent. He says, *inter alia*,

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1 कर्तृत्वं शारीरस्य प्रदर्शितम्। तत्पुनः स्वाभाविकं वा स्यात्, उपाधिनिमित्तं वा इति चिन्त्यते। तदेतदाह आचार्यः 'यथा च तक्षोभयथा' इति। ---- यथा तु तक्षा लोके वास्यादिकरणहस्तः कर्ता दुःखी भवति स एव स्वगृहं प्राप्तो विमुक्तवास्यादिकरणः स्वस्थ निर्वृतो निर्व्यापारः सुखी भवति। एवम् अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितद्वैतसंपृक्त आत्मा स्वप्नजागरितावस्थयोः कर्ता दुःखी भवति। सः तच्छ्रमापनुत्तये स्वात्मानं परं ब्रह्म प्रविश्य विमुक्तकार्यकरणसंघातः अकर्ता सुखी भवति संप्रसादावस्थायाम्।----तक्षदृष्टान्तश्च एतावतांशेन द्रष्टव्यः। तक्षा हि विशिष्टेषु तक्षणादिव्यापारेष्वपेक्ष्यैव प्रतिनियतानि करणानि वास्यादीनि कर्ता भवति। स्वशरीरेण तु अकर्ता एव। एवम् अयमात्मा सर्वव्यापारेष्वपेक्षैव मन आदीनि करणानि कर्ता भवति स्वात्मना तु अकर्ता एव इति। (S. BSB. 2-3-40).

2 SRK. p. 414.

3 तस्मात्कर्तृत्वमप्यात्मन उपाधिनिमित्तमेवेति स्थितम्। (S. BSB. 2-3-40).

in *sūtra* 36, as interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya himself that *buddhi* is only an instrument and doership cannot be attributed to it. Now Śaṅkarācārya is refuting all those arguments and that too putting it in the mouth of *Sūtrakāra* himself as '*tadetadāha ācāryaḥ* (!)'. Śaṅkarācārya has done it earlier more than once. For example, in *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* (BS. 1-1-12 to 19), the *Sūtrakāra* establishes that *Brahman* is happiness personified (*ānandamayaḥ*) and Śaṅkarācārya refutes it. In the just concluded *utkrāntyadhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra* establishes in ten *sūtras* (BS. 2-3-19 to 28), that *Jīvātman* is of the size of atom (*aṇu*). Śaṅkarācārya treats all of them as *Pūrvapakṣa* and rejects them just on the strength of a word '*tu*' in BS. 2-3-29. In the present *sūtra*, even that '*tu*' is not there. But, Śaṅkarācārya takes the available *ca* only in the sense of *tu* [1]. Thus, the commentator appears interested in refuting the tenets of the *Sūtrakāra* and in advocating his own. But, the present study aims at knowing the *Sūtrakāra*'s concepts about *Brahman*.

The words *yathā* and *ca* in the *sūtra* clearly indicate that this *sūtra* offers just an illustration in support of what is established in the preceding *sūtra* and there is no justification for treating this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. Śaṅkarācārya starts this topic, *kartṛtvādhikaraṇa*, with a preconceived notion and declares, before writing a single word about the *sūtra* (BS. 2-3-33), that the *Jīvātman*'s state of being an agent is not natural but is due to his limiting adjunct *buddhi* based on his interpretation of an earlier *sūtra* '*tadguṇasāratvāt---* (BS. 2-3-29)' [2]. The interpretation of that *sūtra* itself is shown to be far from convincing. And now he is trying to refute the intrinsic agency of *Jīva*, with the help of this illustration of a carpenter. According to the commentator, when a carpenter works with his tools, "in the case of particular acts like chopping he is an agent only through the particular tools

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1 त्वर्थे च अयं चः पठितः। (S. BSB. 2-3-40).

2 तद्गुणसारत्वाधिकारेणैवापरोऽपि जीवधर्मः प्रपञ्च्यते। (S. BSB. 2-3-33).

but is quite inactive so far as his own body is concerned (*svaśarīreṇa tu akartā eva*). This is not so. The carpenter is active through his body too. The body acts as much as the tools. The tools cannot act without the body acting''[1]. In such skilled works, the value added is more due to the skills of the person and he cannot be held inactive. While interpreting *sūtra* 2-3-37, Śaṅkarācārya himself offers the example of a cook and says that the cook does not cease to be a cook because he needs fuel, water and so on[2]. In what way these two examples are different? In production works the agent or the instruments cannot be treated as imaginary or superimposed simply because they need one another's help[3]. The simple example of a carpenter is just to illustrate that in a work situation, a person can be free to do his work to a certain extent and depends on other authority or auxiliaries to a certain extent. Perhaps being aware of the fact that his view of this illustration is inappropriate, the commentator adds that 'the illustration of the carpenter is to be understood only so far'[4]. But no open-minded person would accept this view. As V. S. Ghate puts it that "this illustration cannot support the point, which Śaṅkara has tried to make out, in-spite of all the explanations, which he has given''[5].

Rāmānujācārya does not agree with the above view and he arrives at his own conclusions, as follows. An objection is raised that if it were admitted that the *Ātman* is the agent, his activitity for all time would not cease. To this, the *Sūtrakāra* says- The *Ātman*, although endowed with the sense organs, speech etc., acts when he wishes, but does not act when he wishes not; just as a carpenter even when the tools, axe etc., are near, acts or does not

1 BNK. II. p. 257.

2 न च सहायापेक्षस्य कर्तुः कर्तृत्वं निवर्तते। (S. BSB. 2-3-37).

3 न हि कार्योत्पादने सहकार्यपेक्षामात्रेण कर्तृकरणादेः कर्तृत्वादित्वं कल्पितं भवति। (TC. III. p. 125).

4 तक्षदृष्टान्तश्च एतावतांशेन द्रष्टव्यः। (S. BSB. 2-3-40).

5 VSG. p. 92.

act according to his will. But, if the non-sentient *buddhi* were to be the agent, there is bound to be activity for all time, on account of the absence of any regulating cause such as desire for enjoyment etc.[1].

Madhvācārya's interpretation is more natural and befitting.

In this illustration of a carpenter, we know that he is subject to his employer regarding the facilities at work-place and payment of remuneration etc., but his skills and his identity as a carpenter are his own, acquired through training and experience. A doubt arises whether the *Jīvātman*'s capability of action (*kartṛtva*) is also his own, as in the case of the carpenter or not. The next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः ॐ ॥ **(2-3-41)**

जीवस्य कर्तृत्वशक्तिः परात् एव ईशाधीन एव तच्छ्रुतेः 'कर्तृत्वं करणत्वं च'[2] इति ईशाधीनत्वश्रुतेः।

***Jīva*'s capability to act is subject to *Paramātman* only, on account of scriptural text like '*kartṛtvaṁ karaṇatvaṁ ca*' to that effect.**

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* and the next as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. Rāmānujācārya interprets this *sūtra* as shown below[3]. The agency of the soul is dependent on the Supreme Being only, because the *Śruti* declares so. Then he quotes some relevant texts. Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* as follows. "The soul in the state of *saṁsāra* when it appears as agent and enjoyer is brought about through the permission of the Lord who is the

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1 Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-3-39.

2 "कर्तृत्वं करणत्वं च स्वभावश्चेतना धृतिः। यत्प्रसादादिमे सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षये॥" इति हि पैङ्गिश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-3-41). "The capability to act, instrumentality, nature, intelligence, steadfastness, all these exist by the grace of the Supreme Being and they cease to exist when His grace is withdrawn". Thus, indeed states *Paiṅgiśruti*.

3 तत्कर्तृत्वम् अस्य परमात्मन एव हेतोर्भवति। कुतः ? श्रुतेः। (Śrībhāṣya 2-3-40).

Highest Self, the Supervisor of all actions, the witness residing in all beings, the cause of intelligence''[1], etc. on account of scriptural texts to that effect. But this interpretation appears improper because (as advocated by the commentator in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*), if the agency of *Jīvātman* is superimposed on him on account of his proximity to his limiting adjuncts, *buddhi* etc., due to misconception (*avidyā*) as in the case of silver seen in place of a shell, where is the room for *Paramātman* to come in the picture?[2]

If the agency of *Jīvātman* is dependent on the Supreme Being, it means that after so much of discussion we have come back to square one, from where we started, that if *Jīvātman* is a puppet in the hands of the Supreme Being, then the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions will be meaningless. The next *sūtra* clarifies the point.

॥ ॐ कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषेधावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः ॐ ॥

(2-3-42)

विधिनिषेधशास्त्रावैयर्थ्याय स्वस्य वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यनिरासाय च परः जीवं तदनादिकर्मप्रयत्नयोग्यतापेक्षः एव प्रेरयति ।

The Supreme Being impels the *Jīva* to action in accordance with that individual's merits and demerits due to beginningless previous actions, efforts and aptitude only, so that the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are not rendered futile and He, the Lord Himself, is clear off the charge of partiality and cruelty.

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra* and interpret it more or less in the same way. Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation is as follows. ''The Lord directs the soul taking into

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1 SRK. p. 415.

2 'परात्तु' इत्यधिकरणमप्ययुक्तं जीवेऽन्तःकरणसन्निधानादारोपितस्याविद्यककर्तृत्वस्यरूप्यादेरिव ईश्वरानपेक्षत्वात् । (TC. III. p. 128).

account previous good and bad deeds---"[1]. The remark made against Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of the preceding *sūtra* applies here too. In his scheme of things where the soul by nature is inactive but the agency is superimposed on him, this *sūtra* and the preceding one, both appear redundant.

According to Rāmānujācārya, "The Lord makes the soul act by granting it permission, taking into consideration the efforts put forth by it. Though the Lord's permission is essential, yet the responsibility for the initial volition is the soul's; hence injunctions and prohibitions etc. have a scope"[2].

18 अंशाधिकरणम्।

In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtrakāra*, considers the controversial topic of *Jīvas*' relation with the Supreme Being i.e. whether *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman* or not and decides as follows.

॥ॐ अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एके ॐ॥
(2-3-43)

Śaṅkarācārya explains the *sūtra* thus[3]. Since it is held in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* that the relation between *Jīva* and the Lord is that between the beneficiary (*upakārya*) and the benefactor (*upakāraka*), a question arises whether the relation is one of the master and servant or fire and its sparks. The *sūtra* avers that it is proper to take *Jīva* as a part of the Lord as the spark is a part of fire. As *Brahman* is part-less, a soul can only be thought of as a part, *as it were* (*aṁśaḥ iva aṁśaḥ*). Then, why not consider

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1 SRK. p. 416.

2 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-3-41.

3 ततश्च जीवेश्वरयोरप्युपकार्योपकारकभावाभ्युपगमात् किं स्वामिभृत्यवत्संबन्धः आहोस्वित् अग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवत्। ------ जीव ईश्वरांशो भवितुमर्हति यथाग्नेर्विस्फुलिङ्गः; अंश इवांशः; न हि निरवयवस्यमुख्योऽश संभवति। कस्मात्पुनः निरवयवत्वात् स एव न भवति ?। नानाव्यपदेशात्। -----अन्यथा चापि व्यपदेशो भवति अनानात्वस्य प्रतिपादकः। तथा ह्येके शाखिनो दाशकितवादिभावं ब्रह्मण आमनन्ति। ---- इति हीनजन्तूदाहरणेन सर्वेषामेव नामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसंघातप्रविष्टानां जीवानां ब्रह्मत्वमाह। अतो भेदाभेदावगमाभ्यामंशत्वावगमः। (S. BSB. 2-3-43).

the Lord Himself as becoming a *Jīva*? The *sūtra* answers that it is because the scriptural texts declare a difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. There are also texts, which declare non-difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. For instance, one Vedic School asserts that even the fishermen and the gamblers are *Brahman*. Thus, with the examples of low creatures, it is told that all *Jīva*s who have entered the body-mind-complexes, are *Brahman* only. Therefore, as there are statements of difference and non-difference, the soul is said to be a part of the Lord.

The *Sūtrakāra* makes a positive assertion without mincing words that '*Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*' and offers two sets of reasons thereof. The commentator poses the problem whether the relation between *Brahman* and *Jīva* is one of difference like that between master and servant or of identity as that between fire and its sparks. The *sūtra* is taken to be in favour of the latter, saying that *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*. The commentator hastens to add that *Brahman* being partless, *Jīva* cannot be taken as part of *Brahman* in the primary sense of the word, but *Jīva* can only be imagined as a part, as it were (*aṁśaḥ iva aṁśaḥ*). It is true that *Jīva* cannot be an organic part or limb of *Brahman* since *Brahman* is held to be partless, and *Jīva*'s *aṁśatva* is only conceptual. But without explaining in what sense *Jīva* is described as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*, if it is simply told that it is imaginary, the explanation makes the confused reader further confounded.

The *Bhāmatī* holds that the purpose of this *Adhikaraṇa* is to prove the relationship of identity between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. Therefore, it concludes that[1], "when *Jīva* gets rid of his limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of mis-apprehension (*avidyā*), *Jīva* realizes his status of being *Brahman* and this is established; with reference to that doctrine, *Jīva* is described as 'as good as an *aṁśa*' of *Brahman*, but the purport is not to convey that *Jīva* is an *aṁśa*

1 एवम् अविद्योपधानापगमे जीवे ब्रह्मभावः इति सिद्धं जीवो ब्रह्मांश इव तत्तन्त्रतया। न तु अंशः इति तात्पर्यार्थः। (*Bhāmatī* 2-3-43) (BNK. II. p. 281).

of *Brahman*". This practically repudiates the *Sūtrakāra*'s position[1]. Moreover, *Jīva*'s *aṁśatva* of *Brahman* cannot prove the identity between *Jīva* and *Brahman* because "*aṁśatva* is not a synonym of non-difference, nor does it have an invariable concomitance with non-difference, as a single fibre which is an *aṁśa* of the cloth is still different from the cloth"[2].

V. S. Ghate observes that "Śaṅkara's theory cannot at all fit in with this (concept of *Jīva* as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*)"[3].

The problem considered by the *sūtra* is not about reconciliation of conflicting texts, one set declaring difference and another advocating identity between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. That has already been discussed in the sūtra '*tadguṇasāratvāt*---- (BS. 2-3-29)'. If the same problem were to be taken up here, then the *sūtra* '*aṁśo nānāvyapadeśāt anyathā ca*' would have sufficed. The remaining words would be superfluous. But the *Sūtrakāra* takes up here the conflict between two sets of texts, one describing *Jīva* as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*, and the other telling that there is no such relation. The word *aṁśa* literally means a share, part, portion or fraction; but it cannot be taken in that primary sense, since *Brahman* is held to be partless. But the *sūtra* avers that *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman* and the *sūtra* is packed up with two sets of evidences to show in what sense the *Śruti* texts describe *Jīva* as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*. Therefore, the *sūtra* has to be blown up and amplified and its import is to be understood.

Rāmānujācārya also proceeds on the same lines, but holds *Jīvas* as parts of *Brahman* in reality. He also gives, a special meaning to the word *aṁśa*. He considers the question whether the soul is quite different from *Brahman*, or it is *Brahman* under

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1 BNK. II. p. 281.

2 न हि अंशत्वमेव अभिन्नत्वम्। नापि तद्व्याप्तम्। पटांशस्यापि एकस्य तन्तोः पटात् भेददर्शनात्। (TC. III. p. 135).

3 VSG. p. 94.

ignorance, or it is *Brahman* determinated by a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), or it is a part of *Brahman*. Different schools hold different views. As against all these views, the *sūtra* says that the soul is a part of *Brahman* since there is declaration of difference and also of unity in the scriptures. By part, however, is meant that which constitutes one aspect (*deśa*) of a substance. Hence a distinguishing quality of a substance is not the substance itself but a part of that substance. For example, the luster of a gem is not the gem but it is a part of it. In this sense, the individual soul, which is the body of *Brahman* (in Rāmānujācārya's doctrine), as declared by the scriptural texts, is a part of it[1]. In the above argument, 'being a portion means existing in a part of one object', and 'the attribute of a qualified entity is but a portion of it'[2]. However, the qualifier and the qualified are interchangeable, e.g. (i) the white cloth or (ii) the whiteness of the cloth. Therefore, there may arise a contingency when *Brahman* may become an adjective of *Jīva* and *Brahman* may have to be looked upon as an *aṁśa* of *Jīva*[3]. Further, in Rāmānujācārya's philosophy, both the sentient (*cit*) and insentient (*acit*) things in the world constitute the body of *Brahman*. Then the insentient entities (*jaḍatattva*s) also may become *aṁśa*s of *Brahman* [4]. But the *Sūtrakāra* has treated only *Jīva* as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*. Hence, it is difficult to accept such an interpretation.

Madhvācārya considers two conflicting scriptural texts as follows. One text says that "Indeed these souls are *aṁśa*s only

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1 इदानीं- किमयं जीवः परस्मादत्यन्तभिन्नः, उत परमेव ब्रह्म भ्रान्तम्, उत ब्रह्मैवोपाध्यवच्छिन्नम्, उत ब्रह्मांशः? इति संशय्यते। ------ एवं प्राप्ते, अभिधीयते ब्रह्मांश इति। कुतः ? नानात्वव्यपदेशात्। अन्यथा च, एकत्वेन व्यपदेशात्। ------ अत उभयव्यपदेशोपपत्तये जीवोऽयं ब्रह्मणोऽश इत्युपेत्यम्। (Śrībhāṣya- SV- 2-3-42).

2 एकवस्त्वेकदेशत्वं ह्यंशत्वम्। विशिष्टस्यैकस्य वस्तुनो विशेषणमंश एव। (Śrībhāṣya-RDK. 2-3-45).

3 शुक्लः पटः पटस्य शौक्ल्यम् इति विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य कामचारित्वेन ब्रह्मविशिष्टं जीवं प्रति ब्रह्मणोऽप्यंशत्वप्रसङ्गात्। (TC. III. p. 138).

4 स्वविशिष्टब्रह्मैकदेशस्य जडस्यापि ब्रह्मांशत्वप्रसङ्गात्। (TC. III. p. 138).

and the *aṁśī* is the Lord indeed. The immutable Hari Himself causes all this, to be done by His *aṁśa*s''[1]. From this *Gaupavanaśruti*, it is observed that the *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of the Lord. Another text[2] tells that, ''the soul is not at all an *aṁśa* of the Lord; he has no relation with Him nor is he helpful to Him. Yet, the Supreme Lord bestows on the *Jīva*, the fruits according to his merits. The Lord is not ruled by any one, while He is the ruler of all''. Thus, there appears a doubt whether the *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of the Lord or not.

The *sūtra* answers saying that *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of the Lord. Since *Paramātman* is partless and *Jīva* cannot be an organic or physical part of Him, the *Sūtrakāra* provides two sets of reasons in support of his predication, thereby indicating the two complementary senses in which the concept of *Jīva*'s *aṁśatva* is to be understood. The amplified exposition of the *sūtra* is as follows.

जीवः परस्य अंशः कुतः (i) नानाव्यपदेशात्- 'पुत्रोऽहं परमात्मनः'[3] इति श्रुतौ पुत्रभ्रातृसखित्वादिनानाप्रकारेण संबन्धव्यपदेशात् परेण केवलं उपकार्यत्वेन, अन्यथा च -'नासावस्य कुतश्चन' इति संबन्धाभावेन परस्य उपकर्तृत्वाभावेन, तदुभयबलात् जीवः परमात्मनः उपजीवकरूपांशः; अपि च (ii) दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एके-यतः एके शाखिनः जीवस्य 'ब्रह्म दाशा ब्रह्म कितवा'[4] इति ब्रह्माभेदमधीयते, अन्यथा च - 'अन्यः परो अन्यः जीवः'[5] इति

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1 ''अंशा एव हीमे जीवा अंशी हि परमेश्वरः। स्वयमंशैरिदं सर्वं कारयत्यचलो हरिः॥'' इति गौपवनश्रुतौ अंशत्वं जीवस्य उपलभ्यते। (M. BSB. 2-3-43).

2 ''नैवांशो न सम्बन्धो नापेक्ष्यो जीवः परस्य। तथाऽपि तु यथायोगं फलदः प्रभुरेकराट्। न नियम्यः स कस्यापि स सर्वस्य नियामकः॥'' इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतौ।

3 'मां रक्षतु विभुर्नित्यं पुत्रोऽहं परमात्मनः।' May the omnipresent Lord ever protect me; I am the son of the Supreme Being. (M. BSB. 2-3-43).

4 'ब्रह्म दाशाः ब्रह्म कितवाः ब्रह्मैवेमे दाशाः।' The fishermen are *Brahman*, the gamblers are *Brahman*, these pilots are *Brahman* indeed. (M. BSB. SSR. 2-3-43).

5 'अन्यः परोऽन्यो जीवो नासावस्य कुतश्चन। नायं तस्यापि कश्चन।' इति अन्यथा काषायणश्रुतिः। The *Kāṣāyaṇaśruti* presents the other view. ''Different is the Lord and different is the soul; for He is none of this and this is none of Him''. (The Lord has nothing to expect of the soul but He has to do everything for the soul; and the soul has nothing to do for the Lord but has everything for him to be done by the Lord). (M. BSB. SSR. 2-3-43).

ब्रह्मभेदं च अधीयते एके अतः ईशजीवयोर्भेदाभेदोक्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या भेदमुपेत्य अभेदस्थाने जीवः परमात्मनः न्यूनत्वे सति किंचित्तत्सदृशरूपांशः।

***Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman* (i) because his relation to *Brahman* is found described in scriptures in various terms as son, brother, friend and so on, which conveys that *Jīva* is only a beneficiary; and *Jīva* is also described as not standing in any relationship to *Brahman*, which indicates that *Jīva* is never a benefactor of *Brahman*; on the strength of both these observations, *Jīva* in his role as one subsistent on *Brahman*, is considered as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*; and also (ii) because the followers of one school study *Brahman* as being identical with fishermen, gamblers (and the entire fraternity of *Jīvas*), and the followers of another school study *Brahman* as different from *Jīvas*, therefore since both identity and difference between the Lord and the *Jīvas* cannot be otherwise justified simultaneously in their primary senses, accepting the difference, the identity is understood figuratively in the sense that *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*, as *Jīva* though being inferior to *Brahman*, has a few attributes resembling those of *Brahman*.**

In order to show that this alone could be at the back of Bādarāyaṇa's mind while composing this *sūtra*, Madhvācārya quotes a verse[1] from *Varāhapurāṇa*, compiled and edited by Bādarāyaṇa himself, which runs exactly like the interpretation of this *sūtra*. It says that "as Hari is spoken of as son, brother, friend, master and in so many other ways by the *Vedas*, the *Jīva* is for this reason considered as His *aṁśa*; and for the reason that the Lord is sung as separate as well as not separate from the *Jīva*, the latter is said to be the *aṁśa* of the Lord. Both separateness and non separateness cannot hold true[2] in their primary senses simultaneously".

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1 पुत्रभ्रातृसखित्वेन स्वामित्वेन यतो हरिः। बहुधा गीयते वेदैर्जीवोऽशस्तस्य तेन तु॥ यतो भेदेन तस्यायमभेदेन च गीयते। अतश्चांशत्वमुद्दिष्टं भेदाभेदौ न मुख्यतः॥ इति वाराहे।
(M. BSB. 2-3-43).

2 BNK. II. p. 274.

Madhvācārya's interpretation of this *sūtra* is brilliant and it appears that it is he who has read the *Sūtrakāra*'s mind correctly.

The next *sūtra* offers another reason based on *Śruti* for considering *Jīva* as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ मन्त्रवर्णात् ॐ ॥ **(2-3-44)**

जीवः परस्य अंशः 'पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि' इति श्रुतेश्च।

***Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Paramātman* also on account of *Śruti*, which holds that 'all the beings are but a quarter of Him' (RV. 10-90-3).**

All commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*.

The next *sūtra* gives another reason based on *Smṛti*, for considering *Jīva* as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*.

॥ ॐ अपि स्मर्यते ॐ ॥ **(2-3-45)**

"ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः" इति ज्ञः परस्य अंश इति स्मर्यते अपि।

***Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Paramātman*, also because of *Smṛti*, in which the Lord declares that "the eternal sentient entity in a living body, called *Jīva*, is my *aṁśa* only" (BG. 15-7).**

All commentators agree on the interpretation of this *sūtra*. Śaṅkarācārya reads an additional *ca* in the *sūtra*.

In the same *Bhagavadgītā*, in which the Lord declares that *Jīva*s are His *aṁśa*s, the Lord also promises that "whenever there is a decline of righteousness and a rise of unrighteousness, I manifest Myself"[1]. This concept of Lord's incarnation is popular in Vedic religion. These incarnations (*avatāra*s) are also known

1 यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्भवति भारत। अभ्युत्थानमधर्मस्य तदात्मानं सृजाम्यहम्॥ (BG. 4-7).

as the Lord's *aṁśa*s in the Epics and *Purāṇa*s. Naturally a doubt would arise that when *Jīva*s are also *aṁśa*s, of the Lord, whether these incarnations are similar to *Jīva*s or they differ from *Jīva*s. The *Sūtrakāra* discusses this point in the remaining *sūtra*s of this *Adhikaraṇa*, according to Madhvācārya. Other commentators view the *sūtra*s differently as it suits their doctrines.

॥ ॐ प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः ॐ ॥ **(2-3-46)**

परः मत्स्याद्यवताररूपी[1] परमात्मा न एवं जीव इव भिन्नांशः प्रकाशादिवत् यथा प्रकाशः तेजोभिमानिनः अवतारः कालाग्न्यभिमानी न खद्योताभिमानिवत्।

Just as the presiding deity of the destructive fire at the end of the world who is the manifestation of the presiding deity of the element *Agni*, is not the same as that of a fire-fly, the Supreme Being in his incarnations as *Matsya* (fish) etc., is not the same as *Jīva* who is a *bhinnāṁśa* (i.e. who is different from the Supreme Being, but is considered as His *aṁśa* because he subsists on Him and has a few attributes resembling those of the Lord).

The contention is that the Lord's incarnations are the *Svarūpāṁśas* of the Lord and *Jīva* is a *Bhinnāṁśa*. In order to explain the difference between the two, Madhvācārya quotes a passage[2] from *Varāhapurāṇa*, which runs thus. "*Aṁśa*s are of two orders, the *Svarūpāṁśa* and the *Bhinnāṁśa*. Whatever is the nature, power and condition of supremacy etc. of the *Aṁśin* (original), the same holds true of the *Svarūpāṁśa*s. There is not even an iota of difference between the *Svārūpāṁśa* and its *Aṁśin*.

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1 In Indian Epics and *Purāṇas*, among many incarnations of the Supreme Being, the ten *avatāras* of Viṣṇu, namely 1) Matsya (fish), 2) Kūrma (tortoise), 3) Varāha (boar), 4) Narasiṁha (lion-headed man), 5) Vāmana (dwarf man), 6) Paraśurāma (Brahmin warrior with an axe), 7) Rāma, 8) Kṛṣṇa, 9) Buddha and 10) Kalki are popular.

2 स्वांशश्चाथो विभिन्नांश इति द्वेधांश इष्यते। अंशिनो यत्तु सामर्थ्यं यत्स्वरूपं यथास्थितिः॥ तदेव नाणुमात्रोऽपि भेदः स्वांशांशिनो क्वचित्। विभिन्नांशोऽल्पशक्तिः स्यात्किञ्चित्सादृश्यमात्रयुक्॥ इति वाराहे। (M. BSB. 2-3-47).

But the *Bhinnāṁśa* is of limited power and has resemblance with the *Aṁśin* to a very slight degree''.

Madhvācārya's interpretation of the word '*prakāśa*' in the *sūtra* as *kālāgni* i.e. the destructive fire at the end of the world, appears rather far-fetched. When it is possible to take *prakāśa* as sun-light and its presiding deity as Sun, which fit well in the illustration, it is not understood why the commentator prefers to choose *kālāgni* in place of sun-light.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows. As when the water-filled jars shake, though the Sun's reflections in them shake, the Sun does not shake, similarly, though the *Jīva*, which is Lord's *aṁśa*, suffers pain as a result of his misconception (*avidyā*) and the limiting adjuncts like *buddhi*, the Lord is not affected like the *Jīva*[1].

Rāmānujācārya reads an additional '*tu*' in the *sūtra*, '*prakāśādivattu naivaṁ paraḥ*' and interprets it as follows. ''Though a distinguishing quality of a substance is a part of it, yet we observe differences between the two. Though light is a part of the object of which it is a quality, yet the object is different in nature from its quality, the light. So also, though the soul is a part of *Brahman* as Its body, still the essential nature and characteristics of the two are not one. Hence the Lord is not affected by the pleasure and pain experienced by the soul''[2].

The next *sūtra* states that *Smṛti*s support the views expressed in the present *sūtra*. The commentators quote different texts in support of their respective interpretations of this *sūtra*.

॥ ॐ स्मरन्ति च ॐ ॥ (2-3-47)

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1 यथा च उदशरावादिकम्पनात् तद्गते सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बे कम्पमाने अपि न तद्वान् सूर्यः कम्पते - एवं अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापिते बुद्ध्याद्युपहिते जीवाख्ये अंशे दुःखायमाने अपि न तद्वान् ईश्वरो दुःखायते। (S. BSB. 2-3-46).

2 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-3-45.

जीवस्य भिन्नांशत्वं मत्स्यादेरभिन्नांशत्वं च स्मृतिकर्तारः स्मरन्ति च। बहुस्मृतिद्योतनाय बहुवचनम्।

The authors of *Smṛtis* also declare that *Jīva* is *Bhinnāṁśa* of the Supreme Being and His incarnations, *Matsya* etc., are His *Svarūpāṁśas*. The plural number in the *sūtra* is to indicate the existence of numerous such *Smṛti* texts.

Madhvācārya refers to a passage form *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* whose import corroborates the contention of this *sūtra*. "The sages, *Manus*, deities, mighty *Prajāpatis* etc. are all bits (*aṁśas*) of Hari only. These bits of the Supreme Being's essential aspects (*Svāṁśakalāḥ* or *Svarūpāṁśaḥ* i.e. incarnations) are the same as Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa Himself, (Kṛṣṇa being understood here as the Supreme Being), which appear in every age to protect and bless the world affected by the enemies of Indra"[1].

Śaṅkarācārya quotes a passage from *Mahābhārata* which supports his view of the last *sūtra* and tells that 'It (*Brahman*) is not stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus by water'[2].

Rāmānujācārya refers to a verse[3] from *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (1-22-37) in support of his interpretation of the last *sūtra*. It says that "whatever is created involving the aggregate of creatures, when the creation comes into existence, all that verily is the body of Hari'.

The next *sūtra* shows the contrast between the incarnations and *Jīvas*, according to Madhvācārya.

॥ ॐ अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसम्बन्धाज्ज्योतिरादिवत् ॐ ॥

(2-3-48)

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1 ऋषयो मनवो देवा मनुपुत्रा महौजसः। कलाः सर्वे हरेरेव सप्रजापतयः स्मृताः॥
एते स्वांशकलाः पुंसः कृष्णस्तु भगवान् स्वयम्। इन्द्रारिव्याकुलं लोकं मृडयन्ति युगे युगे॥
(Bhāg. 1-3-27,28) (BNK. II. p 275).

2 SRK. p. 418.

3 यत्किञ्चित्सृजने येन सत्वजातेन वै द्विज। तस्य सृज्यस्य संभूतौ तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः॥
(Śrībhṣāya- RDK. 2-3-46).

जीवस्य देहसम्बन्धात् परानुज्ञापरिहारौ ईशानुज्ञाधीनप्रवृत्तिमोक्षौ स्तः। उपलक्षणेन परस्य मत्स्यादेर्देहसम्बन्धात् इतराधीनप्रवृत्तिमोक्षौ न स्तः। कथम् ज्योतिरादिवत्। ज्योतिषः अक्ष्यभिमानिनः देहसम्बन्धात् यथा सूर्यानुज्ञाधीनप्रवृत्त्यादिः भवति प्रभाभिमानिनः सूर्यस्वरूपांशत्वात् यथा सूर्यानुज्ञाधीनप्रवृत्तिर्नास्ति तथा। आदिपदेन वरुणादिदेवाः तेषां भिन्नांशाः स्वरूपांशाः च ग्रहीतव्याः।

The *Jīva*'s mundane activities and attainment of liberation are under the control of the Supreme Being, on account of his association with his body (earned as a result of his *karma*). By implication (we get that) the activities of the Supreme Being in His incarnations as *Matsya* etc., are not under the control of any one else. The term *jyotirādivat* illustrates the point. The activities of the inferior presiding deity of the eye, are under the control of the presiding deity of the solar orb, the Sun, on account of the inferior deity's association with the body, while the presiding deity of the sun-light is not subject to any such control by the Sun, on account of the deity being a *svarūpāṁśa* of i.e. on par with the Sun. The word *ādi* in *jyotirādivat* indicates that similar illustrations of *Varuṇadeva* etc. and their *Bhinnāṁśa*s and *Svarūpāṁśa*s are to be taken.

Madhvācārya quotes an appropriate passage from *Varāhapurāṇa*, which gives the exact import of the *sūtra*. It runs thus. "Though the *Jīva*s are the *aṁśa*s of the Lord, they are subject to the worldly bondage etc. on acount of their fitness for bodily existence, and they need the Lord's grace; but it is not so with Hari, the Lord, in His incarnations as *Matsya* etc. because He is not subject to bodily limitations; the two states are altogether different as in the case of sunlight (*svarūpāṁśa* of *Sūrya*) and the eyes (*Bhinnāṁśa* of *Sūrya*) and the ocean of pure water (*svarūpāṁśa* of *Varuṇa*) and phlegm (*bhinnāṁśa* of *Varuṇa*). The *aṁśa*s i.e *Jīva*s need the favour of the whole, the *aṁśī*, and they can stop the transmigration by the Lord's grace alone"[1].

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1 "अंशाश्च देहयोग्यत्वाज्जीवा बन्धादिसंयुताः। अनुग्राह्याश्चेश्वरेण न तु मत्स्यादिको हरिः॥ अदेहबन्धयोग्यत्वाद्यथासूर्यप्रभाक्षिणी। यथाऽमृतसमुद्रस्य श्लेष्मादेश्च द्विरूपता। अनुग्राह्यत्वमन्यस्य तेनैवावृतिरोधनम्।" इति वाराहे च। (M. BSB. 2-3-48).

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[1]. Though *Brahman* is the same everywhere, scriptural injunctions (*anujñā*) and prohibitions (*parihāra*) arise in the case of *Jīva*s only on account of their attachment to their physical bodies; just as (for example), fire, though alike everywhere, from the funeral pyre is avoided and not that from other places; and just as sunlight, from the same Sun, falling on impure ground is avoided not that falling on pure ground.

Rāmānujācārya understands the *sūtra* a little differently. "An objection is raised that, as all souls are equal, being parts of *Brahman*, why then are some permitted (*anujñā*) to study the Vedas, while others are excluded (*parihāra*) from it. The *sūtra* says that this is because of the soul's connection with a pure or impure body. Though the fire is one, yet the fire from a household is acceptable while that from the funeral pyre is rejected"[2].

On account of the collateral evidence of *Smṛti* given by Madhvācārya, his interpretation appears more authentic than the other two.

The next *sūtra* provides another evidence to show that there can be no comparison between the Lord's incarnations and the *Jīva*s according to Madhvācārya.

॥ ॐ असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिकरः ॐ ॥ (2-3-49)

असन्ततेश्च जीवस्य अपूर्णशक्तित्वाच्च उंपलक्षणेन मत्स्यादेश्च पूर्णशक्तित्वात् नैवं पर इत्युक्तस्य अव्यतिकरः व्यत्यासाभावः ।

And on account of the *Jīva*'s limited range of power and by implication the Lord's limitless powers in His incarnations

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1 अनुज्ञापरिहारौ एकत्वेऽपि आत्मनः देहसंबन्धात् स्यात् । ---- ज्योतिरादिवत्----- यथा ज्योतिष एकत्वे अपि अग्निः क्रव्यात् परिह्रियते नेतरः ; यथा च प्रकाश एकस्यापि सवितुः अमेध्यदेशसंबन्द्धः परिह्रियते नेतरः शुचिभूमिष्ठः । (S. BSB. 2-3-48).

2 Śrībhāṣya- SV- 2-3-47.

like *Matsya* etc., there can be nothing contrary to the statement that the Lord in His incarnations is not on a par with *Jīva*s.

In support of the sentiment in the *sūtra*, Madhvācārya quotes a text[1], which states "that the Supreme Being has innumerable forms like Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, Kapila etc. that all of them are perfect, unlimited, incomparable and that the *Jīva*s, who are inferior beings, are imperfect, and bound and some of them get released"[2].

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[3]: The individual soul, *Jīva*, who is the agent of actions and the enjoyer of the fruits of actions, is not associated with all the bodies. For *Jīva* is circumscribed by his limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*s). The *upādhi*s being not all-pervasive, *Jīva* is also not all-pervasive. Therefore, there is no possibility of confusion of sharing the actions and their fruits. It means, for example, that Devadatta is associated with a particular physical body and organs; he is responsible for his own actions; he is not liable to share the enjoyments and sufferings due to actions of Yajñadatta.

However, *Brahman* confined to the *upādhi*s (on account of *avidyā*) and suffering as *Jīva* and pure *Brahman* to which status a *Jīva* attains after liberation, cannot both refer to the same entity. Otherwise *Brahman* to which status a *Jīva* reaches after release, being all-pervasive cannot avoid sharing the sufferings of all[4]. Here, the commentator establishes that *Jīva* is not all-pervasive but is limited by the body he occupies. Earlier in

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1 तथा च चत्रुर्वेदशिखायाम्-तस्य ह वा एतस्य परमस्य त्रीणि रूपाणि कृष्णो रामः कपिल इति। "तस्य ह वा एतस्य परमस्य पञ्चरूपाणि दशरूपाणि सहस्ररूपाण्यमितरूपाणि। तानि ह वा एतानि सर्वाणि पूर्णानि सर्वाण्यनन्तानि सर्वाण्यसम्मितानि। अथावराः सर्वे एवापूर्णाः सर्व एव बध्यन्तेऽथ मुच्यन्ते च केचन।" इति। (M. BSB. 2-3-49).

2 BNK. II. p. 278.

3 न हि कर्तुः भोक्तुः च आत्मनः संततः सर्वैः शरीरैः संबन्धो अस्ति। उपाधितन्त्रो हि जीव इत्युक्तम्। उपाध्यसंतानाच्च नास्ति जीवसंतानः। ततश्च कर्मव्यतिकरः फलव्यतिकरो वा न भविष्यति। (S. BSB. 2-3-49).

4 दुःखादिभोक्तृत्वस्योपाधिविशिष्टगतत्वे बन्धस्य शुद्धगतमोक्षसामानाधिकरण्यायोगात्। उपाधिसंबन्धात् शुद्धगतत्वे सांकर्यापरिहारात्। (TC. III. p. 137).

utkrāntyadhikaraṇa (BS. 2-3-20 to 28), the *Sūtrakāra* establishes that the *Jīva* is atomic in size and that the range of his functioning extends to the whole body he occupies. But in the next *sūtra* (BS. 2-3-29) the commentator refutes the whole contention and argues that "*Jīva* is all-pervasive"[1] and that "the declaration that the soul's size is atomic, is on account of the soul's having for its essence the quality of that *buddhi* ". He further contends that "as long as the soul is connected with the *buddhi*, it has *Jīvatva* and has mundane existence. In fact, apart from this combination of soul and intellect thought of, there is no such entity as *Jīva* or individual soul"[2]. If this is so, then which *Jīva* is all-pervasive and which *Jīva* is circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts? Thus, the interpretation is not convincing but confusing.

Rāmānujācārya interprets on the same lines, but at the same time critisizes the *advaita* doctrine, as follows. "The souls, being atomic, are different in different bodies and are limited to those bodies. So there is no confusion of the results of actions done by them i.e. the results of the actions done by one do not affect another soul. This would not have been possible if the souls were *Brahman* in ignorance or limited by *upādhis*. For, the same *Brahman* being in connection with ignorance or the limiting adjuncts, there would have resulted the confusion of the results of actions"[3].

In *Advaita* philosophy, *Jīva* is *Brahman* with *avidyā*, circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts. *Brahman* being one, *Jīva*s are in essence, the same everywhere. Therefore confusion can arise regarding the possibility of a *Jīva* sharing the fruits of action of others. But in Rāmānujācārya's philosophy, though all *Jīva*s form the body of *Brahman*, they are distinct among themselves. So there is no possibility of such a doubt about sharing of the

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1 तस्माद्विभुर्जीवः । (S. BSB. 2-3-29).

2 S. BSB. 2-3-30.

3 Śrībhāṣya-SV. 2-3-48.

fruits of actions of others. Therefore, the above interpretation of the *sūtra* renders the *sūtra* itself superfluous so far as Rāmānujācārya's doctrine is concerned[1].

The next *sūtra* provides another reason to show why the Lord's incarnations are not on a par with *Jīvas*, according to Madhvācārya.

॥ ॐ आभास एव च ॐ ॥ (2-3-50)

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[2]. The *Jīva* should be understood as a mere reflection of the Supreme Being like the reflection of the sun in the water. The *Jīva* is neither the Supreme Being Himself nor is he a different thing (other than the Supreme Being). Therefore, when one reflected image shakes, another image does not shake (on that account). So also, when one *Jīva* is associated with some actions and their fruits, another *Jīva* has no connection with them. Therefore, there is no confusion like sharing of fruits of actions. Therefore, it can be said that, when the reflection appears due to *avidyā* (mis-apprehension), this mundane existence of *Jīva* associated with that reflection, also appears to be on account of that *avidyā*. And when that *avidyā* is thrown away, the fact that *Jīva*, in reality, is of the nature of *Brahman* is realized, which corroborates with the scriptural teaching.

Rāmānujācārya understands the word *ābhāsa* in the *sūtra* as *hetvābhāsa* i.e. fallacy and interprets the *sūtra* as criticizing the *Advaita* doctrine, in the following way[3]. Indeed, even in the

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1 BNK. II. p. 291.

2 आभास एव च एष जीवः परस्यात्मनो जलसूर्यकादिवत् प्रतिपत्तव्यः। न स एव साक्षात् नापि वस्त्वन्तरम्। अतश्च यथा नैकस्मिञ्जलसूर्यके कम्पमाने जलसूर्यकान्तरं कम्पते एवं नैकस्मिञ्जीवे कर्मफलसंबन्धिनि जीवान्तरस्य तत्संबन्धः। एवमव्यतिकर एव कर्मफलयोः। आभासस्य च अविद्याकृतत्वात् तदाश्रयस्य संसारस्य अविद्याकृतत्वोपपत्तिरिति तद्व्युदासेन च पारमार्थिकस्य ब्रह्मात्मभावस्योपदेशोपपत्तिः। (S. BSB. 2-3-50).

3 ननु भ्रान्तब्रह्मजीववादेऽप्यविद्याकृतोपाधिभेदाद्भोगव्यवस्थादयः उपपद्यन्ते अत आह-आभास एव च। अखण्डैकरसप्रकाशमात्रस्वरूपस्य स्वरूपतिरोधानपूर्वकोपाधिभेदोपपादनहेतुः आभास एव। प्रकाशैकस्वरूपस्य प्रकाशतिरोधानं प्रकाशनाश एव। (Śrībhāṣya-RDK. 2-3-49).

doctrine, which talks of *Jīva* as infatuated *Brahman*, the diversities in the experiences of *Jīva*s, have been accounted for as due to the limiting adjuncts caused by *avidyā*. So, the *Sūtrakāra* says that the argument is fallacious. In the case of an entity, *Brahman*, which is pure consciousness by nature, the argument that the diversities in the experiences are due to the differences in the limiting adjuncts of that entity, when its nature is covered by *avidyā*, is but a fallacy. In the case of one having consciousness alone as its nature, disappearance of that consciousness is but the destruction of the consciousness. This interpretation needs the importation of the word *hetuḥ* in the *sūtra* and also the understanding of the word *ābhāsa* as *hetvābhāsa*. Hence it appears far-fetched.

Like Śaṅkarācārya, Madhvācārya also understands the word *ābhāsa* in the sense of a reflected image, *pratibimba*. The exposition of the *sūtra* is as follows.

जीव आभास एव ईशप्रतिबिम्ब एव, मत्स्यादिस्तु न तथा, अतश्च नैवं पर इत्युक्तस्य व्यत्यासाभावः।

***Jīva* is Lord's reflected image only. His incarnations like *Matsya* etc. are not so. So also, there can be nothing contrary to the statement that the Lord in His incarnations is not on a par with *Jīva*s.**

In support of this interpretation, Madhvācārya quotes a *Smṛti* text, which runs thus. "There are two forms of *aṁśa*s of the omnipresent Supreme Being, namely *pratibimbāṁśa*, a reflection, and *svarūpāṁśa*, an *aṁśa* non-different from His essence. *Jīva*s are the Lord's *pratibimbāṁśa*s, and the *svarūpāṁśa*s are His manifestations. In reflections, there is little similitude, but the manifestations are essentially the Lord Himself"[1]. Madhvācārya

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1 द्विरूपावंशकौ तस्य परमस्य हरेर्विभोः। प्रतिबिम्बांशकश्चाथ स्वरूपांशक एव च॥
प्रतिबिम्बांशका जीवाः प्रादुर्भावाः परे स्मृताः। प्रतिबिम्बेष्वल्पसाम्यं स्वरूपाणीतराणि तु॥
इति वाराहे च। (M. BSB. 2-3-50).

considers this *sūtra*, not in isolation, but in the context of the preceding *sūtra*s, which establish various aspects of *Jīva*. They state that the *Jīva* in essence is eternal; he is created when he acquires a body, he is atomic in size, he is different from *Brahman*, he has doership within his limits under the direction of the Lord and he is an *aṁśa* of the Lord. Thus, the *Sūtrakāra* does not hold *Jīva* as held by Śaṅkarācārya as a non-existent entity[1] or as infatuated *Brahman* confined to the limiting adjuncts on account of the omniscient *Brahman*'s undesirable contact with nescience (*avidyā*) or as a lifeless reflection of *Brahman* like that of sun in a bucket of water. But he holds *Jīva* as *pratibimba* (reflection) of the Supreme Being in the sense of "a living self who shines forth by the light of *Brahman*"[2].

In a discussion earlier on the *sūtra* '*yāvadātmabhāvitāt*-- (BS.2-3-30), it is seen that *Jīva* has two kinds of *upādhi*s, one *svarūpopādhi* i.e. what configures him as he is in himself, which is beginningless and exists even after liberation, and the other *bāhyopādhi* consisting of physical bodily adjuncts. It is the *svarūpopādhi* by which he remains constituted as a *pratibimba* of *Brahman* forever. This *pratibimba* should not be thought of as a lifeless image of a face in a mirror. In the case of a mirror image it vanishes when the face moves away or the mirror is moved away. But in the case of *Jīva*, his *svarūpopādhi* exists as long as *Paramātman* exists, and since *Paramātman* is ever omnipresent there is no possibility of Jīva with his *svarūpopādhi* moving away from Him. Therefore, Jīva as a *pratibimba* of *Brahman* is eternal[3].

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1 परमार्थतः तु न जीवो नाम बुद्ध्युपाधिपरिकल्पितस्वरूपव्यतिरेकेण अस्ति।
(S. BSB. 2-3-30).

2 BNK. II. 280.

3 नित्य एव जीवः। प्रतिबिम्बस्य बिम्बोपाधितत्सन्निधिनाशं विना नाशानुपपत्तेः। बिम्बस्य परमात्मनोऽनाद्यनन्तत्वात्। उपाधेश्च यावत्परमात्मभावित्वात्। सर्वगतबिम्बस्योपाधिसन्निधेश्च नित्यत्वात्। (TP. 2-3-50).

Further, in the case of mirror image, the face (*bimba*) is outside the mirror (medium) and away from the image (*pratibimba*), and it is the face that sees its image. However, in the case of *Jīva* (*pratibimba*), *Paramātman* (*bimba*) is in and out of *Jīva*, and it is the *Jīva* (*pratibimba*) who has to see and realize his original *bimba* i.e. *Paramātman* through his *svarūpopādhi* the medium.

Jīva possesses attributes like intelligence, bliss etc. though limited, and they resemble those of *Brahman*[1]. *Jīva* has capacity to be, to act and to be able to enjoy his own blissful nature[2]. BNK Sharma observes that Madhvācārya's "interpretation is one that will make every *Jīva* feel truly proud of being an *ābhāsa* of *Brahman* and wish to continue to be so, for ever"[3].

19 अदृष्टाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ अदृष्टानियमात् ॐ ॥ **(2-3-51)**

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya consider this *sūtra* and the next two as part of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. Since the *sūtra* contains only a probans and it could be an additional probans for a proposition in a previous *sūtra*. So it is pertinent to include the *sūtra* in the last *Adhikaraṇa*. However, though Madhvācārya treats this *sūtra* as providing another probans for the assertion in the preceding *sūtra*, he holds these three *sūtras* as forming a separate *Adhikaraṇa*, possibly because they discuss about *adṛṣṭa*, a topic other than *aṁśatva*.

Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation is as follows. "*Adṛṣṭa* is the unseen principle of the nature of religious merit or demerit. According to the *Sāṅkhya* system it inheres not in the self but in *pradhāna*. As the latter is the same for all souls, it cannot determine the enjoyment of pleasure and pain for each individual self.

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1 BS. 2-3-29.

2 BNK. II. p. 280.

3 BNK. II. p. 279.

According to the *Vaiśeṣika*, the unseen principle is created by the conjunction of the soul with the mind and there is no reason why any particular *adṛṣṭa* should belong to any particular soul. So confusion of results is inescapable''[1].

According to this interpretation, the *sūtra* establishes that the confusion of actions and experiencing of pleasure and pain due to the results of those actions, in *Sāṅkhya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems, cannot be avoided. There is nothing in the *sūtra* to indicate that the *Sūtrakāra* wants to establish this proposition. When it is possible to connect this *sūtra* to the preceding one and establish the known proposition that '*Jīva* is only a reflection of *Brahman* (*ābhāsa eva ca*)', though there are diversities among *Jīva*s, because the diversities can be on account of diversities in the unseen merits of *Jīvas* (*adṛṣṭāniyamāt*), importing (*adhyāhāra*) a fresh proposition (*sādhya*) that the confusion of actions and results in *Sāṅkhya* system etc. cannot be avoided, is far-fetched and unconvincing[2]. The inclusion of this *sūtra* in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* is held pertinent on the expectation that this *sūtra* would strengthen the proposition therein. If a fresh proposition is being imported, that pertinence is lost.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on similar lines, but takes it as directed against those who hold that the individual soul is *Brahman* screened by real limiting adjuncts. According to him[3], even in the doctrine advocating *Jīva* as *Brahman* screened by real limiting adjuncts, if it is contended that there would be no confusion of the spheres of experience because of the differences in *upādhi*s due to the beginningless unseen merits (*adṛṣṭa*), it is not so because *adṛṣṭas* cannot regulate the spheres of experience. "As the unseen principles (*adṛṣṭa*s) have *Brahman* for their substratum,

1 SRK. p. 421.

2 'अदृष्टानियमात्' इति हेतोः 'आभास एव' च इति श्रुतसाध्यान्वयसंभवे सांख्यादिमते अव्यवस्था इति साध्याध्याहारायोगात्। (TC. II. p. 141).

3 पारमार्थिकोपाध्युपहितब्रह्मजीववादेऽपि उपाधिभेदहेतुभूतानाद्यदृष्टवशाद् व्यवस्था भविष्यति इत्याशङ्क्याह अदृष्टानियमात्। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-3-50).

there can be no rule that a particular *adṛṣṭa* operates in a particular soul; so the confusion of the spheres of experience is inevitable''[1].

Here also, the proposition proved by the *sūtra* is imported. Therefore, the interpretation is held as far-fetched. The remaining two *sūtras* of this *Pāda* are also interpreted by the two commentators in the context of these arbitrarily imported propositions, and therefore it serves no purpose in referring to them.

Madhvācārya does not leave the track of ideas from the preceding *sūtras*. The exposition of the *sūtra* according to him is as follows.

जीव आभास एव ईशप्रतिबिम्ब एव , जीवानां वैचित्रे तथा बिम्बावैचित्रे अपि, कुतः? अदृष्टानियमात् जीववैचित्र्यं तत्तदीयानाद्यदृष्टवैचित्र्यात्।

Though there is diversity among *Jīvas* and no diversity whatsoever in *Brahman* the *bimba*, still *Jīva* is reflection of *Brahman*, because the diversity among *Jīvas* is on account of the variations in their respective beginningless unseen merits.

The word *adṛṣṭa* (unseen merit) has been understood by some commentators as 'the unseen principle of the nature of religious merit or demerit i.e. *puṇya* or *pāpa*'[2]. It is shown earlier in '*vaiṣamyanairghṛṇyādhikaraṇaṁ* (BS. 2-1-35 to 37)' that the diversities in the world cannot be explained away on the theory of *karma*, *puṇya* and *pāpa* etc. According to Madhvācārya, ''by regressive reasoning the acceptance of *adṛṣṭa* or unseen merit as the cause of existing variations in equipment, endowment and opportunities leads to the conclusion that ultimately such *adṛṣṭa* has to be equated with *anādisvarūpayogyatā* or the *svarūpopādhi* of *Jīvas*''[3]. Therefore, the word *adṛṣṭāniyama* in the *sūtra* conveys

1 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-3-50.
2 SRK. p. 421.
3 BNK. II. p. 294.

the diversities in *svarūpopādhis* or the beginningless intrinsic capabilities and aptitudes of *Jīvas*[1]. The basic diversities in the capabilities of *Jīvas* only result in the present variations in knowledge, merits and demerits and culture etc. in the *Jīvas*[2].

The next *sūtra* traces the cause of diversities in behavioural tendencies of *Jīvas*.

॥ ॐ अभिसन्ध्यादिष्वपि चैवम् ॐ ॥ (2-3-52)

अभिसन्ध्यादिषु रागद्वेषमोहादिदोषेषु अपि च एवं वैचित्र्यम् अदृष्टानियमात्।

And the diversities in behavioural traits like desire, aversion, delusion and so on, are also on account of the diversities in *adṛṣṭa* i.e. aptitudes of *Jīvas*.

This explains why even the twins, born of the same parents at the same time and brought up under the same environment, behave differently.

The next *sūtra* traces the territorial influence on the diversities in *Jīvas*.

॥ ॐ प्रदेशादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात् ॐ ॥ (2-3-53)

प्रदेशात् स्वर्गादिस्थानवैचित्र्यात् जीववैचित्र्यम् इति चेत् न स्थानवैचित्र्यस्य अपि अदृष्टवैचित्र्ये अन्तर्भावात्।[3]

If it be said that the diversities in *Jīvas* are due to territorial variations like heaven etc., it is not so because the variation of the place itself is due to diversities in *adṛṣṭa*.

1 स्वरूपोपाधिवैचित्र्यस्यैवादृष्टानियमपदेनाभिप्रेतत्वात्। (BVD. 2-3-53).

2 अदृष्टानियमात् विद्याकर्मसंस्कारादिवैचित्र्यात् इत्यर्थः। (TDK. 2-3-51).

3 VKM. 2-3-53.

Chapter XI
Adhyāya II, *Pāda* 4
(द्वितीयाध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।)

After resolving the apparent conflicts in Vedic texts regarding the origination and nature of matter and souls in the world, in the third *Pāda*, the *Sūtrakāra* now proceeds to remove the apparent conflicts of texts in respect of the origination of bodily equipments of *Jīvas*, the physical and mental, i.e. the organs of knowledge and action.

1 प्राणाधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ तथा प्राणाः ॐ ॥ **(2-4-1)**

The word *'prāṇa'* in the *sūtra* stands for the sense organ. All the three commentators have taken the word in that sense only. The question taken up here is whether the sense organs are created or eternal.

Śaṅkarācārya treats this *sūtra* and the next three as one *Adhikaraṇa*. He raises the doubt about the genesis of the *prāṇas* as follows[1]. Some texts like 'It (*Brahman*) created fire', and 'from that *Ātman* indeed this *Ākāśa* sprang' etc. talk of creation, but in those sections dealing with creation, there is no mention of the genesis of *prāṇas*. In one place it is told that *prāṇas* are not created at all. "This was, indeed, non-existence at the beginning. They say: what was non-existence at the beginning? These *ṛṣis*. Who are those *ṛṣis*? The *prāṇas* are the *ṛṣis*" [2]. Here, the existence of *prāṇas* before creation has been stated. But elsewhere, the

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1 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3)' इति. 'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः' (Tait. Up. 2-1-1). इति च एवमादिषु उत्पत्तिप्रकरणेषु प्राणानाम् उत्पत्तिर्न आम्नायते। (S. BSB. 2-4-1).

2 क्वचिच्चानुत्पत्तिरेव एषामाम्नायते 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्' 'तदाहुः किं तदसदासीदित्यृषयो वाव तेऽग्रेऽसदासीत्। तदाहुः के ते ऋषय इति। प्राणा वाव ऋषयः।' (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 6-1-1) इत्यत्र प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्राणानां सद्भावश्रवणात्। (S. BSB. 2-4-1).

genesis of *prāṇas* also is declared, as for example in the text 'from that (*Ātman*) spring the vital force, the mind and all the organs'. Thus, there is a contradiction in scriptural texts and there is no ground seen for deciding the question one way or the other. Therefore, there is uncertainty. The *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that since one text states the existence of *prāṇas* before creation, the other text declaring the genesis of sense organs has to be taken in a secondary sense[1]. The *sūtra* resolves the conflict by holding that 'the *prāṇas* also are created like *Ākāśa* etc. (established at the beginning of the preceding *Pāda*)'. Śaṅkarācārya argues that non mention of a thing in one scriptural text, cannot refute the same thing expressly mentioned in other texts. Therefore, it is quite proper to accept *prāṇas* also as created like *Ākāśa* etc. since creation is identically told in the scriptural texts for both *Ākāśa* etc. and *prāṇas*[2].

Rāmānujācārya interprets the *sūtra* in a slightly different way[3]. The *Pūrvapakṣin* relates the word *tathā* in the *sūtra* to the eternity of *Jīvas* discussed at the end of the previous *Pāda* and contends that, like the *Jīvas*, the organs also are not created on account of *Śruti* text to that effect. The same text from *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (6-1-1) quoted above is referred to in support. He further argues that the plural number of the word *prāṇa* confirms that the sense organs only are meant here. Rāmānujācārya holds that this *sūtra* is to be connected with the earlier topics in the last

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1 अन्यत्र तु प्राणानामप्युत्पत्तिः पठ्यते यथा 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3)' इति। तत्र श्रुतिविप्रतिषेधादन्यतरनिर्धारणकारणानिरूपणाच्च अप्रतिपत्तिः प्राप्नोति। अथवा प्रागुत्पत्तेः सद्भावश्रवणात् गौणी प्राणानामुत्पत्तिश्रुतिः इति प्राप्नोति। (S. BSB. 2-4-1).

2 न हि क्वचिदश्रवणम् अन्यत्रश्रुतं निवारयितुम् उत्सहते; तस्मात् श्रुतत्वाविशेषात् आकाशादिवत् प्राणाः अपि उत्पद्यन्ते इति सूक्तम्। (S. BSB. 2-4-1).

3 जीववदेव इत्याह पूर्वपक्षी, तथा प्राणाः इति। यथा जीवो न उत्पद्यते तथा इन्द्रियाणि अपि न उत्पद्यन्ते। कुतः श्रुतेः। ---- प्राणशब्दे बहुवचनादिन्द्रियाण्येवेति निश्चीयते।--- इत्येवं प्राप्ते अभिधीयते -वियदादिवदेव प्राणाश्च उत्पद्यन्ते। कुतः? 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् (Chānd. Up. 6-2-1)' इत्यादिषु प्राक्सृष्टेः एकत्वावधारणात्। ---- उत्पत्तिप्रतिषेधश्रुतीनां नित्यत्वबोधकश्रुतीनां च अदर्शनात्। 'असद्वा इदमग्रम् आसीत' इत्यादिवाक्येऽपि प्राणशब्देन परमात्मैव निर्दिश्यते। (Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-4-1).

Pāda, dealing with the genesis of *Ākāśa* etc. Why? Because before creation everything was one, as averred by *Śruti* texts, Chānd. Up. 6-2-1 etc. Moreover, there are texts which declare the creation of the organs, and in support of that he quotes the same text, Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3, cited above. On the other hand, there are no texts denying the origination of the organs. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* text quoted above also, the word '*prāṇas*' refers to *Brahman* only. All these reasons show that the organs are originated like the elements *Ākāśa* etc.

Rāmānujācārya reads the second and third *sūtras* together as one *sūtra*, and holds this *Adhikaraṇa* as consisting of only three *sūtras*, instead of four.

In both the above interpretations, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is based on very weak grounds. Since the word *prāṇas* in *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* text refers to *Brahman* only, that text is of little help in arguing the eternality of sense organs. Further, as Śaṅkarācārya himself points out, mere non-mention of a thing in one text, cannot refute the same thing expressly mentioned in other texts. Therefore, as there is no real conflict, the *Pūrvapakṣa* does not arise[1].

Madhvācārya reads an additional *sūtra* after the second one, and treats these three *sūtras* as forming this *Adhikaraṇa*. He considers the following conflict of testimony. One text[2] clearly states that, "the *prāṇas* alone were in the beginning; from them the elements came forth; out of the elements the cosmic egg (*brahmāṇḍa*) and within that egg the worlds were created. Therefore, the *prāṇas* are without a beginning; *prāṇas* are eternal". He quotes a *Smṛti* text[3] in support of this contention that the sense organs are unoriginated. It argues that "as there is no material

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1 एतस्मादिति श्रुतावुत्पत्तौ श्रुतायामपि क्वचिदश्रवणमात्रेण पूर्वपक्षानुदयात्। (TC. III. p. 146).

2 'प्राणा एवेदमग्र आसुस्तेभ्यो भूतानि जज्ञिरे। भूतेभ्योऽण्डमण्डस्यान्तस्त्विमे लोकाः। अथ प्राणा एवानादयः प्राणा नित्या।' इति काषायणश्रुतौ प्राणानामनुत्पत्तिः प्रतीयते। (M. BSB. 2-4-1).

3 नोपादानं हीन्द्रियाणामतोऽनुत्पत्तिरिष्यते। उपादानकृता सृष्टिः सर्वलोकेषु दृश्यत। इति भविष्यत्पर्वणि। (M. BSB. 2-4-1).

cause required for the sense organs they are said to be unoriginated; for, all creation is made out of the material cause as observed in the case of all that are effected''. On the other hand, the Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3, already quoted above claims that the sense organs are created. The *sūtra* resolves the conflict as follows.

तथा इति प्रागुक्तयुक्त्यनुकर्षणार्थम्। यथा वियदादयः जाताः तथा प्राणाः इन्द्रियाणि ईशादेव उत्पत्तिमन्ति अश्रुतेरित्याद्युक्तहेतुभ्यः।

The term 'likewise' (*tathā*) in the sūtra suggests the extension of the arguments from the *Viyadadhikaraṇa* (2-3-1 to 7). Just as *Ākāśa* etc. are originated, likewise the sense-organs are originated from the Supreme Being only, because there is no clear scriptural statement declaring that sense organs are not created.

Madhvācārya takes the word *prāṇas* as the sense organs as well as their presiding deities. The origination established here is in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti,* i.e. to say that the sense organs (existing in a germinal form) develop (*upacaya*) through association with the elements, appropriate to the capabilities of those elements[1].

An immediate objection is expected on the above interpretation of the sūtra that when the *Kāṣāyaṇaśruti*, quoted above, clearly states that the *prāṇas* are without a beginning and '*prāṇas* are *eternal*', how can it be said that there is no clear scriptural statement declaring that sense organs are not created? The next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ गौण्यसंभवात् ॐ ॥ (2-4-2)

अनादित्वश्रुतिः गौणी, अनादिसूक्ष्मेन्द्रियपरा कुतः? असंभवात् मुख्या-नादित्वासंभवात्। तथा तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतिबाहुल्यासंभवात्।[2]

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1 अत्र प्राणा इतीन्द्रियाणि तदभिमानिनश्च। जनिरपि पराधीनविशेषरूपैव। सा च यथायोगमुपचयादिरूपा ध्येया। (TDK. 2-4-1).

2 VKM. 2-4-2.

The scriptural text, which speaks of the sense organs as unoriginated and eternal, is to be taken in a secondary sense i.e. it means the sense organs are unoriginated in their germinal forms, why? because their eternality in the primary sense of the text is impossible, and also because in case the sense organs are held to be eternal in the primary sense of the text, it would be impossible to justify numerous texts, which declare the genesis of sense organs.

Śaṅkarācārya also takes this *sūtra* as supporting the conclusion established in the preceding *sūtra* that *prāṇas* also are created like *Ākāśa* etc. He refers to[1] the contention of the *Pūrvapakṣin* (mentioned in the interpretation of the preceding *sūtra*) i.e. since one text states the existence of *prāṇas* before creation, the other text declaring the genesis of sense organs has to be taken in a secondary sense. The present *sūtra* refutes this contention. It asserts that it is impossible to hold the text, which declares the genesis of sense organs, in a secondary sense, because in that case there will be the undesirable contingency of the failure of the general assertion that 'By the knowledge of one, everything else is known'.

There is another *sūtra* (BS. 2-3-3) in the preceding *Pāda* which has exactly the same wording *'Gauṇyasambhavāt'*. The commentator treats the word *'gauṇī'* there as a part of the assertion and the term *'asambhavāt'* as the probans[2]. That looks natural. But here he takes the whole *sūtra* as one compound-word and treats it as the probans. He understands the compound word as *'guaṇyā asambhavaḥ gauṇyasambhavaḥ'* and interprets the *sūtra* as telling that the text declaring the genesis of sense organs cannot be taken in a secondary sense. If the *Sūtrakāra* wanted to tell this,

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1 यत्पुनः उक्तं प्रागुत्पत्तेः सद्भावश्रवणात् गौणी प्राणानामुत्पत्तिश्रुतिः इति तत्प्रति आह-गौण्यसंभवात् इति। गौण्या असंभवो गौण्यसंभवः। न हि प्राणानामुत्पत्तिश्रुतिः गौणी संभवति प्रतिज्ञाहानिप्रसङ्गात्। गौण्यां तु प्राणानामुत्पत्तिश्रुतौ 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्' इति प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत। (S. BSB. 2-4-2).

2 या तु इतरा वियदुत्पत्तिवादिनी श्रुतिः उदाहृता। सा गौणी भवितुमर्हति; कस्मात् असंभवात्। (S. BSB. 2-3-3).

then the *sūtra* was expected to be something like '*gauṇyatvāsambhavāt*'. Therefore, the interpretation does not appear natural.

Rāmānujācārya combines this *sūtra* and the next, and interprets it as follows.

गौण्यसंभवात्तत्प्राक्श्रुतेश्च ।

The *Śruti* passage (*'prāṇā vāva ṛṣayaḥ'* from *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*) containing the plural number is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, because it is impossible to understand it in the plural sense on account of that very *Paramātman* being mentioned in the *Śruti* itself, as staying alone prior to creation[1].

After the second *sūtra*, Madhvācārya reads an additional *sūtra* and treats it as another probans for refuting the eternality of sense organs.

॥ ॐ प्रतिज्ञानुपरोधाच्च ॐ ॥ (2-4-3)

प्राणानाम् उत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारे 'स इदं सर्वमसृजत (Tait. Up. 2-6)' इति श्रुत्युक्त-प्रतिज्ञानुपरोधात् प्राणाः उत्पत्तिमन्तः ।[2]

If the genesis of sense organs is accepted, then the scriptural declaration that 'He (*Paramātman*) created all this' stands uncontradicted; and on account of this reason also the sense organs are originated.

2 मनोधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ तत्प्राक्श्रुतेश्च ॐ ॥ (2-4-4)

This *sūtra* has been understood differently by different commentators. Ramanujacarya reads this *sūtra* along with the

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1 बहुवचनश्रुतिर्गौणी बह्वर्थासंभवात्तस्यैव परमात्मनः सृष्टेः प्रागवस्थानश्रुतेरेव । (Śrībhāṣya - RDK.2-4-2).

2 TP. 2-4-3.

previous one and his interpretation is already seen. Śaṅkarācārya interprets it as follows.

"From Him are born vital breaths, mind and all the organs, ether, air, water, fire and earth (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3). The word 'born' occurs at the very beginning; if it is interpreted in the primary sense with respect to ether etc., it should be so interpreted with regard to vital breath, mind and organs mentioned earlier"[1].

In the above interpretation, the pronoun *tad* in the *sūtra* refers to *Ākāśa* (ether) and others, which do not appear in the preceding *sūtras*. Therefore, Madhvācārya takes the pronoun *tad* as referring to *prāṇāḥ* (sense organs) appearing in the first *sūtra* (BS. 2-4-1) and understands the compound *tatprāk*, i.e. what precedes the sense organs viz. the mind (*manas*)[2]. Since the mind, though it is also a sense organ, stands on a different pedestal as compared to other sense organs, Madhvācārya thinks it fit to discuss it in a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. He quotes a text[3], which holds the mind as permanent. It says that "the sense organs are indeed of two types, the permanent and the non-permanent; of them the permanent is the mind, for the soul cannot be without the mind; the other organs are non-permanent". On the contrary, the text from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (2-1-3) quoted above avers that the mind is originated along with the vital breaths, other organs, ether etc. So a doubt arises whether the mind is eternal or originated. The *sūtra* reconciles.

तत्प्राक् मनः अनादीशात् उत्पत्तिमत्। कुतः? 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च' इति श्रुतौ च तेभ्यः प्राणेभ्यः प्राक् मनसः उत्पन्नत्वेन श्रवणात्।

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1 यत् जायते इत्येकं जन्मवाचिपदं प्राणेषु प्राक्श्रुतं सत् उत्तरेष्वाकाशादिष्वनुवर्तते - 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च। खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी' इत्यत्रष आकाशादिषु मुख्यं जन्मेति प्रतिष्ठापितम्; तत्सामान्यात् प्राणेषु अपि मुख्यमेव जन्म भवितुमर्हति। (S. BSB. 2-4-3).

2 तदिति प्रस्तुतप्राणोक्तिः। तत्प्रागित्युक्त्या मन इति लभ्यते। (TDK. 2-4-4).

3 'द्विधा हैवेन्द्रियाणि नित्यानि चानित्यानि च। तत्र नित्यं मनोऽनादित्वान्न ह्यमनाः पुमांस्तिष्ठत्यनित्यान्यन्यानी'ति गौपवनश्रुतौ मनसोऽनुत्पत्तिः सयुक्तिका श्रूयते। (M. BSB. 2-4-4).

The mind is originated from the eternal Supreme Being, because in the text 'from Him are born---' (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3) also, the mind is declared to have been originated prior to the other senses.

The word *ca* in the *sūtra* indicates the existence of other texts telling the same thing; for example, one text[1] says that "the mind was originated first, then followed the genesis of the other senses; the description of mind as uncreated (in *Gaupavanaśruti*) is with reference to the small development (*upacaya*) it is liable to".

The text quoted above also explains why the mind is declared as permanent (*nitya*) when it is originated along with other sense organs. The concept of genesis of mind mentioned in scriptures refers only to its development in the assemblage of elements (*bhūtopacaya*). Therefore, the declaration of mind as permanent is to be understood in the sense that the mind which exists in a germinal form, develops when it comes in contact with an assemblage of elements, within no time before the development of other senses[2].

3 वागधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ तत्पूर्वकत्वाद्वाचः ॐ ॥ **(2-4-5)**

Commentators differ on the interpretation of this *sūtra*. Śaṅkarācārya treats this as a part of the preceding *Prāṇādhikaraṇa* and as supporting the conclusion that the sense-organs (*prāṇas*) are originated. He argues : Though the section which tells that, 'It created fire' (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3) does not mention the genesis of the sense-organs; it tells about the origination of three elements, viz. fire, water and food (earth). It is further told in the same

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1 'पूर्वं मनः समुत्पन्नं ततोऽन्येषां समुद्भवः। तदनुत्पत्तिवचनमल्पोपचयकारणादि'ति वायुप्रोक्तवचनं चशब्देन गृहीतम्। (M. BSB. 2-4-4).

2 नित्यं मनः इत्यादिश्रुतिः सूक्ष्मनःपरा। जन्मश्रुतिः उपचयरूपोत्पत्तिपरा इति भावः। (TDK. 2-4-4).

section that from these three elements, fire, water and earth, which originated from *Brahman*, arise respectively speech, the chief breath and mind. Other sense organs are similar to that speech. Therefore, all the sense organs are proved to be the products of *Brahman* only.

According to the commentator, the *sūtra* states that "the speech, (the chief breath and mind) are produced from those earlier mentioned elements (which in turn are originated from *Brahman*), therefore these sense-organs are proved to have been originated from *Brahman*"[1]. Thus, in this interpretation, the pronoun *tat* in the *sūtra* is taken as referring to the elements fire, water and earth, which do not appear in the preceding *sūtras*. Further, the speech, the chief breath and mind are to be understood from the word *vāk* in the *sūtra*, by implication (*upalakṣaṇa*). Hence, the interpretation appears far-fetched.

Rāmānujācārya also holds that this *sūtra* supports the conclusion that sense organs are originated, and includes it in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. He interprets the *sūtra* as follows. The word *vāk* in the *sūtra* stands for the names of all entities other than *Paramātman*, which are within the province of speech[2]. The text, Bṛha. Up. 1-4-7, states that 'then (before creation) this indeed was unmodified; that became modified in name and form'. So before the creation of *Ākāśa* etc. there was nothing, which could have a name and form, and consequently speech and other organs had no function to perform. Therefore, it is to be understood that the sense-organs (*prāṇāḥ*) did not exist before creation, and for

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1 यद्यपि 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' (Chānd. Up. 6-2-3) इत्येतस्मिन् प्रकरणे प्राणानामुत्पत्तिर्न पठ्यते तेजोबन्नानामेव त्रयाणां भूतानामुत्पत्तिश्रवणात्; तथापि ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकतेजोबन्नपूर्वकत्वाभिधानाद्वाक्प्राणमनसां तत्सामान्याच्च सर्वेषामेव प्राणानां ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वं सिद्धं भवति। (S. BSB. 2-4-4).

2 इतश्च प्राणशब्दः परमात्मवचनः। वाचः परमात्मव्यतिरिक्तविषयस्य नामधेयस्य वाग्विषयभूतस्य वियदादिसृष्टिपूर्वकत्वात्। 'तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्। तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत' (Bṛha. Up.1-4-7) इति नामरूपभाजामभावात्तदानीं वागादीन्द्रियकार्याभावाच्च तानि न सन्तीत्यर्थः। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-4-3).

this reason also the word *prāṇa* in the *Śatapatha Brahmaṇa* text (6-1-1) quoted earlier does not refer to the sense organs but denotes *Paramātman*.

The interpretation appears round about. The pronoun *tat* in the *sūtra* is taken as referring to the creation of *Ākāśa* and others, which do not appear in the preceding *sūtras*. The interpretation of the word *vāk* as referring to the names of things other than *Brahman*, looks far-fetched. Hence, the above interpretation is not found convincing.

Madhvācārya treats this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the question of genesis of the sense organ, *vāk* i.e. speech. He considers a conflict whether *vāk* is originated or eternal. One text[1] declares that 'speech is indeed eternal; it is not originated; for the Vedas abide in this speech only'. Another text[2] says that 'therefore the mind is the earlier form, speech is the later form' (A. Ā. 3-1-1). The *sūtra* resolves the conflict.

वाचः वागिन्द्रियस्य तत्पूर्वकृत्वात् तत् प्रकृतं मनः पूर्वं कारणं यस्याः तस्याः भावः तस्मात् मनःकारणकत्वात् वाक् उत्पत्तिमती।

Since speech has its genesis from the mind, speech is originated[3].

In the *śruti*, *'Manaḥ pūrvarūpaṁ vāg uttarūpaṁ'*, the words *pūrva* and *uttara* stand for cause and effect respectively. In the other *śruti* text[4] *'vāgvāva nityā'*, the speech is considered as eternal in a figurative sense; for the words only can express *Vedas*, and when *Vedas* are considered as eternal, speech has to be taken as eternal.

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1 'वाग्वाव नित्या न ह्येषोत्पद्यतेऽस्यां हि श्रुतिरवतिष्ठत' इति सयुक्तिकं पौष्यायणश्रुतौ वाचोऽनुत्पत्तिरुच्यते। (M.BSB. 2-4-5).

2 'तस्मान्मन एव पूर्वरूपं वागुत्तररूपमि'ति मनः पूर्वकत्वाद्वाचो नानुत्पत्तिः। (M.BSB. 2-4-5)

3 VKM. 2-4-5.

4 ''वाग्वाव नित्या न ह्येषोत्पद्यते'' इति श्रुतिस्तु नित्यवेदोच्चारणयोग्यत्वाद् गौणीति भावः। (TDK.2-4-5).

4 सप्तगत्यधिकरणम् ।

The *Sūtrakāra* considers here in this *sūtra* and the next, the conflicting statements in scriptures regarding the number of sense-organs.

॥ ॐ सप्त गतेर्विशेषितत्वाच्च ॐ ॥ **(2-4-6)**

Śaṅkarācārya quotes a number of scriptural texts, each declaring a different number of sense-organs, viz. seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen. Thus, there is a doubt regarding the number of sense-organs. According to the commentator, the *sūtra* decides it as follows[1]. The sense-organs are seven only. Whence? It is 'understood' (*gateḥ* i.e. *avagateḥ*) from scriptures like Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-8 that they are that many. This is also defined by another text (*Taittirīyasamhitā* 5-1-7-1) which says 'seven indeed are the sense-organs in the head'.

This *sūtra* is taken as raising the *Pūrvapakṣa,* which is to be refuted by the next *sūtra.*

हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् । **(2-4-6)**

"But, the hands etc. (are also mentioned as sense-organs in scriptural texts). This being so, it is not like this (i.e. they are not merely seven in number). 'But' refutes the view of the previous *sūtra.* The number is said to be eleven consisting of the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action and the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). *Manas* or mind, *buddhi* or understanding, *ahaṁkāra* or self-sense and *citta* or consciousness are all modifications of the internal organ. *Etat sarvaṁ mana eva.* All this is mind only, They are not separate organs and do not raise the number beyond eleven"[2].

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1 सप्तैव प्राणा इति कुतः गतेः; यतः तावन्तः अवगम्यन्ते 'सप्त प्राणाः प्रभवन्ति तस्मात्' इत्येवंविधासु श्रुतिषु. विशेषिताश्चैते 'सप्त वै शीर्षण्याः प्राणाः' इत्यत्र । (S.BSB. 2-4-5).

2 SRK. p. 424, 425.

It has been pointed out time and again earlier that in these *Brahmasūtras*, wherever a *Pūrvapakṣa* is expressly mentioned, it is found stated as a part of a *sūtra* and with a rider like *cet* or *iticet*. There are no *Pūrvapakṣa sūtras* as such, and all *sūtras* are to be treated as *Siddhānta sūtras*. Moreover, in the interpretation of the first *sūtra*, the word *gateḥ* is taken in the sense of *avagateḥ* i.e. understood from scriptures like *Muṇḍakopaniṣat*. The other text quoted next is also a passage from a scripture and therefore can be included in the expression 'understood from scriptures' i.e. *avagateḥ*. So, this interpretation renders the words *'viśeṣitatvāt ca'* in the *sūtra* superfluous[1]. In the second *sūtra* also, the meaning as shown above can be had from a *sūtra* something like[2] *'hastādyaḥ api ataḥ na evaṁ'*, and therefore the word *sthite* in the *sūtra* becomes redundant. It is true that the sense-organs can be counted as twelve or eleven depending on whether mind (*manas*) and intellect (*buddhi*) are counted separately or together as one internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). But, as the two *sūtras* above stand interpreted, the *Pūrvapakṣin* contends in the first *sūtra* that the sense-organs are seven only; the second *sūtra* refutes the contention, arguing that there are five more, viz. hands etc., to be counted. Then the total should come to twelve and not eleven. Thus, the above interpretation of the two *sūtras* is not found convincing.

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtras* on similar lines and treats the first *sūtra* as *Pūrvapakṣa*. He takes the word *'gati'* in the *sūtra* in the sense of movement of *Jīva* to and from a body at the time of birth and death. The *Pūrvapakṣin* holds in the first *sūtra* that the sense-organs are seven, because the *Jīva* is said to be moving in the worlds at the time of birth and death (during transmigration) with only seven sense-organs[3]. Again, they are

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1 श्रौतावगतिवाचिना सौत्रेण गतिशब्देनैव 'सप्त प्राणा' इत्यस्या इव 'सप्तैव शीर्षण्याः प्राणा' इत्यस्या अपि श्रौतावगतेर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वेन विशेषितत्वाच्च इत्यस्य वैयर्थ्याच्च। (TC. III. p. 150)

2 हस्तेति सूत्रेऽपि 'हस्तादयोऽप्यतो नैवम्' इत्येतावतैव पूर्णत्वात् स्थितेऽतः इति शब्दो व्यर्थः, (TC. III. p. 150)

3 किं प्राप्तम् ? सप्त इति। कुतः? गतेर्विशेषितत्वाच्च। गतिः तावत् जायमानेन म्रियमाणेन च जीवेन सह लोकेषु संचरणरूपा सप्तानामेव श्रूयते। (Śrībhāṣya-SV. 2-4-4).

distinctly enumerated in a text. The second *sūtra* refutes the same. It says; the sense organs are not merely seven in number; but they are eleven[1]. When the *Jīva* abides in the body, the hands etc. are equally its instruments of experience and also there is a difference in their functions. Therefore, it is not that hands etc. are not sense-organs. In an attempt to see that the word *sthite* in the second *sūtra* is not rendered superfluous, the commentator imports two more words, *śarīre* and *jīve* in the interpretation[2]. However, these interpretations are in no way materially different from those of Śaṅkarācārya and hence are found equally unconvincing.

Madhvācārya considers the conflict between two *śruti* texts as follows.[3] One text says, 'from Him (the Supreme Being) seven sense-organs originate' (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-8). Another text from *Kauṇḍinya Śruti* declares, 'twelve indeed are these sense-organs, twelve are the months, twelve are the suns, twelve are the signs of the zodiac, twelve are the *soma*-vessels''. Thus there is a doubt whether the sense-organs are seven or twelve. The *sūtra* reconciles :

गतेः ज्ञानस्य संबन्धिनः जनकाः प्राणाः सप्त कुतः? विशेषितत्वात् ''सप्त प्राणाः प्रभवन्ति तस्मात्'' इति श्रुतौ उत्तरत्र 'गुहाशयां निहिताः सप्त सप्त' इति बुद्धौ ज्ञानार्थत्वेन विशेषितत्वात्। चः तु अनुक्तसमुच्चये ।

The sense-organs concerned with knowledge i.e. cognitive organs (*jñānendriyas*) are seven; whence? because in the passage, 'from Him seven sense-organs originate', these organs are further described as having been placed in the cave of intellect (*buddhi*) i.e. these organs are distinguished as being meant for the acquisition of knowledge. The word *'ca'* in the *sūtra* implies the existence of similar statements elsewhere.

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1 न सप्तैवेन्द्रियाणि, अपि तु एकादश, हस्तादीनामपि शरीरे स्थिते जीवे तस्य भोगोपकरणत्वात् कार्यभेदाच्च। अतो नैवम्-अतो हस्तादयो न सन्तीत्येव न मन्तव्यम्। (Śrībhāṣya-SV. 2-4-5).

2 BNK. II. p. 321

3 'सप्त प्राणाः प्रभवन्ति तस्मात्।' (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-8) इति श्रुतिः। 'द्वादश वा एते प्राणा द्वादश मासा द्वादशाऽदित्या द्वादशराशयो द्वादश ग्रहा' इति कौण्डिन्यश्रुतौ द्वादशप्राणा दृश्यन्ते। (M.BSB. 2-4-6).

A question arises that when another text claims with equal force that there are twelve sense-organs, why are the remaining five also not taken into account along with the seven in that *śruti* *'sapta prāṇāḥ'* and so on? The next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ हस्त्यादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् ॐ ॥ (2-4-7)

'स्थित' इति संसारबन्धस्थितिहेतुत्वात् कर्म उच्यते। तुः वैलक्षण्यद्योतकः। हस्तपादपायुगुह्यवाचस्तु स्थिते कर्मविषये कर्मार्थानि अतः कर्मार्थत्ववैलक्षण्यादेव तैः सप्तज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सह पाठो नास्ति।

The word *'sthita'* in the *sūtra* refers to that which leads to staying on in the world of transmigration i.e. mundane activity, *karma*. The particle *'tu'* suggests the functional difference. But, the organs hands, feet, the anus, the reproductive organ and the speech are the organs of action (*karmendriyas*), and therefore on account of their difference in character, they have not been mentioned along with the seven organs of knowledge.

In support of his interpretation, Madhvācārya quotes a *Smṛti* text. It says, "the learned ones understand that action is called *'sthita'* (the stagnating) because it makes one stay on in the worldly existence. Therefore, knowledge being the cause of uplifting the selves, is called *'gati'*, a means of self-elevation"[1].

The merit in Madhvācārya's interpretation lies in his explanation of the key-words *gati* and *sthita* in the two *sūtras*. From this interpretation one can easily notice that in these two *sūtras*, the *Sūtrakāra* appears to be interested, not so much in counting the sense organs, but in classifying them based on their functions and purpose.

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1 "संसारस्थितिहेतुत्वात्स्थितं कर्म विदो विदुः। तस्मादुद्गतिहेतुत्वाज्ज्ञानं गतिरिहोच्यते ॥" इति वायुप्रोक्ते। (M. BSB. 2-4-7).

5 अण्वाधिकरणम्।

॥ ॐ अणवश्च ॐ ॥ **(2-4-8)**

The *sūtra* asserts that the sense-organs are atomic in size. All commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*, but they explain the same differently.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets as follows. The sense organs under consideration are to be understood as atomic in size. By atomic, they should be taken as minute and limited in size (medium-sized or *madhyamaparimāṇa*) and not literally atomic in size; otherwise their activity throughout the body cannot be justified. These organs are subtle; if they were big or gross, then at the time of death, they would have been seen by others while departing from the body, like a snake coming out of a burrow. These are limited in size; if they were all pervading then the texts, which speak of going out of the body etc. would be contradictory.[1]

The *Sūtrakāra* avers that the sense organs are atomic in size. But the commentator appears reluctant to accept the same and holds that they are medium-sized. His fear that if the organs are taken as atomic, their activity throughout the body cannot be justified, appears unfounded. The *Sūtrakāra* explains in detail in *utkārntyadhikarṇa* (BS. 2-3-20 to 26), how a *Jīva,* though atomic in size, is active throughout the body. In BS. 2-3-26, he clarifies, "just as a flame, though limited to a particular spot in a lamp, pervades the covering area by the property of light, similarly a *Jīva* of atomic size, though confined to a place in the heart, pervades the body by means of the intrinsic property of consciousness". The same example holds good here also. In fact, the range of perception of the organs of sight, hearing and smell

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1 अण्वश्चैते प्रकृताः प्राणाः प्रतिपत्तव्याः। अणुत्वं चैषां सौक्ष्म्यपरिच्छेदौ न परमाणुतुल्यत्वम् कृत्स्नदेहव्यापिकार्यानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात्-सूक्ष्मा एते प्राणाः। स्थूलश्चेत्स्युः-मरणकाले शरीरान्निर्गच्छन्तः बिलादहिरिव उपलभ्येरन् पार्श्वस्थैः; परिच्छिन्नाश्चैते प्राणाः। सर्वगताश्चेत्स्युः उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिश्रुतिव्याकोपः स्यात्। (S. BSB. 2-4-7).

extend much beyond the body. So, for their functioning, the sense organs need not be physically present throughout their range of perception.

Rāmnujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on similar lines. His *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that the sense organs are infinite and so all-pervading. "This *sūtra* refutes it and says that they are all minute in size. They pass out of the body and therefore they must be finite. 'When the vital force goes out of the body, all organs accompany it' (Bṛha. Up. 4-4-2). As they are not perceived when they pass out of the body, they must be minute in size"[1].

Madhvācārya presents a scriptural conflict as follows.[2] One text tells that, "just as the eye pervades the sky (so is the form of the Supreme Being)". From this text sense organs are understood to be pervasive. The fact that distant things can be seen and heard, also supports this view. On the other hand, the *Kauṇḍinyaśruti* says "(*Jīva*) knows things by organs of atomic size and works by organs of atomic size; the sense organs are indeed atomic in size; from such sense organs these knowledge and activities) are accomplished.

The *sūtra* resolves the conflict by suggesting that both are correct.

प्राणाः अणवः तेजसा व्याप्ताः च ।

The sense organs are in essence of atomic (minute) size and by their power to perceive they are pervasive (beyond their position).

That is how the sense organs of sight, hearing and smell, having their centres in the body, can see stars, millions of miles away, can hear thundering and smell the raining from miles away.

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1 Śrībhāṣhya- SV. 2-4-6.

2 'दिवीव चक्षुराततम्' (RV. 1-22-20) इति व्याप्तिः प्रतीयते दूरश्रवणदर्शनादियुक्तश्च ।
'अणुभिः पश्यत्यणुभिः कृणोति प्राणा वा अणवः प्राणैर्ह्येतद्भवति' इति च कौडिन्यश्रुतिः ।
(M. BSB. 2-4-8).

6 श्रेष्ठाधिकरणम् ।

This *Addhikaraṇa* considers the conflict of texts regarding the genesis of *Mukhyaprāṇa* or the Chief vital breath. A question arises, when the genesis of *Mukhyaprāṇa* is already decided earlier in *Mātarīśvādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-3-8), why again the same topic is taken up for discussion. Earlier, the genesis of *Mukhyaprāṇa* as the presiding deity of an element*Vāyu* was considered. Here he is being referred to again along with the sense organs in his role as the chief vital breath or vital force behind the sense organs and the cause of birth and death of a living being[1].

॥ ॐ श्रेष्ठश्च ॐ ॥ **(2-4-9)**

All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*, but explain it in their own way.

Śaṅkarācārya refers to the conflict between two texts as follows. In one text, 'from that (*Ātman*) spring the vital force, the mind and all the organs'[2], the genesis of *Mukhyaprāṇa* is proclaimed. In *Nāsadīyasūkta*[3] it is mentioned that 'at that time (in *pralaya*) there was neither death nor immortality, neither night nor day, that *Brahman* alone was breathing on windless by its own power, there was nothing other than That'. From this text some may think that before creation also somebody was breathing; so *Prāṇa* existed; and therefore *Prāṇa* could be eternal. The *sūtra* removes this doubt by telling that chief vital breath, *Mukhyaprāṇa* also is originated from *Brahman*. In this second text, the words 'breathing on' are further qualified by the word 'windless' (*avātaṁ*) and therefore they do not indicate the existence of vital breath before creation.

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1 एतेन मातरिश्वा इत्यत्र बाह्यवायुरूपेणोत्पत्युक्तौ अपि सर्वमृत्यूत्पत्तिहेतुना प्राणरूपेणापि उत्पत्तिः उच्यते इति ध्येयम् । (TDK. 2-4-9).

2 एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च । (Muṇḍ. Up. 2-1-3) (S. BSB. 2-4-8).

3 ''न मृत्युरासीदमृतं न तर्हि रात्र्या अह्न आसीत्प्रकेतः । आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकं तस्माद्धान्यन्नपरः किंचनास ॥''(*Nāsadīyaūskta* S. BSB. 2-4-8).

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the *sūtra* on the same lines, quoting the same texts from *Nāsadīyasūkta* and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*.

Madhvācārya presents the scriptural conflict by quoting different texts as follows. One text says,[1] 'this *Prāṇa* (vital breath) does not rise, nor does he set, but stands absolute and unchanged between birth and death; hence they call him the middle (i.e. always living)'. Another text[2] avers that 'from the Supreme Being springs this *Prāṇa*'. Thus there is doubt whether *Mukhyaprāṇa* is originated or eternal.

The *sutra* clarifies.

न केवलम् अन्ये प्राणाः उत्पद्यन्ते किंतु श्रेष्ठः प्राणः मुख्यप्राणः च उत्पद्यते ।[3]

Not only the sense organs are originated but the chief vital breath or the vital force (behind the sense organs) also is originated.

If *Mukhyaprāṇa* is thus accepted as having genesis, then how to explain the text, which claims that he neither rises nor sets but stands unchanged. It is made clear in *Mātariśvādhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-3-8) that *Mukhyaprāṇa* in essence (*prakṛtitaḥ sūkṣmaḥ*) is eternal like other *Jīvas*, and his getting a gross (*sthūla*) form like vital breath, is taken as creation in the sense of *abhūtvābhavanaṁ* and his getting the exalted position as Chief vital breath is also considered as creation in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*. Therefore, the text, which claims that '*Mukhyaprāṇa* does not rise' etc. is to be understood with reference to his subtle and gross forms[4]. Madhvācārya quotes

1 'नैष प्राण उदेति नास्तमेति एकल एव मध्ये स्थाता । अथैनमाहुर्मध्यम' इति मुख्यप्राणस्य अनुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते, (M. BSB. 2-4-9).

2 'आत्मत एष प्राणो जायत ।' (Praśna Up. 3-3) इति च । (M. BSB. 2-4-9).

3 VKM. 2-4-9.

4 नैष प्राण उदेति इति श्रुतिश्च स्थूलसूक्ष्ममुख्यप्राणविषया इति भावः । (TDK. 2-4-9).

another text[1], which corroborates this view. It says, "in his subtle essential form he indeed remains eternal, he springs in gross form, so he is both subtle and gross; in essence he is subtle, in other forms he is gross; therefore they say 'he has a beginning and he has no beginning' etc."

Since the text claiming eternality of *Mukhyaprāṇa* is on stronger ground, a doubt arises whether the *Śruti* telling genesis of chief vital breath could be alternatively taken as referring to the origination of elemental air or motion in general which is caused by the vital force. The next *sūtra* disagrees.

॥ ॐ वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात् ॐ ॥ **(2-4-10)**

प्राणोत्पत्तिश्रुतिस्थः प्राणः बाह्यवायुचेष्टारूपक्रिये न भवतः। कुतः? 'स प्राणमसृजत' इत्युक्त्वा "प्राणात् श्रद्धां खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवीन्द्रियं मनोऽन्नमन्नाद्वीर्यं तपो मन्त्राः कर्म" इति तयोः पृथगुपदेशात्।

The word *Prāṇa,* in the text telling the genesis of *Prāṇa,* cannot be taken in the sense of elemental air or vibrant action; because in the text from *prāśnopaniṣad* (6-4), after telling that "He (*Paramātman*) created *Prāṇa*", the genesis of those two has been separately mentioned further as "from that *Prāṇa* were created---- air----activity----" etc.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* differently[2]. "His *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that *prāṇa* is just air, as learnt from scriptures. The commentator also refers to the *Sāṅkhya* view that *Prāṇa* is the combined function of all the sense organs. The *sutra* points

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1 'सौक्ष्मेण ह वा एषोऽवतिष्ठते स्थूलत्वेनोदेति सूक्ष्मश्चाथो स्थूलश्च प्रकृतितः सूक्ष्मोऽन्यतः स्थूलोऽथैनमाहुः सादिरनादिरिती' ति गौपवनश्रुतेः। (M. BSB. 2-4-9).

2 तत्र प्राप्तं तावत् - श्रुतेः वायुः प्राण इति; अथवा तन्त्रान्तरीयाभिप्रायात् समस्तकरणवृत्तिः प्राण इति प्राप्तम्। अत्र उच्यते - न वायुः प्राणः नापि करणव्यापारः कुतः? पृथगुपदेशात्; 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च। खं वायुः (Muṇḍa. Up. 2-1-3)' इत्येवमादयोऽपि वायोः करणेभ्यश्च प्राणस्य पृथगुपदेशे अनुसर्तव्याः। न च समस्तानां करणानामेका वृत्तिः संभवति। प्रत्येकमेकैकवृत्तित्वात्; समुदायस्य च अकारकत्वात्।----तस्मादन्यो वायुक्रियाभ्यां प्राणः। वायुरेवायम् अध्यात्ममापन्नः पञ्चव्यूहो विशेषात्मनावतिष्ठमानः प्राणो नाम भण्यते। न तत्त्वान्तरं नापि वायुमात्रम्। (S. BSB.2-4-9).

out that *Prāṇa* is neither air nor the combined function of sense organs. For, in Muṇḍ. Up. 2-3-1, the genesis of *Prāṇa* is mentioned separately from that of air and sense organs. Moreover, it is not possible to have a common function of all the sense organs, since each organ has its own special function, and the aggregate of sense organs cannot do any function. This air only having related itself to the individual soul and dividing itself five-fold and abiding in a specialized condition in the body, is termed as *Prāṇa*. *Prāṇa* is neither a different principle than air nor is it only air''.

Since this *Pāda* is meant for resolving the apparent conflicts in *Śrutis*, a reference to *Sāṅkhya* tenet is not expected here[1]. The discussion here is about the genesis and nature of *Mukhyaprana*[2], a sentient presiding deity behind the sense organs. But the conclusion arrived at in the above interpretation is that *Prāṇa* is ''air in its *ādhyātmika* set-up, with its five-fold function''[3], which is an insentient principle. Thus, the sentient *Mukhyaprāṇa* (*śreṣṭha*) is reduced to the level of an insentient (*jaḍa*) principle. Vyāsatīrtha avers that in *Śrutis*, the word *Mukhyapraṇa* is nowhere seen used with reference to an insentient thing[4]. Hence, the interpretation is found unconvincing.

Rāmānujacārya interprets this *sūtra* almost on these lines only, with one change. Instead of taking the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* as the combined function of all the sense organs, he takes it as the function of air, moving in and out as breath[5]. Therefore, the interpretation is equally unconvincing.

Both the commentators include the above *sūtra* in the next Adhikaraṇa.

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1 सांख्यमतनिरासस्य इह असङ्गतेः। (TC. p. 154).

2 स पुनः मुख्यः प्राणः किंस्वरूप इति इदानीं जिज्ञास्यते। (S. BSB. 2-4-9).

3 BNK. II. P. 336.

4 चेतनत्वेन निर्णीतमुख्यप्राणे----- वायुविकारत्वसिद्धान्तश्च अयुक्तः। न हि जडे श्रुतिषु क्वापि मुख्यप्राणशब्दो दृष्टः। (TC. III. p. 154).

5 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-4-8.

7 चक्षुराद्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ चक्षुरादिवत्तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः ॐ ॥ (2-4-11)

Śaṅkarācārya treats the preceding *sūtra*, this one and the next two as forming one *Ādhikaraṇa*. He interprets this *sūtra* as follows. ''Just as the sense organs, eye and others, are instruments of activity and enjoyment of a *Jīva*, similarly *Mukhyaprāṇa* also is an instrument of *Jīva*, since he carries out all the works of *Jīva*. *Mukhyaprāṇa* is not independent, because *Prāṇa* has been spoken of along with eye and other sense organs in the conversation of *Prāṇas* in the *Śruti* (Chānd. Up. 5-1-5). It is proper to talk of things together only when they have common characteristics. The word *ādi* in the *sūtra* indicates other reasons like *Prāṇa*'s being made up of parts and its being insentient which repudiate the independence of *Prāṇa*''[1].

This section is for resolving apparent conflicts in *Śrutis*. But no such conflict is referred to in the above interpretation. Moreover, *Mukhyaprāṇa,* the presiding deity of the element air and the vital force behind all sentient beings, who is being discussed here, is taken as an insentient principle. When there are *Śrutis* (being quoted in the following Madhvācārya's interpretation), which aver that *Prāṇa* creates, supports and absorbs this whole world and he is immediately next (in power) to the Supreme Being only, how can he be accepted as an insentient principle subservient to *Jīva*? Further since the word *Mukhyaprāṇa* is nowhere seen in *Śruti* with reference to an insentient thing, as vouched by Vyāsatīrtha, the above interpretation appears unconvincing.

Rāmānujācārya interprets the *sūtra* exactly in the same way as shown above.

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1 यथा चक्षुरादीनि जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वं प्रति उपकरणानि. न स्वतन्त्राणि, तथा मुख्योऽपि प्राणः जीवस्य सर्वार्थकत्वेन उपकरणभूतः, न स्वतन्त्रः । कुतः? तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः । तैः चक्षुरादिभिः सहैव प्राणः शिष्यते प्राणसंवादादिषु । समानधर्माणां च सह शासनं युक्तम् । आदिशब्देन संहतत्वाचेतनत्वादीन् प्राणस्य स्वातन्त्र्यनिराकरणहेतून् दर्शयति । (S. BSB. 2-4-10).

Madhvācārya presents *Śrutis* seemingly conflicting on the point whether *Prāṇa* is independent or dependent. One text[1] says, "from *Prāṇa* sprang this (world); *Prāṇa* supports it; and into *Prāṇa* it merges; *Prāṇa* is not dependent on anything". Another text[2] asserts that "all this (world) is under the control of *Prāṇa* and *Prāṇa* remains under the control of the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being does not depend on anyone. He is the Supreme". The *sūtra* resolves the conflict.

श्रेष्ठः मुख्यप्राणः चक्षुरादिवदेव यथा चक्षुरादि ईशाधीनं तथैव ईशाधीनः। कुतः? तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः तैः चक्षुरादिभिः सह शिष्टिः उक्तिः "सर्वं ह्येवैतत् परमेऽवतिष्ठते प्राणश्च प्राणाश्च प्राणिनश्च"[3] इति प्राणैः सह ईशवशत्वेन पाठः तस्मात्। आदिशब्देन "सर्वकर्ताऽपि सन् प्राणः परमाधारतः स्थितः"[4] इत्यादिवचनात् ईशद्वयायोगादिरूपयुक्तेश्च।

Just as the sense organs eye etc. are dependent on the Supreme Being, likewise *Mukhyaprāṇa* also is dependent on *Paramātman,* because in the (*Gaupavanaśruti*) text "All this indeed is dependent on the Supreme Being, --the (*Mukhya*)*prāṇa,* the sense organs and all beings", he too is spoken of along with the sense organs as dependent on the Supreme Being, and there are other evidences also; the other evidences include the text, "The (*Mukhya*) *Prāṇa* though the author of all, depends on the support of the Supreme Being" etc. and the argument that there can not be two absolute Lords for the world.

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1 "प्राणादिदमाविरासीत्प्राणो धत्ते प्राणे लयमभ्युपैति न प्राणः किंचिदाश्रित" इत्याग्निवेश्यश्रुतौ। (M. BSB. 2-4-11).

2 "प्राणस्यैतद्वशे सर्वं प्राणः परवशे स्थितः। न परः कश्चिदाश्रित्य वर्तते परमो यत।" इति पैङ्गिश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-4-11).

3 'सर्वं ह्येवैतत्परमेऽवतिष्ठते प्राणश्च प्राणाश्च प्राणिनश्च स ह्येक एवैतान्नयत्युन्नयति वशीकरोती'ति गौपवनश्रुतौ चक्षुरादिभिः सह तद्वशत्वेनैव शासनात्। (M. BSB. 2-4-11).

4 सर्वकर्ताऽपि सन्प्राणः परमाधारतः स्थितः। कथमेवान्यथा स स्याद्यतो नैवेश्वरद्वयम्।
अवान्तरेश्वरत्वेन तस्येश्वरवचो भवेत्। अतो मध्यमतामाहुस्तस्य वेदेषु वेदिनः।
अनन्येश्वरता प्राणे तदन्येश्वरघर्जनम्। यतो विशेषवाक्येन ह्रियते समतावचः।
(M. BSB. - SSR.2 4-11).

The full text of *Gaupavanaśruti* quoted by Madhvācārya (see fn.3 on p.525) runs as follows. "All this indeed is wholly dependent upon the Supreme Being, - the Chief *Prāṇa,* the sense organs and all beings; He is the one who absolutely leads them (to life and death), lifts them up and keeps them under His power".

Madhvācārya quotes a *Smṛti* text (see fn. 4 on p. 525) which explains the purport of the *sūtra* and clearly reconciles the seeming conflict among *Śrutis* as follows. "The (*Mukhya*) *prāṇa,* though the author of all, rests on the support of the Supreme Lord; or how could he be different (independent)?; for, there cannot be two absolute Lords for the world. But the term 'Lord' may be used in his case as being immediately next (in power) to the Supreme Lord. So the wise say that in scriptural texts he is spoken of as being the Middle; (for he is between all the beings on one side and the Supreme Lord on the other); and in case of the *Mukhyaprāṇa* the statement that 'he is without another Lord', means he has no other as his ruler than the Supreme Being. For, any general statement is to be understood thus in a restricted sense with deference to (i.e., is narrowed in sense by), specific statements".

The above *sūtra* brings out the comparison or similarity between *Mukhyaprāṇa* and other sense organs in the matter of being dependent on *Paramātman*. Incidentally, the *Śruti* texts declare that though *Mukhyaprāṇa* is dependent on the Supreme Lord, he has intermediate lordship (*avāntareśvaratva*). The next *sūtra* shows the contrast or difference between *Mukhyaprāṇa* and other sense organs. A doubt arises here that when *Mukhyaprāṇa* is dependent on the Supreme Being like other sense organs, how can he be said to have intermediate sovereignty? The next *sūtra* answers[1].

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1 यदि चक्षुरादिवद्देवेश्वराधीनत्वं मुख्यप्राणस्य तर्हि तस्य अवान्तरेश्वरत्वाद्यसम्भवेन स्वातन्त्र्यश्रुतिर्व्यर्था स्यात् इत्याशङ्कां परिहरत्सूत्रं पठित्वा व्याचष्टे। (TP. 2-4-12).

॥ ॐ अकरणत्वाच्च न दोषस्तथा हि दर्शयति ॐ ॥

(2-4-12)

अकरणत्वाच्च श्रेष्ठस्य मुख्यप्राणस्य अकरणत्वात् कर्तृप्रयोज्यत्वाभावात् चक्षुरादेः करणत्वात् कर्तृप्रयोज्यत्वात् च न दोषः तद्वद्वान्तरेश्वरत्वाभावदोषो नास्ति। कुतः? हि यस्मात् 'तानि ह वा एतानि करणानि अथ प्राण एवाकरणः'[1] इति श्रुतिः तथा चक्षुरादि करणत्वेन प्राणम् अकरणत्वेन च दर्शयति।

It is not erroneous to credit *Mukhyaprāṇa* with intermediate sovereignty on account of his not being an instrument of *Jīva* i.e. not working at the will and pleasure of *Jīva,* unlike other sense organs which are instruments of *Jīva* functioning at the will and pleasure of *Jīva;* because the *Śruti* 'all these now spoken of are indeed organs, but *Prāṇa* is the one who is not an organ', points out that the sense organs are instruments of *Jīva* but *Prāṇa* is not an instrument.

The fact that in deep sleep, in the absence any effort by *Jīva* his sense organs cannot function but respiration, the activity of *Mukhyaprāṇa,* continues unabated, proves that *Mukhyaprāṇa* is not an instrument of *Jīva* like other sense organs. So, one cannot find fault with Śruti when it ascribes the status of intermediate sovereignty (*avāntareśvaratva*) to *Mukhyaprāṇa.*

Śaṅkarācārya interprets this *sūtra* as follows : The *Pūrvapakṣin* objects that if *Prāṇa* is an instrument of *jīva* (as told in the preceding *sūtra*) like the eye and other organs, then there must be some particular activity assigned to it by which it helps *Jīva,* but no such field is seen. The *sūtra* answers that[2] there is no such defect or difficulty because *Prāṇa* is not an instrument i.e. *Prāṇa* is not an organ like the eye which has its own sense object (sight

1 'तानि ह वा एतानि सर्वाणि करणान्यथ प्राण एवाकरणस्तस्मान्मुख्यस्तस्मान्मुख्य इत्याचक्षत' इति माण्डव्यश्रुतिश्च। (M. BSB.- SSR. 2-4-12).

2 न तावद्विषयान्तरप्रसङ्गो दोषः, अकरणत्वात्प्राणस्य; न हि चक्षुरादिवत् प्राणस्य विषयपरिच्छेदेन करणत्वमभ्युपगम्यते। न च अस्य एतावता कार्याभाव: एव कस्मात्? तथा हि श्रुतिः प्राणान्तरेषु असंभाव्यमानं मुख्यप्राण्स्य वैशेषिकं कार्यं दर्शयति प्राणसंवादादिषु। ------ श्रुतिः प्राणनिमित्तां शरीरेन्द्रियस्थितिं दर्शयति। (S. BSB. 2-4-11).

etc.). That does not mean that *Prāṇa* has no function; because the *Śruti* points out in the conversation between the sense organs etc. that *Mukhyaprāṇa* has a special function which is not possible for the other sense organs to do. The *Śruti* demonstrates that the functioning of the body and all the other organs are sustained by *Mukhyaprāṇa*.

The second half of the *sūtra* '*tathā hi darśayati*' is normally expected to provide an example or evidence to substantiate what is already established in the earlier assertion. It is in the nature of a collateral evidence. But here it is found supplying fresh information to complete the sense of the assertion itself. The typical phrases used by the *Sūtrakāra* to indicate the principal evidence from *Śruti*, are *śruteḥ, upadeśāt, āmananāt* etc. Therefore, the interpretation does not appear natural[1]. Moreover, Śaṅkarācārya interprets the preceding *sūtra* as telling that *Mukhyaprāṇa* is an insentient instrument of the *Jīva* like other organs eye etc. He interprets this *sūtra* as saying that *Mukhyaprāṇa* is not an instrument of *Jīva* like eye etc., but he sustains the functions of the body and its organs. There is silence about how an insentient thing does all this. Thus, the *sūtras* appear inconsistent. Hence, this interpretation is not convincing.

Rāmānujācārya's interpretation is interesting. Having said in the preceding *sūtra* that *Prāṇa* is an instrument of the *Jīva*, he does not want to contradict himself by saying now that *Prāṇa* is not an instrument of the *Jīva*. Therefore, he treats the compound *akaraṇatvāt* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound and takes the word *karaṇa* in the sense of *kriyā* or activity. He assumes the word *akaraṇatvāt* in the *sūtra* as a probans of *Pūrvapakṣa*. Thus, the interpretation reads as follows[2]. The objection that *Prāṇa* has no activity helpful

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1 'तथा हि दर्शयति' इत्यस्य 'अकरणत्वाच्च न दोष' इति पूर्वोक्तार्थपरत्वाभावेनास्वारस्याच्च। (TC. III. p. 155).

2 अकरणत्वात् --- करणं क्रिया अक्रियत्वात्-अस्य प्राणस्य जीवं प्रति उपकारविशेषरूपक्रियारहितत्वात् च यो दोष उद्भाव्यते स नास्ति। यत उपकारविशेषरूपशरीरेन्द्रियधारणादिरूपां क्रियां दर्शयति श्रुतिः।------ इति चक्षुरादिवत्करणत्वम्। (Śrībhāṣya- 2-4-10).

to the *Jīva* is not correct, for the *Śruti* shows how *Prāṇa* performs the activity of supporting the body and the sense organs, which is beneficial to the *Jīva*. Therefore, the *Prāṇa* has the nature of an instrument like eye etc.

This interpretation appears far-fetched. Firstly, it is a matter of common knowledge that *Prāṇa* is absolutely necessary for maintaining the body and its organs. Therefore, a doubt whether *Prāṇa* does not exercise any activity helpful to *Jīva* should not arise[1]. Secondly, there is no word in the *sūtra*, like *cet* or *iti cet*, to justify the treatment of the word *akaraṇatvāt* as a probans of *Pūrvapakṣa*. Thirdly, taking the word *karaṇa* as activity and treating the compound *akaraṇatvāt* as *bahuvrīhi* appear far-fetched[2]. Here again, the words *'tathā hi darśayati'* indicative of a collateral evidence, are used as part of the main assertion. Hence, this interpretation is also not convincing.

8 पञ्चप्रवृत्त्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते ॐ ॥ (2-4-13)

By and large, all the commentators interpret this *sūtra* in the same way. The *sūtra* literally means that 'It (*Prāṇa*) is taught as having a five-fold function like the mind[3].

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[4]. And for this reason also, *Mukhyaprāṇa* has its own special function. It has five functions viz. *Prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna* and *samāna*. This distinction is made on the basis of their works. The five functions

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1 स्फुटप्रत्यक्षादिविरोधेन चक्षुरादाविवानुपकारकत्वशंकानुदयस्य उक्तत्वात् । (TC. III. p. 155).

2 BNK. II. p. 339.

3 SRK. p. 427.

4 इतश्चास्ति मुख्यस्य प्राणस्य वैशेषिकं कार्यम् । यत्कारणं पञ्चवृत्तिरयं व्यपदिश्यते श्रुतिषु-'प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदानः समानः' इति; वृत्तिभेदश्चायं कार्यभेदापेक्षः - प्राणः प्राग्वृत्तिः उच्छ्वासादिकर्मा, अपानः अवाग्वृत्तिर्निश्वासादिकर्मा, व्यानः तयोः संधौ वर्तमानो वीर्यवत्कर्महेतुः, उदानः ऊर्ध्ववृत्तिरुत्क्रान्त्यादिहेतुः, समानः समं सर्वेष्वङ्गेषु योऽन्नरसान्नयति - इत्येवं पञ्चवृत्तिः प्राणः, मनोवत् - यथा मनसः पञ्चवृत्तयः एवं प्राणस्यापीत्यर्थः । (S. BSB. 2-4-12).

carried out by these are respectively, breathing out, breathing in, holding in between the two and generating strength to aid works, the ascending when the *Jīva* passes out of the body, and carrying the nutriment through all the parts of the body. Thus, *Prāṇa* also has five-fold function just as mind has.

Rāmānujācārya interprets this way. "Just as desire etc. are not different from the mind, though they are different functions of it producing different effects, according to the text, 'Desire, determination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, want of firmness, modesty, understanding, fear- all this is mind' etc. (Bṛha. Up. 1-5-3), even so according to the same text, '*Prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna* and *samāna* - all this is *Prāṇa*', they are but fivefold functions of the one *Prāṇa* and not different from it"[1].

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* as part of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. But, on account of absence of *ca* in the *sūtra*, Madhvācārya takes this *sūtra* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. He refers to an apparent controversy between two scriptural texts. The *kauṇḍinyaśruti* text[2] declares that "All these other *Prāṇas* viz. *Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna* and *Samāna* are the servants of *Mukhyaprāṇa*. He is their sovereign Lord". On the other hand, the *Gaupavanaśruti*[3] says : "The five *Prāṇas* are identical forms of the Chief *Prāṇa*. It is He that dwells day in and day out in the five forms within the body"[4]. The *sūtra* resolves the conflict by citing the analogy of mind (*manas*).

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1 यथा कर्मादिवृत्तिभेदे तत्कार्यभेदेऽपि न कामादिकं मनसस्तत्त्वान्तरम् 'कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव' (Bṛha. Up. 1-5-3) इति वचनात्, एवं 'प्राणोऽपानो'---(Bṛha. Up. 1-5-3) इति वचनादपानादयोऽपि प्राणस्यैव वृत्तिविशेषाः न तत्त्वान्तरमित्यवगम्यते। (Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-4-11).

2 'सर्वे वा एते मुख्यदासाः प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदानः समान इति। अथ प्राणो वाव सम्राडि' ति कौण्डिन्यश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-4-13).

3 'मुख्यस्यैव स्वरूपाणि प्राणाद्याः पञ्चावयवः। स एव प्राणिनां देहे पञ्चधा वर्ततेऽनिशमि'ति च गौपवनश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-4-13).

4 BNK. II. p. 332.

श्रेष्ठः मुख्यप्राणः पञ्चवृत्तिः प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमानेतिपञ्चस्वरूपवान् प्राणादिपञ्चदासवांश्च। कुतः? मनोवत्, यथा मनः मनोबुद्ध्यहङ्कार-चित्तचेतनाख्यस्वरूपवत् तज्जन्यमनःप्रभृतिवृत्तिपञ्चकवत् च तद्वत् श्रेष्ठोपि वर्गद्वयवान् इति "पञ्चवृत्त्यैतत् प्रवर्तते" इति श्रुतौ यतः व्यपदिश्यते अतः।

Mukhyaprāṇa **is of five forms, namely, *Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna* and *Samāna,* and the five functions and the functionary deities of the same names in the body are subservient to them respectively; whence? because it is told in the (*Kauṇḍinyaśruti*) text *'pañcavṛtyaitat pravartate'* that just as *Manas* (or *antaḥkaraṇa*) is of five phases viz. *Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Citta* and *Cetanā* (sensation, understanding, egoism, memory and comprehension) and the five functions and the functionary deities of the same names in the body are subservient to them respectively, similarly the *Mukhyaprāṇa* also is referred to in two categories of forms and functions (with their presiding deities)[1].**

Thus, there is no real conflict between the two texts quoted above. One talks about the functions of *Mukhyaprāṇa* from the microcosmic or individual point of view (*vyaṣṭi*) and the other about his forms from the macrocosmic or universal point of view (*samaṣṭi*). The *Kauṇḍinyaśruti* text quoted by Madhvācārya (see

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1 'अथ पञ्चवृत्त्यैतत्प्रवर्तते प्राणो वाव पञ्चवृत्तिः प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदानः समान इति। तेभ्यो वा एतेभ्यः पञ्चदासाः प्रजायन्ते। प्राणाद्वाव प्राणोऽपानादपानो व्यानाद्व्यान उदानादुदान समानादेव समानो यथा ह वै मनः पञ्चधा व्यपदिश्यते मनोबुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चित्तं चेतनेति। तेभ्यो वा एतेभ्यः पञ्च दासाः प्रजायन्ते। मनसो वाव मनो बुद्धेर्बुद्धिरहङ्कारादहङ्कारश्चित्ताच्चित्तं चेतनया एव चेतनैवमिती'ति।

The *Kauṇḍinyaśruti* says : "Now this body lives (lit. proceeds) by the author of fivefold function; *Prāṇa* is indeed (the author of) five functions (forms); as *Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna, Samāna* and from them indeed these five functionaries, five servants are produced; from *Prāṇa* indeed *Prāṇa,* from *Apāna, Apāna;* from *Vyāna, Vyāna;* from *Udāna, Udāna;* and from *Samāna* too *Samāna*. Just as the mind is spoken of in five aspects as *Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, citta,* and *cetanā* (sensation, perception, self consciousness, memory and comprehension or judgment), and from these five functions five servants (or organs) spring; from *Manas* springs Manas; from *Buddhi, Buddhi;* from *Ahaṅkāra, Ahaṅkāra;* from *citta, citta,* and from *cetanā, cetanā;* so (are the five *Prāṇas*). (M. BSB. SSR. 2-4-13).

fn. 1 on p.531) aptly explains the import of the *sūtra*. The text is so apt that it appears as though the *Sūtrakāra* had this text before him while composing this *sūtra* and he picked up the three words in the *sūtra* and its purport from this text only.

9 अण्वधिकरणम् ।

This *Adhikaraṇa* discusses the size of *Mukhyaprāṇa*. The size of a *Jīva* is already discussed in *Utkrāntyadhikaraṇa* (BS. 2-3-20 to 26) and it is established that *Jīva* is of atomic size. *Mukhyaprāṇa* also being a *Jīva*, he can be taken as of atomic size in essence. Moreover, in an earlier *sūtra 'aṇavaśca'* (BS. 2-4-8) it is established that all *Prāṇas*, i.e. sense organs are of atomic size. *Mukhyaprāṇa* also could have been taken along with them. But a special discussion is initiated here on account of *Mukhyaprāṇa*'s position in the world, that from him sprang this world, he supports it, and into him it merges etc.[1] and also on account of his being the presiding deity of *Vāyu*, which pervades the world.

॥ ॐ अणुश्च ॐ ॥ (2-4-14)

All commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra*, but they explain it from different standpoints. According to Śaṅkarācārya, "It is minute, limited and subtle like the senses. If the objection is raised that in Bṛha. Up. 1-3-22, it is said to be all pervading, the answer is given that the reference there is to *Hiraṇya-garbha*, the cosmic soul (*samaṣṭirūpa*). So far as the individual soul (*vyaṣṭirūpa*) is concerned, it is limited"[2].

Rāmānujācārya explains it as follows. "Like the sense organs the vital force is also minute, for the scriptural texts declare that it passes out of the body with the soul, that it moves, and so on; 'When it (soul) goes out, the vital force accompanies it' (Bṛha.

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1 Refer *Agniveśyaśruti*. śruti quoted by Madhvācārya under BS. 2-4-11. p. 525

2 SRK. p. 428.

Up. 4-4-2). An objection may be raised that other texts declare that it is infinite. 'Equal to these three worlds, equal to this universe' (Bṛha. Up. 1-3-22). This is only by way of praise, as the life of all living beings depends on breath''[1].

Madhvācārya presents a seeming scriptural conflict. One text[2] states that 'It is *Prāṇa* that is underneath; *Prāṇa* is overhead; *Prāṇa* is in the middle; *Prāṇa* is on all sides; *Prāṇa* indeed is all this'. Thus pervasion seems to be predicted of *Prāṇa*. But the *Sautrāyaṇaśruti* declares that, 'By the minute one this is created, by the minute one this is upheld, into the minute one it becomes absorbed; *Prāṇa* indeed is the minute one and by the *Prāṇa* indeed all this (creation etc.) proceeds'[3]. The *sūtra* clarifies. The word *'ca'* in the sūtra indicates that the *Mukhyaprāṇa* is both atomic and pervasive simultaneously.

श्रेष्ठः मुख्यप्राणः अणुः व्याप्तः च अन्तः प्राणरूपेण अणुः बहिः वायुरूपेण व्याप्तः ।

***Mukhyaprāṇa* is both atomic and pervasive; in the form of *Prāṇa* inside individual bodies, he is atomic in size, and outside the bodies he is pervasive in the form of *Vāyu* (air).**

Thus, there is no conflict between *Śruti* texts. One speaks from the macrocosmic or universal point of view (*samaṣṭi*) and the other talks from the microcosmic or individual point of view (*vyaṣṭi*).

10 ज्योतिराद्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात् ॐ ॥ (2-4-15)

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1 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-4-12.

2 'प्राण एवाधस्तात्प्राण उपरिष्टात्प्राणो मध्यतः प्राणः सर्वतः प्राण एवेदं सर्वम् ।' इति प्राणस्य व्याप्तिः प्रतीयते । (M. BSB. SSR. 2-4-14).

3 'अणुनैतत्सृज्यतेऽणुनैतद्धार्यते अणौ लयमभ्युपैति प्राणो वा अणुः प्राणो ह्येतद्भवति' इति च सौत्रायणश्रुतिः । (M. BSB. SSR. 2-4-14).

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows. A question is raised whether the vital breath and other sense organs proceed to carry out their respective functions on their own intrinsic strength or they are driven to work by their presiding deities[1]. The *Pūrvapakṣin* holds that the sense organs carry out their works on their own strength. If we accept that they are impelled to work by their presiding deities, then those deities will be liable to enjoy or suffer the results of the actions, and not the *Jīva*. The *sūtra* refutes this contention. It avers that the sense organs, speech etc., proceed to do their respective functions, impelled by the deities *'jyoti'* etc., which are the presiding deities of *Agni* etc. Whence? Because it is told so in scriptures[2]. The next *sūtra,*

प्राणवता शब्दात्।

is interpreted as follows[3]. Though the sense organs have their respective presiding deities, it is understood from scriptures that the sense organs have the (master and servant) relation only with *Jīva,* the owner of the body-mind complex. Therefore, *Jīva* only is the enjoyer in the body. The presiding deities of sense organs are not the enjoyers or sufferers. The next *sūtra* provides a reason for this.

तस्य च नित्यत्वात्।

It is *Jīva* only who is always in the body as the experiencer of pleasure and pain, because the religious merit and demerit and the resulting enjoyment and suffering is possible in the case of *Jīva* only and not for deities. The deities abiding in divine affluence,

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1 ते पुनः प्रकृताः प्राणाः किं स्वमहिम्नैव स्वस्मै स्वस्मै कार्याय प्रभवन्ति आहोस्वित् देवताधिष्ठिताः प्रभवन्ति इति विचार्यते। (S. BSB. 2-4-14).

2 ज्योतिरादिभिः अग्न्याद्यभिमानिनीभिः देवताभिः अधिष्ठितं वागादिकरणजातं स्वकार्येषु प्रवर्तते इति प्रतिजानीते। हेतुं च व्याचष्टे तदामननात् इति। (S. BSB. 2-4-14).

3 सतीष्वपि प्राणानामधिष्ठात्रीषु देवतासु प्राणवता कार्यकारणसंघातस्वामिना शारीरेणैव एषां प्राणनां संबन्धः श्रुतेः अवगम्यते। (S. BSB. 2-4-15).

need not get in a deficient worldly body for enjoyment[1]. Therefore, the *Jīva* is always the enjoyer.

Rāmānujācārya points out a flaw in the above interpretation. Those *Prāṇas* i.e. sense organs are presided over and directed by the deities *Agni* etc. has been already established while explaining the *sūtra*[2] *'abhimānivyapadeśastu viśeṣānugatibhyāṁ'* (BS.2-1-5). While interpreting that *sūtra* Śaṅkarācārya says, "When the scriptures talk of activities fit for sentient beings, in the case of insentient things like earth etc. and sense-organs *Vāk* etc., the reference is to their presiding deities but not to the elements or sense-organs"[3]. Therefore, the *Pūrvapakṣa* that the insentient sense-organs carry out their activities on their own strength should not arise at all. Hence, the above interpretation by Śaṅkarācārya renders the *sūtras* superfluous.

Rāmānujācārya reads the first and the second *sūtra* together as :

ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात्प्राणवता शब्दात्।

and interprets it as follows. He raises the doubt "whether this directing of sense organs (to carry out their functions), by *Jīva* and the presiding deities *Agni* etc. is self-dependent or dependent on others[4]. The *sūtra* answers[5]: "The control of the deities *Agni* etc. and of *Jīva* over the sense organs depends on the will of the

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1 तस्य च शारीरस्य अस्मिन् शरीरे भोक्तृत्वेन नित्यत्वं पुण्यपापोपलेपसंभवात् सुखदुःखोपभोग-संभवाच्च। न देवतानाम्; ता हि परस्मिन् ऐश्वर्ये पदे अवतिष्ठमाना न हीने अस्मिन् शरीरे भोक्तृत्वं प्रतिलब्धुमर्हन्ति। (S. BSB. 2-4-16).

2 तेषां प्राणानाम् अग्न्यादिदेवताधिष्ठितत्वं च पूर्वमेव 'अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्यां' (BS. 2-1-5) इत्यनेन सूत्रेण प्रसङ्गादुपपादितम्। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-4-13).

3 मृदाद्यभिमानिन्यो वागाद्यभिमानिन्यश्च चेतना देवता वदनसंवदनादिषु चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रम्। (S. BSB. 2-1-5).

4 तदिदं जीवस्य अग्न्यादिदेवतानां च प्राणविषयमधिष्ठानं किं स्वायत्तम् उत परायत्तम् ? (Śrībhāṣya- RDK.- 2-4-13)

5 प्राणवता जीवेन सह ज्योतिरादीनाम् अग्न्यादिदेवतानां प्राणविषयम् अधिष्ठानम्, तदामननात् तस्य परमात्मन आमननात् भवति। कुतः? शब्दात्। इन्द्रियाणां स्वाभिमानिदेवतानां जीवात्मनश्च स्वकार्येषु परमपुरुषमननायत्तत्वशास्त्रात्। (Śrībhāṣya- RDK. 2-4-13).

Supreme Being. Whence? On account of scriptures propounding the dependence of the sense organs, their presiding deities and the *Jīva* in respect of their functionings, on the Supreme Being''. The next *sūtra*,

तस्य च नित्यत्वात्।

provides a reason for the above conclusion. The *sūtra* avers that, ''since *Paramātman*'s control over all the (sentient and insentient) things is eternal and since His association with the essence (*svarūpa*) of all the things is permanent, the presidency or the controlling power of these (deities and *Jīvas* on the sense-organs) is inevitably subject to the *Paramātman*'s will only''[1].

The remark made earlier by Rāmāṇujācārya against Śaṅkarācārya's interpretation of this *Adhikaraṇa*, applies to his own interpretation also. For, he has already established by the *sūtra* '*parāttu tacchruteḥ* (BS. 2-3-41)' that ''the agency of soul, - (the presiding deities are also souls only), - is dependent on the Supreme Being only, because the *Śruti* declares so''. Hence, Rāmānujācārya's interpretation also renders this *Adhikaraṇa* superfluous.

Moreover, combining of the two *sūtras* by treating the instrumental case-ending of the word *prāṇavatā* as '*upapadavibhakti*', and taking it as a prefix of *jyotirādi*, which is already a part of a compound, and then dissolving the compound as '*prāṇavatā saha jyotirādīnaṁ adhiṣṭhānaṁ*' looks circuitous and unnatural. A '*kārakavibhakti*' has precedence over '*upapadavibhakti*'[2]. ''*Kārakavibhati* is a grammatical case prescribed independently of association with particular words while *upapadavibhakti* is a case prescribed in the event of association with particular words, e.g. *Rāmeṇa bāṇena hato Vālī;*

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1 सर्वेषां परमात्माधिष्ठितत्वस्य नित्यत्वात् स्वरूपानुबन्धित्वेन नियतत्वात् च तत्सङ्कल्पादेव एषाम् अधिष्ठातृत्वम् अवर्जनीयम्। (Śrībhāṣya-RDK. 2-4-14).

2 प्राणवता इति तृतीयायाः कारकविभक्तिसंभवे सहयोगसापेक्षोपपदविभक्तित्वकल्पनायोगाच्च। (TC. III. p. 157-158).

Putreṇa (*saha*) *āgataḥ pitā* (both instrumental) where the latter is a case of *upapadavibhakti*. The dictum is उपपदविभक्तेकारकविभक्ति-र्बलीयसी ।''[1]. Further, both the words *āmananāt* and *śabdāt* in the *sūtra* carry the same meaning.

Madhvācārya presents an apparent conflict between two texts. One text states that, "the wise ones say that all these sense organs are the instruments of *Jīva*, for these are observed to be under the control of *Jīva* in all the creatures"[2]. Another text[3] avers that 'these sense-organs the eye, the ear, the mind and speech indeed are the instruments of *Brahman*, for He impels them to do all the things'. Thus, there is a doubt whether these sense-organs are instruments of *Jīva* or *Brahman*. The *sūtra* 2-4-15 resolves.

ज्योतिराद्याधिष्ठानं 'योऽग्नौ तिष्ठन्' इत्यादिश्रुतेः अग्न्यादिभूतनियामकं यद् ब्रह्म तदेव ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानम् , अग्न्याद्यंशचक्षुरादिनियामकं, तत्करणमिति यावत्, कुतः? तदामननात् तस्य चक्षुरादिनियामकत्वस्य 'यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठन्' इत्यादिना अभिधानात् ।[4]

***Brahman* only, who is the indwelling ruler of the elements *Agni* etc. as told in the *Śruti* texts such as *'yo'gnau tiṣṭhan'* (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-5)[5], is the ruler of the sense organs the eye etc. which are the *aṁśas* of *Agni* etc., i.e. the sense organs are the instruments of *Brahman*; whence? because it is asserted in *Śruti* texts like *'yaścakṣuṣi tiṣṭhan'* (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-18)[6].**

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1 BNK. II. p. 348.

2 जीवस्य करणान्याहुः प्राणानेतांस्तु सर्वशः । यस्मात्तद्वशगा एते दृश्यन्ते सर्वदेहिषु ॥ इति सौत्रायणश्रुतौ सयुक्तिकं जीवकरणत्वं प्रतीयते । (M. BSB. 2-4-15).

3 'ब्रह्मणो वा एतानि करणानि चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनो वागिति तद्ध्येतैः कारयति' इति च काषायणश्रुतौ । (M. BSB. 2-4-15).

4 VKM. 2-4-15.

5 योऽग्नौ तिष्ठन् अग्नेरन्तरः यमग्निर्न वेद, यस्याग्निः शरीरं, योऽग्निमन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः । (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-5). He who inhabits fire, is within it, whom fire does not know, whose body is fire, and who controls fire from within, this immortal *Ātman* is the indweller in you.

6 यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठंश्चक्षुषोऽन्तरः, यं चक्षुर्न वेद, यस्य चक्षुः शरीरं, यश्चक्षुरन्तरो यमयति, एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः । (Bṛha. Up. 3-7-18). He who inhabits the eye, is within it, whom the eye does not know, whose body is the eye and who controls the eye from within, this immortal *Ātman* is the indweller in you.

If the sense-organs are instruments of *Brahman*, then how *Sautrāyaṇaśruti* states that "all these sense organs are the instruments of *Jīva*?" The next *sūtra* answers.

॥ ॐ प्राणवता शब्दात् ॐ ॥ **(2-4-16)**

तद् ब्रह्म प्राणवता इन्द्रियवता जीवेन कर्त्रा स्वकरणैः इन्द्रियैः दर्शनादि कारयति; कुतः? शब्दात् 'एष ह्यनेनात्मना चक्षुषा दर्शयति' इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।[1]

That *Brahman*, with His instruments i.e. the sense-organs, enables *Jīva* as the agent, to see with the eyes etc; whence? because *Bhāllaveyaśruti*[2] states that 'this *Brahman* indeed enables the *Jīva* to see with the eyes'.

Though the sense-organs are the instruments of *Brahman,* they are instrumental in the activities of *Jīva,* an agent subservient to *Brahman.* Hence, the *Sautrāyaṇaśruti* describes the sense-organs as the instruments of *Jīva*. Thus, there is no contradiction between *Śrutis.*

The next *sūtra* offers another reason why *Sautrāyaṇaśruti* states the sense organs as the instruments of *Jīva.*

॥ ॐ तस्य च नित्यत्वात् ॐ ॥ **(2-4-17)**

तस्य जीवस्य प्राणानां तत्संबन्धस्य च नित्यत्वात् जीवकरणसंबन्धस्य चिरकालीनत्वात् जीवकरणत्वश्रुतिः उपचरितार्थः ।

Since the *Jīva,* the sense organs and their relationship are eternal, the *Śruti* metaphorically describes the sense organs as instruments of *Jīva* on account of their long time association.

11 तदिन्द्रियाण्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात् ॐ ॥
(2-4-18)

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1 VKM. 2-4-16.

2 M. BSB. 2-4-16.

All the commentators have understood the words in the *sūtra* in the same way as follows.

श्रेष्ठात् अन्यत्र ते प्राणाः इन्द्रियाणि कुतः तद्व्यपदेशात्।

"Except the chief *Prāṇa* (vital breath), they the other *Prāṇas* are organs, because the scripture speaks so".

But further discussion on the topic, the doubt raised, the scriptural statement (*viṣayavākya*) discussed and the conclusion arrived at, vary from one commentator to the other.

Śaṅkarācārya raises the doubt[1] whether the other sense organs are different modes of the Chief vital breath or they are distinct principles. The *sūtra* decides that[2] the speech and others i.e. the other sense organs are separate principles different from the Chief breath because they are separately mentioned in places like *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (2-1-3), which says that 'from Him are born the *Prāṇa*, the mind and all the other sense-organs'. The next *sūtra*

भेदश्रुतेः।

confirms that the sense-organs are separate principles and not modes of the vital breath because "the vital breath is referred to distinctly from the sense organs speech etc. in all the places in scriptures"[3]. Further, the next *sūtra*

वैलक्षण्याच्च।

points out that the sense-organs are separate entities different from the Chief breath, also because "there is difference in the characteristics of the vital breath and the other sense organs. The

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1 किं मुख्यस्यैव प्राणस्य वृत्तिभेदा इतरे प्राणाः आहोस्वित् तत्त्वान्तराणीति। (S. BSB. 2-4-17).

2 तत्त्वान्तराण्येव प्राणाद् वागादीनि इति कुतः? व्यपदेशात्।----- 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च' (Muṇḍa. Up. 2-1-3) इति ह्येवंजातीयकेषु प्रदेशेषु पृथक् प्राणो व्यपदिश्यते पृथक् च इन्द्रियाणि। (S. BSB. 2-4-17).

3 भेदेन वागादिभ्यः प्राणः सर्वत्र श्रूयते। (S. BSB. 2-4-18).

sense organs speech etc. do not function during deep sleep while the vital breath alone keeps awake functioning''[1].

Vyāsatīrtha points out that this line of interpretation is criticized even by Vācaspati Miśrā, an ardent follower of Śaṅkarācārya, who wrote an exhaustive commentary called *Bhāmatī* on *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* of *Brahmasūtras,* because of the following shortcomings in it. (i) The word *'tattvāntarāṇi'* is imported in the statement of the proposition. (ii) The *sūtra 'Bhedaśruteḥ'* tells the same thing told by the word *tadvyapadeśāt* in the earlier *sūtra*. (iii) The pronoun *tad* in the compound *tadvyapadeśāt* refers to the imported word *tattvāntarāṇi* [2].

Rāmānujācārya also interprets the first *sūtra* as follows[3]. The *Prāṇas* other than the Chief *Prāṇa* are alone the sense-organs; whence? because the *Prāṇas* other than the Chief *Prāṇa* alone are referred to as sense organs in scriptures. He quotes *Bhagavadgītā* [4] in support. He reads the second and the third *sūtras* together and interprets it as shown here below. He quotes the *mantra* from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (2-1-3) and contends that here the Chief *Prāṇa* is stated as different from the sense-organs[5]. Further, the Chief *Prāṇa* differs in characteristics from the sense-organs the eye etc; for in deep sleep the Chief *Prāṇa* functions; but the sense organs the eye etc., do not function. Here also, the first part of the second sūtra, *Bhedaśruteḥ,* repeats what is told in the earlier *sūtra*. Moreover, from the *Bhagavadgītā* (13-5), the

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1 वैलक्षण्यं च भवति मुख्यस्य इतरेषां च - सुप्तेषु वागादिषु मुख्य एको जागर्ति। (S. BSB. 2-4-19).

2 तत्र तत्त्वान्तराणीति प्रतिज्ञाध्याहारः। तद्व्यपदेशादित्यस्य भेदश्रुतेरित्यनेन पौनरुक्त्यम्। तच्छब्दस्याध्याहृततत्त्वान्तरपरतेति दोषा इति स्वमतमेव दूषितं भामतीकारेण। (TC. III. p. 158).

3 श्रेष्ठव्यतिरिक्ता एव प्राणा इन्द्रियाणि। कुतः? श्रेष्ठादन्येष्वेव प्राणेषु तद्व्यपदेशात् इन्द्रियव्यपदेशात्। (Śrībhāṣya- 2-4-15).

4 इन्द्रियाणि दशैकं च पञ्च चेन्द्रियगोचराः। (BG. 13-5).

5 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च' इत्यादिषु इन्द्रियेभ्यः प्राणस्य पृथक्श्रवणात् ----। वैलक्षण्यं चक्षुरादिभ्यः श्रेष्ठप्राणस्य उपलभ्यते। सुषुप्तौ हि प्राणस्य वृत्तिरुपलभ्यते चक्षुरादीनां तु वृत्तिर्नोपलभ्यते। (Śrībhāṣya- 2-4-16).

commentator holds the sense-organs as eleven (*indriyāṇi daśaikaṁ*), which has been shown earlier to be in disagreement with BS. 2-4-6 and BS. 2-4-7.[1]

According to Madhvācārya, this *Adhikaraṇa* resolves the apparent conflict between *Śruti* texts on the question[2] whether *Mukhyaprāṇa* can also be taken as an organ or not. For, *Pautrāyaṇaśruti* makes a general statement that ''*Prāṇas* indeed are the sense-organs, for *Prāṇas* go to this i.e. their respective objects''[3]. But the *Kāṣāyaṇaśruti*[4] says, ''twelve only are the sense-organs,- the mind and the intellect making the eleventh and the twelfth''. Madhvācārya tells that the same *Pautrāyaṇaśruti* which holds that, in general, *Prāṇas* are the sense organs, further tells that, ''Only twelve are said to be the sense-organs. But, the Chief *Prāṇa* is not a sense organ. For, the Chief *Prāṇa* is the absolute master and guide of the sense-organs that run towards their respective objects''[5]. Therefore, the *sūtra* makes it clear as follows.

श्रेष्ठात् अन्यत्र मुख्यप्राणात् अन्ये ते प्राणाः इन्द्रियाणि, न श्रेष्ठः, कुतः? तद्व्यपदेशात् तस्य श्रेष्ठादन्येषाम् इन्द्रियत्वस्य "द्वादशैवेन्द्रियाण्याहुः प्राणो मुख्यस्त्वनिन्द्रियम्" इति व्यपदेशात्।

Except the Chief *Prāṇa* (vital breath), they the other *Prāṇas* are sense-organs, but not the Chief *Prāṇa;* because in the (*Pautrāyaṇa*) *Śruti* '*dvādaśaivendriyāṇyāhuḥ prāṇo mukhyastvanindriyaṁ*' the *Prāṇas* other than the Chief *Prāṇa* are spoken of as the sense-organs.

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1 तत्र इन्द्रियस्य एकादशत्वं प्रागेव निरस्तम्। (TC. III. p: 158).

2 अत्र श्रेष्ठस्य इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियत्वश्रुत्यविरोध उच्यते। (TDK. 2-4-18).

3 'अथेन्द्रियाणि प्राणा वा इन्द्रियाणि प्राणा हीदं द्रवन्ति' इति सयुक्तिका पौत्रायणश्रुतिः सामान्येन प्राणानाम् इन्द्रियत्वं वक्ति। (M. BSB. 2-4-18).

4 'द्वादशैवेन्द्रियाण्याहुर्मनोबुद्धी तु द्वादश' इति काषायणश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-4-18).

5 ''द्वादशैवेन्द्रियाण्याहुः प्राणो मुख्यस्त्वनिन्द्रियम्। द्रवतां हीन्द्रियाणां तु नियन्ता प्राण एकराडि'' ति पौत्रायणश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-4-18).

If one objects that, since the Chief *Prāṇa* and the eye etc. are all subservient to the Supreme Being, there is no difference between them and therefore, if the Chief *Prāṇa* is not an organ, then the eye etc. also may not be the organs, the next *sūtra* replies.

॥ ॐ भेदश्रुतेः ॐ ॥ **(2-4-19)**

तेषां द्वादशप्राणानां श्रेष्ठस्य च भेदश्रुतेः ते एव इन्द्रियाणि।

Those twelve *Prāṇas* only are the sense-organs because there is a clear distinction between the Chief *Prāṇa* and those twelve *Prāṇas* heard in the scriptures.

Madhvācārya quotes[1] a *mantra*, which corroborates the distinction between the Chief *Prāṇa* and the other sense-organs. It says: "Without moving from where he is, *Mukhyaprāṇa* does all this - he causes all this to be done. ---- So they call him the powerful Lord. The organs of sense are not steady. They do nothing, they cause nothing to be done. They are really weak and so they say they are instruments"[2].

Having established the characteristic difference between *Mukhyaprāṇa* and the other sense-organs on the evidence of *Śruti*, the next *sūtra* shows the same on the evidence of perception (*pratyakṣa*).

॥ ॐ वैलक्षण्याच्च ॐ ॥ **(2-4-20)**

प्राणानां मुख्यप्राणस्य च क्रमात् जीवप्रयत्नाधीनत्वतदनधीनत्वरूपवैलक्षण्यात् च ते एव इन्द्रियाणि।[3]

They, (the *Prāṇas* other than *Mukhyaprāṇa*,) are alone the sense organs also because of the characteristic difference

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1 'स्थित एव ह्रीदं मुख्यप्राणः करोति कारयति----- प्रभुं वा एनमाहुः अथेन्द्रियाणि न स्थितानि न कुर्वन्ति न कारयन्ति----तानि ह वा एतानि अबलानि तस्मादाहुः इन्द्रियाणि करणानि' इति पौत्रायणश्रुतेः। (M. BSB. 2-4-19).

2 BNK. II. p. 351.

3 VKM. 2-4-20.

between the *Prāṇas* and the *Mukhyaprāṇa,* the former being subject to the effort of *Jīva* and the latter independent of it.

It is a matter of common experience that even during deep sleep when the sense organs do not function on account of lack of will and effort on the part of *Jīva*, the *Mukhyaprāṇa* continues to function in all his five forms, independently.

12 संज्ञामूर्त्यधिकरणम् ।

॥ ॐ संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् ॐ ॥

(2-4-21)

Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya treat this *sūtra* and the next two, as one *Adhikaraṇa,* while Madhvācārya treats the next two *sūtras* as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. All the commentators agree on the purport of this *sūtra* that the Supreme Being is the author of all names and forms in the world. But they differ in their explanations of the *sūtra*.

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows. Having told the creation of the three elements fire (*teja*), water (*ap*) and earth (*annaṁ* i.e. food in the form of earth) in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (6-2), it is further said that[1] "That deity willed -'well, let me, entering into these three deities through this living self (*Jīvātman*), differentiate name and form. Of these, let me make each one tripartite'---". Now, a doubt arises here, whether the creator of these names and forms is *Jīvātman* or *Paramātman*. The *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that this evolution of names and forms is by *Jīvātman* only, because the *Śruti* makes a special reference to *Jīvātman* by saying 'entering by means of this living self (*anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya*)'.

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1 सत्प्रक्रियायां (Chānd. Up. 6-2) तेजोबन्नानां सृष्टिम् अभिधाय उपदिश्यते - "सेयं देवता ऐक्षत हन्त अहम् इमाः तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति। तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतम् एकैकां करवाणीति" (Chānd. Up. 6-3-2 and 3) तत्र संशयः - किं जीवकर्तृकम् इदं नामरूपव्याकरणम् आहोस्वित् परमेश्वरकर्तृकम् इति। तत्र प्राप्तं तावत् - जीवकर्तृकमेव इदं नामरूपव्याकरणम् इति कुतः? 'अनेन जीवेन आत्मना' इति विशेषणात्। (S. BSB. 2-4-20).

The *sūtra* clarifies the doubt. The evolution of names (*saṁjñākḷpti*) and forms (*mūrtikḷpti*) is indeed the work of the Supreme Lord who is the creator of fire, water and earth; whence? because the *Śruti* says so. Commencing the *mantra* (Chānd. Up. 6-3-2) with 'That Divinity (willed)' and using the verb 'let Me evolve (*vyākaravāṇi*)' in the first person, the *Śruti* attributes the evolution to that Supreme Lord only. The wording 'by means of this living self (*jīvena ātmanā*)' goes with 'having entered (*anupraviśya*)' on account of its nearness, not with 'let Me evolve'[1].

In *Vivartavāda*, advocated by Śaṅkarācārya, the concepts of *Brahman, Īśvara, Jagat* and *Jīva* are as follows.

(i) The ultimate reality, *Brahman,* is pure intelligence (i.e. consciousness), *cinmātra,* devoid of all forms, devoid of qualities[2]. Apart from consciousness or Self, the world of objects is non-existent[3]. The world is a phenomenal appearance of Brahman[4].

(ii) *Brahman* associated with the principle of *Māyā* or creative power, is *Īśvara,* who is engaged in creating and maintaining the world[5]. *Māyā* is not a real entity. It is only wrong knowledge *avidyā,* that makes the appearance[6]. *Māyā* is the principle of cosmic illusion[7].

(iii) *Jagat,* the world (of names and forms) is like a dream or an illusory cognition. It exists, as it is perceived. It has no other independent existence except the fact of its perception. It has

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1 येयं संज्ञाक्लृप्तिः मूर्तिक्लृप्तिश्च ----- सा खलु परमेश्वरस्यैव तेजोबन्नानां निर्मातुः कृतिः भवितुमर्हति; कुतः? उपदेशात्। 'सेयं देवता' इत्युपक्रम्य 'व्याकरवाणि' इति उत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण परस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्याकर्तृत्वम् इह उपदिश्यते। -----'जीवेन' इत्येतत् 'अनुप्रविश्य' इत्यनेन संबध्यते। आनन्तर्यात् न 'व्याकरवाणि' इत्यनेन। (S. BSB. 2-4-20).

2 SRK. p. 31.

3 SRK. p. 32.

4 OIC. p. 339.

5 SRK. p. 30.

6 SRK. p. 34.

7 OIC. p. 365.

Brahman for its basis. The concrete appearances are impositions on this unchanging reality[1].

(iv) The unmodified *Brahman* only appears as *Jīva* on account of *Brahman's* contact with limiting adjuncts, *buddhi* etc.[2] And as long as the *ātman* is connected with *buddhi*, it has *Jīva*-hood and has mundane existence. In fact, apart from this combination of *ātman* and *buddhi* conceived of, there is no such entity as Jīva[3]. The *Jīva* should be understood as a mere reflection of the Supreme Being like the reflection of the sun in the water[4].

Thus, in the above doctrine *Īśvara* and *Jīva* are qualified entities and therefore they too come within the ambit of names and forms. Now, in the interpretation of the present *sūtra*, if we take the words *Jīva* and *Īśvara* as referring to qualified entities having a name and a form, then they cannot be the author of their own names and forms; therefore, the evolution of their names and forms will have to be ascribed to a third entity, which could as well be the author of the other names and forms in the world; on the other hand, if the words *Jīva* and *Īśvara* are held as referring to pure consciousness (*cinmātra*) then by hypothesis they would be devoid of activities; so the *Pūrvapakṣa* that *Jīvātman* is the author of names and forms and the *Siddhānta* that *Īśvara* is the author, are both not tenable. Further, *Jīva* being a reflection of *Brahman*, the pure consciousness, in the limiting adjuncts (and apart from this there being no such entity as *Jīva*), entering of the body-mind-complex made of fire, water and earth, in the form of *Jīva* is also not tenable[5]. B. N. K. Sharma observes that, "it

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1 SRK. p. 34.

2 परमेव ब्रह्म अविकृतम् उपाधिसंपर्कात् जीवभावेन अवतिष्ठते। (S. BSB. 2-3-18).

3 यावदेव च अयं बुद्ध्युपाधिसंवन्धः तावदेव अस्य (आत्मनः) जीवत्वं संसारित्वं च। परमार्थतः तु न जीवो नाम बुद्ध्युपाधिपरिकल्पितस्वरूपव्यतिरेकेण अस्ति। (S. BSB. 2-3-30).

4 आभास एव च एष जीवः परस्यात्मनो जलसूर्यकादिवत् प्रतिपत्तव्यः। (S. BSB. 2-3-50).

5 जीवेश्वरशब्देन नामरूपवद्विशिष्टविवक्षायां तस्य स्वनामरूपकर्तृत्वाभावात् चिन्मात्रविवक्षायां च तस्य अकर्तृत्वात् जीवकर्तृत्वपूर्वपक्षस्य ईश्वरकर्तृत्वसिद्धान्तस्य च अयोगात्। जीवभावस्य प्रतिबिम्बनरूपप्रवेशाधीनत्वेन जीवरूपेण प्रवेशोक्त्ययोगात् च। (TC. III. p. 159).

would be putting the cart before the horse to speak of *cinmātra* entering *Tejobanna* in the guise of *'Jīvātman'* (*anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya*) in order to develop name and form''[1].

Rāmānujācārya takes the same *mantras*, Chānd. Up. 6-3-2 and 3, as the *Viṣayavākyas* and interprets the *sūtra*. He considers the doubt whether the *Hiraṇyagarbha* (the four-faced Brahmā) or the highest Self, having the *Hiraṇyagarbha* for its body, is the author of the world of names and forms. According to Rāmānujācārya, ''the *sūtra* states that this activity belongs to the highest Self, having *Hiraṇyagarbha* for its body, and not to *Hiraṇyagarbha* only, for texts teach that names and forms were evolved by the same agent that produces the tripartite combination (of fire, water and earth)''[2]. It is true that *Jīva* is a very general term and *Hiraṇyagarbha* is also held as a *Jīva*, but the interpretation of the term *Jīva* in the *mantra*[3] specifically as *Hiraṇyagarbha*, appears farfetched. Hence, the interpretation is not found convincing. If the commentator wanted to refer to *Hiraṇyagarbha*, he could have chosen another suitable text, which made a mention of it.

Madhvācārya refers to the apparent conflict of texts as follows. One text states that ''*viriñca* indeed evolves this world and appoints it in different ways; the four-faced Brahmā (*Hiraṇyagarbha*) indeed is *Viriñca;* from him originate these name and form''[4]. On the other hand, another text avers: ''Then why is He called the Supreme? Verily from the Supreme Being these name and form issue forth; therefore they call Him the Supreme. Then why is He called *Brahman*? For, He is great and He is vast''[5]. Thus there

1 BNK. II. p. 357.
2 Śrībhāṣya-SV. 2-4-17.
3 जीवशब्दमात्रेण हिरण्यगर्भाप्राप्तेः। (TC. III. p. 160).
4 'विरिञ्चो वा इदं सर्वम् विरेचयति विदधाति ब्रह्मा वाव विरिञ्च एतस्माद्धीमे रूपनामनी' इति गौपवनश्रुतिः। (M. BSB.- SSR. 2-4-21).
5 'अथ कस्मादुच्यते परम इति परमाद्ध्येते नामरूपे व्याक्रियेते तस्मादेनमाहुः परम इति। अथ कस्मादुच्यते ब्रह्मेति वृहत्त्वाद् बृंहणाच्च।' इति आग्निवेश्यश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. - SSR. 2-4-21).

is a doubt whether, the author of the world of names and forms is *Viriñca* or the Supreme Being. The *sūtra* resolves :

संज्ञामूर्त्योः नामरूपयोः प्रपञ्चस्य क्लृप्तिः सृष्टिः त्रिवृत्कुर्वतः तु त्रयाणां तेजोबन्नानां मिश्रणं कुर्वतः ब्रह्मणः एव न विरिञ्च्यात्; कुतः? उपदेशात्; "सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य नामानि कृत्वा" इति श्रुतेः।

The fashioning of the world of names and forms proceeds from the One who is the author of the tripartite mixture of the elements fire, water and earth, i.e. from *Brahman* only and not from the four-faced Brahmā, on account of the scriptural teaching to that effect, as seen, for example, in the *mantra* '*sarvāṇi rūpāṇi vicitya nāmāni kṛtvā*''[1].

Therefore, the statements in some scriptures, which refer to the *Hiraṇyagarbha* as the author of names and forms, are to be taken in a metaphorical sense i.e. they describe *Hiraṇyagarbha* as the intermediate author acting on the authority delegated to him by the Supreme Being. Madhvācārya quotes some verses from *Padmapurāṇa* and *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa,* which exactly corroborate this interpretation of the *sūtra*. He further tells that the term '*trivṛtkurvat*' is a hetugarbha-viśeṣaṇa.

13 मांसाधिकरणम्।

This *Adhikaraṇa* discusses the physical composition of the bodies of living beings.

॥ ॐ मांसादि भौमं यथाशब्दमितरयोश्च ॐ ॥ (2-4-22)

Śaṅkarācārya interprets the *sūtra* as follows[2]. When earth subjected to the process of tripartition is assimilated by a person,

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1 "सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरः। नामानि कृत्वाऽभिवदन् यदास्ते।" (T. Ā. 3-12) इति श्रुतेः। The Wise One (Supreme Being), having created all forms and names to denote them, remains expressing them (M. BSB. 2-4-21).

2 भूमेस्त्रिवृत्कृतायाः पुरुषेण उपभुज्यमानायाः मांसादिकार्यं यथाशब्दं निष्पद्यते। तथा हि श्रुतिः। "अन्नमसितं त्रेधा विधीयते तस्य यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तत्पुरीषं भवति यो मध्यमस्तन्मांसं योऽणिष्ठस्तन्मनः"(Chānd. Up. 6-5-1) इति। एवम् इतरयोः अप्तेजसोः यथाशब्दं कार्यं अवगन्तव्यम् - मूत्रं लोहितं प्राणश्च अपां कार्यम् । अस्थि मज्जा वाक् तेजसः - इति। (S. BSB. 2-4-21).

i.e. when a person eats food, from that are produced flesh etc. as told in the *Śruti*. That specific *Śruti mantra* (Chānd. Up. 6-5-1) states that "food when eaten becomes divided into three parts; the grossest ingredient is excreta, the middling ingredient becomes flesh, and the subtlest ingredient becomes mind". Similarly, the effects of the other two elements, water and fire, are to be understood according to the scriptures. Water produces urine, blood and vital breath. Fire produces bone, marrow and speech.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that[1], if all the elements and their products are tripartite, i.e. they contain the three elements, then why do we have special names such as 'this is earth', 'this is water', 'this is fire' etc.? The answer is given by the next *sūtra*.

वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ।

Vaiśeṣyaṁ means abundance or preponderance. Though everything is a product of the three elements subjected to tripartition, yet in some cases we find the predominance of some particular element. For example, in fire the fire-element is predominant, in water the water-element is abundant and in earth the food-element is preponderant. Therefore, though all the substances are tripartite, the gross elements and their products are distinguished as 'this is *Taijasa*', 'this is *Āpya*' and 'this is *Pārthiva*' on account of the preponderance of that particular element in the composition of the substance under consideration. There is nothing improper in that[2].

Vyāsatīrtha observes that, since all the substances are the products of the three elements, through the process of tripartition, even without any *sūtra*, the items flesh etc. can be taken as

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1 अत्राह यदि सर्वमेव त्रिवृत्कृतं भूतभौतिकम् ।----- किंकृतः तर्हि अयं विशेषव्यपदेशः - इदं तेजः इमा आपः इदमन्नम् इति? (S. BSB. 2-4-21).

2 विशेषस्य भावो वैशेष्यम्। भूयस्त्वम् इति यावत्। सत्यपि त्रिवृत्करणे क्वचित् कस्यचित् भूतधातोः भूयस्त्वम् उपलभ्यते -अग्नेः तेजोभूयस्त्वम्, उदकस्य अब्भूयस्त्वम्, पृथिव्याः अन्नभूयस्त्वम् इति। तस्मात् सत्यपि त्रिवृत्करणे वैशेष्यादेव तेजोबन्नविशेषवादो भूतभौतिकविषये उपपद्यते। (S. BSB. 2-4-22).

products of the three elements after tripartition, and since the doubt as to how they can be classified as made of food, water or fire, is possible to be resolved on the basis of preponderance of the particular element (as stated by this *sūtra*), the earlier *sūtra* '*maṁsādi bhaumaṁ---*' becomes superfluous[1]. Therefore, this interpretation does not appear to be befitting.

While interpreting the *sūtra* '*māṁsādi bhaumaṁ---*' Rāmānujācārya also quotes the same *mantra*, Chānd. Up. 6-5-1, which says that "food when eaten becomes divided into three parts" etc. He continues the discussion from the preceding *sūtra*, whether the highest Self is the agent of evolution of names and forms and the tripartite creation, or the *Hiraṇyagarbha* is the agent. According to him the present *sūtra* says that "the tripartite process referred to in Chānd. Up. 6-5-1 is only a description of the evolutionary process of food, drink etc. taken by beings and not the true tripartite process described in the earlier *Chāndogya* text"[2]. He concludes that "what the *Chāndogya* text 'Let me----differentiate name and form---of these let me make each one threefold' means is that the highest Self willed to evolve name and form, and for this purpose, He created as a first step the gross elements from the fine ones by the tripartite process, and then evolved name and form with these gross elements. So the highest Self alone, having *Hiraṇyagarbha* as its body, is the evolver of name and form"[3]. The last *sūtra* is interpreted by Rāmānujācārya in exactly the same way as done by Śaṅkarācārya, as follows. "Though each gross element is a compound of the three rudimentary elements, yet due to the preponderance of one of these three fine elements in the gross element, it is called after that element as earth, water or fire"[4].

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1 मांसादेः त्रिवृत्कृतभूतकार्यत्वात् सूत्रेण विनापि भूतानां भौतेन त्रिवृत्कृतत्वमात्रेण मांसादेरपि तेन त्रिवृत्कृतभूतकार्यत्वेन अव्यवस्थाशंकायाः भूयस्त्वेन व्यवस्था इति समाधेश्च संभवेन मांसादिसूत्रस्य निष्फलत्वात्। (TC. III. p. 160).

2 Śrībhāṣya- SV. 2-4-18.

3 Śrībhāṣya-SV. 2-4-18.

4 Śrībhāṣya-SV. 2-4-19.

It is already remarked in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* that "the interpretation of the term *Jīva* in the *mantra* specifically as *Hiraṇyagarbha*, appears farfetched. Hence, the interpretation is not found convincing". The same applies Here too[1].

Madhvācārya takes an all-together different view. He points out to the divergent and apparently conflicting texts regarding the composition of the physical bodies of living beings. The *Kauṇḍinyaśruti*[2] declares the body to be a product of water. "From water indeed this is produced; water is truly flesh as well as bone, water is the body, water is verily all this (body)". But, the Bṛha. Up. 3-2-13 says that when a man dies his "body merges with earth, the *Ātman* with the sky (*Brahman*)"[3]. Similarly there is a text[4] which holds body as made up of *Tejas*. It says "The sacrificer becoming golden bodied through *Agni*, the nourisher of the gods, on account of the offerings made by him, ascends to the heavenly worlds"[5]. Further, Chānd. Up. 6-4-7 states[6], "know from me how, on reaching man, each of these three deities becomes three-fold". Therefore, there arises a doubt whether the physical body under consideration is composed of water, or food (earth), or fire or all the three[7]. The *sūtra* clarifies :

मांसाद्येव देहस्थं कठिनं वस्तु भौमं पार्थिवं, न सर्वशरीरं, किंतु इतरयोः अप्तेजसोः च कार्यं यथाशब्दं "यत्कठिनम् सा पृथिवी यद् द्रवं तदापो यदुष्णं तत्तेज"[8] इति श्रुत्यनुसारेण अङ्गीकार्यम्।[9]

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1 जीवशब्दमात्रेण हिरण्यगर्भांप्राप्तेरिति परोक्तं पूर्वमेव दूषितम्। (TC. II. p. 160).

2 'अद्भ्यो हीदमुत्पद्यते आपो वाव मांसमस्थि च भवत्यापः शरीरमाप एवेदं सर्वम्' इति कौण्डिन्यश्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-4-22).

3 'पृथिवी शरीरमाकाशमात्मा' इति च श्रुतिः। (M. BSB. 2-4-22).

4 तैजसत्वेऽपि श्रुतिः 'सोऽग्नेर्देवयोन्या आहुतिभ्यः सम्भूय हिरण्यशरीर ऊर्ध्वं स्वर्गलोकमेति' इति। (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7-8) (TP. 2-4-22).

5 BNK. II. p. 360.

6 इमास्तिस्रो देवताः पुरुषं प्राप्य त्रिवृत्त्रिवृदेकैका भवति तन्मे विजानीहीति। (Chānd. Up. 6-4-7).

7 प्रकृतो देह एवात्र विषयः। किमाप्यः किं वा पार्थिव उत तैजसो भूतत्रयात्मको वेति सन्देहः। (TP. 2-4-22).

8 गर्भोपनिषद्-४

9 VKM 2-4-22.

Flesh etc. i.e. the hard part of the body alone is to be taken as composed of earth and not the whole body; the effect of the other two i.e. water and fire is to be accepted as that which is according to the *Śruti* text such as 'that which is hard is earth, that which is liquid is water, that which is warm is fire'.

Therefore, the purport of the text Chānd. Up. 6.4.7, that the body is composed of all the three elements is tenable.

If this is so, then how do the texts like the *Kauṇḍinyaśruti* etc. say that flesh is exclusively composed of water etc.? The next sūtra answers.

॥ ॐ वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ॐ ॥ (2-4-23)

भूम्यादिभूतसंयोगवैशेष्यात् तद्वादः भौमत्वादिविशेषवादः।

On account of the preponderance of a particular element like earth etc. in a combination, that product (such as flesh,) is spoken of as exclusively composed of that particular element, earth etc.

The last word in the *sūtra* is said twice as '*tadvādaḥ tadvādaḥ*' in accordance with the practice in Vedic literature, to indicate the end of the *Adhyāya*, and to emphasize and ratify all that has been said earlier. It is believed that such repetition at the end, renders the work fruitful and brings all the fruits promised by the *Vedāntaśāstra*[1].

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1 संपूर्णफलता शास्त्रस्योक्ता भवतीति शेषः। TP. 2-4-23.

Chapter XII
Conclusions and findings

Brahmasūtra or *Vedāntasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa contains authoritative judgements on what exactly is the essence of Vedas. The work is intended to reconcile the conflicting thoughts and opinions about Vedic teachings. It is universally recognized as the manual of *Vedānta*. The world consists of three factors, *Jīva, Jagat* and *Īśvara*. The first is self-evident and the second is perceptible. The problem is about comprehending the *Īśvara*, the Supreme Being, and His relation with the first two. The topic of this study viz. '*Brahman*, the Supreme Being, in *Brahmasūtras*' is covered by the first two *Adhyāyas*. The study of the *sūtras* in these two *Adhyāyas*, reveals as follows.

Adhyāya I

Pāda 1

In order to get rid of the worldly sufferings, and to accomplish eternal bliss, one should enquire into the nature of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is the author of this world. He creates, governs and destroys this world. He is knowable only through *śāstras* (scriptures) and the purpose of *śāstras* is only to expound *Brahman*. The *śāstras* are to be critically examined for knowing *Brahman*. *Śāstras* are full of words only and *Brahman* is not inexpressible in words. The *Śruti* statements which declare that *Brahman* is beyond words, only indicate that all the available words are insufficient to fully describe the extent of the limitless characteristics of *Brahman*.

In the rest of the first *Adhyāya*, the Sūtrakāra illustrates how all the words and phrases in scriptures convey *Brahman* and describe His nature and his in-numerable attributes. *Brahman*, the Supreme Being, is *Annamaya* (the source of sustenance), *Prāṇamaya* (the source of energy), *Manomaya* (abundant spiritual

thought essence[1]), *Vijñānamaya* (knowledge personified) and *Ānandamaya* (happiness personified). The names of deities like Indra, Varuṇa etc. primarily convey Him because He is the inner controller of and the power behind all these deities; but He is distinct from them. Similarly, the names of elements like *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. convey Him because these elements owe their characteristics to Him. The names of bodily organs and functions convey Him since they owe their capabilities to Him. All the terms popularly denoting luminous objects like fire, sun etc. and even the words like *Gāyatrī* which is ordinarily understood to denote a metre, connote Him, in their ultra-primary sense. The purpose of describing *Brahman* in three different forms viz. (i) the omnipresent, (ii) the indwelling ruler and (iii) as a personal God present outside, is to suit the devotees of different capabilities. The knowledgeable ones can meditate on all - pervasive *Brahman*, the Yogis can meditate on *Brahman* in their own self and the laity can meditate on *Brahman* in idols outside.

Pāda 2

All the words and phrases expressing omnipresence, refer to *Brahman*. On account of His omnipresence, though the Supreme Being dwells in the heart-cavity of a body along with the *Jīva*, the Lord is not subject to the undesirable experience of pleasure and pain. The characteristic of devouring the entire moveable and immoveable world is attributable to *Brahman* only. The Lord co-existing with the *Jīva* in a body, does enjoy the fruits of good deeds performed by the *Jīva* and offered to Him, but He is not liable to the experience of undesirable and inauspicious fruits of actions, done by the *Jīva*. The indwelling ruler in the eye of a being, and that in the sun is that *Brahman* only. The indwelling controlling spirit in all the beings is the *Brahman* only. *Brahman* is invisible, incomprehensible (fully), unoriginated, indescribable

(fully), imperishable and has no physical organs. The same body of Vedic literature, *Ṛgveda* and others, is looked upon as higher knowledge (*parā vidyā*) if it is used in the quest of *Brahman*, and as lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*) otherwise. The term *Akṣara* primarily denotes *Brahman*, but the term is found used in scriptures to denote *Prakṛti* as well. Therefore, it is to be understood with reference to context. The term *Vaiśvānara* which commonly denotes fire and has the characteristics like 'being the digester', 'being the purifier', 'being the locus of oblations', 'indwellingness' etc., primarily connotes *Brahman* because all these attributes are the characteristic marks of *Brahman*.

If all the scriptural words commonly applied to other things, are to be understood as primarily conveying *Brahman*, then one may doubt whether all these words would become synonyms and the ordinary linguistic communication would be impossible; further, whether in the context of Vedic rituals, *Indrasūkta, Agnisūkta, Varuṇasūkta* etc. would all be *Brahmasūktas* only. No such difficulty is expected because eventhough the scriptural words primarily convey *Brahman*, they do not lose their ability to convey their respective referents according to the common language and lexicon. The knowledgeable people, knowing well that all the scriptural words primarily denote *Brahman* only, choose the proper words for worldly communication according to the sense assigned to them by language and ignore the other words. The ignorant ones use the words in the sense ascribed to them by traditional practice.

Pāda 3

The Supreme Being is the abode of the heaven, the earth and the rest. He is not only omnipresent but is abundance personified and has all transending glory. He pervades the space occupied by the earth, the heaven, between the two and beyond the two. He sustains the entire cosmos. He is eternally existent and He existed

before this creation. Such an all-pervasive and all-transcending Lord dwells in the heart-cavity of all beings and yet is free from sin, oldage, death, sorrow, hunger, thirst and so on. All the activities in the world are subject to the will and compliance of this Supreme Being. Knowing the Lord who is present in the middle of one's own body, everyone can overcome fear in life. The Supreme Being, Who is all-knowing and Who dwells in the organs and the heart of every being, is the Self-effulgent leading light and accompanies the *Jīva* during both the states of waking and sleeping. The term *Brāhmaṇa* primarily connotes *Brahman* only, because that Person is described by the epithets like the lord of all, the controller of all, the ruler of all etc., which characteristics can be ascribed to *Brahman* only.

Pāda 4

There are some words and phrases in scriptures, used solely to denote entities other than *Brahman*. It is difficult to interpret such words and to show them as conveying *Brahman*, by ordinary methods of interpretation. For example, the term '*avyakta*' popularly denotes the unmanifest *Prakṛti*. But *Prakṛti*, though unmanifest, always exists (i.e. it exists even before creation), in some form with its three qualities *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, controlled by the indwelling *Brahman*. Therefore, the term *avyakta* primarily refers to *Brahman* abiding in *Prakṛti* and secondarily to *Prakṛti*. Similarly, the terms like *Jīva, Duḥkhin, Baddha, Avara* etc. primarily convey the *Brahman* abiding in them and having an overall control over the functioning of the properties denoted by these terms. An epithet can be applied to a person if he either possesses the properties denoted by the epithet or has an overall control over the functioning of those properties. For example, a king is said to have won the war evenif he has not actually fought in any battle. A doubt arises that in *Brāhmaṇa* texts, which include names of sacrifices and their necessary accessories, if all the words are taken as connoting *Brahman*, the sentences would

carry no sense. The *Sūtrakāra* clarifies that evenif all the words primarily connote Brahman it would not interfere with the understanding of these texts as per conventional etymology, grammar, usage etc. Further, eventhough the Supreme Being is one, He can be expressed by words in plural, because He can manifest in different forms. Similarly, though the Lord is the support (*ādhāra*) for all, He can be expressed by words signifying things contained (*ādheya*) in *Brahman*, because *Brahman* as the container is distinct from the forms of *Brahman* described as contained in the former. The maxim that the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained may be applicable to ordinary things, but *Brahman* is an exception and beyond common logic.

In the cosmic evolution, it is told that *Ākāśa* originates from *Brahman*, *Vāyu* from *Ākāśa*, *Agni* from *Vāyu* and so on. It is also told that the terms *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. all denote *Brahman* primarily. It amounts to saying that *Brahman* originates from *Brahman*, which is absurd. The *Sūtrakāra* explains that in the creation of *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. in a succession, *Paramātman* is the initial cause for the creation of *Ākāśa*, and after origniating *Ākāśa* He enters it as its indwelling controller and at every step from *Ākāśa* onwards, He enters the thing created as its indwelling controller, and becomes the intermediate and proximate cause for the next entity in the chain. So there should be no objection if *Brahman* is viewed both as the cause and the effect. Therefore, the terms like *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* can convey *Brahman* despite 'their being in a cause and effect relationship.

The words get their denotative power (*abhidhāśakti*) through usage (*rūḍhi*) and etymology (*yoga*). Scriptural words primarily denoting *Brahman*. when diverted for use in worldly transactions acquire the sanction of usage and etymology. But they are not homonyms. Two levels of primary denotation are understood. Words refer to worldly things in their primary sense (*mukhyavṛtti*)

based on usage (*rūḍhi*) and etymology (*yoga*). The same words denote *Brahman* in their highest primary sense (*paramamukhyavṛtti*) based on *mahāyogavṛtti* and *vidvadrūḍhi*.

The feminine words like *Prakṛti*, *Strī*, *Yoni* etc. also connote *Brahman* only. Even the words like *Śūnya* (void), *asat* (non-existent), *abhāva* (non-existence), *tuccha* (worthless) etc. which do not have a positive referent and have a sense of total negation, are applied to *Brahman*, not in the sense in which they are ordinarily understood, but in their esoteric etymological senses.

Thus, *Brahman* can be known only through scriptures, by critically interpreting them and by knowing that all the words therein convey the innumerable attributes of *Brahman* only, in their highest primary sense.

Adhyāya II

In the preceding first *Adhyāya*, the *Sūtrakāra* has shown how the scriptures convey the Supreme Being and disclose Him as the author of creation, governance and destruction of the sentient and insentient world. In this second *Adhyāya*, he confirms the conclusion reached in the first one, by refuting and clearing all possible objections and contradictions against his doctrine, from other orthodox or heretical doctrines as well as from some apparent conflicts in the *Śruti* texts themselves.

Pāda 1

Smṛti is a scriptural text composed by a historically known credible author. But some *Smṛtis* accept *Brahman* as the author of this world while some others do not. Those *Smṛtis*, which do not accept the authorship of *Brahman* are to be rejected. The *Śrutis*, and the *Smṛtis* faithful to them, are to be held valid evenif certain benefits promised by them are not always realizable. *Śrutis* cannot be held invalid on account of some apparent irrational

statements in them. *Śrutis* are held eternal, superhuman and as having intrinsic validity.

Non-existence (*asat*) cannot be the cause of the world. The *Śruti* statements telling that the world sprang from non-existence, only mean that the world has a beginning. Similarly, the other theories holding *Jīva*, *Pradhāna*, *Śūnya*, *Kāla*, *Svabhāva* etc. as the cause of creation, which are not countenanced by and are opposed to *Vedas*, stand refuted. Inferences would be acceptable only if they have supporting evidences of perception or *āgama*, but not universally. Evenif the *Śruti* talks of *Jīva* attaining *Brahmanhood* and becoming one with *Brahman* in the released state, it does not mean that there is no distinction between *Jīva* and *Brahman* because the oneness talked of is the oneness of co-existence, as seen in ordinary experience when water is mixed with water. *Brahman* is the one and the only independent cause of creation. There is no other independent accessory required by *Brahman* for creation. The Supreme Being sportingly creates the world using other accessories under His control. He can create a world out of nothing. B. N. K. Sharma remarks that "He could bring into existence a universe not unlike the one with which we are now familiar, without the aid of a pre-existent matter or souls. But the *fact remains* that He has *not*, in His infinite wisdom, *chosen to do so*. And our philosophy has necessarily to take note of this and respect it. Similarly, He does not choose to destroy the eternal existence of matter and souls and other entities, even though they are all dependent on Him"[1]. Though *Jīvas* have some freedom of action to complete the task undertaken, his agency (*kartṛtva*) is dependent on and derived from *Brahman*, and therefore *Jīva* cannot be credited with the status of the independent creator of the world. According to *Śruti*, the Supreme Being can possess strange and mutually exclusive attributes and powers in all matters and at all times, which can defy common logic. The Supreme

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1 PHM. p. 4.

Being creates the world without any motive of gaining anything for Himself. The creation is a sporting act (*līlākaivalyaṁ*) of *Brahman*. It is not an act for the sake of pleasure but that, which flows from pleasure. The Lord cannot be blamed for the disparity and cruelty in the world. The Supreme Being favours everyone not equally but equitably. The inequalities in the world are due to the basic diversity of natures (*svabhāva*) and capabilities of *Jīvas*. The beauty of nature (*sṛṣṭi*) lies in its diversity. Thus, there is nothing illogical in conceiving *Brahman* as the abode of all auspicious attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, bliss etc. and devoid of any blemishes like grief, enmity etc., since the same has been expressly stated and demonstrated in the *Śruti*.

Pāda 2

The tenets about creation advanced by various rival doctrines and schools namely, the *Nirīśvarasāṅkhya*, *Seśvarasāṅkhya*, *Cārvāka*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, various shades of Buddhism like *Vaibhāṣika*, *Sautrāntika*, *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra*, the *Jainism*, the *Pāśupata* and *Śākta* schools are to be discarded.

Pāda 3

Creation is of two types. Conventionally creation signifies the origination of a thing, which did not exist earlier (*abhūtvābhavana*). A thing is what its characteristics are. Therefore, if an existing thing or person is empowered to have a new characteristic, then a thing or person of that new characteristic can be said to have been created (*parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*). The term *Ākāśa* conveys empty space (*avyākṛtākāśa*) and the element ether (*bhūtākāśa*), which is an exceedingly fine matter filling the empty space. The term also stands for the controlling deities of these entities. All these four referents of the term *Ākāśa* are created. The element ether is created in the sense of *abhūtvābhavana*, and the other three which are eternal by nature, are also considered as created in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*. The characteristic of empty space is

its ability to accommodate corporeal things in it. The concept of empowering the empty space to hold things, is creating corporeal things and thereby enabling empty space to hold them. Air is created in the sense of *abhūtvābhavana* and its controlling deity *Mukhyaprāṇa*, an eternal *Jīva*, is created in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeśāpti*. One should not doubt that *Brahman* also may have been created likewise. The *Brahman* is absolutely unoriginated. The Supreme Being is the primary cause of creation of fire (*Agni*), water (*Ap*) and earth (*Pṛthivī*). He only is the destroyer of the created world. The order of dissolution of these created elements is in the reverse of the order of evolution. There is no exception to this general rule. But the Supreme Being Himself is not subject to retraction and extinction.

Jīva, the knower in a body originates from the Supreme Being only. But *Jīva* is intrinsically eternal and it is considered as originated in the sense of *parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* whenever he acquires a body. *Jīva* is of atomic size and abides in the heart of the body he occupies and functions throughout that body. Though *Jīva* is an indivisible unit of atomic size, in some rare cases of highly placed *yogins*, the *Jīva* can function through many bodies simultaneously as though *Jīva* splits into many parts. There are a number of scriptural texts, which declare that the *Jīvātman* is different from the *Paramātman*. There are also a number of texts, which advocate that *Jīvātman* is non-different from *Paramātman*. Therefore, the Indian philosophers have been debating inconclusively from antiquity, whether *Jīvātman* is different or non-different from *Paramātman*. However, Bādarāyaṇavyāsa gives his verdict here that the *Jīvātman* is different from *Paramātman*. He further explains that the texts, which appear to indicate the non-difference between the two, are to be understood as telling that *Jīva* has for his essence of being such attributes as intelligence and bliss, resembling those of *Paramātman*. *Jīva* with his essential discriminative attributes is eternal. Though intelligence and bliss are the intrinsic attributes of *Jīva*, they remain latent during the

state of *saṁsāra* and become manifest after liberation. *Jīva* has some freedom of action. But the accomplishment of the task that he undertakes depends on some factors beyond his control as well. Nevertheless, *Jīva* has a contribution in the accomplishment or otherwise of a task and he has to own up credit or discredit for that. Further, *Jīva* is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*. Since *Brahman* is partless, *Jīva* cannot be a physical part of *Brahman* as the spark is of fire. *Jīva* is said to be an *aṁśa* of *Brahman* since *Jīva*, though being inferior to *Brahman*, has a few attributes resembling those of *Brahman*. *Paramātman's* incarnations in the world are also called as His *aṁśas*, but they differ from *Jīvas*. An incarnation can exercise all the powers of *Paramātman*. Just as the *Jīva* is called an *aṁśa* of *Brahman* on account of his having a few attributes resembling those of *Brahman*, *Jīva* is also understood as the Lord's reflected image, *pratibimba*, for the same reason. Though *Jīvas* are the *aṁśas* or the reflected images of the same *Brahman*, yet there is disparity in the world, and that is due to the beginningless basic discriminative attributes of *Jīvas*.

Pāda 4

The sense-organs, the mind and the speech of the body-mind complex of living beings, are originated from the Supreme Being. The cognitive sense-organs are minute in essence, but they are able to radiate and pervade beyond their position. The chief vital breath or force i.e. the *Mukhyaprāṇa* is also originated. This *Mukhyaprāṇa* depends on the *Paramātman* as the sense-organs do, but unlike the sense-organs, which are instruments of *Jīva*, functioning at the will and pleasure of *Jīva*, the *Mukhyaprāṇa* is not an instrument of *Jīva*. Since the *Mukhyaprāṇa* is subservient to *Paramātman* and works independent of *Jīva*, the *Mukhyaprāṇa* is credited with intermediate sovereignty. He has five forms with which he performs five functions in a living body viz. *Prāṇa*, *Apāna*, *Vyāna*, *Udāna* and *Samāna*. *Mukhyaprāṇa* is of atomic size in the living bodies and he is pervasive in the form of *Vāyu*

(air) outside the living bodies. The sense-organs are subservient to *Paramātman* only, Who enables the *Jīvas* to use them, but they are figuratively described as the instruments of *Jīva* on account of eternal association between the *Jīva* and the sense-organs. The twelve sense-organs which function at the will and pleasure of the *Jīva*, are only taken as the organs of the *Jīva*; but *Mukhyaprāṇa* who functions independent of the *Jīva*, is not considered as an organ of *Jīva*.

The fashioning of the world of names and forms proceeds from *Brahman* only and not from the *Brahmā* or *Hiraṇyagarbha*; the latter is only an intermediate author acting on the authority delegated to him by the Supreme Being. All the substances are the products of the three elements fire, water and earth, through the process of tripartite combination. Therefore, the physical bodies of living beings are composed of these three elements. Whatever is hard in the body is earth, that which is liquid is water and that which is warm is fire. When a product such as flesh is said to be composed of earth; it does not mean that it has no water or warmth but it only signifies the preponderance of that particular element earth in that product.

Brahmasūtras and Vivartavāda

The *Vivartavāda* or *Kevalādvaita* doctrine advocated by *Śaṅkarācārya* holds *Brahman* as existing in two stages viz. *nirguṇa* (i.e. without qualifications) and *saguṇa* (i.e. with qualifications). The "ultimate reality is pure intelligence, *cin-mātra*, devoid of all forms. Brahman is devoid of qualities"[1]. "*Brahman*, associated with the principle of *māyā* or creative power, is *Īśvara* who is engaged in creating and maintaining the world"[2]. But *Brahmasūtras* do not appear to subscribe to this two-stage theory of *Brahman*. The *Sūtrakāra* defines *Brahman* as the creator,

1 SRK. p. 31.
2 SRK. p. 30.

sustainer and destroyer etc. of the world. The word *māyā* is no where seen used in these two *Adhyāyas*. Then, throughout the first *Adhyāya* he illustrates how all the words in Vedas go to describe some of the innumerable auspicious attributes of *Brahman*. He holds only one *Brahman* and that too a qualified (*saguṇa*) *Brahman*. V. S. Ghate remarks: "The distinction between the higher and the lower *Brahman* not finding any support in the *sūtras*, it naturally follows that the idea of *māyā* in the sense in which *Śaṅkara* understands it cannot have any place in the doctrine of the *Sūtrakāra*"[1].

Another important tenet of *Vivartavāda* is the phenomenal appearance of the world. "The world is like a dream or an illusory cognition. It exists as it is perceived. It has *Brahman* for its basis. The concrete appearances are impositions on this unchanging reality"[2]. But the *Sūtrakāra* does not appear to hold this view. He defines *Brahman* as the creator of the world. Then in the second *Adhyāya* (*Pāda 3*) he tells how *Brahman* creates the elements *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. in a succession and during dissolution how He retracts the created elements in the reverse order. The concept of superimposition is nowhere seen in these *sūtras*. Under these *sūtras*, *Śaṅkarācārya* discusses whether *Ākāśa* was created first or *Tejas* was created first. But if *Ākāśa* etc. are all superimposed on *Brahman* (as advocated by him) then the question of priority or order of creation becomes a non-issue.

The most important tenet of *Vivartavāda* is its concept about the nature of individual soul, *Jīva*. It holds that "the individual self is a phenomenon while the truth is *Brahman*"[3]. *Brahman* only appears as *Jīva* on account of *Brahman*'s contact with the limiting adjuncts. And *Jīva* is all-pervasive. *Jīva* is inactive by nature but becomes active when it is connected with its adjuncts.

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1 VSG. p. 160.
2 SRK. p. 34.
3 SRK. p. 36.

But the *Sūtrakāra* appears to hold different views. He has established in the second *Adhyāya* (*Pāda* 3) as follows. *Jīva* is intrinsically eternal and is considered as originated whenever he acquires a body. *Jīva* is of atomic size and abides in the heart of the body, he occupies, and functions throughout the body. *Jīva* has freedom of action to some extent. *Jīva* is different from *Brahman*. The words like *aikya, abheda, advaita* or any synonyms of them, are nowhere seen used, in the context of *Jīva*.

Thus, I do not find any support for or reference to the *Vivartavāda*, in these *sūtras*. S. N. Dasgupta observes that, "judging by the *sūtras* alone, it does not seem to me that the *Brahma-sūtra* supports the philosophical doctrine of Śaṅkara, and there are some *sūtras* which *Śaṅkara* himself interpreted in a dualistic manner"[1]. V. S. Ghate concludes that "Śaṅkara's doctrine is out of count so far as the *sūtras* are concerned, whatever be its value as a philosophical system, and whatever be its merit as an attempt to draw a system from the *Upaniṣads*"[2]. Further, I find that Śaṅkarācārya only has disagreed with many *sūtras*. Vācaspati Miśra, Śaṅkarācārya's disciple, has defended him by saying that[3] "the *sūtras* have to be overruled and otherwise interpreted if they conflict with the *Śrutis*". Many *sūtras* are treated by Śaṅkarācārya as the *Pūrvapakṣa-sūtras* without any indicatory words like *cet* or *iti cet* in them, and then refuted on the strength of a letter '*tu*' or '*ca*' in a subsequent *sūtra*. Commentators like George Thibaut, V. S. Ghate, S. Radhakrishnan and B. N. K. Sharma have all raised their eyebrows in surprise and thereby euphemistically expressed their disapproval for such a treatment of *sūtras*[4].

The *Sūtrakāra* has refuted the tenets of *Sāṅkhya-darśana* in as many as ten *sūtras* at the outset in the second *Pāda* of the

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1 HIP. II. p. 2

2 VSG. p. 162.

3 BNK. I. p. 98.

4 VSG. p. 88. SRK. p. 408, BNK. II. p. 230.

second *Adhyāya*, along with the refutation of other rival schools. Yet Śaṅkarācārya has interpreted a number of other *sūtras* time and again as refuting the claim of *Sāṅkhya-Pradhāna* to be the author of the world thereby rendering the *sūtras* redundant. V. S. Ghate appears to have been forced to remark that "Śaṅkara's interpretation unnecessarily brings in the *Pradhāna*"[1].

Under some *sūtras* Śaṅkarācārya discusses the concepts of cause and effect, efficient cause and material cause etc., which form a part of *Pariṇāmavāda* and have little relevance in *Vivartavāda*. I find that wherever Śaṅkarācārya has advocated the *Kevalādvaita* doctrine, it is based on *Upaniṣads* and not on *Brahmasūtras*. This reveals that Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa and Śaṅkarācārya evidently hold different views on the purport Vedas.

R. D. Karmarkar remarks[2]: "Śaṅkara firmly believes that the *Brahma-sūtras* could not possibly be preaching a philosophy different from that in the *Upaniṣads*. The *Brahmasūtras* therefore have got to be looked at, only in the light of the exposition in the *Śruti*. That is why Śaṅkara in the case of about a dozen *sūtras*, first gives what may appear to be a natural interpretation and then offers his supplementary remarks. This may appear to be audacious on the part of Śaṅkara, but it was quite necessary---". This shows that *Vivartavāda* relies heavily on *Upaniṣads*. But S. Radhakrishnan's observations about *Upaniṣads* in general, are quite revealing. He says: "It is not easy to decide what the *Upaniṣads* teach. Modern students of the *Upaniṣads* read them in the light of this or that preconceived theory. Men are so little accustomed to trust their own judgement that they take refuge in authority and tradition. Though these are safe enough guides for conduct and life, truth requires insight and judgement as well. A large mass of opinion inclines today to the view of Śaṅkara, who in his commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the

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1 VSG. p. 55.

2 Śrībhāṣya- RDK. I. p. xxxv.

Vedāntasūtras, has elaborated a highly subtle system of non-dualistic metaphysics. Another is equally vehement that Śaṅkara has not said the last word on the subject, and that a philosophy of love and devotion is the logical outcome of the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*. Different commentators starting with particular beliefs, force their views into the *Upaniṣads* and strain their language so as to make it consistent with their own special doctrines. When disputes arise, all schools turn to the *Upaniṣads*. Thanks to the obscurity as well as the richness, the mystic haze as well as the suggestive quality of the *Upaniṣads*, the interpreters have been able to use them in the interests of their own religion and philosophy. The *Upaniṣads* had no set theory of philosophy or dogmatic scheme of theology to propound. They hint at the truth in life, but not as yet in science or philosophy. So numerous are their suggestions of truth, so various are their guesses at God, that almost anybody may seek in them what he wants and find what he seeks, and every school of dogmatics may congratulate itself on finding its own doctrine in the sayings of the *Upaniṣads*. In the history of thought it has often happened that a philosophy has been victimized by a traditional interpretation that became established at an early date, and has thereafter prevented critics and commentators from placing it in its proper perspective''[1]. His remarks about forcing the abstract monism on the *Upaniṣads* are worth noting. He says[2]: ''There is hardly any suggestion in the *Upaniṣads* that the entire universe of change is a baseless fabric of fancy, a mere phenomenal show or a world of shadows. The artistic and poet souls of the *Upaniṣads* lived always in the world of nature and never cared to fly out of it. The *Upaniṣads* do not teach that life is a nightmare and the world is a barren nothing. Rather is it pulsating and throbbing with the rhythm of the world harmony. The world is God's revelation of Himself. His joy assumes all these forms. But there is a popular view which identifies

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1 IPR. I. p. 139, 140.

2 IPR. I. p. 186.

the *Upaniṣad* doctrine with an abstract monism, which reduces the rich life of this world into an empty dream''. However, the scope of this study is to know the purport of Vedas including *Upaniṣads* and other supplementary scriptures, regarding the concept of *Brahman* as expressed in the *Brahma-sūtras*.

Brahmasūtras and *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda*

The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* doctrine advocated by Rāmānujācārya, tries to reconcile various statements in the *Upaniṣads* referring to unity and plurality between the Supreme Being and the sentient and insentient world. Rāmānujācārya holds that the Supreme Being, *Brahman* or Viṣṇu, possesses all the auspicious qualities and is free from all impurities; He is all-knowing, all-pervading, all-powerful, all-merciful, all-blissful and free from all limitations of time, space and causality. The doctrine holds that the individual soul, *Jīva*, is not mere consciousness but the knower, has the power to act and in its pristine purity it possesses some auspicious qualities resembling those of *Brahman* but to a limited extent. *Jīva* is atomic in size and has no power whatsoever on the movements of the world. *Jīvas* are infinite in number. *Jīva* suffers on account of ignorance of *Brahman*. Right knowledge of *Brahman* results in devotion (*bhakti*) towards *Brahman*. *Jīva* can get salvation only through *bhakti*. Even in liberation, *Jīva* does not lose its individuality.

Rāmānujācārya further holds that the inanimate matter (*acit*) and the sentient individual souls (*cit*) are different from *Brahman* and they are considered as forming the body of *Brahman*. *Brahman* who controls this body, is considered as the soul of this body. The inanimate matter and individual souls are considered as attributes or qualities (*viśeṣaṇa*) of *Brahman*, and *Brahman* himself is taken as the qualified (*viśeṣya*) entity. Rāmānujācārya argues that a *viśeṣaṇa* has to be different from the *viśeṣya* and at the same time the *viśeṣaṇa* cannot exist by itself separately. Thus, there is unity or inseparability (*apṛthak-siddhi*) between a substance and

its attributes, but there is no identity between them. The complex whole (*viśiṣṭa*) in which the *Viśeṣya* i.e. *Brahman* and the *Viśeṣaṇas* viz. inanimate matter and the individual souls, are included is spoken of as a unity. This concept is the speciality of Rāmānujācārya's doctrine and the doctrine derives its name '*Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda*' from this concept.

Rāmānujācārya interprets the sūtras in the light of these tenets. But the concept of *Brahman* having the inanimate matter and sentient individual souls as His body, is nowhere indicated in the *sūtras*.

Rāmānujācārya also holds that an attribute is a part (*aṁśa*) of the qualified substance. Similarly he explains the unity or inseparability between *Brahman* and His attributes, matter and souls, as well as the difference between them. However, there is a danger in this hypothesis. The qualifier and the qualified are interchangeable, as for example (i) the blue flower or (ii) the blueness of the flower. Therefore, it may also mean that *Brahman* depends for His existence on matter and souls, and *Brahman* may be an *aṁśa* of *Jīva* or inanimate matter. It restricts the existence of *Brahman* to the realm of matter and souls. This position is not acceptable to *Brahmasūtras*. The *sūtras* hold that the Supreme Being is immanent in the world and that He transcends it as well. The *sūtras* hold only *Jīva* as an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*, but not inanimate matter (as seen here).

In his ontology, Rāmāṇujācārya holds that *Brahman* is both the operative cause and the material cause of the world. *Brahman* has for its body the whole world of sentient and insentient things in both the modes, one evolved as names and forms and the other as unevolved. The manifest world is the effect and the unmanifest state is the cause. Thus, what changes from subtle to gross state is the insentient factor which has no separate existence apart from *Brahman*, and *Brahmacaitanya* does not transform itself into the world. Rāmānujācārya appears to admit here that *Prakṛti* exists

eternally as a dependent material principle and that *Prakṛti* is the material cause of the world, and pure *Brahmacaitanya* is the operative cause.

Rāmānujācārya belongs to a tradition of devotion (*bhakti-mārga*) towards a personal Supreme Being, Viṣṇu. That tradition believes that the Supreme Being is different from and far superior to all the *Jīvas*. According to Rāmānujācārya, salvation is only through *bhakti*. Without *bhakti*, mere knowledge cannot lead us to *mokṣa*. One can develop *bhakti* by performing the prescribed duties and obtaining right knowledge of *Brahman* from the study of the *śāstras* and the *Vedāntasūtras*. He has advocated a doctrine which tries to explain both the types of statements in the *Upaniṣads*, one declaring unity and the other asserting difference between the Supreme Being and the world of matter and souls. He has severely criticized the *Kevalādvaita* doctrine advocated by Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the *sūtras*, and yet has interpreted most of the *sūtras* more or less on the same lines, but in the light of his doctrine. However, I find that his attempt is unconvincing.

Brahmasūtras and the *Dvaitavāda*

Madhvācārya's interpretations of the *Brahmasūtras* appear, by and large, more convincing. He seems to have come out of the influence of the older interpretations and has taken a fresh look at the *sūtras*. What strikes in his interpretations is that he quotes appropriate extracts from a large range of *Śruti*, *Smṛti* and *Purāṇas*. At many places, the extract appears as though it is an interpretation of the *sūtra* itself or the *sūtra* could have been composed on the basis of that particular text. The conclusions of *sūtras* in *Adhyāya* I and II given above, are according to Madhvācārya's interpretations, as elucidated by Rāghavendratīrtha.

A question that naturally arises here is, if this is so, how the modern intelligentsia has failed to take note of it. S. N. Dasgupta answers this question. He says: "Of the controversy between the monists of the Śaṅkara school and the dualists of the Madhva

school, most people are ignorant of the Madhva side of the case, though there are many who may be familiar with the monistic point of view"[1]. Even if some take note of it, they appear to have made a perfunctory reference to it. To add to this predicament, Madhvācārya's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is difficult to understand without the elucidations by later pontiffs.

George Thibaut also indicates the mental blocks in the modern intellectuals. He says: "The Śaṅkara-bhāṣya further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the *Vedānta-sūtras* and ever since Śaṅkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school. --- But to the European- or generally, modern-translator of the *Vedāntasūtras* with Śaṅkara's commentary another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not Śaṅkara's explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the *sūtras*. To the Indian *Paṇḍit* of Śaṅkara's school this question has become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to its being raised, as he looks on Śaṅkara's authority as standing above doubt and dispute"[2]. Thus, for many a modern intellectual, Śāṅkarabhāṣya is the last word on the subject.

Another unsubstantiated belief among the modern scholars is that *Vedānta*, in the sense of the essence of Vedas, is synonymous with the *Upaniṣads*. It is evident from such remarks: "The *Brahmasūtra* is the exposition of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*"[3], "All schools of *Vedānta* claim to be based on *Upaniṣads*"[4], and "Śaṅkara firmly believes that the *Brahmasūtras* could not possibly be preaching a philosophy different from that in the *Upaniṣads*"[5]. As a result, the scholars find fault with

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1 HIP. IV. p. viii.
2 VST. p. xv.
3 SRK. p. 21.
4 OIP. p. 336.
5 Śrībhāṣya- RDK. p. xxxv.

Madhvācārya's interpretations and remark that, for example, 'the scriptural passages he (Madhvācārya) refers to for discussion more often belong to the *Saṁhitās* than to the *Upaniṣads*, a procedure, which can be easily explained by the fact that it is very difficult for him to find in the *Upaniṣads* a support for his own doctrine''[1]. But the word '*antaḥ*' in the compound '*Vedāntaḥ*' can mean both (i) the essence and (ii) the last portion. The *Upaniṣads* are known as *Vedānta* because they are appended to the Vedas at the end, just as the metaphysics of Aristotle owes its name to its being placed after physics[2]. *Upaniṣads* do contain some Vedic truths but *Vedānta* transcends *Upaniṣads*. S. Radhakrishnan's observations on the *Upaniṣads* quoted above[3], show the extent of obscurity in the *Upaniṣads*. Evidently, it is a misunderstanding to assume the *Upaniṣads* as THE VEDĀNTA. Madhvācārya appears to expect the scholars who discuss *Vedānta*, to know Vedas also, and Vedas include *Saṁhitās*. His commentary does not appear to be addressed to novices.

Madhvācārya quotes extracts from *Smṛtis* like the Epics and the *Purāṇas* also. Some modern scholars think that these are after all 'cock and bull stories', and therefore they doubt how far the extracts could be relied upon in a serious discussion on *Vedānta*. But one should know that the *Upaniṣads* consider these as the fifth Veda. Even in the so-called 'cock and bull stories', the story may be about a cock or a bull, but the moral behind the story is a serious truth. The legends in the Epics and *Purāṇas* are meant to drive home the Vedic truths i.e. *Vedānta* to the masses, since the study of Vedas and *Vedānta* do not fall within their scope. *Mahābhārata* considers the study of Epics and *Purāṇas* as a necessary supplement to that of Vedas. It says: ''One should amplify the Veda by *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*; The Veda is afraid of one of little learning (fearing), 'This one would be distorting

1 VSG. p. 156.
2 OIP. p. 51.
3 See p. 565, 566, 567 ante.

me'''[1]. So there is nothing wrong in referring to extracts from Epics and *Purāṇas*. It is to be noted that the *Bhagavadgītā*, so fondly treated as one of the pillars of *Vedānta* (*Prasthānatrayī*) alongside the *Upaniṣads* and *Brahmasūtras*, is a legendary conversation from an Epic only. S. N. Dasgupta observes: "It is highly probable that at least one important school of ideas regarding the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahamsūtra* was preserved in the Purāṇic tradition-----it may be believed that the views of the *Vedānta*, as found in the *Purāṇas* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, present, at least in a general manner, the oldest outlook of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahamsūtras*''[2]. Madhvācārya deserves to be lauded for his ability to refer to such a wide range of scriptures. It is unfair if somebody finds fault with him on the same count.

There is another difficulty with these references to a wide range of scriptures. It is difficult to trace all of them to the original source books, many of them being non-extant. Therefore, some of the modern scholars doubt the bonafides of these quotations. But the point to be noted is that the senior disciples of Madhvācārya like Padmanābhatīrtha, Naraharitīrtha, Trivikramapaṇḍitācārya, and Acyutaprekṣa (the former preceptor of Madhvācārya) etc. were all earlier erudite *Advaitins* who became his disciples only after protracted disputations. All of them cannot be expected to be so naive as to accept a new system or faith based on spurious texts. History records a disputation between Vidyāraṇya alias Mādhavācārya and Akṣobhyatīrtha, a direct disciple of Madhvācārya, in which the former is said to have lost[3]. But Mādhavācārya is not reported to have raised this question of spurious base of Madhvācārya's doctrine. On the contrary, in his

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1 इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत्। बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रतरिष्यति ॥ (Mbh. 1-1-273) (Śrībhāṣya- RDK. p. 109).

2 HIP. III, p. 496.

3 HDSV I. p. 300.

Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, Mādhavācārya gives an honourable place to this doctrine as *Pūrṇaprajñadarśana*. Therefore now, after seven centuries, it is unfair to doubt the bonafides of Madhvācārya's quotations. Moreover, history records that his library of rare collections was ransacked by his doctrinal adversaries and some valuable books were robbed[1].

The doctrine advocated by Madhvācārya is generally dubbed as *dvaita* or dualism. It is not a correct description of the doctrine if that word conveys the recognition of two independent principles in the world. Along with the beginningless *Brahman*, the Supreme Being, Madhvācārya does accept the beginningless existence of *Prakṛti*, innumerable *Jīvas*, their intrinsic nature, their *karmas*, time etc.[2]. Śaṅkarācārya also accepts the beginningless existence of *Prakṛti*, *Jīvas*, *Karma* etc. According to him, "at the end of each of the world periods called *kalpas*, the Lord retracts the whole world; the material world is merged in the non-distinct *Prakṛti* while the individual souls free for the time from actual connection with their *upādhis* or adjuncts, lie in deep sleep, as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they re-enter embodied existence when the Lord sends forth a new world"[3]. But unlike the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *Jaina* doctrines, Madhvācārya's doctrine does not accept their independent existence. They, the *Prakṛti*, *Jīvas* etc. all owe their existence to and are subservient to Him. The Supreme Being is capable of creating the world even without these[4]. But He has not chosen to do so. Thus, Madhvācārya holds the existence of only one independent principle and therefore this doctrine may be called as Monotheism.

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1 GVN. p. 244.

2 द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च। यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया॥
(Bhāg. 2-10-12) (M. BSB. 2-1-37)

3 SRK. p. 36

4 PHM. p. 28.

The Nature and Attributes of *Brahman* according to *Brahmasūtras*

Brahman, according to *sūtras*, is that sentient principle which evolves, governs and withdraws the world. That Supreme Being, *Paramātman*, is comprehensible only through scriptures. He possesses innumerable auspicious attributes. All the words in scriptures try to convey His glory. Words fall short to describe His majesty. Therefore, He is said to be beyond words. He is the source of sustenance for all. He is bliss personified. The insentient material elements and objects owe their properties to Him and the bodily organs and functions of sentient beings owe their capabilities to Him. He is the inner controller of all and dwells in the heart-cavity of all beings and co-exists with *Jīvas*. He enjoys the good deeds performed by the *Jīvas*, but is not subject to the undesirable experience of pleasure and pain. He is immanent in the world, but is invisible, incomprehensible (fully), unoriginated, indescribable (fully), imperishable and has no physical organs. He pervades the earth, the heaven and the rest, between them and beyond them. He is the abode, the support of them and sustains the entire cosmos. He is abundance personified and has all transcending glory. He exists eternally. Though this all-transcending Lord dwells in the heart of all beings, He is free from sin, oldage, death, sorrow, hunger, thirst and so on. All the activities in the world are subject to the will and compliance of this Supreme Being. He evolves the entities in the cosmos in a succession. He creates a thing and enters it as its indwelling controller, and becomes the cause for the creation of the next entity in the chain. Thus, He is the direct cause of creation of everything in the world.

The Lord needs no other independent accessories to evolve the world. He can create a world out of nothing. He has strange and mutually exclusive attributes and powers in all matters and at all times, which can defy common logic. He sportingly creates the world using some accessories under His control. He has no motive of gaining anything from this creation. Creation is not an act for the sake of pleasure, but that which flows from His

pleasure. He evolves the elements *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* etc. and their controlling deities. He evolves the elements in an order. *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* and so on. and dissolves them in the reverse of that order. Along with the empty space, time and *Prakṛti*, an innumerable number of *Jīvas* having atomic size, eternally exist, with their intrinsic nature, capabilities and *Karma*. *Jīvas* are said to be created by the Supreme Being, when they get their physical bodies. *Jīvas* are different from *Paramātman*. But in their pristine form, *Jīvas* have such attributes as intelligence and bliss, resembling those of *Paramātman*. These intrinsic attributes, intelligence and bliss, remain latent during the state of *saṁsāra* and become manifest after liberation. Even after liberation, *Jīvas* retain their individual identity, and enjoy their pristine bliss. Though all the activities in the world are subject to the will and compliance of the Supreme Being, He allows some freedom of action to *Jīvas*. They perform the allotted deeds within the available means and earn credit or discredit according to their contributions. In the world, the Lord favours all, not equally but equitably according to their merits and demerits. Therefore, the Supreme Being cannot be blamed for the disparity in the world.

Thus the Supreme Being, conceivable by human beings, possesses abundance of innumerable auspicious qualities (*sarvaguṇapūrṇatva*) and is free from all limitations and blemishes (*nirdoṣatva*)[1]. He pervades and transcends without limit the time, space and attributes[2]. No one else in the world can claim such attributes.

That *Brahman* is Viṣṇu only

Such an all-pervasive, all-knowing and all-powerful *Brahman*, described above is traditionally worshipped and propitiated as Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa. Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya agree on this point. Yāska holds that the term Viṣṇu is derived from the root '*viṣ*' (to pervade), or '*viś*' (to enter, to indwell) or '*vyaś*' (*vi* + *aś*)

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1 अतोऽशेषगुणोन्नद्धं निर्दोषं यावदेव हि तावद्देवेश्वरो नाम --- । (AV. 3-2-18) (PHM. p. 329).

2 देशतः कालतश्चैव गुणतश्च त्रिधा ततिः सा समस्ता हरेरेव ---- । (GT. 2-17) (PHM. p. 329).

(to occupy)[1]. So, the word Viṣṇu means the one who is all pervasive and therefore it signifies *Brahman* only. All branches of *Śāstra* viz. *Śruti*, *Smṛti*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* corroborate this concept. For example, *Ṛgveda Saṁhitā* avers that "the highest is Viṣṇu's abode; it is perceived by the liberated souls"[2]. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* tells that "among gods *Agni* is the lowest and Viṣṇu is the highest; in between come all other gods"[3]. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* states that "he attains the end of the road i.e. the very supreme goal; and that is the highest place of Viṣṇu"[4]. In *Bhagavadgītā*, Lord Kṛṣṇa, an incarnation of Viṣṇu, declares, "O Arjuna, there is nothing whatsoever beyond me"[5]. In the well-known *Puruṣasūkta*, which asserts that "The Supreme Being (*Puruṣa*) who has thousands of heads, eyes and legs, pervades the world from all sides and transcends it by a measure of ten fingers"[6], the term *Puruṣa* undoubtedly stands for *Brahman*. The same word *Puruṣa* is mentioned twice (14th & 406th) in the *Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra*[7]. Moreover, all Vedic rituals and all Vedic religious functions start with the chanting of the twenty-four names of Viṣṇu only. Verses in praise of Viṣṇu's supremacy appear in plenty, not only in *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and *Viṣṇupurāṇa* but in many other *Purāṇas* as well. *Harivaṁśa* sums up and says: "In the Vedas, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*, Viṣṇu's glories are sung, at the beginning, at the end and in the middle"[8]. Madhvācārya observes that the term *Brahman* signifies Viṣṇu only[9].

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1 अथ यद्विषितो भवति तद्विष्णुर्भवति। विष्णुर्विशतेर्वा। व्यश्नोतेर्वा। (निरुक्त XII-18) (DNS. p. 127).
2 तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः। (RV. 1-22-20) (DNS. p. 46).
3 अग्निर्वै देवानामवमो विष्णुः परमः। तदन्तरा सर्वा देवताः। (A.B. 1-1) (DNS. p. 33).
4 सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्। (Kaṭha. Up.- SG. 1-3-9).
5 मत्तः परतरं नान्यत् किञ्चिदस्ति धनञ्जय। (BG. 7-7).
6 सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपात्। स भूमिं विश्वतो वृत्वाऽत्यतिष्ठद्दशाङ्गुलम्॥ (RV. 10-90-1)
7 Mbh. *Anuśāsanuparva* Chapter 149. (DNS. p. 115).
8 वेदे रामायणे चैव पुराणे भारते तथा। आदावन्ते च मध्ये च विष्णुः सर्वत्र गीयते. (*Harivaṁśa* 3-132-95) (M. BSB. 1-1-1).
9 ब्रह्म शब्दश्च विष्णावेव। (M. BSB. 1-1-1).

About the Book

Brahmasutras are the central text of Vedanta Philosopy. The Sutras are arranged in four chapters. The first one is called Samanvayadhyaya in which Shastrasamanvaya in Brahman is achieved. In the second chapter known as Avirodhadhyaya, the views of other schools of Philosophy, Sankhya, Vaisheshika, Jaina, Bauddha, etc. are rejected. In the third chapter known as Sadhanadhyaya, Vairagya, Bhakti, and Upasana are explained. In the fourth chapter known as Phaladhyaya, Utkranti, Marga and Bhoga are explained.

The Sutras are very brief. Hence it is difficult to comprehend the import of the Sutras. The three Bhashyakaras, Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva have explained the import of Sutras in favour of their respective doctrines. In this book, Shri Raghavendra Katti has made an objective study of the Sutras in Chapters I and II, following the plan of Sri Madhvacaharya. He gives the details of the plan of samanvaya in the first chapter and the refutation of the doctrines of the other schools in the second.

Shri Raghavendra Katti summarizing these topics presents his conclusion. He has made use of Panini Sutras and Jaimini Sutras to fix the import of Brahmasutras. In the introduction, he has pointed out that Dr. V.S. Ghate's analysis of Brahmasutras is quite inadequate as he disposes off five Bhashyakaras' views in two or three sentences on each Sutra.

The present author presents a detailed study of each Sutra. This enables research scholars and students to comprehend the import of Sutras accurately.

I hereby record my appreciation of his scholarly work which is very useful for research students and scholars.

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi
Former Professor of Sanskrit
Bangalore University